Iraqi Perspectives Project
Primary Source Materials for
Saddam and Terrorism: Emerging
Insights from Captured Iraqi Documents
Volume 5 (Redacted)

Kevin M. Woods, Project Leader

• This volume is a redacted version of Primary Source Materials
  for Saddam and Terrorism: Emerging Insights from Captured Iraqi

• The classification markings are original to the Iraqi documents and
do not reflect current U.S. classifications.
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This report is a redacted version of the original *Iraqi Perspectives Project—Primary Source Materials for Saddam and Terrorism: Emerging Insights from Captured Iraqi Documents, Volume 5*, dated January 2007.

This redacted version was prepared by the original authors following a classification review by the Defense Intelligence Agency (DIA) pursuant to a request by the Under Secretary of Defense for Intelligence and the Undersecretary of Defense for Policy.

All redactions from the original are in accordance with the 15 September 2007 DIA Memorandum, Subject: Classification Review of Iraqi Perspectives Project (IPP) Report Saddam and Terrorism. As stated in said memorandum, the DIA “made every effort to balance national security concerns, requirements of law, and the needs of an informed democracy and focused the redactions to the necessary minimum.” Moreover, all redactions have been made pursuant to Executive Orders 12958 (as amended) and 12333, and US Code provisions 5 USC 552, 5 USC 552a, and 10 USC 424.

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Preface

IDA Paper P-4151 was prepared under the Iraqi Perspectives subtask of the Joint Advanced Warfighting Program (JAWP) task order for the Director, Joint Center for Operational Analyses and Lessons Learned, United States Joint Forces Command (USJFCOM). It helps address the subtask objective of “cueing beneficial paths of exploration for other parts of the national security community” by using interviews, oral histories, and captured Iraqi documents and media to place in temporal context the conversations and materials of senior Iraqi leaders (political and military).

IDA Paper P-4151 comprises five volumes published as part of the Iraqi Perspectives Project Phase II series. Volume 1 examines the relationships between the regime of Saddam Hussein and terrorism in its local, regional, and global context. Volumes 2 through 4 contain the English translations and detailed summaries of the original Iraqi documents cited in Volume 1. Volume 5 contains additional background and supporting documents.

** **

JAWP was established at the Institute for Defense Analyses (IDA) to serve as a catalyst for stimulating innovation and breakthrough change. It is co-sponsored by the Under Secretary of Defense for Acquisition, Technology, and Logistics; the Under Secretary of Defense for Policy; the Vice Chairman of the Joint Chiefs of Staff; and the Commander, USJFCOM. JAWP includes military personnel on joint assignments from each Service and civilian specialists from IDA. JAWP is located in Alexandria, Virginia, and includes an office in Norfolk, Virginia, to facilitate coordination with USJFCOM.

This paper does not necessarily reflect the views of IDA or the sponsors of JAWP. Our intent is to stimulate ideas, discussion, and, ultimately, the discovery and innovation that must fuel successful transformation.
Notes

This collection of primary source materials supports the research contained in Volume 1. Volumes 2 through 4 contain the English translations and detailed summaries of the original Iraqi documents cited in the paper. Volume 5 contains additional background and supporting documents.

Volumes 2 through 5 have an example of a generic metadata reference sheet (next page). Certain elements of the reference sheet have been highlighted to help explain the structure and contents of a Harmony document folder or a Harmony media file.

The contributors to the Harmony database have left the original Iraqi security markings intact for research purposes, but for classification purposes, the Iraqi security markings should be ignored.
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<td><strong>Date Acquired:</strong> The date that the document was captured.</td>
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**Metadata Reference Sheet – Example**

No. Description of Elements

1 Document #: A unique number used to identify each entry in Harmony database. May correspond to one or more documents in a folder.

2 Document Date: The approximate date that a document (or the document folder) was published. The documents within a folder may have different dates originally.

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<th>No.</th>
<th>CMPC-2003-00015083</th>
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<td>Memoranda within the Iraqi Intelligence Service (IIS) dated on 1992 concerning the agreement between the IIS and Abu al-Abbas, the General Secretariat of the Palestinian Liberation Organization</td>
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<td>IIS compliance in '93 killings by members of the National Defense Regiment of two Kurds, one Australian and one Belgian (UN relief workers)</td>
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<td>Arab volunteers who arrived in the country by way of Syria, total of 646 (report date 3/28/03)</td>
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Harmony Document Folders and Media Files:
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A letter, dated 2000, from the Director of the 1st Directorate of the IIS, addressed to the Director of the Al-Ghafiqi Project, requesting to review the annual plan of the Al-Ghafiqi for the year 2000.

Language: ARABIC

Document Date: 20000312

Document Type: LETTER, OPERATING INSTRUCTIONS, STUDY

Agency: DIA

Project: IRAQI FREEDOM

Country Of Information: IRAQ

English Title: A letter, dated 2000, from the Director of the 1st Directorate of the IIS, addressed to the Director of the Al-Ghafiqi Project, requesting to review the annual plan of the Al-Ghafiqi for the year 2000.

Keywords: MILITARY PLANS; TERRORISM; PLANS
These 8 pages contain a letter from the Director of the 1st Directorate of the Iraqi Intelligence Service (IIS), addressed to the Director of the Al-Ghafiqi Project, requesting to review the annual plan of the Al-Ghafiqi Project for the year 2000. The file details are as follows: -Page 2: Contains the triage sheet. -Pages 3-8: Contain a letter, dated 2000, from the Director of the 1st Directorate of the IIS, addressed to the Director of the Al-Ghafiqi Project, requesting to review the annual plan of the Al-Ghafiqi for the year 2000. The letter is enclosed with tables showing type of plans, to include preparation of explosive bombs, studying the destruction effect of any explosive device through a computer program, disassemble different explosive bombs, preparation of means of exploding bomb, manufacturing bombs timer, booby-trapping vehicles for intelligence purposes, and carrying out quality control processes on bombs manufactured in Al-Ghafiqi Project.
In the Name of God, the Compassionate, the Merciful

The Republic of Iraq
Presidency of the Republic
Intelligence Service

Number/Branch 1/1/5/1206
Date/ 3/12/2000

Mr. Al-Ghafiqi Project Director

Your memorandum 27/P/82 in 12/7/1999 and enclosed plan for the year 2000.

1. Inform us whether the numbers shown in the plan reflect the concerns of the intelligence components and their requests.
2. Add a new paragraph in the plan that would include the planned initiatives in the development sector to be implemented in the year 2000.

We ask that you take the necessary steps and inform us. Respectfully,

[Signature]
Branch Director
3/11/2000

Enclosures:
Action plan for year 2000
The Yearly Plan for Al-Ghafiqi Project for the year 2000

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Number</th>
<th>Type</th>
<th>Quantity</th>
<th>Time</th>
<th>Notes</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>1</td>
<td>Preparation of explosives of various forms and sizes and detonators, and developing new ways of making explosives to satisfy the security situation.</td>
<td>100</td>
<td>360</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>2</td>
<td>Research an explosive mixture in the form of a highly explosive liquid.</td>
<td>1</td>
<td>360</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>3</td>
<td>Studying the effect of [illegible] used in making bombs in order to select the best one.</td>
<td>4</td>
<td>360</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>4</td>
<td>Studying and calculating the destructive force of various explosives in any quantities using an advance computer program.</td>
<td>10</td>
<td>360</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>4</td>
<td>Handling and disassembling various types and makes of explosives.</td>
<td>25</td>
<td>360</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>2</td>
<td>Making electronic detonators according to the requirements of the mission.</td>
<td>100</td>
<td>360</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

(1-5)

Top secret
The Yearly Plan for Al-Ghafiqi Project for the year 2000

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<th>Notes</th>
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<tr>
<td>6</td>
<td>Manufacturing electronic timers (TCM026 TCM03-3) to be used to detonate explosives.</td>
<td>200</td>
<td>360</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>7</td>
<td>Research electronic wireless detonators (and converting walkie-talkie radios to be used as detonators.)</td>
<td>20</td>
<td>360</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>8</td>
<td>Setting up and maintenance of new car security systems (remote control)</td>
<td>250</td>
<td>360</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>9</td>
<td>Maintenance of bomb detectors.</td>
<td>50</td>
<td>360</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>10</td>
<td>Preparing and developing silencers of various types and calibers.</td>
<td>25</td>
<td>360</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>11</td>
<td>Booby-trapping of vehicles of the various intelligence missions.</td>
<td>5</td>
<td>360</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>12</td>
<td>Preparing wooden casts to be used in making explosives.</td>
<td>50</td>
<td>360</td>
<td></td>
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</tbody>
</table>

2-5

Top Secret
The classification markings are original to the Iraqi documents and do not reflect current US classification.

CMPC-2003-007410

[Page 4:]

**Top Secret**

The Yearly Plan for Al-Ghafiqi Project for the year 2000

<table>
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<th>Quantity</th>
<th>Time</th>
<th>Notes</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>13</td>
<td>Maintenance and welding of various rifles and pistols.</td>
<td>25</td>
<td>360</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>14</td>
<td>Developing the project of laser pointer for rifles and pistols.</td>
<td>4</td>
<td>360</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>15</td>
<td>Preparing containers for the various parts of bombs and cases for car security systems.</td>
<td>100</td>
<td>360</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>16</td>
<td>Preparing and developing tool against tire theft.</td>
<td>50</td>
<td>360</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>17</td>
<td>Surveying incidents involving explosives and handling the un-exploded bombs.</td>
<td>20</td>
<td>360</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>18</td>
<td>Protecting raids and investigation operations of booby-traps by the ignorant.</td>
<td>2</td>
<td>360</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>19</td>
<td>Inspecting and securing vehicles from acts of sabotage with explosives brought into the site of Intelligence service.</td>
<td>3000</td>
<td>360</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

3-5

**Top Secret**
The Yearly Plan for Al-Ghafiqi Project for the year 2000

<table>
<thead>
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<th>Quantity</th>
<th>Time</th>
<th>Notes</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>20</td>
<td>Securing rooms and buildings from threats of explosives.</td>
<td>10</td>
<td>360</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>21</td>
<td>Setting up and maintaining explosive and weapons detectors.</td>
<td>10</td>
<td>360</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>22</td>
<td>Inspecting mail and packages addressed to Mr. Director and the units of the Intelligence service for material intended for sabotage.</td>
<td>6000</td>
<td>360</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>23</td>
<td>Training session and lectures about the detection and handling of explosives.</td>
<td>4</td>
<td>120</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>24</td>
<td>Following up publications and periodicals and studying catalogues and presentations.</td>
<td>5</td>
<td>360</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>25</td>
<td>Training officers and sources on the explosives developed in the project.</td>
<td>50</td>
<td>360</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>26</td>
<td>Developing ways to explain how explosives work.</td>
<td>10</td>
<td>360</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
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</table>
The Yearly Plan for Al-Ghafiqi Project for the year 2000

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
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<th>Type</th>
<th>Quantity</th>
<th>Time</th>
<th>Note</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>27</td>
<td>Quality control by conducting examinations and testing of the explosives developed in the project</td>
<td>100</td>
<td>360</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>28</td>
<td>Carrying out tests on silencers developed in the project</td>
<td>25</td>
<td>360</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>29</td>
<td>Developing an armored briefcase for the protection of personalities</td>
<td>1</td>
<td>180</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>30</td>
<td>Developing a theoretical and practical study of improvised explosives.</td>
<td>1</td>
<td>120</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>31</td>
<td>Conducting training courses on explosives.</td>
<td>1</td>
<td>30</td>
<td></td>
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</table>
The classification markings are original to the Iraqi documents and do not reflect current US classification.

### Original Document Information

- **Document #:** IISP-2003-00013214
- **Classification:** [Redacted]
- **English Title:** Iraqi Intelligence Service (IIS) File on HULMI ZAIDAN KHALAF HAMZA AL QAISSI
- **Language:** ARABIC
- **Document Date:** 20020812
- **Total Pages:**
- **Inclusive Pages:**
- **Oversized Pages:**
- **Document Type:** PERSONNEL FILE
- **Agency:** DIA
- **Project:** IRAQI FREEDOM, IRAQI INTELLIGENCE SERVICE
- **Country Of Information:** IRAQ
- **Title:**
- **Country Of Origin:**
- **Originators Classification:**

### Translation Information

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<td>JFCOM</td>
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### Linked Documents

- **Original Document:** IISP-2003-00013214
- **Translation:** IISP-2003-00013214-HT

### Exploitation Status

- **Exploitation Status:** NOT AVAILABLE

### Related Document Numbers

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<tr>
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### Keyword Categories

### Biographic Information

- **Name:** AL QAISSI, HULMI ZAIDAN KHALAF HAMZA
- **PROFESSIONAL TITLE:** WORKING AGENT
- **City of Birth:** DIYALA
- **Date of Birth:** 19570000
- **Other Attribute:** DEPARTMENT: M5/4
Pages 4-14, 20 contain personnel file of Hilmi Zaydan Khalaf Hamzah Al-Karkhi, as follows:

Name: Hilmi Zaydan Khalaf Hamzah Al-Karkhi
Party Rank: Active Member
Date of Birth: 01 July 1957
Place of Birth: Baghdad
Work experience: He worked at M5, M4 and M23
Job Title: Chief Supervisor
Address: Diyala, Ba'qubah, Saddam District, near Bahraz School

Page 2, 3, 15-19, 21 contain letters, dated July 2001, issued by the Intelligence Apparatus to various directorates, assigning officers to staff the training camps of the Arabic Fedayeen (TC: It is meant by "Arabic Fedayeen"nsurgents from outside Iraq) The names of these Officers are:

-Sari Sulyman Jasim: He is responsible for individuals coming from Palestine
-Muhammad Qabil Marfu': He is responsible for individuals coming from Syria
-Hamid Qadir Jamil: He is responsible for individuals coming from Lebanon
-Hilmi Zaydan Khalaf: He is responsible for individuals coming from Morocco
-Muhammad 'Umar 'Ali: He is responsible for individuals coming from Yemen
-Tariq Ahmad Yasin: He is responsible for individuals coming from Sudan
-'Uday Khalil Ibrahim: He is responsible for individuals coming from Egypt
-'Ali Husayn Muslih: He is responsible for individuals coming from Egypt
The Republic of Iraq
The Presidency of the Republic
Intelligence Service

Your memorandum 1/1/1481 in 7/12/2001

We support assigning what came in your above mentioned memorandum to Branch 14 to monitor the camps of Arab volunteer fighters with the exception of series number 141.

Respectfully,

Branch 6
7/[Illegible]/2001
The Republic of Iraq
Presidency of the Republic
Intelligence Service

Memorandum 31116

Your memorandum 1/1/1481 in 7/12/2001

[Duplicate of page 1]
Secret

The Republic of Iraq
The Presidency of the Republic
Intelligence Service

Memorandum B 2/1/1

To: B 6

Mr. Intelligence Service Director has agreed to assign the officers listed in the enclosed list, which begins with Sari Sulayman Jasim as number (1) and ends with Ali Husayn Muslih as number (8) from B5 to B14 to monitor the camps of Arab volunteer fighters. They are listed by area of responsibility for each one of them.

Please read and send us your input regarding security. Respectfully.

[Signature]
12 July 2001

Enclosure:
(1) List

(1-1)

Secret
<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Name</th>
<th>Area assigned</th>
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<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Sari Sulayman Jasim B5/1</td>
<td>Palestinian</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Muhammad Qabil Marfu B5/2</td>
<td>Syrian</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Samid Qadir Jamil B5/2</td>
<td>Lebanese</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Hilmi Zaydan Khalaf B5/4</td>
<td>Moroccan</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Muhammad Umar Ali B5/2</td>
<td>Yemeni</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Tariq Ahmad Yasin B5/4</td>
<td>Sudanese</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Adi Khalil Ibrahim B5/3</td>
<td>Egyptian</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Ali Husayn Muslih B5/[illegible]</td>
<td>Egyptian</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>
The classification markings are original to the Iraqi documents and do not reflect current US classification.

IISP-2003-00013214

[Page 5:]

[Duplicate of page 1 and 2]
The classification markings are original to the Iraqi documents and do not reflect current US classification.

IISP-2003-00013214

[Page 6:]

[Duplicate of page 1 and 2]
The Presidency of the Republic
Intelligence Service

Mr:
Subject:

5. The mentioned individual is being monitored due to his relationship with Walid Jamal who is outside the country. The latter used him because he had in-laws inside the Directorate of Residence, and he asked for blank receipts from a citizen named Ja'far.

6. We received a memorandum from B6 about your approval of assigning a number of officers from B5 to B14 to monitor the camps of Arab volunteer fighters including the above individual. Based on the indications we have, we propose that you don't approve the assignment of the subject above to B14 because he is not fit to work in this area and ask that you find an alternative from his directorate.

For your review, respectfully.

[Signature]
D. B 6
7/24/2001
In the Name of God, the Compassionate, the Merciful

The Presidency of the Republic
Intelligence Service

To: Honorable Branch 6 Director
Subject: Officers Assignment

We would like to inform your Excellency of the following:

1. We have received a memorandum B2/1 1481 in 12/7/2001 about [illegible] our input regarding security in the assignment of a number of officers from B5 to B14 to monitor the camps of Arab volunteer fighters.

2. We currently have no indication of a security issue against them except for the staff member Hilmi Zaydan whose case is explained in the note about his service [Illegible].

3. Based on the above, my opinion is as follows: Respond to B2 with approval except for series number (3).

Please read and distribute the enclosed memorandum. Respectfully.

[Signature]
Section 1 director
Hathim Hamid Fayyad

[Signature]
[Illegible]
Abd-al-Karim Jasim
7/19/2001

[Signature]
Ali Habib Husayn
7/6/2001
This file contains:

- Pages 2 to 12: contain a catalogue for an aircraft called Pilatus.

- Pages 13 & 14: contain an article written in Hebrew.

- Pages 15 & 16: contain a detailed report on Afkom Military bus station, which is located in Bi?r Al-Sab?l area Palestine, followed by a list titled by Transport Targets; the list contains 26 bus stations.

- Pages 18, 19 & 20: contain three forms titled Main Targets Card, The first one is blank, the second one for Al-A?baal Bridge, and third one is for Al-Damya Bridge.

- Pages 22, &23: contain two maps, the first is for a village in Israel called Kiryat Shamuna, and the second one show Israeli? s borders with Jordan and Syria.

- Page 26: contains a map of Haifa, a Palestinian city. The map shows the organization of the city.


- Pages 25, 28, 29, 30, 31, 32, 33, 34, 35, 36, 37, 38 and 39: contain 13 Main Targets Cards for the following targets: Al-Quds bus station, Dimona bus station, A?shudud bus station, 'Asqalan bus station, Tel Aviv train station, Haifa train station, Bi?r Al-Sab?a bus station, Kiriat Gat bus station, Rahobot bus station, Al-Ramla bus station, Rishon Litsiun bus station, Al-Lid bus station.

- Pages: 40 & 41: contain two maps of Tel Aviv city, the maps show the organization of the city and the assembly points for cars and taxis-train station.

- Pages 42 to 76: contain Main Targets Cards for 35 targets in Israel. The targets are: Bus stations, Medicine industry companies, Medical centers, and Synagogues.

- Pages 79 & 80: contain a map of Palestine.
shows the sports activities places, followed by a picture for a church in Tel Aviv. Pages 82 to 102: contain Main Targets Cards for 35 targets in Israel. The targets are: Mosques, Churches, Ministries, Sports centers, and Swimming pools. - Page 103: contains an article written in English about Israel, the article also includes a map and there is Arabic text written on it saying: Dayzban institute for atomistic research. - Pages 104 to 189: contain detailed reports prepared by the 17 Forces / Geometrical Planning section. The reports titled as Airports and Runways in Palestine. The file contains the following information on 56 airports: Organization, specifications, map, usage, hangars, and buildings. These pages also contain information about the location of 18 runways. - Pages 190 to 202: contain reports about the military airports in Israel; the reports contain the following information about each airport: Brigades, missiles division, squadrons, and types of planes. - Pages 203 to 214: contain reports about the Air Bases and Civil Airports in Israel, the file contain the following information about each airport such as the name, type of planes and the companies that work in the airport. - Page 216: contains a map of Ramat Matrid Airport. - Pages 217 to 222: contain lists of the airports and air bases in Palestine; the list includes the name and the city of each airport. - Page 223: contains a map that shows the check point in the border between Palestine and Jordan.
The classification markings are original to the Iraqi documents and do not reflect current US classification.

**Original Document Information**

**Document #:** ISGQ-2003-00003576  
**Classification:** [redacted]  
**English Title:** Presented reports by groups of sources concerning the activities of Badr Corps and Hezbollah Party [redacted]  
**Language:** ARABIC  
**Document Date:** 20020624  
**Total Pages:** 130  
**Inclusive Pages:** 129  
**Oversized Pages:**  
**Document Type:** LETTER  
**Format:** PAPER ORIGINAL  
**Agency:** DIA  
**Project:** IRAQI FREEDOM  
**Country Of Information:** IRAQ  
**Title:**  
**Country Of Origin:**  
**Originators Classification:** TOP SECRET  

**Translation Information**

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This file contains the following: Pages 3, 4, 6-21, 26-28, 30-36, 40-45, 91-102 and 104 contain correspondence dated 1999-2001, within Fedayeen Saddam about the following: - Presented reports by groups of sources concerning the activities of Badr Corps and the Hezbollah Party, the reports contain names of individuals who were involved with these activities - Intelligence Iranian Groups entering Iraq for carrying out acts of sabotage - Information concerning the radio stations of the Iraqi oppositions and other groups - Announcements of Islamic Revolution Broadcasting Page 5 and 103 are unreadable Pages 22, 23, 29, 46-50, 125, 126, 127 and 130 contain personal information sheets of Iraqi sources also include pledges signed by some of them for killing Muhammad Baqir Al-Hakim, Sayid Hamzah and Karim Mahud Pages 24-25 and 51-59 contain a report dated 1998, presented by Mustafa Hadi Al-Ahwazi, asking for carrying out sabotages activities and exploding Badr Corps headquarters in Iran Pages 37-39 a report dated 25 May 2001, presented by Brigadier General Ibrahim Dhiyab Khalaf about the collected personal information regarding six individuals. One of them his son "'Abd-al-Hamid", leaving Kuwait in 1989 to Syria because he was a suspect in attempted of Jabir Ahmad Al-Jabir Al-Sabah. Pages 60-76 and 79-81 contain a logbook of Fedayeen Saddam duties dated 2002, the logbook showing serial number, execution party, name of target, duty type and remarks Pages 77-78 contain correspondence dated 2002, within Fedayeen Saddam about the activities that were carried out. Page 82 contains a weekly training schedule of Fedayeen Saddam for the period 15-20 Apr 2002. Page 83-86 are a blank chart and weekly training schedule of Fedayeen Saddam Pages 87-90 contain the training commandment and instructions of Al-Anbar Force (Fedayeen Saddam) for the period 1 Jan-31 Mar 2002. Pages 105-106 contain dossier index, indicating suspect name and his cause Pages 107, 108 contain rosters of Dhi Qar Force who carried out the orders, the rosters showing suspect name, case, serial number, rank, duty, amount. Pages 109-110 contain rosters of prisoners who did not volunteer Pages 111-115 contain a plan for attacking and destroying Mujahidin Khalq location in Iraq, also include a drawing showing the place that will attack. Pages 116-122 contain a report dated 9 Feb 2001, presented by Colonel Muhsin 'Abd-al-Karim to Fedayeen Saddam supervisor about the obtained information by source 'Abdallah Isma'il Muhammad Al-Barzanji regards the relations and the agreements between Mas'ud Al-Barazini and Jalal Al-Talibani and information about Barham Salih and Hushar Zibari. Pages 123, 124 and 128 contain correspondence between Fedayeen Saddam regarding the commando, Hasan Muhammad Zaki Dawud and his information is as follows: Full Name: Hasan Muhammad Zaki Dawud Alias: none given Date of Birth: 1974 Place of Birth: Kuwait Work Organization: Fedayeen Tel #:417827 Address: Al-Basrah Pages 129 a minutes of meeting dated 13 Sept 1999, concerning the presented request by 'Ali Kazim Wadi about carrying out acts of sabotage in Saudi Arabia especially against the foreign bases, his request rejected. The organizations associated with this file: Fedayeen Saddam Badr Corps Mujahidin Khalq Senior Officials associated with this file: Major General Ayub Mahdi Salih Major General Wisam 'Abd-al-Hafiz Ahmad Major General Thamir Hamad Humud Brigadier General Hasan Hamad Dhawi Brigadier General Salah 'Abd-al-Sattar Brigadier General Wa'dallah Husayn Yasin The sources associated with this file: Khattar Hasan Al-'Abbadi Rashid Shiri Natun Husayn Za'yrun Bakki Ya'qup 'Ayiz Baridi Muhammad 'Abd-al-Husayn Talla' Kamil unreadable Ghaythan Sabah Ghadban Radad 'Inad Juwayil Qasim Shabib
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| **Capture Information** | Capturing Unit: COMBAT SERVICE SUPPORT BN 10/117 | Date/Time of Capture: 22XXX APR 03 | Place of Capture: POSSIBLE TRAINING CAMP | Coordinates: MC 318467 | Identity of Source: UNK |

| **Transmittal Information** | Transporting Unit: COMBAT SERVICE SUPPORT BN 10 | Date/Time of Arrival: 291300LAPR03 | Transmittal Number: UNK | Point of Contact: **REDACTED** |

| Comments | **REDACTED** | NO ADDITIONAL INFORMATION |
The documents in the pages above contain reports dated 4 Sep 1998 by Khittar Hassan Al-'ibadi, the active member in Al-B’ath party, sent to the supervisor of Feday’een Saddam about some of the Iraqi people who were involved with Badr Corp and Hizballah, Khittar Hassan resides in Al-madinah district in Basrah Governorate, his phone number is 040772200, there are few sources working for him and their names are:

1- Ya’qub ‘Aiyz Bridi ‘Israh Al-mish’al
   Resides in Um Al-shyukh village, it is about 5 Kim from Al-madinah district/Basrah Governorate, he is married and has 4 children, he self employed. His title in Al-b’ath party is Supporter
2- Hussain Zghayrun.
3- Majid Hamid Al-miryani, his address is:
4- Hamid Rahim Shamikh Muhammad AL Irayrich, his address is
   Al-shuhada’ district, born in 1968, and has 9 children.

Page # 24,25
The pages above contains a report sent to the supervisor of Feday’een Saddam from one of the Feday’een (N/A) asking to allow him to go to Iran and join Badr Corp to collect information about their weapons, training, locations, names of members, etc. His name is scratched but his fingerprint is shown on page 25.
This page is about the source Qusay ‘Abd-al-amam Harmal Al-mansuri, he is married and has 3 children, his address is: Saddamiyat Al-qurna/Talhah subdistrict/near Al-hush Al-janubi school, he works as a scrap seller, and he is a member of Sayid Kazim Al-mansuri group which includes:
1- Sahid Mihsin
2- Walid ‘Asi
3- Sakban Mihsin.

This page is about the source Yunis Nazir Muhammad Bani Mansur, married and has 3 children, his address is: Saddamiyat Al-qurna/Talhah subdistrict/Al-hush Al-shamali.

This page is about a report written by the source Kamil Buniyah about some Iraqi people in Al-‘amarah city/Maysan Governorate where he lives.

The pages above are about the sources:
1- Salman Dawud ‘Ajil Al-timimi, married and has 5 children, his address is: Al-Basrah/Shat Al-‘Arab/Al-tanumah district/near Al-qa’aq’a Ba’th Party Division/Street number 29, works as a source for Al-basrah.security department.
2- Sharif ‘Abd-al-Latif’ Asfur Al-musawi, married and has 9 children, his address is Al-Basrah/Shat Al-‘Arab/Al-tanumah, near 14 Ramadan school.

They were assigned to assassinate the following persons:
1- Muhammad Baqir Al-hakim
2- Sayid Hamzah
3- Karim Mahud
4- They received ID 25,000 for each.

This page is about one of the Feday’een named Sai’d Laftah Radi Al-Musawi, his address is: Al-Basrah/Al-qiblah/Al-qai’d district.

This page is about a commitment written by the source Salman Dawud ‘Ajil as follows:

COMMITMENT

I met the Staff BG Hassan Hamad and I commitment to assassinate the traitor Muhammad Baqir Al-hakim, the traitor Sayid Hamzah, and the traitor Karim Mahud, therefore I signed on 16/4/200.

The source
Salman Dawud ‘Ajil
16/4/200
This page is about a commitment written by the source Sharif ‘Abd-al-Latif ‘Asfur as follows:

COMMITMENT
I met the Staff BG Hassan Hamad and I commitment to assassinate the traitor Muhammad Baqir Al-hakim, the traitor Sayid Hamzah, and the traitor Karim Mahud, therefore I signed on 16/4/200.

The source
Sharif ‘Abd-al-Latif ‘Asfur Al-musawi
16/4/200

Page # 52
This page is about a meeting minute as follow:
1- The meeting was held between the work- team and the source Mustafa Hadi Al-ahwazi (T.C. Al-ahwazi according to Al-ahwaz province, south of Iran where the Iranian-Arab people live), the teamwork to be formed of:
   A- Staff MG Ayub Mahdi Salih (the president).
   B- Staff MG Wsam ‘Abd-Al-Hafiz Ahmad (member).
   C- Staff BG Hassan Hamad Thawi.
   D- Staff BG Salah Abd-al-Satar.

The source Mustafa Hadi Al-ahwazi asked the work- team to help him on a few issues like:
1- Rebuild the Arab-Stan liberty organization inside Iran and establish headquarter office and other administrative requirements.
2- Re establishes communications with his sources inside Iran.

The work- team asked Al-ahwazi if he can attack Badr Corp, he said that he would need to send 4-5 sources to a residential complex in Dezful city (TC. southwest of Iran) so they can contact some members in Badr Corp, and that going to cost ID 750,000 per day. And also the teamwork has to provide weapons, Boats and a safe way to smuggle all this inside Iran.

Page # 56
This page is about a report from the Active member in B’ath Party, dated on 31 Aug 1999 contains names of the tribal leaders or Shaykhs names in Al-ahwaz area who used to support Saddam’s regime as follows:
1- Y’aqub ‘Abd-al-Hussain Al-mashkur (Shaykh Al-ya’tawi Clan) Al-ahwaz/Al-khrusi area/Iran
2- ‘Abd-al-Shahid Haj Jabar (Shaykh AL Qayim or Al-kuwam Clan) Turat Al-hudayr/‘Abadan /Iran
3- ‘Adnan Bin Shaykh Kazim (Shaykh AL Abu Farhan Clan)
4- Hussain Salman Al-salih (Shaykh AL Ghanim and AL Abu Farhan Clan)

Also some names collaborators with Saddam’s regime as follow
1- ‘Abd-al-Karim Khudayr Ashim
2- Taha Ibrahim Muhammad
3- Talib ‘Abd-al-Samad ‘Abd-allah
4- Sayid Mujtaba Al-sayid Ma’tuf

Pages # 58- 65
The pages above contain names of some of officers in Feday’een Saddam as follow:
1- Staff LTC. Qutaybah Sai’d Hamu.
2- Staff COL ‘ALI ‘Abas Muhammad
3- Major Ziyad Khalifa Jasam
4- Staff LTC Haytham Kamil Mustafa
5- Captain Ahmad ‘Abd-al-Hasan Khalaf
6- Staff COL Shakir Mahmud Khalaf
7- Major Ahmad Lam’I Ibrahim
8- Staff LTC ‘Amir ‘ali Kamal
9- Major Salam Mutar Diwak
10- Staff COL Ghanim ‘Abd-al-Ghani
11- Major Karim Faiyad Jalub
12- Staff COL ‘Ajami Yunis Khalaf
13- Major Yusuf Hussain Mislih
14- Staff LTC. Fahad Hindan Mikhlib
15- Major Muhammad Zidan ahmad
16- Staff COL Muhammad Ghanim Mahmud
17- Major ‘Abd-al-Rahim Jawad Kazim
18- ‘Amir Mahmud Farhan
19- Major Kamal ‘Ali Ahmad
20- Staff BG Wa’ad-allah Hussain Yasin
21- Captain Khamis Mir’I Ibrahim
22- Staff COL Hussain ‘Ali ‘Abd-allah
23- Major Muhanad Khalid
24- Staff LTC Satar ‘Abd-al-Rahman
25- Captain Khayri Elias
26- Staff BG Salman Hamid Zahir
27- Major Najim ‘Abud Kazim
28- Staff LTC Qusay Wa’dallah Hussein
29- Staff COL Qasim Jabar Shanan
30- Staff COL Salah Si’ud Ahmad
31- Major Bashar Muhmud Jirjis
32- Staff LTC ‘Umar ‘Abd-al-Hamid Hussein
33- Major Nazir Razuqi Wayis

Pages 83- 86: blank weekly training rosters of al-Anbar force of Feda’yeen Saddam
Page 87-90
The pages above contain the training orders and instructions of Al-Anbar force (Feda’yeen Saddam) for the period 1 Jan- 31 Mar 2002
The pages above are blank.
Page # 93
This page contains report dated on 18 Jan 2000, signed by Staff LTC Sabah Ahmad Himadi about Shaykh Jasim AL Thani when he was in Al-muthana’ (Al-samawah) desert in Iraq in Shu’iyb Al-ghani area for hunting with his companions, when another group of 15 people carrying weapons intercepted him, and asked him about what he was doing in the area, he replied that he is one of the Qatari Sheikhs and he is in that area for hunting.
Page # 115
This page is about the source Qasim Sib, he was sent to Al-huwayza Hur on 26 Jan 2001 to the Badr Corp locations to collect information, he returned on 2 Feb 2001.

Page # 124
This page contains information about one of Feday’een Saddam, he was terminated, his name is Hassan Muhammad Zaki, and following is some information about him:
P.O.B: Kuwait 1974, he is married to a woman was resides in Kuwait since 1945, he went back to Iraq in 1992 because his family are Iraqi citizens, his Ant named Khadijah ‘Abid Buniyah (Kuwaiti citizen) has 4 children and they are:
1- Nasir ‘Abd-allah Al-zamil/ works for the prince’s Guards (NFI).
2- Khalid ‘Abd-allah Al-zamil / works as an interrogator in one of the courts (NFI)
3- Jasim ‘Abd-allah Al-zamil/ works as a policeman in one of the airports (NFI)
4- Rai’d ‘Abd-allah Al-zamil/ works as a Gainer
His brother Basim has a permanent resident in Kuwait and works in the Al-sultan Mall.
In the area where he used to live there was a person who frequently visited him, and his name is ‘Ali Al-shamlan, he works as an officer for the Kuwaiti Intelligent. He currently resides in the address below:
Dur Nuwab Al-dubbatl/ phone number 417827, he succeeded in executing some missions in Kuwait.
Page # 125
This page is about the source ‘Ali Tu’mah Wadi, resides in Al-basrah/ Al-zubayr/ Al-jumhuriyah Al-thaniyah, he was born in 1979, he worked in a body shop in Al-hay Al-sina’i/ Al-sina’a Al-qadimah, he is married and has two children, he was married for the second time from a Saudi woman who spoke well English, to contact him through the Feday’een (Abu ‘Uday).
Page # 127
This page is about the source Ra’ad Miswal Didan Al-asadi, his address is:
Al-basrah/ Alzubayr / Al-qu’ud district/ near the produce market, born in 1965, married and has 4 Children, he is in Al-Ba’th party as a supporter in Al ‘ubur /Al-jibaish village, he stops doing the party duties.
Page # 129
This page is about on of the Feday’een ‘Ali Kazim Wadi who volunteered to be a member of Feday’een Saddam, and he offered to go to the KSA and execute any mission especially against the foreign basses, then he brought his wife to do the same job, she asked for a ID 250,000 before they do anything. They were hired as sources.
Page # 130
This page is about the source ‘Adil Jum’ah Danad Al-maliki, his address is Baghdad/ Al-dula’i/ house number 10/10 near Al-dula’i mosque/ Abu Firas house, his mission is to follow Said Hamzah, he ran away after stealing from his uncle (NFI)
The classification markings are original to the Iraqi documents and do not reflect current US classification.

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### Linked Documents

#### Original Document
- ISGQ-2003-00003598 (Multi-Part)
  - ISGQ-2003-00003598.pdf
  - cmpc-m/ISGQ-2003-00003598.pdf

#### Translation
- ISGQ-2003-00003598-JCOA-HT

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Document Remarks

This 145-page file contains correspondence and security reports within the Secretariat of Fedayeen Saddam, dated in 2001. Pages 2-11 contain a report dated 5 May 2001 on an agent named 'Abd-al-Razzaq Yasir Muthir Hassuni Al-Yasiri. His code name is Al-Sayyad Hamzah Al-Musawi. The report was about his affiliation to Badr Corps and his activities of dispatching saboteurs to carry out terrorist operations such as murders, explosions and looting. Pages 12-26, 31-50, 52-57, 60, 81-88 and 103-119 contain correspondence, handwritten memorandums, information reports, minutes of meetings and handwritten charts within the Secretariat of Fedayeen Saddam on the project study named "Tha'r Al-Basrah". This study tends to hit the American and British marine exists near Al-Bakr port using modified motorboats. This project is recommended be archived and adjourned to the Armed Forces for any future marine targets, dated in 2001. Pages 27-30 are handwritten reports prepared by the General Secretary of Fedayeen Saddam Staff Major General Ayub Mahdi Salih on descriptions of the American warships in the Arabic Gulf. Page 51 is an items' request form related to Hittin Establishment and includes handwritten substances such as
The classification markings are original to the Iraqi documents and do not reflect current US classification.

white cloth, carton surfaces and needles of sewing machines. Pages 58-59 and 61-64 are pages extracted from the CNN website that are written in English and their handwritten translation to Arabic pertaining to the allied military assets in the Persian Gulf region, dated 31 December. Pages 65-78 and 89-102 contain duplicate of handwritten report entitled "Situation Assessment of the Naval Operation Theatre" pertaining to confront the Iranian and Kuwaiti violations in the Gulf region dated 29 December 2000. Pages 79-80 contain a letter dated 4 January 2001 from the General Relationship Commission to the Fedayeen Saddam Chief of Staff related to assigning 19 Fedayee for unspecified duties. Pages 120-145 include the translation for two articles taken from two websites named "Gulf Info" and "Xinventions.com" that are written in English and titled "Projecting Air Power during the Crisis" of the Gulf war, dated 31 December 2000.

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- Date/Time of Capture: 22XXXXAPR03
- Place of Capture: POSSIBLE TRAINING CAMP
- Coordinates: MC 318467
- Identity of Source: UNK

**Transmittal Information**

- Transporting Unit: COMBAT SERVICE SUPPORT BN 10
- Date/Time of Arrival: 291300LAPR03
- Transmittal Number: UNK
- Point of Contact: [Redacted]

**Comments**

- NO ADDITIONAL INFORMATION
The agent Hamza al-Musawi.
Information from Basra's director of security about the agent (Hamza al-Musawi) until 3/17/2001:

1. He was withdrawn from his station, located in Ahwaz city, at the end of 2000 and currently resides in Qum with his Iranian wife.
2. According to intelligence, the Iranian Intelligence provides high level protection for him out of fear over him because he represents an important element for them.

The above meeting took place on 3/17/2001 in the presence of staff colonel Muhammad Fahad and staff general Kazim Muhammad Faris, Kazima's force commander.
In the name of God, the Merciful, the Compassionate

To the commander of al-Rasafa's Saddam Fedayeen
Subject / Information

I wish to share with you some of the information available to me about the defendant Barzan 'Araj Kubaidi, among the group of the agent Sayid Hamza al-Musawi and the agent Mihyal Diyab. This agent participated in al-Yubash operation in the province of Diqar which resulted in the killing of the commander of the 47th brigade in 1999 and the injury of the secretary general of the Party branch. He began receiving the salaries of his deceased brothers, Ghaylan 'Araj Kubaidi and Shakir 'Araj Kubaidi who were killed during the revolt of treachery and deceit, and the other at the hands of the Iranian services, and the third who currently resides at the Badr base on the island between 'Imara and Diqar, and is receiving salaries from his brother Khalil 'Araj Kubaidi who is currently residing at the base of al-'Amala corps 9 Badr. Many thanks, sir.

This report was prepared regarding the agent (Hamza al-Musawi) until 5/5/2001

The officer charged with follow-up: Staff brigadier general Ahmad Sadak Batah.

1. The true name of the agent: 'Abd-al-Razzak Yasir Mutahhar Hassuni al-Yasiri

2. The dynamic name for the agent: Sayid Hamza al-Musawi.


4. Place of birth: Diqar province, Suq al-Shiukh district, al-'Akika neighborhood.

5. Social status: Married to two women, the first an Iraqi, the second an Iranian.

6. Party affiliation: Affiliated with the al-'Amala corps 9 Badr, allied with Hezbollah. He is responsible for a large number of groups with destructive agendas.

7. His activities: Charged with dispatching destructive groups to carry out terrorist operations (murder, bombing, looting.)

8. Locations he frequents inside Iran:
   a. Intelligence headquarters for al-'Amala corps 9 Badr in area (Si Rah,) that is the area of the three roads south of the city of Ahwaz.
   b. The area of Shat 'Ali in Ahwaz city.
   c. Uramin area in Tehran.
   d. Presently he lives in the city of Qum with his wife of Iranian origin under heavy protection from the Iranian Intelligence.

9. His description:
   a. Medium height.
   b. Medium build.
   c. His beard is not long, peppered with gray hair.

10. Mode of transportation: He used to travel using a khaki Nissan Petrol that belonged to the al-'Amala corps 9 Badr; presently he travels using a vehicle that belongs to the Iranian Intelligence.
There was coordination with the Basra security directorate on 3/17/2001. All the information showed that he is currently living with his Iranian wife in the city of Qum.

11. There was coordination with the intelligence directorate of the southern area on 4/2/2001, where the director of intelligence confirmed the information referred to by Basra's security director and he promised us that there is continuous work regarding this agent, and very soon it will bear fruit.

12. One of the sources, Ahmad Sa'id 'Abdullah al-Sharifi, confirmed to us that the agent (Hamza al-Musawi) is now working under intense fear after he received information that the Iraqi authority is searching for him to kill him. He is moving around under heavy protection and is accompanied by a protective vehicle designated especially for him.

13. During a 4/2/2001 meeting with the director of the southern area, attended by Kazma's commander, the director asked us to work quietly since the above mentioned agent works with extreme caution, and it will require time until he feels assured and goes back to his normal mode of work. We are awaiting results. In case the intelligence services are unable to eliminate him, we will work using all means available to us to eliminate him.

14. Finally, sir, we pledge to you, as men of probity would, that we will be truthful with God and with ourselves in relaying the facts as they are to you, praying to God that he guides us to best serve our dear Iraq. We will hold to the covenant as honest soldiers worthy of the trust of the beloved leader, the President, God preserve him. May God keep you as a valuable aid to us. May God guide us.

Staff brigadier general Ahmad Sadak Batah
Board of Public Relations
5/5/2001

[Translator Note: An arrow leading from point 14 and at the end of the arrow the following is handwritten:] there is no harm that we work parallel, or does time not matter much to you, Ahmad!!
Information provided by the southern area intelligence director on 3/17/2001 in the presence of Kazma's leader and staff colonel Muhammad Fahad:

1. The intelligence director confirmed all the information that was stated by Basra's security director regarding his being present in the Iranian city of Qum.

2. He did not reveal further information about him, only that work is afoot regarding him, and that the coming few days will give the glad tiding of his being dispatched.

The decision
The director

Greetings and salutations, sir:

The subject: Suggestion to change the weapon.
Sir, this is regarding your order that five boats would be assigned for the mission of (the Revenge of Basra.) Sir, we would like to clarify to you the following:

1. Four boats were completed; they are: (One boat carrying Malotka missiles, [one with] a 106 millimeter caliber cannon, [one with] RPG7 grenades launcher, and a rubber booby trapped boat.)
2. The fifth boat, and as per your decision, sir, was to carry a guided aircraft. Until now the aircraft is not available. Even the boat is not ready because its engines are smashed, and it will require huge sums of money, roughly 30 million Dinars to repair.
3. The opinion: We suggest the following, provided it meets your approval:
   a. change the weapon that will be used on the fifth boat from a guided aircraft to a Sterla antiaircraft shoulder carried missile launcher since we gleaned information that there are helicopters aboard those frigates. In case these helicopters interfered with our mission, we will need this kind of weapon. This is one hand; on the other, the fact that we have four boats, all equipped to strike the very ship, will fulfill the goal.
   b. sell the fifth boat by convening a committee for this purpose and buy a small prepared boat to best manage time and money.

Awaiting your orders, sir. With all due deference,

Staff Colonel Muhammad Fahad Salih, public relations board, 3/17/2001.
Staff brigadier general Ahmad Sadak Batah, public relations board, 3/17/2001.
Republic of Iraq  
Office of the President  
The Secretary  
Secret  
Number: k/5301  
Date: 5/27/1420 Hegira, 9/7/1999  

The director general for Saddam's Fedayeen  
Subject / Information  

The President, God preserve him, has commanded the following regarding what was conveyed in your letter, number 1/b/1490 on 8/31/1999:  

((Preserve the subject, but it's to be ignored and left to the armed forces to deal with it. They can handle any future naval enemy target according to their mandates.))  
Please review. With due appreciation,  
[TN: handwritten on the lower left margin:] give it to Ayub for the safekeeping of the subject.  
Signature: Lieutenant general, Dr. 'Abd-al-Hamid al-Khattab, Secretary to the President of the Republic.  
September 6, 1999.
To the leader of the Kazma Saddam's fedayeen via the commander of Basra force of Saddam's fedayeen.

Subject / Information

I am the fedayee Qasim Karim Khalaf. I departed on 6/12/1999 to the territorial waters using a fishing boat type (Tornado) accompanied by a group of fishermen numbering seven along with the owner of the boat. On this trip I monitored the approach of a helicopter that belonged to the Coalition forces that have positioned themselves in the Arabian Gulf, and which was conducting reconnaissance flights near our territorial waters and carrying out maneuvers to antagonize the boatmen in their fishing boats, but without firing any rounds at them. These flights were conducted throughout three successive days during the night and during the day. Following that, I saw on 6/15/1999 at around four in the afternoon an aircraft that belonged to the same forces taking off. It was conducting a maneuver near al-Bakr port that lasted for half an hour. This aircraft was guided, without a pilot, flying via a remote device under the control of the same forces. A day later a ship was spotted navigating toward the 'Abdullah inlet. While it moved past al-Bakr port, a swift Iranian boat came from the direction of the Iranian waters. Fifteen minutes after it reached the ship, it fired a number of rounds from a light caliber gun at the ship. The captain of the ship continued toward the 'Abdullah inlet without stopping, following which, the Iranian boat returned to its territorial waters after it encroached across our territorial waters to fire at the ship. For your information, there are Iraqi boats that rendezvous with Kuwaiti boats for the purpose of smuggling contraband like alcoholic beverages and the like. Also, there was an Iraqi boat that assaulted a Kuwaiti boat carrying people of Egyptian nationalities. They beat up these people and robbed them of their Kuwaiti money and other nautical necessities like a battery, depth sweeping device, fishing nets, even the fish that they caught. [Cont’d on Page 12.]
There were Iraqis on those boats who were carrying weapons, which were not licensed from any pertinent departments in al-Faw jurisdiction. They were carrying these weapons solely for piracy. The authorities captured one of these people. He was carrying three weapons of the type Kalashnikov, half snubbed assault rifles. Investigation with them is in progress. There are people who fish in the Shat al-'Arab using small, wooden boats who also smuggle alcoholic beverages to Iranian boats. I obtained this information from an Iranian boat that approached the boat that was carrying me near al-Bakr port. They asked us to bring the beverages to them, but we refused. They then said that the small, wooden boats bring them all they want from beverages, prayer soil patties [Shiite custom], rosaries, and anything they wanted in return for the dollar.

This is all I have, sir; I await your orders.

Signature: The fedayee Qasim Karim Khalaf, the second squadron, eighth round.

[A reviewer wrote:] To the leader – please review and form a decision. Know that this fedayee was directed to continue to gather the most available amount of information, 6/18.
In the name of God the Merciful the Compassionate
Be ye fair and drawn swords against tyranny while remaining truthful men
God. Country. The leader. Those who give pledge to you they are giving pledge to Allah
[Holy Quran: 48-10.]
The Republic of Iraq
Office of the President
Saddam's fedayeen
General secretariat

To the Saddam's fedayeen's supervisor
Greetings and salutations
Subject / the project of Basra's revenge

In reference to your marginal note regarding the side review attached that includes: "It is imperative to assign one or more of the fedayeen, and I prefer two at least to one of the boats under the cover of fishermen and covertly—and if we have originally fishermen that would be from God's grace. I do want to assure myself that the citizen did spot the frigate." We wish to clarify for you the following, sir:

1. To carry out your orders, the two fedayeen (Qasim Khalaf and Fadil Tahir Muhsin, members of the Basra force,) who are fishermen by trade, were charged with one of the boats in our territorial waters where the citizen with the Basra revenge project claims he saw the American frigate patrolling.

2. Attached is the information offered by the aforementioned fedayeen regarding what they saw during their fishing outings that they made (clipping 'a'.)

Please review and coordinate, sir. With sincere thanks,
Lieutenant general Ayub Mahdi Salih, secretary general
8/5/1999.

[TN: Above is handwritten:] discussion with Ayub.
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Saddam's fedayeen
General secretariat

[Page 14:]

To the Saddam fedayeen's supervisor
Greetings and salutations, sir:
Subject / the Basra revenge project

In reference to your marginal notes on my attached review regarding the Basra revenge project, we wish to elucidate the following to you:

1. After confirming the addresses of the two fedayeen, members of the Basra force, we found out that one of the fedayeen lives in Faw city and works as a fisherman aboard one of the fishing boats. He was called and was briefed about the nature of the duty and the details to be observed during the fishing trip. Bear in mind that the fedayee under discussion has gone out on a fishing trip since 6/5/1999.

2. In order to decide on the potential of using other types of missiles different from the ones that were suggested by the citizen Muhsin Ibrahim Jiad in his project (Revenge of Basra,) naval staff commodore 'Abd-al-Sattar 'Abd-al-Jabbar (the most senior staff officer in the naval force command) was called in and was questioned indirectly about the technical specifications of the French-made missile (Exoset) [continued on Page 15.]
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AM 39) and the Chinese-made missile (Silkworm-H72). He stated the specifications for both
missiles and the obstacles in using each one, as follows:

A. The Exocet missile (AM 39) and the obstacles in using it:
   First: The Exocet missile is one of the radar-guided missiles. Therefore, we cannot —
rather it is impossible- to modify it into a system where we can install it on any type
of boat or cruiser.
   Second: Despite its being impossible to modify the missile, in case we do modify it,
we will need a boat with a displacement capacity of 200 tons, keeping in mind that
fishing boats' displacement capacity ranges between 5 – 10 tons.
   Third: The missile will require a scan and launch systems.

B. The Silkworm (HY2) missile and the obstacles in using it:
   First: The silkworm missile is one of the radar-guided missiles. Therefore, we cannot
—rather it is impossible- to modify it into a system where we can install it on any type
of boat or cruiser.
   Second: This system, one of the more complicated coastal systems, is composed of
[cont'd on Page 16]
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1. Guiding radar wheel.
2. Specialized missile launcher.
3. Energy wheel.
5. Special cables to connect the circuit branches of the above system.

Please review and we are awaiting your orders, sir.
With all appreciation,


[TN: A reviewer handwrote:] there was a discussion. The director ordered that a report be forwarded to the President in case the mission is unable to be carried out after the return of the fedayee from the open sea.
Signature: 713. QS, 6/8.

(3/3)
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[Holy Quran: 48-10.]
The Republic of Iraq
Office of the President
Saddam's fedayeen
General secretariat

To the secretary general
Greetings and salutations:

Subject / the Basra revenge projects

In reference to the marginal note penned by the director of Saddam's fedayeen regarding the
Basra revenge project including (placing one of the fedayeen or more then one, preferably no
less then two, on one of the boats under the cover of fishermen and in total secrecy. If we
have actual fishermen to start with, then this would be by grace of God. I do wish to verify
the citizen's claim: that it is possible to spot the frigate) we wish to clarify the following:

1. In carrying out the director's order, a canvassing was conducted among the members of
the Saddam fedayeen of the Basra force to find any who make a living as fishermen in
our territorial waters where the citizen who originated the idea of the project claims he
saw the frigate plying the water therein. We found the two fedayeen, (Qasim Karim
Khalaf and Fadil Zahir Hasan,) which make a living as fishermen; they are from the
people of the Faw city.

2. The two above mentioned fedayeen were briefed and directed to concentrate on
anything they spot that resembles ships, boats, cruisers, liners, and naval force vessels, be
they Kuwaiti, American, or Iranian in our territorial waters and the surrounding waters
during their fishing trips.

(1-2)
In the name of God the Merciful the Compassionate

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[Holy Quran: 48-10.]

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3. After many fishing trips made by the two above mentioned fedayeen, they were called in to the general secretariat and were debriefed to hear what information they collected that they can remember. Based on what they stated, the following is now confirmed to us:

a. The target (the frigate) did not entirely appear within our vision range since the start of 1999 and until the date of the last fishing trip that the two made on 7/5/1999.

b. The first sighting of the target was at the start of September 1998, where the frigate was spotted noontime in our territorial waters in front of the 'Abdullah inlet. At the time it was at a range close enough to discern those who were standing on its deck — men and women. We estimate the range was no more than 100 to 150 meters.

c. The second sighting of the target was on one of the nights of November 1998, where the frigate was sailing in our territorial waters across from Um Qasr port. It was accompanied by a helicopter hovering above it.

Please review and direct an order regarding presenting the above mentioned to the supervising director.

Signature: Staff colonel Qutaiba Sa'id Hammu, general secretariat, 8/5/1999.

(2-2)
In the name of God, the Merciful, the Compassionate.

To the director of Saddam fedayeen
Greetings and salutations, Sir:

Subject: The specifications of the warships that are operating in the Arabian Gulf.

In reference to your order, that at 2330 hours on 1/30/2001 regarding offering the information available to us about specifications, weaponry, and readying the American warships that are operating in the Arabian Gulf and are numbered (37, 51, 56, and 992,) we wish to clarify the following to you, sir:

1. The warship Portland LSD-37
   a. The general shape
   b. The manufacturing firm
   c. Date of completion
   d. Date it was commissioned
   e. The source of financing
   f. The length of the ship
   g. Length of deck
   h. Speed
   i. The crew
   j. Weaponry
   k. The information available to us from our special sources indicate the presence of two helicopters on the rear deck of the ship.

   As shown in appendix ( )—pictures of the ship.
   Quincy Davidson company or General Dynamics.
   9/27/1967
   10/3/1970
   Ms. Emily Walton Ford
   562 feet
   442 feet
   20 knots (approximately 65-70 kilometers per hour.)
   25 officers and 312 recruits.
   1) two 25 mm caliber mechanical cannons.
   2) two 20 mm Phalanx cannons.
   3) a system for close combat engagement.
   4) seven, 50 mm caliber cannons.

(1)
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[Marginal note:] A copy of the letter will be sent by us to comrade Qusai to see how his viewpoints will concur with those of his other comrades, then prepare an answer to present to the leader President Saddam Hussein, God keep and preserve him.

Greetings and salutations, sir:
As per your order, the committee charged with discussing the project (operation Basra revenge) under the leadership of staff major general Qais 'Abd-al-Razzaq, and with the membership of staff lieutenant general Aiub Mahdi Salih and staff general Wisam 'Adb-al-Hafiz. The committee wishes to clarify the following:

1. The purpose of the study: to destroy the American and British naval vessels that are stationed near the Bakr port by using cruisers and missile boats, after the modifications thereof have been implemented.

2. The resources to carry out the operation:
   a. cruisers fitted with a 107 mm caliber grenade launcher at the boat's aft.
   b. cruisers fitted with a 107 mm caliber grenade launcher at the boat's fore.
   c. missile boats from the Iraqi naval forces command.
   d. cruisers rigged with explosives and a timer.

3. Modus operandi to carry out the mission:
   The modus operandi will be according to the following:
   a. The first group (the one mentioned in 2-a) will strike the frigate's deck with a salvo of missiles to destroy all its instrumentation, equipment, weaponry and personnel on deck.
   b. The second group (the one mentioned in 2-b) will strike the frigate's hull to cause large openings in the hull that will cause the ship to lose equilibrium and sink.
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c. The third group (the one mentioned in 2-c) will strike the ship with missiles to destroy what's left of her.
d. The rigged cruisers will be detonated one hour after the end of the operation via the timer. Following that, the operatives will clear the area as fast as possible using speedboats.

4. Field of operations:
The area where the frigate navigates (estimated at one nautical mile southeast the Bakr port and two nautical miles southwest the 'Amiq port).

5. Analysis and evaluation of the study:
After discussing the study by the committee, given the above information and all other factors (logistical and technical,) and after comparing it with the means available to the naval vessels, including the said frigate, of the hostile countries, we can determine a final decision in the following points:

a. The grenade 107 mm caliber launcher was designed to be used for striking targets / target (area) such as infantry, not for point targets that are armored (thickness of the armored hull of the frigate.) Even if the naval target is large, the explosive head on the launcher's missile is soft because it's made of aluminum.

b. For the purpose of handling the naval targets with precision, the launching person will require modern means of capability for the purpose of firing the launcher. The projectile launcher will require a laser stabilizing device (stabilizer) that is currently not available, and cannot be installed on boats. Previously, the Iraqi landing ships were outfitted with such devices before they were sunk in the glorious mother of all battles.

(2-3)
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c. The search and destroy capabilities, including the helicopters that are available to
the enemy countries are sufficient to keep any of these boats or cruisers from getting
close to the influence zone.

d. The missile boat that belongs to the Iraqi naval command and was referred to in the
study operate according to the theory of the (tracking beam,) which means the course
that the missile takes to hit its target depends upon the emission emanating from the
boat. This is old design. And any scrambling done to the radar (and this is a definite
thing) will result in failure of the missile in reaching its target; it will either be
dropped down or it will deviate from its course.

e. The helicopters that accompany the naval ships are constantly and totally sweeping
the area, including Iraq's territorial waters (visually, by radar, or electronically) daily
and round the clock. Therefore, any Iraqi armed boat that leaves in the direction of the
Bakr port or the 'Amiq port, or tries to approach enemy naval targets will either
instantly be sunk or captured.

6. In light of what was presented, the committee appreciates the initiative offered by the
citizen Muhsin Ibrahim Jiad and his civic feelings, but overall the study is unable to
be implemented from the logistic and technical aspects.

Please review and coordinate, sir. With all due appreciation
Signature: Wisam 'Abd-al-Hafiz, member.
Signature: Aiub Mahdi Salih, member.
Signature: Qais 'Abd-al-Razzak, head of the committee.

(3-3)
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To the general secretary. Greetings and salutations
Subject: Operation Basra revenge

In executing the director's order that entails meeting the citizen Muhsin Ibrahim Jiad, the originator of operation Basra revenge, and to probe him for details to ascertain the nature of his true intentions and even more details regarding his project, we wish to state the following:

1. At 2000 hours on April 9, 1999, I met in utmost secrecy with the citizen Muhsin Ibrahim Jiad at one of the hotels in Basra province.

2. From the dialogue with the afore mentioned citizen, it turned out that he works as a hired hand on one of the fishing boats in Faw city. During one of the fishing trips he noticed one of the American Navy vessels -the one he called 'frigate'- navigating our territorial waters back and forth in constant motion. He also noticed one or more helicopters docked on the frigate's deck, but took flight and chased our naval command's boats and cruisers when they launched from their bases to perform patrol duties within the limits of our territorial waters, then returned to the frigate's deck.

3. In the area where the frigate navigates, there are hundreds of fishing boats jostling for space

(1-9)
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[Continued] and at a distance the citizen estimated at half a nautical mile (or rough
826 meters,) or maybe the distance is less than that, for the citizen mentioned that
while they were casting their nets they were able to, from a good distance, the naval
personnel on its deck, and he was able to distinguish some of the letters on its side.

4. The fact that there are that many fishing boats near the frigate for such a long time
without arousing its suspicion and doubts made the crew of the frigate complacent
toward them.

5. From the tens of fishing trips that were made by the citizen Muhsin Ibrahim Jiad, and
from his monitoring the movement of the frigate, he felt a civic duty to exact revenge
upon Iraq's enemies. He started thinking of a way to destroy this frigate, namely using
the 107 mm caliber missile launcher and the 122 mm caliber Grad missiles.

6. The citizen presented his idea to his son (N. D. 'Ala,) a member of the Iraqi naval
forces, who supported it. The two began to join their ideas and illustrate them on
paper, and that's where the Basra revenge project idea was conceived. He summarized
it as follows:

A. Required resources for execution:
   1. Four fishing boats, examples of which were seen in the Dakir region – the
      region where fishing boats are built. The average length was 20-30 meters, and the
      maximum height is 5 meters.
   2. Two speedboats, assuming they are available in our naval forces formations.

(2-9)
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3. One missile boat, assuming it is available in our naval forces formations.
4. Eight Grad missiles with launcher.
5. Two 107 mm caliber modified grenade launchers.

B. The suggested modus operandi to execute the mission:
The modus operandi entails the use of three groupings of boats and as follows:
First. The first group
(1) Arrangement:
   a. One boat with the 107 mm caliber modified launcher. (It will be installed on movable jacks that are raised to the boat's deck at the instant of striking, and as shown on the attached appendix (a).)
   b. A boat that could be modified by installing four 122 mm caliber Grad missiles, as shown in attached appendix (b).
   c. One speedboat.
(2) The mission:
   a. The boat that's mentioned in (a) above will unleash a barrage of missiles from the launcher installed on it, which carries 14 missiles, upon the frigate's deck, destroying all equipment, instrumentation, and munitions on deck in addition to inflicting casualties upon the sailors that are present on deck.
   b. The boat previously mentioned in (b) above will [cont'd., Page 26]
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Fire its Grad missiles at one of the sides of the ship in order to blow
large holes near the ship's bottom, which will cause water to gush into
its engine room, causing her to sustain damage and become immobile.
c. The speedboat referred to in (c) above will be used to evacuate the
operatives from the mission boats and to transport them to shore as fast
as possible.

Second. The second group
(1) Arrangement:
Same makeup as the first group.
(2) The mission:
[perform] The same duty as the first group, but from the other side of the
frigate.

Third. The third group
(1) Arrangement:
A missile boat from our naval forces resources, armed with four missiles,
with the warhead of each weighing 500 kilograms of TNT material.
(2) The mission:
This boat will launch its missiles toward the frigate to finish her off after
its deck, with all its equipment and supplies, has been destroyed, and after
the frigate becomes unable to maneuver and navigate after the malfunction
of its engine from the seawater that entered its engine rooms through the
blasted holes...[cont'd., Page 27]
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That the Grad missiles assumed to have caused in both sides of the frigate.
7. In order to cover all traces of the mission, the boats will be rigged with charges of TNT connected to a timer clock or a remote control detonator, so that they can be blown up after the operatives have been whisked away from them.
8. Mission location:
The target has taken position at an area located one nautical mile (roughly 1652 meters) southeast the Bakr port and two nautical miles (roughly 3304 meters) southwest the 'Amiq port.
9. Operation assessment:
a. The technical aspect:
After reviewing the technical properties of the Grad missiles and the 107 mm caliber missile launcher that are supposed to be used in implementing the operation, and after reviewing the available information regarding the American frigate's capabilities, we reached the following:
First - It is not possible to use the Grad missiles to strike the frigate in the manner suggested by the citizen (and explained in appendix 2) because the missile is 287 centimeters long. Therefore, to carry out the citizen's idea, the missile will require a launcher that is 25 meters long – as long as the boat.
Second – The Grad missiles and the 107 mm caliber grenade launcher are designed to hit [cont'd., Page 28]
In the name of God the Merciful the Compassionate
Be ye fair and drawn swords against tyranny while remaining truthful men
God. Country. The leader. Those who give pledge to you they are giving pledge to Allah
[Holy Quran: 48-10.]
The Republic of Iraq
Office of the President
Saddam's fedayeen
General secretariat

regional targets, not point targets. Even if we assume they can be used to hit this kind of target, this will require extra capabilities and a balancing device (Stabilizer).
Third – The Grad missiles can only be fired with an electric detonator that ignites the missile's capsule.
Fourth – The recoil from firing the Grad missiles or the 107 mm caliber grenades and the intense rear thrust exhaust gust generated from their launch will cause the boats to capsize, which will hinder the task of evacuating the operatives at the required speed.

b. The security aspect:
First – Radar and electronic detection methods used on the frigate's deck are able to reveal any hostile intentions toward it, as demonstrated when the on-deck helicopter takes off to chase away any of our naval force speedboats the minute they leave their bases.
Second – The frigate's on-deck helicopters perform a round-the-clock sweep of the sea surface.

10. Evaluating the citizen, the originator of the project:
From the conversation with the citizen Muhsin Ibrahim Jiad, we know the following:
a. That the citizen had more than one motive when he advanced operation Basra revenge. Among them is his civic duty, mixed with the attempt of appearing to be connected with the office of the President or even with the President himself (God keep him and give him long life). I inferred this when he mentioned to me... [cont'd., Page 29]
In the name of God the Merciful the Compassionate
Be ye fair and drawn swords against tyranny while remaining truthful men
God. Country. The leader. Those who give pledge to you they are giving pledge to Allah
[Holy Quran: 48-10.]
The Republic of Iraq
Office of the President
Saddam's fedayeen
General secretariat

That he had exchanged correspondence with the office of the President from years ago, and he showed me some official business envelopes that he claimed he received letters in them from the office of the President.

b. The citizen enjoys a medium level income despite his asserting the opposite, for he told me, "the day I leave for work my family eats, and the day I do not leave for work my family does not eat." What he was hiding behind his affected honesty and dignity, which he tried earnestly to show during the conversation, was a naked desire for money.

c. No evil intentions were detected in the character of the citizen through his advancing the idea of operation Basra revenge.

11. The citizen hoped for help in treating his son whom he claimed was shot with a bullet, during the riots that lodged itself in his brain causing him a 60 % paralysis. Bear in mind that the citizen had previously asked for compensation from the committee for aiding the injured, in Basra, according to Basra's health department in its letter (copies attached,) but the previously mentioned committee declined the compensation, according to its letter number 5194 on 8/24/1999 (copy attached,) citing that injuries caused by riots and looting are exempt from compensation as reason.

Signature: Staff major Qutaiba Sa'id Hammu, 4/16/1999.
Appendix (a)

[Starting from the top and after rotating counterclockwise 90 degrees, the lines read as follow:]
The grenade launcher 107 mm caliber on the boat's deck
The grenade launcher, concealed
A jack to raise the launcher
[The vertical dimension:] five meters
[To the left:] appendix (a) – Operation Basra revenge

(8-9)
The rear end of the Grad missile
The warhead of the Grad missile
Length of the boat 20-30 meters
[To the left:] appendix (b) – Operation Basra revenge.
In the name of God, the Merciful, the Compassionate

Subject / minutes of meeting

On 4/30/2001 representatives from the Qa'qa' General company visited the Basra Saddam fedayeen command headquarters. The following took place during the visit:

1. The group charged with work on the boat was trained on the task of disassembling and mechanical and electrical connections on the boat's parts. The group learned the job expertly.

2. Disassemble the special parts of the boat, and set aside each parts group as spare parts.

3. It was discovered that the depot was not suitable to store explosive materials. In order for the depot to provide proper storage conditions for certain materials, the following conditions must be available in it:
   a. The temperature must be ambient and not rise above 30 degrees Celsius.
   b. Ample ventilation and appropriate humidity.
   c. Electric circuitry and electric equipment must be explosive-resistant (connections insulated and reinforced,) and it should be grounded and should have a lightning rod.
   d. Materials should not be stored mixed together, but separated, each material in its own space.
   e. No rolling or striking the materials.
   f. The depot should be looked after by a person who is knowledgeable with the material; who will prevent any smoking or sources of open flame; and who will bar entry to unauthorized personnel.
   g. It is preferable that the depot is located at a remote place, away from population centers and places of gathering, and it should be surrounded with an earthen barrier.
   h. In the case of long-term storage, lab analytical testing should be done on the explosive materials from time to time to ensure its potency every three months.

4. Minutes of meeting were agreed upon and signed by the representatives of the Qa'qa' General company and by the representatives of Basra command.
Signature: Hasan Hashim Radi - technical engineer.
Signature: 'Adnan Hasan Hussein – technical engineer.
In the name of God, the Merciful, the Compassionate.

The decision:
To be delivered to the facility and later recollected when needed or when a crisis happens that involves the enemy or before the occurrence of a crisis with the enemy.
Signature: Saddam's fedayeen director.

[In a marginal answer to the director:]
To the director, greetings and salutations.
Subject / report of testing an explosive substance.

1. The Qa'qa' General company informed us that the C4 substance that was used to modify one of the boats used in operation Basra revenge is an extremely explosive substance that requires periodic testing to ensure its potency and the conditions of its storage. After we have sent a professional group comprising three engineers from the facility named above on 4/30/2001, the committee tested the substance and provided us with the attached report. The report states the necessity of erecting a special depot that fulfills the requirements of air conditioning and other storage stipulations, as entailed in the report. This facility must be remote, far from population centers.

2. The opinion. After your approval, we recommend that we coordinate with the facility or any other engineering outfit for the purpose of providing us with a design blueprint for such a depot. A suitable area that's closest to a group of other depots within the Basra sector will have to be scoped out for such a depot. Please review, sir. With due regards,

Minutes of meeting
Referencing the letter from the military manufacturing board – top secret and confidential.
Number 95 on 2/6/2001. The explosive PG7 has been manufactured at an amount sufficient for 20 missiles, as a first batch, and a field test was conducted on five missiles to assess performance, yielding the following results:

- depth of penetration = 60 millimeter.
- Diameter of penetration = more than 50 millimeter.

1. The Saddam fedayeen representative, captain Muhammad Hadi Karam, was provided with 15 missiles as per the above mentioned specifications.
2. It was agreed that the second batch will be provided at the end of this week with a total of 15 missiles as per the oral agreement with them.
3. The payment aspects will be resolved later.

Minutes of meeting were finalized on 2/19/2001.

Signature: chief physicist, Nabil Ahmad Muhammad 'Ali – Hittin General company.
Signature: captain Muhammad Hadi Karam, Saddam's fedayeen.
Signature: chief engineer Muhammad Salman 'Alwan – Hittin general company.
Minutes of meeting
Referencing the letter from the military manufacturing board – top secret and confidential. Number 95 on 2/6/2001, and as an attachment to the minutes of meeting recorded on 2/19/2001.

Saddam's fedayeen's representative, captain Muhammad Hadi Karim, was provided with ten missiles as per the specifications listed in the previous minutes of meeting, bringing the total amount delivered to them to 25 specialized and modified PG7 missiles.

Minutes of meeting report was finalized on 3/1/2001.

Hittin general company
In the name of God, the Merciful, the Compassionate
Al-Rashid plant bill of lading for material leaving the plant. Such material will not be returned.

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>No</th>
<th>Name of substance</th>
<th>Unit</th>
<th>Number</th>
<th>Written</th>
<th>Amount</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>11</td>
<td>Explosive – PG7 missile</td>
<td>Quantity</td>
<td>10</td>
<td>Ten only</td>
<td>To the fields for the purpose of Special testing</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>12</td>
<td>Propellant filler</td>
<td>Quantity</td>
<td>10</td>
<td>Ten only</td>
<td>For the fedayeen</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>13</td>
<td>Wooden box</td>
<td>Quantity</td>
<td>1</td>
<td>One only</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

Three items only.
Signature: Muhammad Hadi Karim
Signature: department chief, 3/1/2001
Signature: depots, Muhammad [UI]
Signature: Ahmad Rashid 'Abdullah Muhammad
Identification number: 8530 / 31112000
Signature: company's security officer, 3/1
Signature: [UI], 3/1/2001
Confirmation by the operations room, entered into the computer under the file number 759.
Sectors, Signature: name: 'Aqil 'Abbas, date.
[stamped seal:] Hittin general company – material exit – number – date.
Signature: 'Aqil 'Abbas. Date:
The classification markings are original to the Iraqi documents and do not reflect current US classification.

### Material Request

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>No.</th>
<th>Material name and description</th>
<th>Code No.</th>
<th>Unit</th>
<th>Quantity: No</th>
<th>Quantity: written</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>1</td>
<td>Adhesive tape</td>
<td></td>
<td>One roll</td>
<td>23</td>
<td>Twenty three</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>2</td>
<td>Black paint to paint the missile</td>
<td></td>
<td>Gallon</td>
<td>1</td>
<td>Only one</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>3</td>
<td>White fabric</td>
<td></td>
<td>Meter</td>
<td>7.5</td>
<td>Seven and a half</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>4</td>
<td>Carton layers</td>
<td></td>
<td>Kg</td>
<td>5</td>
<td>Only five</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>5</td>
<td>White paint to paint the boxes</td>
<td></td>
<td>Gallon</td>
<td>1</td>
<td>Only one</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>6</td>
<td>Sponge brushes</td>
<td></td>
<td>Quantity</td>
<td>5</td>
<td>Five only</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>7</td>
<td>Paint brushes, 3 inches</td>
<td></td>
<td>Quantity</td>
<td>2</td>
<td>Two only</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>8</td>
<td>Sewing machine needle</td>
<td></td>
<td>Quantity</td>
<td>1</td>
<td>Only one</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

#### Notes:
- For the needs of the workshop to manufacture the PG7 material.
- There are numerous illegible signatures, names and other scribbled notes.

**Operation name:** The depot: al-Rashid

**Requesting section:** al-Rashid

**Cost center:** 55104

**Material request Date:** 2/9/2001

**No. 14..45**
In the name of God, the Merciful, the Compassionate

I, the undersigned, received from Captain Muhammad Hadi Karim, a member of the Saddam's fedayeen staff headquarters, the following materials:

1. Grenade missiles, 40 mm caliber, modified. Quantity = only ten.
2. Filler for grenade missiles, 40 mm caliber, modified. Quantity = only ten.
3. One wooden box.

Only three items.

Restricted. For the purpose of serving the concerns of the [Central] Intelligence, which plays a major role in framing its policy, namely the policy of the United States of America, making it able to scrutinize the issues that it handles or decides in the fields of the electronics industry and other industries, and to make future decisions based on calculated and precise planning and for extended periods of time for both the near and far future. We will see that the American Intelligence did not leave any areas unexploited to influence American policy. One of these methods is the use or the exploitation of parapsychology in its most secret work, for it is a weapon for both war and peace.

17. The American Central Intelligence Agency developed a program of transferring skills from the brains of some individuals to those of others, whether the latter are serving near or far in espionage missions. This experiment started on 6/25/1958. It involved telepathy, and it ended with a 70 percent rate of success. The American Intelligence also studied the possibility of sending special waves that can influence someone's brain at a distance of thousands of miles, and that the best place to use these studies is naval bases and submarines. In 1977, the Challenger, an American surveillance ship discovered a sunken Soviet submarine at the bottom of the Atlantic Ocean. Inside it, they found equipment and information that enabled the American Army to decode the secret code that was used by all the units of the Soviet fleet. This operation was the biggest and greatest military victory for the American Intelligence Agency for many years because it enabled the agency to uncover positions of the striking Soviet forces, causing the Soviets to reposition forces and to change the code as well as the plans in this regard. This operation did not succeed through conventional efforts and means, as through electronically equipped aircraft and ships and satellites that discovered the location of the sunken Soviet submarine at the depth of the Atlantic. Rather, a new kind of weapon was used in this operation, namely parapsychology – by using a specialized diver and telepathy.

(11-22)  
Restricted
In the name of God the Merciful the Compassionate
Be ye fair and drawn swords against tyranny while remaining truthful men
God. Country. The leader. Those who give pledge to you they are giving pledge to Allah
[Holy Quran: 48-10.]
The Republic of Iraq
Office of the President
Saddam's fedayeen
General secretariat

Number: l/b/286
Date: 3/5/2001

The decision:
For the review of Ahmad Sadak
Saddam's fedayeen director, 3/18/2001

To the director of Saddam's fedayeen – greetings and salutations
Subject: Information

Attached, please find the letter number 2864, on 3/3/2001, from the office of the chief of staff and the letter number 1382, on 2/24/2001, from directorate of internal affairs, Basra Province, wherein you will find the President's order as to how to deal with the fishermen in the Gulf waters (clipping a). Please review and coordinate. With warm regards,
Signature: Staff lieutenant general 'Abdullah Kulaib 'Uwain – secretary general, 3/5/2001

[handwritten:] 663, circulate / 3/19/2001, to the office of the chiefs of staff (a.s.)
Staff brigadier general Ahmad Sadak Batah to review and take the necessary arrangements.

In the name of God the Merciful the Compassionate
Be ye fair and drawn swords against tyranny while remaining truthful men
God. Country. The leader. Those who give pledge to you they are giving pledge to Allah
[Holy Quran: 48-10.]
The Republic of Iraq
Office of the President
Saddam's fedayeen
General secretariat

The Intelligence
Number 1/1/2864 / 3/3/2001
Date: 3 March 2001

To the general secretariat of Saddam's fedayeen
Subject: The fishermen

Referring to letter number 38, on 2/25/2001, from the Kazma command of Saddam's fedayeen, we herewith attach a copy of Basra Province internal affairs directorate letter number 1382, on 2/24/2001, that entails the Presidential order. Please review. Warm regards,

Attachments: (1) copy of a letter
Signature: Staff major general 'Ali 'Abd Mahmud, head of chiefs of staff – Saddam's fedayeen

Copy to: Kazma Saddam's fedayeen command / regarding your above mentioned letter. Please review. Warm regards,

[handwritten:] The office / shown before the eyes of the general secretary, 3/4, Signature:

Qasim //
T. W (A. B. J.)
In the name of God, the Merciful, the Compassionate

Republic of Iraq
Ministry of Interior
Basra Province
Directorate of internal affairs
Covert section
Number: 1382
Date: 2/24/2001

To the director in charge of Basra and Diqar provinces' coordination
Subject: The fishermen

We have been informed by the office of the ministry of the interior, office of the internal minister, in ministry of the interior's letter number 3905, on 2/14/2001, of the Presidential order, which was conveyed in Presidential office letter number B.Q/5099, on 2/12/2001, marked secret and urgent, that the fishermen in the Gulf are to be handled in the following manner:

1. They are to be allowed to carry weapons with them on their fishing trips in the Arabian Gulf.
2. There shall be no coercing the fishermen to carry weapons on their fishing trips in the Arabian Gulf and in our territorial waters.
3. In the event that one of the Iraqi fishermen is assaulted while in our territorial waters and he did not retaliate against the Kuwaiti or Iranian attackers, then this fisherman is to be doubly punished and have his fishing license revoked.
4. Encourage our fishermen, by the state and the party, to fish inside and outside our territorial waters in the Arabian Gulf.

Please review. Warmest regards
Signature: staff major general Ahmad Ibrahim Hammash, Basra’s governor.

[handwritten:] please review and coordinate then brief the President as well as [UI].

Ministry of the interior / office of the minister / referencing your above mentioned letter, with thanks.
Party command center of al-Ablasa
Party command center of Um al-Ma'arik branch
Party command center of Basra branch
Party command center of al-Zubair bin al-'Awwam
Town hall of al-Faw jurisdiction
Town hall of al-Zubair jurisdiction
Town hall of Abu al-Khasib jurisdiction

[handwritten:] 1. Brief the President.
ISGQ-2003-00003598

2. Brief the head of chiefs of staff, along with a copy of the above letter.
3. Inform the Basra command force of its content after receiving the opinion of the head of
the chiefs of staff.
Signature: 2/24

((continued))
In the name of God, the Merciful, the Compassionate
Republic of Iraq
Ministry of Interior
Basra Province
Directorate of internal affairs
Covert section

Directorate of Um Qasr borough
Southern region secret police directorate
Law enforcement directorate of Basra province
Police directorate of Basra province
Southern region intelligence agency
Naval intelligence
Southern region customs directorate

Proceed to enact the necessary arrangements regarding the subject and inform all fishermen of it. Warm regards.

Kazim 21/2 preliminaries, Dia
1. The first question: Is the area called "Jamila," which you informed staff major general 'Abdullah about, inside Iraqi or Iranian territorial waters?
Answer: According to our information it is a commercial exchange area, with maritime vessels from neighboring countries. It also has Iranian boats of various types ('Ashura force is Iranian and is located to the left, outside al-'Amiq port toward the Iranian side at a distance of 9 kilometers).

2. Second question: Why do you hesitate to sell fish in Jamila area, where you fish?
Answer: Because the area is located in the Iranian side and is under Iranian control, and because our boats are originally Iranian but were confiscated by the Iraqi naval force. Therefore, we fear that if we trespass into the Iranian side, the Iranians will reclaim the boats back.

Signature: Ra'ad 'Awda 'Abd-al-Jalil.
As a matter of fact, developing weapons that can penetrate deeply into the ground or concrete is one of the foremost priorities of American weapon manufacturers. Some targets may contain chemical and biological weapons. Unless these are annihilated to the highest degree, they can be detected from the air by some hazardous airborne substances. No matter how precise these weapons are, it is necessary for the attacking force to know exactly what its aim in the attack is: some targets are mobile, and Iraq has proven that it moved throughout the country very expansive equipment and data to evade United Nations' weapons inspection teams. Still, precision is essential and fundamental to the Americans if they want to strike vital targets while minimizing civilian losses simultaneously.

Training the light on the air force during crises.

Remainder of forces in the Gulf:
- The forces' record.
- Iraq.
- American forces in the Gulf.
- Remainder of forces in the Gulf.
- Weapons systems in the Gulf.
- The 1991 Gulf War.

Britain, January 18 – British forces (source: British defense department)

750 force units
18 Tornadoes and four Jaguar bombers
Two war ships
12 Tornado fighter jets for attack and surveillance and 500 soldiers at the Salim air force base in Kuwait and seven additional Tornadoes plus 210 from the Saudi forces in Kharj to patrol southern Iraq.
Two tanker aircraft and 50 recruits in Bahrain for in-air fueling and four Jaguar fighter jets for land assault and one 15-72 aircraft positioned at Incirlik, in Turkey, to patrol the no-fly zone.
Two war ships armed with Exocet weapons and one gunfire support ship to patrol the Gulf, and one frigate to head toward the area.

Australia
Special force
- There are no forces to date

Air force
- There are no forces to date

Aboard the carrier Invincible there are 1200 sailors. It participated in the Falklands war in 1982, and is presently positioned in the Gulf.
Tabulated comparison for the weapon RPG

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Type</th>
<th>Weight</th>
<th>Range</th>
<th>Penetration Depth</th>
<th>Usage</th>
<th>Caliber</th>
<th>Length</th>
<th>Notes</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>RPG-7/D1</td>
<td>6.3 kg for the launcher, 2.3 kg for the grenade.</td>
<td>300 m</td>
<td>320 mm</td>
<td>Armor</td>
<td>40 mm</td>
<td>950 mm in the firing position</td>
<td>20 launchers count.</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>RPG-7/V1</td>
<td>6.7 kg for the launcher, 2.3 kg for the grenade.</td>
<td>300 m</td>
<td></td>
<td>Armor</td>
<td>40 mm</td>
<td>950 mm in the firing position. 650 mm without grenade</td>
<td>20 launchers count.</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>RPG-7</td>
<td>6.7 kg for the launcher, 2.3 kg for the grenade.</td>
<td>400 m</td>
<td>300 mm</td>
<td>Armor</td>
<td>40 mm</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>RPG-22</td>
<td>2.8 kg</td>
<td>200 m</td>
<td>1000 mm reinforced concrete; 1200 mm building</td>
<td>Reinforced concrete barriers; brick buildings</td>
<td>72.5 mm</td>
<td></td>
<td>One-time usage only; 20 launchers count.</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>RPG-18</td>
<td>2.6 kg</td>
<td>200 m</td>
<td>1000 mm reinforced concrete; 1200 mm building</td>
<td>Reinforced concrete barriers; brick buildings</td>
<td>64 mm</td>
<td></td>
<td>One-time usage only.</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

Note: the types highlighted in yellow are the ones required.
Review of firepower

Allies airpower
The striking force for the United States in the Persian Gulf comprises more than 300 aircraft among them fighter jets, heavy bombers, and assault helicopters.
The airpower includes aircraft positioned in Saudi Arabia, Kuwait, Bahrain, and Turkey; also, B-52s and tanker aircraft stationed on Diego Garcia Island.
Despite the fact that 100 aircraft, half of which are fighters, land in Saudi Arabia, it is possible that the United States will not release the fighters that failed in securing Saudi guarantee in gunfire support.

Coalition military power
American ships
Air carriers: The USS George Washington and the USS Independence, five destroyers plus frigates, submarines, amphibious vessels, and other ships.
American fighter jets and support aircraft.
American forces; British forces.
Iraqi forces.
Commands and control.
Republican guard.
Air force.
Military equipment.
The classification markings are original to the Iraqi documents and do not reflect current US classification.

ISGQ-2003-00003598

[Page 49:]

[English document]
The classification markings are original to the Iraqi documents and do not reflect current US classification.

ISGQ-2003-00003598

[Page 50:]

[English document]
The classification markings are original to the Iraqi documents and do not reflect current US classification.

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[Page 51:]

[English document]
[11: 41] And he (Nūḥ (Noah) (peace be upon him)) said: "Embark therein: in the Name of Allah will be its (moving) course and its (resting) anchorage. Surely, my Lord is Oft-Forgiving, Most Merciful." (Holy Quran - Tafsir At-Tabari)

To the director of the Saddam's fedayeen, greetings and salutations, Sir:
Subject: An assessment of the naval field of operations

Referring to your orders to the task team that comprises staff lieutenant general Aiub Mahdi Salih, secretary general; special forces staff major general Muhammad Faris, commander-in-chief of Kazma's Saddam's fedayeen; staff brigadier general Ahmad Sadak Batah, from the public relations board; staff brigadier general Salman Hamid Zahir, commander of Basra force of Saddam's fedayeen; and staff colonel Muhammad Fahad of the public relations board at 2300 hours on 12/29/2000 regarding the assessment of the naval operations theatre in order to confront the Kuwaiti and Iranian transgressions in the Arabian Gulf area, we wish to clarify to you the following:

1. As soon as we received your order, a task team convened a meeting at 0900 hours on 12/31/2000 at the general secretariat of Saddam's fedayeen to formulate a movement and information-gathering plan and to ponder scenarios and consider opinions in order to carry out the mission with every precision and boldness and trust, given that it [plan] is one of the civic duties in the course of dealing with these transgressions to put a stop to them.

2. The task team moved to Basra sector to execute the movement plan in-field and to become familiar with the nature of the operations theatre and to establish contact with all our covert sources so as to identify the true nature of the situation and to formulate a number of alternatives that will result in the success of the operation, God willing.

3. The aim: prepare an evaluation of the operations theater, identify the violations, their [cont'd., Page 53]
locations, and their nature, and formulate confrontation plans plus secure the requirements thereof.

4. Description of the naval operations theater: Appendix (a) is a chart of northern Arabian Gulf.
   a. The Iraqi coast is located north of the Arabian Gulf, bordered from the east by Iran, from the south by Kuwait, and it stretches for 60 kilometers from Ras al-Bisha until Um Qasr.
   b. The average depth in the Arabian Gulf is 70 meters, and it decreases as we move toward the north where the 20th depth line is located at a distance of 40 kilometers from the Iraqi coast.
   c. The presence of the de-militarized zone at 'Abdullah inlet will check the navigation of our naval vessels. There is a group of buoys that demarcate the imaginary maritime boundary line. The Kuwaiti coast is located five kilometers from the boundary line and ten kilometers from the Iraqi coast. This area is considered the territorial waters for that country.
   d. The Iraqi maritime coast has been demarcated after the ceasefire, and it has become smaller. Additionally, the Coalition forces are steadfast in further shrinking the coast to make it resemble an inland waterway.
   e. The al-Bakr and al-'Amiq ports are in the Arabian Gulf. The al-'Amiq port lies 50 kilometers from Um Qasr and contains an oil pipe.
   f. There is a demilitarized zone in the Shat al-'Arab area at one kilometer from both sides, the Iraqi and the Iranian; it is forbidden to position any heavy military equipment in it.
   g. In the Kuwaiti Gaid area, there are two observation boats in addition to a number of maritime observation posts that cover the Kuwaiti shoreline.
   h. There are Iraqi patrol boats that belong to the Iraqi navy that perform surveillance and observation up to al-'Amiq and al-Bakr ports.
   i. There are a number of Kuwaiti islands, such as Wuria, Bubian, Failaka, and Kuwait port as well as a group of islands that are close to the Iranian coast.
5. Armament and naval readiness of the hostile countries (Kuwait, Iran, and the Coalition countries).
   a. The Kuwaiti armament and naval readiness:
      1) Two guided-missile boats, the Sunbuk, P-V-505, and the Istiqalal, P.5702, with a speed of 40 knots. Its firepower: four surface-to-surface, MM40 Exocet missiles with a range of 10 kilometers. Weight of the warhead is 165 kilograms. Lethal firing range is 5 kilometers. The boat is also armed with a 76 mm caliber Broler gun.
      2) Four small patrol boats: Intisar 30, Aman 302, 303, and 304. Speed is 28 knots. Firepower is two, 12.7 mm caliber anti-aircraft machineguns.
      3) Twelve small high-speed patrol boats, speed is 40 knots, each armed with a machinegun.
      4) Seventeen small patrol boats equipped with a single-bore machinegun.
      5) Eight patrol boats that were received from one of the French companies each armed with a 26 mm caliber gun plus two, 20 mm caliber guns.
      6) A number of British-made small interdiction high speed boats, received in 1991. Speed is 43 knots. Powered by two Yamaha outboard motors, it is armed with a single-bore 12.7 mm caliber machinegun.
      7) High speed Kuwaiti-made interdiction boats with a length of 13 meters powered by two Yamaha 100 HP motors. They were entered into service in 1998.
   b. Iranian naval armament and readiness:
      1) Three frigates.
      2) Three destroyers.
      3) Two guard ships.
      4) Fifteen missile boats.
      5) Five minesweepers.
      6) Three submarines type Kilo [PH].
      7) Twelve supply ships.
c. Armament and combat readiness of the Coalition in the Arabian Gulf:

1) American forces:
   1. One air carrier with 86 various aircraft aboard.
   2. Seven cruisers.
   3. Five destroyers.
   4. Four frigates.
   5. Three submarines.
   7. Amphibious assault ship.
   8. Minesweeper.
   9. Four tank and personnel landing ship.
   10. One supply ship.

2) Other forces:
   1. Six British naval vessels (three destroyers, two frigates, and one support ship).
   2. Three Canadian frigates.
   3. Three Dutch frigates.
   4. Four New Zealand frigates.
   5. Four French multi-purpose naval vessels.

3) Surface ships (cruisers, destroyers, frigates, and submarines) carrying 166 Tomahawk cruise missiles for striking naval targets and 122 Harpoon anti-ship missiles.

4) One amphibious assault ship (Blilu [PH]) carrying four Harrier aircraft and 19 helicopters of the types Sea Stallion, Super Stallion, Sea Cobra, and Sea Night.

5) Two materiel and personnel landing ships with two infantry battalion plus two tank detachments landing capability via landing boats in a single lift. (4-14)
6. Violations and transgressions, their locations, and their results in 2000:

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>The Map</th>
<th>Vessel's name</th>
<th>Date and time</th>
<th>Type of violation / Aggression</th>
<th>Location</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>1</td>
<td>Fath al-Rahman motorboat</td>
<td>5/7/2000 1200</td>
<td>Intercepted by a Kuwaiti patrol boat and was towed to Kuwait's ports.</td>
<td>Near Bubian island, on the Kuwaiti side.</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>4</td>
<td>22/Basra Al-Mamun 0300 boat</td>
<td>9/6/2000</td>
<td>Intercepted by an Iranian patrol boat and was lead to port Bandar Khumaini.</td>
<td>Half a mile south of Jamila beacon M T (835972).</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>3</td>
<td>The transporter Mustafa</td>
<td>9/13/2000</td>
<td>Interception by American ships, was taken to Abu Dhabi port, then confiscated.</td>
<td>Baharkan area.</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>2</td>
<td>Fishing boat</td>
<td>10/7/2000 1735</td>
<td>A Kuwaiti boat approached the fishing boat and was then chased away by our boats.</td>
<td>Near buoy (12).</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>5</td>
<td>The transporter Muna</td>
<td>10/24/2000 2400</td>
<td>Intercepted by two Iranian military boats.</td>
<td>Southeast port al-Bakr, at a distance of 6.5 kilometers.</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>6</td>
<td>The mechanized barge Jalajil</td>
<td>11/24/2000</td>
<td>Intercepted by four Iranian armed boats and was lead to port Bandar Khumaini.</td>
<td>M T (835972).</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>7</td>
<td>The tugboat 'Ali Bantun</td>
<td>11/24/2000</td>
<td>Intercepted by Iranian boats then lead to port Bandar Khumaini.</td>
<td>The outer barrier of Shat al-'Arab.</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>8</td>
<td>The fishing ship Nur</td>
<td>11/24/2000</td>
<td>Intercepted by Iranian boats, then interdicted at the entrance of Musa Inlet.</td>
<td>M T (835972).</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>9</td>
<td>The ship Rishan</td>
<td>12/8/2000</td>
<td>Intercepted by a group of Iranian boats and interdicted on the Iraqi side of Shat al-'Arab.</td>
<td>Across from the Iranian command control</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

(5-14)
7. The form of hostile violations:
From the information gathered from our secret sources, and after meeting a number of fishermen who work at various locations at sea (Um Qasr, al-Faw, Shat al-'Arab) or seamen who work in shipping freight, the following is now clear:
   a. The Kuwaiti transgressions:
      The Kuwaiti transgressions take place when Iraqi fishing boats trespass into Kuwaiti territorial waters searching for deepwater fish and during certain seasons. Two Kuwaiti boats would approach the fishing boat. An officer on one of the two boats would request that the sailors of the fishing boat should gather at its fore. Two crew members of the Kuwaiti boat then board the fishing boat to search it. If weapons or contraband were found, the boat is then taken to the Kuwaiti shores. If nothing is found, the boat is then expelled out of the Kuwaiti territorial waters.
   b. The Iranian transgressions:
      The Iranian transgressions happen when fishing boats venture into Iranian territorial waters searching for fish that abound in Iranian territorial waters and at certain seasons. Also, Iranian transgressions happen when oil tankers carrying smuggled oil try to evade paying Customs tariffs for using the Iranian territorial waters: An Iranian patrol boat will approach an Iraqi maritime vessel and stop it. If the boatman is a fisherman, he is then told to return to the Iraqi territorial waters. But if the maritime vessel is a ship, its cargo documentation is inspected. If it is found in violation of the governing laws, it is then taken to the Iranian coast.

(6-14)
c. There was no proof that the Iranian and Kuwaiti patrols violated Iraqi maritime vessels inside the Iraqi territorial waters with one exception: the violation against the ship Rishan. This ship has itself committed two previous violations, and has a negative marker on it. The Iranian boat that approached it and fired into the air for the purpose of stopping her caused the sailors aboard it to fire back at the Iranian boat's crew, killing two of its members.

d. The patrols of the Iraqi naval force are constantly moving to cover the entire Iraqi territorial waters region between port Um Qasr and al-Faw, and between port al-'Amiq and port al-Bakr. During this unobstructed movement to carry out their duties there was never once any violation logged against them.

8. Options available to us to confront the aggressions:

From the study of the theatre of naval operations and the foreign violations that were committed against ships and commercial boats, we deduced that the ideal option to stop such operations is to perpetrate a high jacking or to destroy the hostile naval vessel committing this aggression, or kill its crews. This is best done by drawing the enemy into a calculated confrontation with one of the naval vessels that has been fitted and equipped with what ensures a quick and direct response. Considering most of the foreign aggressions (Kuwaiti – Iranian,) and based on what has been concluded from the available information that was gathered from sailing ships and boat captains, there is potential for finding locations of planting the following suggested ambushes.

(7-14)
(2) The negative aspects:
   a. The potential of interference from the large or midsize naval vessels.
   b. The potential for incurring losses.
b. Locations for launching ambushes on the Iranian side:
   First: Ambush No. One: to be launched near the Iranian command control
   (Attachment A.)
   (1) The positive aspects:
      a. Rapid withdrawal toward the Iraqi coast.
      b. There must be no interference from other Iranian naval vessels.
      c. It is possible to provide cover and concealment for the presence of many boats and ships.
   (2) The negative aspects:
      a. An Iranian reaction toward the sailing vessel.
      b. Potential for interference from land forces that are positioned on the Iranian coast.
Second. Ambush No. Two: Can be launched at the mouth of Shat al-Arab
   (Attachment A).
   (1) The positive aspects:
      a. The area is relatively far for the naval vessels to interfere.
      b. The element of surprise is better achieved.
   (2) The negative aspects:
      a. Pulling out would be relatively far.
      b. The potential for interference from land or sea.
Third. Ambush No. Three: To be launched near the Iranian coasts (Attachment A).
   (1) The positive aspects: Execution is in the direction of one boat.
   (2) The negative aspects:
      a. Potential for incurring losses.

(9-14)
b. Potential for interference from other naval vessels.
c. Pull out is relatively far.

c. After analyzing the positive and negative aspects of the ambush launch locations, we reach the following:
First. The best place to launch the ambushes on the Kuwaiti side is Ambush No. One, which launches north of the Arab Gulf area (the entrance to 'Abdullah Inlet).
Second. The best place to launch ambushes on the Iranian side is Ambush No. One, which launches near the Iranian command control (in al-Faw).
9. Special requirements to confront the aggressions (armament / preparedness / elements / command and control)
   a. Supplies:
      1 – Large motorboat with two speedboats powered by two, 235 HP motors each boat and the motorboat. This averages one motorboat and one speedboat for the Kuwait task and one speedboat for the Iran task.
      2 – A communications wireless radio, type Rakal HF with an international channel for each speedboat and motorboat, and a similar device for central command.
      3 – Three GPS devices for position location type Magellan.
      4 – Three rubber boats with three motors.
      5 – Three pneumatic generators.
      6 – Thirty life vests.
      7 – Ten diving suits plus their accouterments.
   b. Armament:
      1 – Three BKC machineguns plus the base.
      2 – Three RPG7 for each speedboat and motorboat at an average of five anti-tank rockets for each launcher.
      3 – Thirty half-butt Kalashnikov assault rifles with four magazines for each assault rifle.
      4 – Thirty attack hand grenades.
      5 – Ten highly explosive adhesion mines.
      6 – Ten smoke grenades.
   c. The elements:
      1 – Three officers.
      2 – Thirty fedayeen.
      3 – Elements for the boats' command and guides to be recruited either from the naval force or from the cooperating civilians after the decision to implement in later stages.
      4 – Admit the officers and fedayeen into a training course at the naval force command to train them on diving and swimming and the use of diving equipment and to learn to adapt and survive in the sea for 15 days.
      5 – When the above requirements are fulfilled, the task team will need ten days to start execution of duty.
d. Command and control:
1 – Secure the task area through Kazma’s command by coordinating with the naval force command.
2 – Establishing a land command center by Kazma’s command and securing the launch and pull-out area for the boats in Um Qasr and al-Faw according to the nature of the task and at subsequent stages for the purpose of securing the safety of the operation.
3 – Wireless connection between the command center and the task boat for the purpose of altering the plans and to safely withdraw when these exigencies are needed and through a commanding officer.

10. The confrontation approach:
a. Confronting the Kuwaiti aggression:
The conventional approach is for two Kuwaiti boats to approach. One of the boats stays at a far distance while the other begins the approach with the request that the Iraqi crew gather at the foredeck. The boat would then circle the vessel several times to confirm that all the crew is assembled at the foredeck. Only then would the Kuwaiti boat tether itself to the Iraqi vessel. Two to three armed personnel would then board the vessel to secure the situation. They then commence searching the boat and beating and insulting or escorting to the Kuwaiti ports and confiscating the naval vessel. In order to confront this practice and provide an armed response we shall do the following:
1 – The naval vessel (motorboat/speedboat) with all the required equipment will set sail for the purpose of fishing near the Kuwaiti coast, south of buoy No. (3) in the direction of Bubian Island and will maneuver in the area while executing a deception plan: Launching as large a number of boats to sea for the purpose of fishing. The Kuwaiti boats are then given the opportunity to observe this while being careful not to have any patrol boats present near the task naval vessel.

(12-14)
2 – When the Kuwaiti boat requests that the crew gather at the foredeck, only part of the crew (5 – 6) will oblige, but the rest will hide inside.
3 – The Kuwaiti sailors are then allowed to board the naval vessel for the purpose of searching. Only then will the personnel hiding inside appear and open fire on them. Other personnel will start engaging the boats with medium weapons, including RPG7 to destroy them and kill anyone aboard them, or the adhesive mines or attack grenades can be used.
4 – Commence immediate withdrawal after execution of the task and do not linger in the area. Withdrawal shall be under the protection of Iraqi naval patrol in the direction of 'Abdullah Inlet.

b. Confronting the Iranian aggression:
For the purpose of carrying out an armed operation against the Iranian naval vessels near the command control in al-Faw [particularly] for the boat 'Ashur, we require the following:
1 – Prepare a small fishing boat with three to four personnel.
2 – The boat will remain anchored for two to three days for the purpose of fishing.
3 – When the boat 'Ashur approaches for material gain purposes or other purposes, it will be addressed using Persian or Arabian dialogue.
4 – The boat 'Ashur lacks any fighting capability, making its capture all the more easy.
5 – Conducting the operation at night requires that it stays longer than the time previously mentioned until the arrival of the target boat.
6 – Immediate withdrawal via 'Abdullah Inlet under the protection of the Iraqi naval patrol.

11. The deception plan:
a. Work under complete secrecy until the start of the execution of the task. The task team should conduct visits to the middle and north sector for the purpose of deception.
b. Coordinate with the member of the Iraqi command in launching the fishing boat at a suitable time to carry out a camouflage-and-hide operation for the boats tasked with duty.
c. Put in place a methodical, detailed deception plan during the preparation stage and secure the task requirements, such as buying or renting boats and modifying them, and establishing the logistical center and securing the launch and withdrawal base. All the details of this plan will be presented to you, Sir, for the safety of the operation.
d. Transportation for all the charged officers during all the operation stages will be via vehicles different from those used in the sacrificial work. The officers will wear civilian clothes similar to those worn in the Basra province environment.
12. General conclusion: From the above, the task team reached the final and general conclusion that all the capabilities are available for the sacrificial work to execute the task with courage and precision for all the confrontation choices at once or based on priority of choices or in case your orders mandate the tackling of any naval target, Kuwaiti or Iranian, inside their territorial waters. The task team pledges to be worthy of your trust in carrying out this task or any upcoming task that you order us to do whether inside our territorial water or in the high seas. We await your orders, sir.

In the name of God, the Merciful, the Compassionate:
"And an Ayah (sign) for them is that We bore their offspring in the laden ship. And We have created for them of the like thereunto, on which they ride. And if We will, We shall drown them, and there will be no shout (or helper) for them (to hear their cry for help) nor will they be saved." Chapter Yasin: 41-43 [Quran].

Staff colonel Muhammad Salih Fahad – public relations.
Staff brigadier general Ahmad Sadak Batah – public relations.
Staff brigadier general Salman Hamid Zahir – Basra force commanding officer.
Special forces staff major general Kazim Muhammad Faris – commander of Kazma command.
Staff major general Aiub Mahdi Salih – secretary general for Saddam's fedayeen.

(14-14)
In the name of God the Merciful the Compassionate 
Be ye fair and drawn swords against tyranny while remaining truthful men 
God. Country. The leader. Those who give pledge to you they are giving pledge to Allah 
[Holy Quran: 48-10.] 
The Republic of Iraq 
Office of the President 
Saddam's fedayeen 
General secretariat 
Public relations board 
No /1/2014 
9 Shawwal 1241H 
1/4/2001

To the office of chiefs of staff – the administration 
Subject: Task delegation

The fedayeen whose names are listed below were assigned to their command posts. They number 19 fedayeen starting from 1/1/2001 until further notice to you from us. They are:

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Sequence Number</th>
<th>Rank</th>
<th>Full name</th>
<th>Force</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>1.</td>
<td>Lieutenant Fedayee</td>
<td>Kamil Ahmad 'Alij Shlish</td>
<td>Al-Qari'a force</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>2.</td>
<td>Fedayee</td>
<td>Sabah Ramadan 'Aziz</td>
<td>Diala force</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>3.</td>
<td>Fedayee</td>
<td>'Abd-al-Rida Majli Sultan</td>
<td>Diala force</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>4.</td>
<td>Fedayee</td>
<td>Muhammad Sabri Hasan</td>
<td>Diala force</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>5.</td>
<td>Fedayee</td>
<td>'Adil Kazim Warior</td>
<td>Diqar force</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>6.</td>
<td>Fedayee</td>
<td>Hashim Nahi 'Ubaid</td>
<td>Diqar force</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>7.</td>
<td>Fedayee</td>
<td>'Abd Ni'ma Jabir</td>
<td>Diqar force</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>8.</td>
<td>Fedayee</td>
<td>'Ali Khairallah Khalaf</td>
<td>Diqar force</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>9.</td>
<td>Fedayee</td>
<td>Hashim Muhammad Shindi</td>
<td>Basra force</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>10.</td>
<td>Fedayee</td>
<td>Muhammad Karim Mutar</td>
<td>Basra force</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>11.</td>
<td>Fedayee</td>
<td>Ahmad 'Abd-al-Majid Ibrahim</td>
<td>Basra force</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>12.</td>
<td>Fedayee</td>
<td>Falih Kahat Sahar</td>
<td>Basra force</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>13.</td>
<td>Fedayee</td>
<td>'Abd-al-Karim Kazim Zubar</td>
<td>Karkh force</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>14.</td>
<td>Fedayee</td>
<td>'Imad 'Awni Jamil</td>
<td>Karkh force</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>15.</td>
<td>Fedayee</td>
<td>'Ali 'Abd-al-'Aziz Hammudi</td>
<td>Karkh force</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

[Diala force cells are marked with the note:] Staff brigadier general Thair.
The classification markings are original to the Iraqi documents and do not reflect current US classification.

ISGQ-2003-00003598

[Diqar force cells are marked with the note:] Lieutenant colonel Raid + captain Samir.
[Karkh force cells are marked with the note:] Staff colonel Qusai.

(1-2)
In the name of God the Merciful the Compassionate

Be ye fair and drawn swords against tyranny while remaining truthful men

God. Country. The leader. Those who give pledge to you they are giving pledge to Allah

[Holy Quran: 48-10.]

The Republic of Iraq
Office of the President
Saddam's fedayeen
General secretariat

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Number</th>
<th>Rank</th>
<th>Full name</th>
<th>Force</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>16.</td>
<td>Fedayee</td>
<td>Surin Yinshan</td>
<td>Rasafa force</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td>Antranik</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>17.</td>
<td>Fedayee</td>
<td>Makki Jawad Kazim</td>
<td>Rasafa force</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>18.</td>
<td>Fedayee</td>
<td>Karim Rahim 'Abd</td>
<td>Rasafa force</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td>Salman</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>19.</td>
<td>Fedayee</td>
<td>'Ali Hussein Jawda</td>
<td>Karbala force</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

[Rasafa force cells are marked with the note:] Major Sulaiman.

Please review and advise, warm regards.


(2-2)
Hamad
1 4
Miqdam 3/1
T. W (A/B/J)
In the name of God, the Merciful, the Compassionate

To my supervisor, greetings and regards:

Subject: Clarification

There was a misunderstanding during my meeting with you on 5/31/2001 regarding the subject of the information presented to you by the secretary general and staff major general Makki Hammudat. Therefore, I wish to explain to you the following:

1. The area named Jamila is a designated a commercial trading area lying nine miles east of al-’Amiya port. Basically it is an Iranian port that was previously proposed but work at it has stopped. The massive concrete pads that were built to serve as a foundation for the port are still there. It is considered a forward base where many boats from Iranian naval force 'Ashura command would dock. Many boats from various countries assemble in this area to engage in commercial exchange based on the goods carried by these boats. It is marked on the chart shown to us by you at the start of the task. Attached you will find attachment "a", which is a confession of the same person who informed the secretary general, plus the confessions of a number of people who were with him. When he was confronted by me, and because he knows that I know many details about this area, he then admitted that it is an Iranian, not an Iraqi area since it is called Jamila only by the Iraqi fishermen as a namesake for the produce market Jamila in Baghdad.

2. Regarding the reference that the task is disclosed. Here I meant to elucidate the matter of disclosure: If the intent was that the task was uncovered by the enemy, then I will be responsible about this before you. Rather, if its disclosure was from other Iraqi sources, then we have an indicator of that reasons that I will recount seriatim. The important thing is that it is of no importance nor does it have any influence upon the task, as follows:
   a. There was coordination with the naval force through many segments, starting with the purchasing of the boats…
And the training that included 50 fedayeen and an officer from the Basra command and gathering preliminary intelligence about the American naval vessels that are operating in the Arabian Gulf and their contribution in facilitating the movement of our boats at sea and other matters that were requested from me by you regarding the Slkworm missile and the delineation of a safe zone within Zubair Inlet.

b. Coordinating with the directorate of Iraqi ports regarding boat examination certificates and allowing our boats to dock at port of Um Qasr and using Hittin shipyard and the coordinating shipyard for repair purposes, noting that port of Um Qasr and its shipyards are not entered by shipping boats, but only the boats belonging to the naval intelligence and secret police.

c. Coordinate with the Basra branch of the leading party and with the fishermen association regarding the launching of a group that of more than 50 boats to provide cover for our boats' movements.

d. Coordinating with Basra province regarding completion of the fishermen's identity documents.

e. Coordinating with the ministry of defense regarding the securing of firepower, such as Malotka missiles and a 106 mm caliber cannon.

f. Coordinating with the military industrialization department regarding the modification of the weapons.

g. Coordinating with the Republican guard for the purpose of starting a workshop for 18 fedayeen from other forces and securing rubber boats.

h. Coordinating with several civilian entities regarding boat repair and regarding numerous occupations.

i. The task originally comprised a group that numbered more than 70 fedayeen and cooperative civilians; and certainly a number as big as this one must pose a risk on the covertness of the task.

j. The privacy that our boats enjoy, particularly when they sail from the port of Um Qasr, would attract the attention of other fishermen especially when noting that using the port of Um Qasr is a necessity that cannot be avoided particularly during the repair stage.

k. There exits another important element, namely that deferring to the commander and constantly confirming orders from Um Qasr has given another indicator to others that there about to be a specific at-sea mission for the fedayeen.
3. Sir: As a result of having the abovementioned reasons warrant sufficient doubt in the task, I still feel very confident toward the task. All these matters were and still remain under consideration and are expected, but they don’t mean much as far as the elemental course of the task execution simply because we basically were in agreement that it is a crucial task, and the level of sacrifice involved in it is initially calculated. Also, since the specification given by you was that we should work within our territorial waters, what harm would there be in having all Iraqis know that we are in our territorial waters, defending our country and that we harbor no aggression toward others?

4. Sir: As far as you know, this task comprised two parts. The first falls under the responsibility of staff major general Makki Hammoudat. This part deals with buying the boats, repairing them, and making them complete from all angles. The second part that concerns us relates to securing human resources, training them, readying them and equipping them with the firepower that they will be using. To be candid, sir, I would say to you that staff major general Makki Hammoudat has gone too far in mixing his sense of economization and scrimping with the significance of the task in that the boats -it is true- are cheap, but they are not suited for this kind of task despite the fact that more than (56,) fifty six million Dinars were spent on repairing them, though this repair procedure is not completely convincing. And I have told him oftentimes about this matter, particularly in relation to the boat that remained neglected at the port of Um Qasr for more than six months until it was destroyed when one of the supply ships crashed into it.

5. I do have additional suggestions that, if you wish to have them presented, I will be ready to bring them along and discuss them at length with you. May God guide us. Please review, sir. Warm regards.

In the name of God, the Merciful, the Compassionate.

The decision:
[in a broad tipped marker:] I agreed.


Mr. Director:
Greetings and salutations,
In reference to your oral command during my meeting with you on 3/18/2001 regarding briefing the naval force commander and chiefs of security departments, I wish to explain the following to you:

1. On 3/21/2001 staff brigadier general Ahmad Sadak Batah and staff colonel Muhammad Fahad Salih went to the province of Basra and stayed there for four days.

2. We visited the naval force commander and a discussion ensued thereafter regarding the Silkworm missile. It later became apparent that this missile is classified among the extra-heavy weapons and, as such, cannot be used on our boats. Its specifications are the following:
   a. Length of the missile: 7.36 meters.
   b. Diameter of the missile: 0.76 meters.
   c. Length of the wing: 2.4 meters.
   d. Total weight, including the warhead: 2.5 tons.
   e. Must be launched only from the coast, and it needs a seven-wheels [dials?] launching base, specialized for this purpose. They are:
      i. Load wheel.
      ii. Energy wheel.
      iii. Launch wheel.
      iv. Radar wheel.
      v. Cable wheel.
      vi. Base wheel.
      vii. Direction wheel.

(1-2)
In the name of God, the Merciful, the Compassionate.

The decision:
[In broad felt tip – two points:]
1) I agree.
2) Everything must be ready immediately after the religious festival, God willing, even if with only three choices out of four, originally.
Signature: Saddam fedayeen director, 2/26/2001.

To the director of Saddam's Fedayeen: Greetings and salutations,
Subject: Operation Basra revenge.

Sir, we wish to advance for your review the stages that we have accomplished regarding operation Basra revenge. They are as follows:

1. The task force that numbers (19) nineteen fedayeen, who received training at the human frog wing of the Republican guard, were dispatched to Basra's Saddam's fedayeen command force on 2/17/2001. They were then divided into five groups according to the number of prepared boats and the type of weapon that has that decided should be used (RPG 7, 106 mm caliber, Malotka missiles, the bomb-rigged rubber boat, the guided airplane [broad felt tip remark:] what happened after we commissioned Farnas club at the time? Contact should have been with general Makki through general 'Aladdin to give the reason for accomplishing.

2. Three boats were completed and work is in progress to complete the other two. Staff major general Makki Hammoudat was informed of the exigency of speed in order to finish them during the few upcoming days, and he promised us that he will go the province of Basra solely for this purpose.

3. All the documentation for the other boats have been furnished (navigation cards, members' identifications, examination certificates, and so forth) through coordination with the province of Basra and with the directorate of ports and with the naval force.
4. Our civilian sources that man these boats were briefed regarding the carrying of three fedayeen on each boat for the purpose of teaching them the trade of fishing and the ways and means of working at sea and navigation and boat operation. They will be replaced through rounds until everyone has been readied while noting that the first convoy has left at 1200 hours on 2/22/2001. [broad felt tip:] Why couldn't you select fedayeen who are adept at fishing from the start?  
5. We made an agreement with the civilian sources that 50% of the fishing profits will be appropriated to them. [broad felt tip:] What is the significance of the civilian sources for the task of the fedayeen?  
6. The modified launch base for firing the Malotka missiles has been readied by officers from the infantry directorate that are being used by us. It has been tested, lifted, and erected on the boat under our supervision.  
7. The firepower of the RPG missile has been completely modified using the material HMX, manufactured at the Hittin facility. It was delivered to Basra force command.  
8. The rubber boat modified using the material C4 will be operational on 3/1/2001, by the estimates of those working on the modification at the Qa'qa' facility.  
9. All appropriate authorizations were secured to receive the 106 mm caliber cannon along with (15) fifteen shells. They will be received on 2/25/2001, upon which we will deliver it to Basra command.  
10. There was an agreement with the naval command officer regarding the designation of a secure position in Zubair Inlet for the purpose of using it as a maintenance and deployment safe base for our boats.  
11. As per your orders, sir, regarding the training workshop at the naval force command for members of the Basra force, similar to the workshop that was open for the Group 19, where 40 fedayeen graduated, we suggest -following your authorization- that we include them in the expenses that total (25,000) twenty five Dinars monthly and assign them at their command force posts following the example of Group 19.  
12. Generally, the task, as we best estimate, will be ready in its entirety in the middle of the coming month of March. We ask God's guidance. Please review, sir. Warm regards,  
Referring to your orders to the task team that comprises staff lieutenant general Aiub Mahdi Salih, secretary general; staff Major general special forces Kazim Muhammad Faris, commander-in-chief of Kazma's Saddam's fedayeen; staff brigadier general Ahmad Sadak Batah, from the public relations board; staff brigadier general Salman Hamid Zahir, commander of Basra force of Saddam's fedayeen; and staff colonel Muhammad Fahad of the public relations board at 2300 hours on 12/29/2000 regarding the assessment of the naval operations theatre in order to confront the Kuwaiti and Iranian transgressions in the Arabian Gulf area, we wish to clarify to you the following:

1. As soon as we received your order, a task team convened a meeting at 0900 hours on 12/31/2000 at the general secretariat of Saddam's fedayeen to formulate a movement and information-gathering plan and to ponder scenarios and consider opinions in order to carry out the mission with every precision and boldness and trust, given that it [plan] is one of the civic duties in the course of dealing with these transgressions to put a stop to them.

2. The task team moved to Basra sector to execute the movement plan in-field and to become familiar with the nature of the operations theatre and to establish contact with all our covert sources so as to identify the true nature of the situation and to formulate a number of alternatives that will result in the success of the operation, God willing.

3. The aim: prepare an evaluation of the operations theater, identify the violations, their...
locations, and their nature, and formulate confrontation plans plus secure their requirements thereof.

4. Description of the naval operations theater: Appendix (a) is a chart of northern Arabian Gulf.

a. The Iraqi coast is located north of the Arabian Gulf, bordered from the east by Iran, from the south by Kuwait, and it stretches for 60 kilometers from Ras al-Bisha until Um Qasr.

b. The average depth in the Arabian Gulf is 70 meters, and it decreases as we move toward the north where the 20th depth line is located at a distance of 40 kilometers from the Iraqi coast.

c. The presence of the de-militarized zone at 'Abdullah inlet will check the navigation of our naval vessels. There is a group of buoys that demarcate the imaginary maritime boundary line. The Kuwaiti coast is located five kilometers from the boundary line and ten kilometers from the Iraqi coast. This area is considered the territorial waters for that country.

d. The Iraqi maritime coast has been demarcated after the ceasefire, and it has become more shrunken. Additionally, the Coalition forces are steadfast in further shrinking the Iraqi coast to make it resemble an inland waterway.

e. The al-Bakr and al-'Amiq ports are in the Arabian Gulf. The al-'Amiq port lies 50 kilometers from Um Qasr and contains an oil pipe.

f. There is a demilitarized zone in the Shat al-'Arab area at one kilometer from both sides, the Iraqi and the Iranian; it is forbidden to position any heavy military equipment in it.

g. In the Kuwaiti Gaid area, there are two observation boats in addition to a number of maritime observation posts that cover the Kuwaiti shoreline.

h. There are Iraqi patrol boats that belong to the Iraqi navy that perform surveillance and observation up to al-'Amiq and al-Bakr ports.

i. There are a number of Kuwaiti islands, such as Wuria, Bubian, Failaka, and Kuwait port as well as a group of islands that are close to the Iranian coast.
5. Armament and naval readiness of the hostile countries (Kuwait, Iran, and the Coalition countries).
   a. The Kuwaiti armament and naval readiness:
      1) Two guided-missile boats, the Sunbuk, P-V-505, and the Istiqlal, P.5702, with a speed of 40 knots. Its firepower: four surface-to-surface, MM40 Exocet missiles with a range of 10 kilometers. Weight of the warhead is 165 kilograms. Lethal firing range is 5 kilometers. The boat is also armed with a 76 mm caliber Broler gun.
      2) Four small patrol boats: Intisar 30, Aman 302, 303, and 304. Speed is 28 knots. Firepower is two, 12.7 mm caliber anti-aircraft machineguns.
      3) Twelve small high-speed patrol boats, speed is 40 knots, each armed with a machinegun.
      4) Seventeen small patrol boats equipped with a single-bore machinegun.
      5) Eight patrol boats that were received from one of the French companies each armed with a 26 mm caliber gun plus two, 20 mm caliber guns.
      6) A number of British-made small interdiction high speed boats, received in 1991. Speed is 43 knots. Powered by two Yamaha outboard motors, it is armed with a single-bore 12.7 mm caliber machinegun.
      7) High speed Kuwaiti-made interdiction boats with a length of 13 meters powered by two 100 HP Yamaha motors. They were entered into service in 1998.
   b. Iranian naval armament and readiness:
      1) Three frigates.
      2) Three destroyers.
      3) Two guard ships.
      4) Fifteen missile boats.
      5) Five minesweepers.
      6) Three submarines type Kilo [PH].
      7) Twelve supply ships.
8) Four landing ships.
9) Seven patrol boats and a number of small boats.
10) Fourteen helicopters.

c. Armament and combat readiness of the Coalition forces in the Arabian Gulf:
1) American forces:
   1. One air carrier with 86 various aircraft aboard.
   2. Seven cruisers.
   3. Five destroyers.
   4. Four frigates.
   5. Three submarines.
   7. Amphibious assault ship. [TN: Underline matches the source document's reviewer's markings, and so forth thereafter.]
   8. Minesweeper.
   9. Four tank and personnel landing ship.
   10. One supply ship.
2) Other forces:
   1. Six British naval vessels (three destroyers, two frigates, and one support ship).
   2. Three Canadian frigates.
   3. Three Dutch frigates.
   4. Four New Zealand frigates.
   5. Four French multi-purpose naval vessels.
3) Surface ships (cruisers, destroyers, frigates, and submarines) carrying 166 Tomahawk cruise missiles for striking naval targets and 122 Harpoon anti-ship missiles.
4) One amphibious assault ship (Bililu [PH]) carrying four Harrier aircraft and 19 helicopters of the types Sea Stallion, Super Stallion, Sea Cobra, and Sea Night.
5) Two materiel and personnel landing ships with two infantry battalion plus two tank detachments landing capability via landing boats in a single lift.
6. Violations and transgressions, their locations, and their results in 2000:

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>The Map</th>
<th>Vessel's name</th>
<th>Date and time</th>
<th>Type of violation / Aggression</th>
<th>Location</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>Fath al-Rahman</td>
<td>5/7/2000</td>
<td>Intercepted by a Kuwaiti patrol boat and was towed to Kuwait's ports.</td>
<td>Near Bubian island, on the Kuwaiti side.</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>1</td>
<td>motorboat</td>
<td>1200</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>22/Basra Al-Mamun</td>
<td>9/6/2000</td>
<td>Intercepted by an Iranian patrol boat and was led to port Bandar Khumaini.</td>
<td>Half a mile south of Jamila beacon M T (835972).</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>4</td>
<td>Mustafa</td>
<td>9/13/2000</td>
<td>Interception by American ships, was taken to Abu Dhabi port, then confiscated.</td>
<td>Baharkan area.</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>3</td>
<td>Fishing boat</td>
<td>10/7/2000</td>
<td>A Kuwaiti boat approached the fishing boat and was then chased away by our boats and it ran away.</td>
<td>Near buoy (12).</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>2</td>
<td>1735</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>The transporter Muna</td>
<td>10/24/2000</td>
<td>Intercepted by two Iranian military boats.</td>
<td>Southeast port al-Bakr, a distance of 6.5 kilometers.</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>5</td>
<td>2400</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>The mechanized</td>
<td>11/24/2000</td>
<td>Intercepted by four Iranian armed boats and was lead to port Bandar Khumaini.</td>
<td>M T (835972).</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>6</td>
<td>barge Jalajil</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>The tugboat 'Ali</td>
<td>11/24/2000</td>
<td>Intercepted by Iranian boats then lead to port Bandar Khumaini.</td>
<td>The outer barrier of Shat al-'Arab.</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>7</td>
<td>Bantun</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>The fishing ship Nur</td>
<td>11/24/2000</td>
<td>Intercepted by Iranian boats, then interdicted at the entrance of Musa Inlet.</td>
<td>M T (835972).</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>8</td>
<td>Nur</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>The ship Rishan</td>
<td>12/8/2000</td>
<td>Intercepted by a group of Iranian boats and interdicted on the Iraqi side of Shat al-'Arab.</td>
<td>Across from the Iranian command control</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>9</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>
7. The form of hostile violations:
From the information gathered from our secret sources, and after meeting a number of fishermen who work at various locations at sea (Um Qasr, al-Faw, Shat al-'Arab) or seamen who work in shipping freight, the following is now clear:

a. The Kuwaiti transgressions:
The Kuwaiti transgressions take place when Iraqi fishing boats trespass into Kuwaiti territorial waters searching for deepwater fish and during certain seasons. Two Kuwaiti boats would approach the fishing boat. An officer on one of the two boats would request that the sailors of the fishing boat should gather at its fore. Two crew members of the Kuwaiti boat then board the fishing boat to search it. If weapons or contraband were found, the boat is then taken to the Kuwaiti shores. If nothing is found, the boat is then expelled out of the Kuwaiti territorial waters.

b. The Iranian transgressions:
The Iranian transgressions happen when fishing boats venture into Iranian territorial waters searching for fish that abound in Iranian territorial waters and at certain seasons. Also, Iranian transgressions happen when oil tankers carrying smuggled oil try to evade paying Customs tariffs for using the Iranian territorial waters: An Iranian patrol boat will approach an Iraqi maritime vessel and stop it. If the boatman is a fisherman, he is then told to return to the Iraqi territorial waters. But if the maritime vessel is a ship, its cargo documentation is inspected. If it is found in violation of the governing laws, it is then taken to the Iranian coast.

(6-14)
c. There was no proof that the Iranian and Kuwaiti patrols violated Iraqi maritime vessels inside the Iraqi territorial waters with one exception: the violation against the ship Rishan. This ship has itself committed two previous violations, and has a negative marker on it. The Iranian boat that approached it and fired into the air for the purpose of stopping her caused the sailors aboard it to fire back at the Iranian boat’s crew, killing two of its members.

d. The patrols of the Iraqi naval force are constantly moving to cover all the Iraqi territorial waters area between port Um Qasr and al-Faw, and between port al-'Amiq and port al-Bakr. During this unobstructed movement to carry out their duties there was never once any violation logged against the.

8. Options available to us to confront the aggressions:

From the study of the theatre of naval operations and the foreign violations that were committed against ships and commercial boats, we deduced that the ideal option to stop such operations is to conduct a high jacking or to destroy the hostile naval vessel that is committing this aggression or kill its crew. This is best done by drawing the enemy into a calculated confrontation with one of naval vessels that has been fitted and equipped with what ensures a quick and direct response. Considering most of the foreign aggressions (Kuwaiti – Iranian,) and based on what has been concluded from the available information that was gathered from sailing ships and boat captains, there is potential for finding locations of planting the following suggested ambushes.

(7-14)
a. Locations of launching the ambushes on the Kuwaiti side:

First: Ambush No. 1: to be launched north of the Arabian Gulf area (entrance to 'Abdullah Inlet, see Attachment A).

(1) Positive aspects:
   a. Proximity to the Iraqi coasts.
   b. Ability to pull out under cover provided by Iraqi naval force boats.
   c. Kuwaiti interference is limited.

(2) The negative aspects:
   a. Potential for incurring losses.
   b. Potential for a confrontation from the Kuwaiti terrain.
   c. The Kuwaiti face-off will use two naval vessels.

Second: Ambush No. 2: to be set up north of Failaka Island (Attachment A).

(1) The positive aspects:
   a. Open sea area.
   b. The Kuwaiti opposition is conducted with one naval vessel.

(2) The negative aspects:
   a. Potential for incurring losses.
   b. The difficulty in pulling out the naval vessel.

Third: Ambush No. 3: to be set up in the open sea in the direction of the Kuwaiti coasts (Attachment A).

(1) The positive aspects:
   a. Open sea area.
   b. Kuwaiti opposition is conducted with one naval vessel.
(2) The negative aspects:
   a. The potential of interference from the large or midsize naval vessels.
   b. The potential for incurring losses.

b. Locations for launching ambushes on the Iranian side:
   First: Ambush No. One: to be launched near the Iranian command control (Attachment A.)
   (1) The positive aspects:
      a. Rapid withdrawal toward the Iraqi coast.
      b. There must be no interference from other Iranian naval vessels.
      c. It is possible to provide cover and concealment for the presence of many boats and ships.
   (2) The negative aspects:
      a. An Iranian reaction toward the sailing vessel.
      b. Potential for interference from land forces that are positioned on the Iranian coast.

Second. Ambush No. Two: Can be launched at the mouth of Shat al-Arab (Attachment A.)
   (1) The positive aspects:
      a. The area is relatively far for the naval vessels to interfere.
      b. The element of surprise is better achieved.
   (2) The negative aspects:
      a. Pulling out would be relatively far.
      b. The potential for interference from land or sea.

Third. Ambush No. Three: To be launched near the Iranian coasts (Attachment A.)
   (1) The positive aspects: Execution is in the direction of one boat.
   (2) The negative aspects:
      a. Potential for incurring losses.
b. Potential for interference from other naval vessels.

c. Pull out is relatively far.

c. After analyzing the positive and negative aspects of the ambush launch locations, we reach the following:

First. The best place to launch the ambushes on the Kuwaiti side is Ambush No. One, which launches north of the Arab Gulf area (the entrance to 'Abdullah Inlet).

Second. The best place to launch ambushes on the Iranian side is Ambush No. One, which launches near the Iranian command control (in al-Faw).

(10-14)
9. Special requirements to confront the aggressions (armament / preparedness / elements / command and control)

a. Supplies:

1 – Large motorboat with two speedboats powered by two, 235 HP motors, each boat and the motorboat. This averages one motorboat and one speedboat for the Kuwait task and one speedboat for the Iran task.

2 – A communications wireless radio, type Rakal? [Broad tip, one word:] naval HF with an international channel for each speedboat and motorboat, and a similar device for central command.

3 – Three GPS devices for position location type Magellan.

4 – Three rubber boats with three motors.

5 – Three pneumatic generators.

6 – Thirty life vests.

7 – Ten diving suits plus their accouterments.

b. Armament:

1 – Three BKC machineguns plus the base.

2 – Three RPG7 for each speedboat and motorboat at an average of five anti-tank rockets for each launcher.

3 – Thirty half-butt Kalashnikov assault rifles with four magazines for each assault rifle.

4 – Thirty attack hand grenades.

5 – Ten highly explosive adhesion mines.

6 – Ten smoke grenades.

c. The elements:

1 – Three officers.

2 – Thirty fedayeen. -----→?

3 – Elements for the boats' command and guides to be recruited either from the navy [marker:] trustworthy or from the cooperating civilians request information after the decision to implement in later stages.

4 – Admit the officers and fedayeen into a training course at the naval force command to train them on diving and swimming and the use of diving equipment and to learn to adapt and survive in the sea for 15 days.

5 – When the above requirements are fulfilled, the task team will need ten days [boldface arrow connecting the 10 and 15 days] to start execution of duty.

(11-14)
d. Command and control:
   1 – Secure the task area through Kazma’s command by coordinating with the naval force command.
   2 – Establishing a land command center by Kazma’s command and securing the launch and pull-out area for the boats in Um Qasr and al-Faw according to the nature of the task and at subsequent stages for the purpose of securing the safety of the operation. [boldface marker connecting 1- and 2- and the word:] **it will be revealed.**
   3 – Wireless connection between the command center and the task boat for the purpose of altering the plans to safely withdraw when needed and through a commanding officer.

10. The confrontation approach:
   a. Confronting the Kuwaiti aggression:
      The conventional approach is for two Kuwaiti boats to approach. One of the boats stays at a far distance launching while the other begins the approach with the request that the Iraqi crew gather at the foredeck. The boat would then circle the vessel several times to confirm that all the crew is assembled at the foredeck members. Only then would the Kuwaiti boat tether itself to the Iraqi vessel. Two to three armed personnel would then board the vessel to secure the situation. They then commence searching the boat and beating and insulting or escorting to the Kuwaiti ports and confiscating the naval vessel. In order to confront this practice and provide an armed response we shall do the following:
      1 – The naval vessel (motorboat/speedboat) with all the required equipment will set sail for the purpose of fishing near the Kuwaiti coast, south of buoy No. (3) in the direction of Bubian Island and will maneuver in the area while executing a deception plan: Launching as large a number of boats to be coordinated with [UI] and commander from artillery support to sea for the purpose of fishing. The Kuwaiti boats are then given the opportunity to observe this while being careful not to have any patrol boats present near the task naval vessel.

(12-14)
The classification markings are original to the Iraqi documents and do not reflect current US classification.

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[Page 85:

2 – When the Kuwaiti boat requests that the crew gather at the foredeck, only part of the crew (5 – 6) will oblige, but the rest will hide inside.
3 – The Kuwaiti sailors are then allowed to board the naval vessel for the purpose of searching. Only then would the personnel hiding inside appear and open fire on them [broad marker:] swift. Other personnel will start engaging the boats with medium firepower, including RPG7 to destroy them and kill anyone aboard them, or the adhesive mines or attack grenades can be used.
4 – Commence immediate withdrawal after execution of the task and do not linger in the area. Withdrawal shall be under the protection of Iraqi naval patrol in the direction of 'Abdullah Inlet.

b. Confronting the Iranian aggression:
For the purpose of carrying out an armed operation against the Iranian naval vessels near the command control in al-Faw [particularly] for the boat 'Ashur, we require the following:

1 – Prepare a small fishing boat with three to four personnel.
2 – The boat will remain anchored for two to three days for the purpose of fishing.
3 – When the boat 'Ashur approaches for material gain purposes or other purposes, it will be addressed using Persian or Arabian dialogue.
4 – The boat 'Ashur lacks any fighting capability, making its capture all the more easy.
5 – Conducting the operation at night requires that it stays longer than the time previously mentioned until the arrival of the target boat.
6 – Immediate withdrawal via 'Abdullah Inlet under the protection of the Iraqi naval patrol.

11. The deception plan:

a. Work under complete secrecy until the start of the execution of the task. The task team should conduct visits to the middle and north sector for the purpose of deception.
b. Coordinate with the member of the Iraqi command in launching the fishing boat at a suitable time to carry out a camouflage-and-hide operation for the boats tasked with duty.
c. Secure a methodical, detailed deception plan during the preparation stage and secure the task requirements, such as buying or renting boats and modifying them, and establishing the logistical center and securing the launch and withdrawal base. All the details of this plan will be presented to you, Sir, for the safety of the operation.
d. Transportation for all the charged officers during all the operation stages will be via civilian vehicles different from those used in the sacrificial work. The officers will wear civilian clothes similar to those worn in the Basra province environment.

(13-14)
12. The general conclusion: From the above, the task team reached the final and general conclusion that all the capabilities are available for the sacrificial work to execute the task with courage and precision for all the confrontation choices at once or based on priority of choices or in case your orders mandate the tackling of any naval target, Kuwaiti or Iranian, inside their territorial waters without waiting for a violation to take place inside our territorial waters. The task team pledges to be worthy of your trust in carrying out this task or any upcoming task that you order us to do whether inside our territorial water or in the high seas. We await your orders, sir.

In the name of God, the Merciful, the Compassionate:
"And an Ayāh (sign) for them is that We bore their offspring in the laden ship. And We have created for them of the like thereunto, on which they ride. And if We will, We shall drown them, and there will be no shout (or helper) for them (to hear their cry for help) nor will they be saved." Chapter Yasin: 41-43 [Quran].

Staff colonel Muhammad Salih Fahad – public relations.
Staff brigadier general Ahmad Sadak Batah – public relations.
Staff brigadier general Salman Hamid Zahir – Basra force commanding officer.
Special forces staff major general Kazim Muhammad Faris – commander of Kazma command.
Staff major general Aiub Mahdi Salih – secretary general for Saddam's fedayeen.

(14-14)
In the name of God the Merciful the Compassionate

Be ye fair and drawn swords against tyranny while remaining truthful men

God. Country. The leader. Those who give pledge to you they are giving pledge to Allah

[Holy Quran: 48-10.]

The Republic of Iraq
Office of the President
Saddam's fedayeen
General secretariat

Decision:

Discussion with staff general Aiub.

Signature: Saddam fedayeen director.

Director of the Saddam's fedayeen, greetings and salutations, sir:

Subject: Operation Basra revenge:

This is in reference to your command that mandates the updating of information regarding the American naval targets that are violating the sovereignty of our territorial waters in the Arabian Gulf. We wish to clarify the following to you, sir:

1. Staff major general Kazim Muhammad Faris was notified of recalling the fedayeen who were tasked with duty to inform them to start carrying out the mission without delay and to task them with providing progress reports that include intelligence regarding the positioning and the movement of the above mentioned targets.

2. On 8/23/2000, and after the return of fedayee Qasim Karim Khalaf (on of the fedayeen previously referred to,) a report was submitted by him that contained information about the targets under discussion.

(1-3)
In the name of God the Merciful the Compassionate

Be ye fair and drawn swords against tyranny while remaining truthful men

God. Country. The leader. Those who give pledge to you they are giving pledge to Allah

[Holy Quran: 48-10.]

The Republic of Iraq
Office of the President
Saddam's fedayeen
General secretariat

3. The author of the report, along with staff major general Kazim Muhammad Faris, was requested to report to the general secretariat. After discussion, he offered some opinions regarding the procuring of a fishing boat designed for this type of sacrificial work, as follows:

a. A fiberglass, out of commission boat was received from the naval force command and was subsequently refurbished and outfitted by us in a way that is appropriate with the nature of the duty. Bear in mind that the refurbishing and outfitting cost was estimated between (9-11) million Dinars.

b. received a good boat from the naval force command and put in place a few modifications to make the boat suitable for the nature of the mission; an estimated cost of the modifications is 5-7 million Dinars.

c. The purchase of a complete fishing boat from the citizens in al-Faw jurisdiction at a cost between 14 and 16 million Dinars.

4. Carrying out the mission in a boat specialized for fedayeen type of missions requires the approval of the governor of Basra and the providing of the fedayeen with fishermen licenses issued by the province.

5. Staff major general Kazim Muhammad Faris suggested including the fedayeen tasked with the mission...

(2-3)
In the name of God the Merciful the Compassionate
Be ye fair and drawn swords against tyranny while remaining truthful men
God. Country. The leader. Those who give pledge to you they are giving pledge to Allah
[Holy Quran: 48-10.]
The Republic of Iraq
Office of the President
Saddam's fedayeen
General secretariat

...in an accelerated training session at the naval force command regarding these topics:
identifying naval targets and reading and estimating nautical distances.

6. As per your command during 8/17/2000, the fedayeen charged with executing the
mission were informed that there is another task that was added to the main task:
confronting and controlling the Kuwaiti boats that practice acts of piracy against the Iraqi
fishing boats in an effort to capture and confiscate them or, in case it became difficult to
do that, to dispatch their crews.

Please review and provide orders to delegate, sir. Warm regards.

The meeting and discussion with the director took place on 9/1. He commanded the
following:

1. Staff major general Makki will be charged with visiting the defense minister and
request that we are provided with three out of commission boats from the navy.
2. Form a committee to be chaired by major general Makki, colonel Kazim, and staff
brigadier general 'Abbas for the purpose of dispensing funds pertinent to outfitting
these boats.
3. Agreed on points 4, 5, and 6 after review.
Signature: 9/2.
To the commander of Saddam's fedayeen, Basra force.
Subject: Security report

I am the fedayee Qasim Karim Khalaf, a member of Basra force of Saddam's fedayeen, second battalion, set out on a Tornado type fishing boat on 8/17/2000 when I saw the American frigate getting closer to the Iraqi territorial waters on 8/19/2000 accompanied by a helicopter type aircraft hovering near the frigate. The frigate approached al-Bakr port and was two kilometers away, then navigated toward the ships that were docked at the entrance of 'Abdullah Inlet, then headed toward the sea. On 8/20/2000 an Iranian patrol boat conducted a search of the Iraqi boats. On the night of 8/22-23/2000 a helicopter flew over the Iraqi territorial water where it patrolled until dawn. [Underline the next five words] There was another American aircraft that flew over the Iraqi territorial waters; it patrolled for the [underline the next five words] sole purpose of taking photographs. There were Iranian patrol boats, type Tanzin, [underline next two words] high-speed, that conducted [underline the next word] extensive patrolling and trespassed across the Iraqi territorial waters. Awaiting your orders, sir.

In the name of God the Merciful the Compassionate

Be ye fair and drawn swords against tyranny while remaining truthful men

God. Country. The leader. Those who give pledge to you they are giving pledge to Allah

[Holy Quran: 48-10.]

The Republic of Iraq

Office of the President

Saddam's fedayeen

General secretariat

3. In the event that you would agree upon receiving the above mentioned frames and completing them in a way that is suitable with the nature of the task, then the total cost for a single boat will be 10.5 million Dinars, and as follows:

   b. Gear modification and altering the boat features and covering the boat – two million Dinars.
   c. Fishing nets and their attachments – a million and a half Dinars.
   d. Various items (anchor, compass, VHF device, ropes, gas stove, gas tanks, oven, other needs) – only two million Dinars.

Please review, sir, and delegate your command. Warm regards.

In the name of God, the Merciful, the Compassionate

To staff colonel Qutaiba Sa'id Hammu.

Subject: Boats.

After meeting the fedayee Qasim to learn the costs of preparing and equipping one boat after procuring the frame from the naval force command, please find below the required details and the funds needed to furnish them:

1. One 235 horsepower boat motor plus attachments costs 4.5 million Dinars.
2. Modifications and covering cost 2.0 million Dinars.

[Translator note: the rest of the writing is illegible until:]

Total cost: 9.975 million Dinars.

Please review. Warm regards,

Staff major general –special forces- Kazim Muhammad Faris – 9/22/2000.
In the name of God, the Merciful, the Compassionate.

To the secretary general of Saddam fedayeen.

Subject: Report

In reference to the oral command from you on 8/21/2000 regarding the probability of securing a good fishing boat or motorboat to be used by Saddam's fedayeen, we wish to clarify the following to you:

1. There was a meeting with the commander of the naval force regarding the potential of obtaining a fishing boat or a motorboat from the resources of the naval force. He responded by saying that fishing boats are not available to them, but they do have fiberglass boats that can be used for fishing after doing some repairs on them. He also mentioned that the naval force intelligence presently has a fishing boat that was purchased for 50 million Dinars two years ago. He showed a good degree of cooperation in providing whatever capabilities they had, and he will visit you when his annual vacation is due.

2. There was a meeting that took place with the fedayee Qasim Karim Khalaf, the source of the information, who is charged with monitoring the movement of the American vessels in the waters of the Arabian Gulf since he works as a fisherman on one of the fishing boats that belong to one of the citizens. He clarified the following:
   a. the large size fiberglass boat is more suitable than the fishing boat for this mission, especially after repairing and finishing it.
   b. in case it became difficult for the naval force command to procure the required boat, there are boats offered for sale by the citizens at an estimated value of fifteen million Dinars; they are fit and completely accoutered.
   c. right now there are three fedayeen at the Basra command of Saddam's fedayeen who can carry out this mission.

(2-1)
d. the mission requires coordination with the province of Basra to issue fishing licenses for the fedayeen who are charged with this mission.
e. it is a mission requirement that some of the fedayeen who will be chosen should attend a workshop at the naval force command (identifying naval targets, estimating nautical distances).
f. the commander of the naval force mentioned that it is possible to make use of whatever boats that are available at the Iraqi ports. The fedayee had previously explained that these large boats that are designed for transporting workers are too large, making them not suitable for this mission.
g. attached please find the report filed by the fedayee Qasim Karim Khalaf after returning from sea on 8/23/2000.

Please review and issue delegating orders. Warm regards,
Signature: Staff major general - special forces - Kazim Muhammad Faris, commander of Kazma’s command of Saddam fedayeen – 8/24/2000.

(2-2)
To the commander of Saddam's fedayeen, Basra force.
Subject: Security report

This is the fedayee Qasim Karim Khalaf, of the Basra force of Saddam fedayeen, second brigade, set out on a Tornado type fishing boat on 8/17/2000 where I saw the American frigate approaching the Iraqi regional waters on 8/19/2000 under the cover of a helicopter hovering along the frigate. The frigate approached al-Bakr port to a distance of 2 km, then sailed in the direction of the vessels that dock at the entrance of 'Abdullah Inlet, then headed toward the sea. On 8/20/2000 an Iranian patrol boat conducted a search of the Iraqi boats. A hovercraft flew over the Iraqi territorial water. It patrolled until the dawn of the night of 22/23 of August 2000. There was another American aircraft that flew over the Iraqi territorial waters; it patrolled only to take photographs. There are high-speed Iranian Tanzin patrol boats in extensive presence that trespass across the Iraqi sovereign waters. Please review.
In the name of God the Merciful the Compassionate
Be ye fair and drawn swords against tyranny while remaining truthful men
God. Country. The leader. Those who give pledge to you they are giving pledge to Allah
[Holy Quran: 48-10.]
The Republic of Iraq
Office of the President
Saddam's fedayeen
General secretariat

Decision: [This was provided by the author for the addressee, the director, who then wrote in broad felt tip:]
1) I agree.
2) Consultation with major general Aiub.
3) Consultation with major general Aiub regarding the minister of military manufacturing.


[The actual letter:]
To the director – greetings and salutations, sir.
Subject: special task.
This is in reference to your directive on 12/4/2000 at 2230 hours. Regarding tasking us with the duty of planning and preparing in an attempt to influence the naval vessels of the Coalition countries that operate in the Arabian Gulf area, we wish to explain the following:
1. A small task force was formed that comprises some of the officers who have expertise in using the weapons listed below to discuss how to fire them while the weapons are mounted on the fishing boats. The weapons are:

(1-4)
In the name of God the Merciful the Compassionate

Be ye fair and drawn swords against tyranny while remaining truthful men

God. Country. The leader. Those who give pledge to you they are giving pledge to Allah

[Holy Quran: 48-10.]

The Republic of Iraq
Office of the President
Saddam's fedayeen
General secretariat

a. Mortar – 82 mm caliber.
b. Grenade launcher – 107 mm caliber.
d. Rocket – Twa.
e. Rocket – Malotka [anti-tank].

This is while noting that the above mentioned group was not given any information about the nature of the mission; rather, they were given cover to use these weapons while working in the marshes to reserve the secrecy of the mission.

2. On 12/5/2000 at 0900 hours a meeting convened with staff lieutenant general Kamal Mustafa, the secretary general for the Republican guard. The following were agreed upon:

a. the lieutenant general showed complete responsiveness in that all the efforts of the Republican guards will be for the purpose of providing support for the fedayeen for this mission.
b. we agreed on training 20 fedayeen as frogmen for the purpose of manning and navigating the rubber boats and precision firing with light weapons, particularly RPG7, for a period of 21 days.
c. secure two rubber boats for the purpose of modifying them and booby-trapping them with explosives.

(2-4)
In the name of God the Merciful the Compassionate
Be ye fair and drawn swords against tyranny while remaining truthful men
God. Country. The leader. Those who give pledge to you they are giving pledge to Allah
[Holy Quran: 48-10.]
The Republic of Iraq
Office of the President
Saddam's fedayeen
General secretariat

3. On 12/5/2000 at 2000 hours there was a meeting with the minister of military manufacturing and with a number of experts from the ministry. We agreed upon the following:

a. the potential for modifying the charge filler for the RPG7 grenade and fill it, instead, with the material (HMX). This material possesses high destructive capability. It can tear through stainless steel. The experts have already started the modification in one of the military manufacturing facilities; it will continue for 15 days.
b. it became clear that the substance C4 is not suitable as a filler for ammunition since we found out that the substance (HMX) is more destructive. Nonetheless, C4 is very effective in booby trapping boats.
c. the military manufacturing board showed its willingness to prepare for booby trapping two rubber boats with the explosive C4, which highly explodes both above and below the water and is not adversely affected by moisture and is extremely sensitive to detonation.
d. the matter of detonating the booby trapped boat has become simple. They can detonate it via timer, touch, or collision.
e. the minister of military manufacturing presented to us one of the research programs for the same purpose that is pertinent to the mission. He was in favor of my explaining to you the idea because it is highly secret and should be for a face-to-face meeting with you.

(3-4)

[Translator note: A photocopy of page 4 of 4 of the source document can be seen under the photocopy of page 3. It may have been overlooked while sorting out the pages.]
Review of air power during crises
The Gulf information:
• Iraq.
• United States airpower in the Gulf.
• Other forces in the Gulf.
• Weapons system in the Gulf.
• The 1991 Gulf War.

Previous news from the Gulf, December 1998:
Washington, December 17: The second air carrier battle group along with six battle ships equipped with Tomahawk cruise missiles have reached the American forces theater in the Gulf area on Thursday.
The air carrier USS Carl Vinson will concentrate on increasing and intensifying the sorties against Iraq amidst attempts to conclude the air campaigns at the start of the month of Ramadan toward the end of this week, an official source added.
An official source in the navy stated that the air carrier USS Carl Vinson, accompanied by ten war ships, has entered the area of special operations under the American central command in charge of all American operations in the Gulf. The source added that this war battle group was stationed in the Indian Ocean east of Pakistan and was expected to reach the Gulf on Friday to join the American air carrier USS Enterprise on the third day of the air campaign against Iraq. This firepower consist of six war ships armed with Tomahawk cruise missiles plus eight other ships, armed with the same kind of missiles, currently involved with Iraq and has played a central role in the bombing campaign against Iraq. Like the air carrier USS Enterprise, the air carrier USS Vinson also has embarked air wings that comprise 36 F/A 18 Hornets, ten F-14 Tomcats, and four EA-6B fighter jets.
-2-

The news, December 18:

'Ali al-Salim Air Base, Kuwait – December 17: Witnesses related that a number of Tornado GR1 missile armed fighter jets were being readied for takeoff on its second campaign to bomb Iraq on Thursday night from the air base in Kuwait. The British ministry of defense had announced earlier that the bomber fighter jets had completed their sorties on Thursday and had returned safely to their base in Kuwait, but refused to give additional information regarding the operation.

The Tornado bomber aircraft are not stationed at the 'Ali al-Salim Air Base in Kuwait, at a 35 mile (56 kilometers) distance from the Iraqi borders.

Washington: the air force B-52H bombers destroyed new military targets inside Iraq on Thursday after naval Tomahawk cruise missiles reduced the number of Saddam Hussein's spy stations and military barracks in Baghdad and turning them into rubble, Pentagon leaders stated.

Secretary of Defense William Cohen informed newspaper reporters, "there were no losses among the Americans, and we are providing good coverage for our targets." He also added: "Iraqi forces offered meager resistance. Not one Iraqi aircraft took off, and no Iraqi air defense radars targeted any attacking American or British fighter jets."

Head of the joint Chiefs of Staff, general Henry Shelton, stated that on the first day of the bombardment of operation Desert Fox, 2000 Tomahawk cruise missiles were readied to attack "more than 50 sensitive targets," but was not "quite successful" as their predecessors and did not provide an explanation for that. After admitting that, Shelton said that the American-British forces were targeting locations that the Iraqi President barred the United Nations' weapons inspectors from visiting, including locations suspected of having pertinence to weapons of mass destruction, locations that provide security for the centers such as Iraqi security forces and air defense sites and air sites and military communications locations and intelligence stations. Cohen added: "One thing needs to be clarified, and that is we are focusing on military targets; we are not attacking the people of Iraq," alluding to the claims that the operations are targeting Saddam and his family members personally.

Shelton then showed two reconnaissance photos showing explosions in Saddam's intelligence stations and military barracks in Abu Ghraib, Baghdad. "Nothing is left except the rubble," said Shelton, referring to a photo that showed the main building in a complex of Iraqi intelligence stations. Another photo showed a row of barracks with large holes in four buildings out of five. Some American officials stated that they were not sure whether there were members of the special guard inside their barracks when they were attacked by the cruise missiles between 1:00 and 4:00 o'clock in the morning, local time, or between 6:00 and 9:00 Wednesday evening. Shelton then said that perhaps because the sorties were expected and because of Iraqis sounding the alarm sirens in Baghdad the citizens moved away from the probable targets. But possibly some of the personnel were inside them. He was speaking even as a second round of strikes was airborne and he stated that "the data show that the first round was successful - in fact more than successful than what this photo shows."

Defense officials stated with some reservation that the targets included missile design and production facilities in Taji, some 19 miles northwest of Baghdad, and special security centers in charge of protecting Saddam, Makhul mountain near Samarra city - which is considered one of the locations of the Presidential palaces - that covers an area of ten square miles and consists of command posts and fortified underground bunkers.
It is believed that the Presidential palaces are locations that are being used to hide biological and chemical materials programs and nuclear weapons, and that they are specialized to maintain control over communications centers that connect the various reaches of Saddam's military empire.

Secretary Cohen stated that the purpose of the strikes is to weaken the Iraqi force in threatening its neighbors with biological and chemical weapons, but not to end the crisis situation between Iraq and the United States, which has lasted almost an entire decade. He also added that there will be more strikes possibly at the end of this week.

"The absence of a military response could mean that Saddam has ordered his forces to 'absorb the shock,' thinking that the attacks will last a short time before he appears again to say that America still is unable to hurt him," an official source in the administration stated.

Shelton said that thousands of additional forces were given their orders to head toward the region, and that the American air carrier USS Carl Vinson will arrive at the operation theater on Thursday. Defense officials stated that B-52 aircraft carrying a payload estimated at between 2000 and 3000 pounds of cruise missiles will be crucial elements in the battle in directing its payload of missiles from outside the boundaries of Iraq. Also participating in the strikes will be navy and Marines' wings embarked on the air carrier USS Enterprise's deck, readied for the attack, as well as British Tornado bomber fighter jets. It is expected that the attack will commence this week at the start of the honored month of Ramadan. Cohen stated that the American presence in the Persian Gulf will continue indefinitely as long as Iraq continues to threaten.

The news: 12/18.

Subject: Operation Desert Fox.


Secretary of Defense William Cohen (also in attendance was head of the joint Chiefs of Staff, general Hugh Shelton).

Secretary Cohen: "Good evening.

"Whatever information we have about the military operations against Iraq revealed that our forces are performing exceedingly well since there were no casualties, and we are achieving complete coverage of our targets. As a result of that, we will continue with our aim of containing Saddam Hussein. We are diminishing his capabilities in attacking his neighbors whether he chooses to use conventional weapons or weapons of mass destruction. And as long as Iraq presently prevents the United Nations' inspectors from performing their duties, then it becomes incumbent upon us to continue to contain him. Our targets include the Iraqi air defense systems, command and control systems, airports, and the remaining military facilities. There is one thing that must be completely clear: we are focusing on military targets, we are not attacking the Iraqi people, nor do we harbor a desire to increase the suffering that Saddam caused to the Iraqi people."
"But before general Shelton briefs you on the latest operations, I would like to emphasize that our forces are doing their duty at a very good level, and that every American should be proud of his forces that are participating in Desert Fox."

General Shelton: "Thank you Mr. Secretary. Good evening.

"I wanted a few minutes to present to you today a summary regarding our forces' latest military operations. But before anything else, I want to warn you that there will be no details provided whether on the targets or the damages incurred. I know it is something you wish to know, but simply put: these details are not yet available and in some instances they will disclose much about the continuing operations. All I can say is that yesterday's operations were carried out well and completely professionally, and we are grateful because our pilots and crews returned back safely. And as I said last night, we can be very proud of our men and women of our armed forces for doing their jobs all around the world, particularly those stationed in the Persian Gulf.

"Yesterday's operations were carried out by the Navy with participation from more than 70 brigades from the Navy and the Marines, backed by air and naval gunfire support from the air carrier USS Enterprise and by more than 200 Tomahawk cruise missiles that were launched from naval ships.

"And while I will not discuss any specific targets, I can say that yesterday night the American forces attacked more than 50 separate targets among which were those mentioned by Secretary Cohen, which included sites of weapons of mass destruction, security sites and security forces and Saddam's air defenses, airports, and centers that provide support to Saddam's forces and regime. I presently have two examples; the first is the military intelligence departments in Baghdad. The building here on the right is one in a series of structures that appear in this area that was targeted. At the bottom of the photo you will see only a pile of rubble that was this said building. We also will take a look at the barracks in Baghdad and the Abu Ghraib facilities that constitute a part of the special guards and the security apparatus. Here you see their barracks in this place. The first area before the strike shows the headquarters in this area, and you see here that this area is now completely destroyed. We have a sizable amount of data most of which is successful or more than successful than what it was, and some of it is not successful at all. But as you know, preparations are underway for more strikes. While it is not suitable at this time to discuss the progressing operations, particularly in details, I can inform you that today's strikes will include the aircraft taking off from their land bases. Among them were the British Tornados plus additional forces from the Navy and the Marines from the deck of the air carrier USS Enterprise. As regards the rapid response forces and their deployment and the air carrier USS Carl Vinson, they will arrive with the other battle groups to the region today. Some of the land and air forces present here in the United States will start arriving at the Gulf at the end of the week."
"And I know that you are aware that the presence of our forces in the region will not be possible were it not for the backing and support of our partners in the Gulf. And we are grateful for their continuous help and their backing of our efforts in reducing the threat posed by Saddam Hussein to the security in this vital area of the world.

"I also wish to take this opportunity to mention the strong backing from the British forces in the region. They are not only steadfast, faithful allies, they are fierce fighters as well. Lastly I wish to emphasize one more point: It is inevitable during the struggle and conflict that the emphasis will be on our weapons and their effectiveness, but we must not lose sight of the fact that it is our people who make the difference and distinction. And as Secretary Cohen said, it is our strong troops, sailors, airmen, and Marines - they are the ones that made America the great power that it is. We owe a debt of gratitude to our men and women who are carrying out these operations. Secretary Cohen and I are now ready to take your questions."

Q: "General, in these two examples there were certain targets that were attacked, so what was inside those sites that were attacked? And is it possible that you can give us any statistics about any kind of casualties? After all, we can see five of those barracks, here, part of which was destroyed if not all."

General Shelton: "Jim, before anything else, speaking of the casualties, we have no data about that yet based on the results of the strikes. As regards the two targets, the first one is the area of the barracks that belong to the special Republican guards. These units, in fact, guard the weapons of mass destruction to help in their transport. This is part of the mechanism used by Saddam to control his facilities, the ones UNSCOM wanted to inspect. And when we take a look at the military intelligence, this is one of the locations that provide intelligence information to the force, where UNSCOM wanted to visit, for it became normal for it to mislead UNSCOM or provide them with information, or missing information that detract from UNSCOM's ability to perform their duty."

Q: "A follow-up question please..."

Q: "Mr. Secretary?"

Q: "Busy at that time?"

General Shelton: "We have no information in any shape or form whether or not these barracks were occupied at that time. We attacked the special barracks between the hours of 1:00 and 4:00 in the morning, Baghdad time, and maybe the troops evacuated them and may be some were still inside them."

Q: "As regards the Iraqi air force, was there any movement of the Iraqi aircraft against our own?"

General Shelton: "In this regard we have not noticed any Iraqi aircraft movement."

Q: "Mr. Secretary, the Iraqi minister of the exterior stated today that the house of Saddam's sister was hit with missiles, which made me wonder whether the American air forces are targeting Saddam's personal palaces, and whether the attack on Saddam's sister's house was deliberate?"

Secretary Cohen: "I have confirmed previously that Saddam owns about 80 palaces, and I don't know which of them his home is and, frankly, I don't like to discuss the targets at this particular point. We are seeking military targets or anything that relates to the military."

Q: "The Republican guards generally and in addition..."
Secretary Cohen: "We will strike these forces that deal with weapons of mass destruction and we will place him in a position not to threaten his neighbors."

Q: "Mr. Secretary, after you destroyed these facilities and many targets inside Iraq, and if Saddam will not comply, what will the United States do? Where will you go?"

Secretary Cohen: "We will go to him to contain him; we are moving headlong toward containment. He is unable to rebuild his army and weapons of mass destruction. He has been contained such that he cannot go north nor south; he's in a box. He is dealing with two subjects, the first is to get rid of the inspectors, and the second is to get rid of the sanctions. He now feels that all he can do is be frustrated, deny the charges, obstruct, and at all occasions prevent the inspectors from fulfilling their obligations plus mitigate their effectiveness either by altering their specialties or by changing their leadership. Secondly, he's seeking a 'complete review of the sanctions so they can be lifted,' so he can get rid of the sanctions that he faces. We are adamant on keeping the sanctions as they are and, at the same time, keeping our forces on red alert. And in case he tries to rebuild or threaten his neighbors, he will face once more the military deterrence, so we will continue with the containment process."

Q: "To what extent do you aim to...?"

Q: "The Coalition, Mr. Secretary, to a certain level he has succeeded with them because many of our friends are now criticizing what is happening."

Secretary Cohen: "And many of them support and stand behind what is happening."

Q: "Mr. Secretary, among the problems that are facing the Pentagon during the Gulf War is the Khamisiya. Do you have any indication or evidence that when sites of weapons of mass destruction were hit, any of the suspect chemical fallout was spread and could affect Iraq?"

Secretary Cohen: "The Short answer is 'no,' before anything else..."

Q: "And what if the answer is long and prolix?"

Secretary Cohen: "I will give you a longer answer. Before anything else, Saddam used to claim, and he did just that over the past eight years, that he does not possess any chemical weapons, that he does not possess its biological element. Only when he was confronted with the facts he backed up and admitted that he was lying. That is why we did not believe what he said about his not possessing any of them, because if we did believe that, we will have no interest in attacking any of the facilities out of fear that poisonous gases would spread. And we were very accurate in selecting the targets that relate to the facilities on the basis that may be they contained some kind of poisonous gas that could spread and threaten the lives of innocent citizens. That is why we scrutinized these targets to reduce the potential that such a thing would happen."

Q: "And a follow up on the subject?"

A: "We have no information about the spread of poisonous gases."
Q: "Is it true that you avoided some targets because you believed that there are weapons present there? Or did you use weapons, a type of weapon capable of doing that...?"
A: "There are a number of facilities that could possibly have dual purposes. It is possible that on some floors there is civilian production and on others there is the otherwise. And we were very precise with our targets in an attempt to restrict them to the military type in an effort to reduce the probability of causing harm to innocent civilians."

Q: "Is this true?"
Q: "Military first..."
Q: "The farther targets?"
Q: "Many organizations that constitute a center for the program for the weapons of mass destruction are fundamental to the regime. So if you attack them in the manner you have outlined, you will in essence be the one who acted to destabilize the regime. Was that not the aim here?"
A: "The aim is not to destabilize the regime; the aim, as I stated, was to eliminate the threat to the neighbors and the use of weapons of mass destruction, in the hope that we are able to strike the facilities that aid him in doing so. We cannot imagine the difficulty in confirming whether it was biological or chemical weapons, we are concentrating on the military facets of his regime."

Q: "And what are they?"
Q: "You mentioned in yesterday's press conference that the last strike crews returned in November, and you later expected that there will be a new crisis in the middle of December. Can you tell us why you did no return the aircraft home, including the essential ones, like the F-117?"
A: "Well, we stated that we keep in reserve a sufficient force in the Gulf, capable of thwarting any possible aggression from Saddam. And just as we started to return home, as we are doing now with our aircraft, we have carried out our task. When we find out that there will be no additional operations, there will be no need for additional forces. We have made our decision, the President has made his decision that we are not going to attack. Based on that, instead of calling on more forces, we have brought some of them back and left the other part on duty; it proved that it has the readiness to strike within 24 hours. Then, of course, we have a follow-up force capable of deploying instantly to give general Zinni added flexibility in the region and be ready to respond to any assault from Saddam."

Q: "But the important crew for the F-117 aircraft which you keep to carry out control and air defense commands."
A: "This depends on the plans that we have; we keep appropriate and sufficient forces in the region that are capable of carrying out the attack that we envisage should the need call for it. But to answer the question, I would say that since November 15th we have been ready to respond even within 24 hours. We have around 72 hours to give an alert to make sure that all systems are in place and that any response..."
we need can be delivered within 24 hours."
Secretary Cohen: "I wish to answer the part of the question regarding the F-117 aircraft and why it stayed here. Perhaps you will say that I respect the point of view of the general and his vision for the future, but I don't think that any of us can predict precisely in what month or on what day would Saddam poke his finger in the eyes of the UNSCOM's inspectors, or search for a metal bar to gouge their eyes with, as he did in the past. Still, we are interested in what is called 'readiness,' for we always persevered to strike a balance in what we do so long as the matter concerns our forces and the pressure and stress to which they are subjected as a result of deployment followed by being called back. And we have taken a decision that will enable us to mobilize these forces speedily should the need call for it. And should the President issue such an order, the question then becomes: 'How can we balance the formation of the forces?' The current situation makes us wonder how this balancing would allow us to act instantaneously and then include these aircraft that are undergoing stress. That is why..."
Q: "Did Iraq try to attack its neighbors? Did you notice any action toward Israel or Kuwait or anything of the sort?"
Secretary Cohen: "Not at this time."
Q: "What about..."
Q: "The two American pilots."
Q: "As far as the escalating threat from the terrorists, what are the precautions that you have set in place?"
Q: "As regards terrorism, it has been with us for a while now, and it is increasing because of Usama Bin Laden and his group who have been planning to attack American facilities. We are concerned about these plans and are following up very, very closely on them. We anticipate that it will happen as it did in the past, and we were very successful with this. In fact we have prevented many bombing attack attempts during this year from happening, after the one in east Africa. We understand the nature of the threat, and we can take every precaution; every one of us is under alert and we can deal any of them from a military viewpoint, and we anticipate that it would happen any time. What the American people need to know is that this has no relation with what is happening in Iraq. This is a plan that has been in preparation for years, and it is continuing on constant foundations, and we are dealing with it as best we could with all the means available to us."
Q: "Can I get a follow up on the Khamisia case? Are there locations that you know of where weapons are being stockpiled that you also know of, that if they are attacked it would cause problems for you and the like."
A: "UNSCOM has more information about it than I do as regards when they should search for certain records or any of the materials. I am not the right person when it comes to a location that might contain that."
Q: "The Pentagon said that there are 400 cruise missiles in the area and about 100 ALCM's. This means half the number of cruise missiles in the area that belong to the Navy. Are you going to mobilize more of these missiles to the area or do you have enough reserves?"
A: "Yes, we do have adequate reserve of them in the Gulf area. As for the rest, they could be deployed as fast as possible."
Q: "When you are concerned with responding to Saddam Hussein, how much money is being spent on one large force to change the mind of one person? Have you looked for an alternative to the bombing that we have conducted many times? Every time he challenges us, his defiance costs us more billions of dollars? For example, why can't the United Nations send enough forces to cover the horizon to protect the inspectors? Have you looked for an alternative to this strategy that failed to change Churchill's mind and Ho Chi Minh's mind, and we are still headstrong in it? Are there other alternatives than this?"

A: "We have tried many options and are still trying other strategies than this one, but I believe that the truth of the matter is that we have Saddam Hussein who is defying UNSCOM and the international community and the United Nations and everyone, and he is continuing in developing programs for weapons of mass destruction. As regards the alternatives, there are a few of them under the current circumstances that we have been engaged in for eight years, and that is we want him clean and free of sanctions and for him to return to the international community, which without a doubt is better for the Iraqi people."

Q: "If you attack his special guard, general, you will then weaken him. I wonder whether there are any other plans you can tell us about as far as weakening and destabilizing him. Was not our policy to get rid of Saddam Hussein? Was not that our goal for the long-term?"

General: "I will not discuss any details regarding the goals that were set by Secretary Cohen to mitigate his strength in threatening his neighbors and everything that could weaken his regime."

Q: "In the first round of strikes, did you hit what was recently named 'in what place is Saddam Hussein [sic]'?"

A: "We currently are not pursuing Saddam Hussein, and Saddam Hussein is not the target in this operation."

Q: "As regards the holy month of Ramadan that is approaching us, you are not sure of the continuation of the strikes during this month, or are they going to stop?"

A: "We have started with the operations and our goal is to continue with them without defining the military operations, but we are sensitive toward the month of Ramadan and that is all I could say."

Q: "Is UNSCOM dead? And if it is so, what is your strategy over the long range to control weapons of mass destruction that are in the hands of Saddam Hussein? Is it going to be the bombardment, then the waiting, then return to bombardment?"

A: "As far as Mr. Butler is concerned, Saddam Hussein has castrated UNSCOM. They are alive but without motion. My hope in the upcoming operations is to at last make Saddam see the wisdom of allowing UNSCOM to return to do their job. Contrary to that, we will continue in the containment operation. And if he threatened his neighbors or tried to revive the weapons of mass destruction program, we will be ready to undertake another action against him again."

Q: "And what if he gave a promise to allow UNSCOM to return to resume their duties, wouldn't that be another promise? He did back up on many of the promises he gave in the past, isn't that true?"

A: "We hope that after this operation that he and the others would be wise enough to comply, if not, then the containment will continue."
"We have no desire to lift the sanctions until he completely complies."

Q: "As regards the holidays, the families of the people who are participating in these operations are worried about the safety of their kids. Can you list the risks that they might face? For example, did Iraq threaten the pilots in any way? What are the risks of mobile air defense? Could you list some of the dangers that..."

Secretary Cohen: "The head of the Joint Chiefs of Staff will answer that, but allow me to make one observation: We have courageous men and women in all the sectors who are exposed to risks every day, whether in peace or in war. So when I was there during last September, the air temperature on the ships was 160 coupled with humidity but still they conducted 2000 launch operations during the month of August and in very adverse conditions. They were training and standing at the highest levels of readiness every day. We lost people every week. Therefore, as long as we remain the best fighting force in the world, their lives will always be exposed to dangers and risks. In addition to that, there are the pilots who fly over Baghdad, exposing themselves to the danger of being hit by surface-to-air missiles or being captured. Or take the people who are in Saudi Arabia or Kuwait or any other place, they are exposed to the danger of Scud missiles that could be launched or they could fall under attack of some sort. So these are the daily risks that may very well escalate. We have taken all the procedures including the defensive ones that as long as you have chosen to use force, then you must be ready for any probability."

General: "I wish to add one thin: We have in reserve 17,000 to 20,000 troops and sailors and pilots and Marines in the area daily. They are in fact exposed to the threat of Saddam's weapons of mass destruction as long as they are within these ranges that he's capable of reaching."

Q: "General, during these operations, was any of these pilots exposed to a direct threat? Were their aircraft painted with normal radar? Were any antiaircraft missiles fired at the aircraft?"

General: "I prefer not to discuss these details now or anything else that might help Saddam in these operations."

Q: "Do you believe the air carrier USS Vinson will participate in the battle when it arrives today or tomorrow and for the rest of the forces to participate in the assault?"

General: "This depends on the flow of operations."

Q: "How do you wish to comment on the statement by Senator Lott in his inability to support the military operations?"

Secretary Cohen: "We will visit Senator Lott and we will provide Congress with a report and there will be a chance for discussion, for Senator Lott is like any other Congressman: He must base his decisions on whatever information he has regarding the situation, but I think it is necessary to support our troops. After we have the discussions, we will come out with the conclusion that this mission is an honorable one and that it is the right thing at the right time and that the President has made the right decision."

Q: "Do you feel that the rapid deployment has given you the element of surprise and made the attack all the more effective?"

A: "All the reports that have reached us indicate that Saddam Hussein feels that he will not be able to face the reality: that he caused the failure, and obstructed the mission of UNSCOM's inspectors in performing their duties, and that he thought there is no chance that the United States would take action during Ramadan."
Q: "General Shelton, did you...?"
Q: "Plan for this on Sunday...?"
Q: "Will continue to the present...?"
General Shelton: "I really don't like to get into the details now regarding the operations, including the type of participating aircraft."
Q: "You...British Tornados and mentioned the aircraft on land airfields."
General: "There will be land based aircraft and there will be Tornados and also sea-lifted aircraft and all types of aircraft on this day."
Q: "The military plans were put into action on Sunday?"
Cohen: "Our military plans started in November to prepare for the operations."
Q: "What about immediate preparedness? You said they will be ready for strike before submitting the UNSCOM report to the United Nations."
Cohen: "We are always ready during the month of December to take action and enact procedures. We will not undertake any procedure until the report is submitted. We know what the report will say and in fact the President called for the strike."
Q: "Place a notice that Desert Fox is imminent?"
Secretary Cohen: "We have no final word regarding the United Nations' report until Monday or Tuesday at the last minute."
Q: "Is Saddam still alive...?"
Q: "Mr. Secretary..."
Q: "Is he in contact with his forces?"
Q: "We know that you have placed your forces on a 72 hour alert."
General: "Yes, we have placed our forces under a 72 hour alert in the Gulf, ready to execute."
Q: "So there is an alert?"
General: "Effective from mid November and we are ready to respond within 24 hours, if it required us to do so."
Q: "Were there previous alerts?"
General: "Yes, a 24 hour alert, an alert to execute an operation where the first missile was launched at 1700 hours toward the target."
Q: "Is Saddam still alive, can he contact his forces?"
- The End-
The news: December 18:
American naval forces launched a strike against Iraq... ships and aircraft aboard the air carrier USS Enterprise along with other maritime vessels in the Arabian Gulf launched a strike with Tomahawk cruise missiles against military targets inside Iraq on December 16 as part of Operation Desert Fox.
The participating units include various aircraft of all air wings to provide impressive support during operation Desert Fox. According to Pentagon officials the candidate targets were chosen based on their military significance to the Iraqi regime. Among them targets that contribute to the production, storage, procurement and usage of weapons of mass destruction, while taking under consideration minimizing harm to the American fighter. A general in the army stated that it is inevitable to focus on using weapons with the most effectiveness, and that our men are the ones that make victory...our brave fighters, sailors, pilots, and Marines are the ones that made America a great force, and for all of those we are indebted. Additionally, it is possible that air carrier USS Vinson would join the force on December 18.

Signature: The translator Sa'ad 'Abdullah, 1/2/2001.
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[Page 111:]

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[Page 112:]

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[Page 117:]

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[Page 119:]  
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[Page 120:]

[English document]
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[Page 121:]

[English document]
<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Material</th>
<th>Color/State</th>
<th>Description</th>
<th>Typical Velocity</th>
<th>Sensitivity</th>
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</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Ammonium Picrate</td>
<td>Yellow to orange to red</td>
<td>Armor piercing and bomb projectile</td>
<td>22,500 ft/s</td>
<td>Sensitive to touch and friction</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Astrolite</td>
<td>White</td>
<td>For destruction and demolition</td>
<td>2,600 to 26,500 ft/s</td>
<td>Inactive and ineffective until it is mixed. Must not be used with tetryl</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>C-4</td>
<td>White to light tan.</td>
<td>Plastic demolition and explosion</td>
<td>26,400 ft/s</td>
<td>Sensitive to pressure and friction</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Cyclotol</td>
<td>Green to tan</td>
<td>Used as thrusting charge for fragmentation bombs</td>
<td>25,900 to 26,400 ft/s</td>
<td>Excellent for explosive effects</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Flex-x</td>
<td>Any color, mostly olive or red</td>
<td>For cutting</td>
<td>23,300 ft/s</td>
<td>Flexible and soft, waterproof and sensitive to friction and shocks</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Torpex HBX</td>
<td>Ashen</td>
<td>Underwater explosives and torpedoes</td>
<td>22,700 to 23,700 ft/s</td>
<td>Excellent for explosive effects</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>HMX</td>
<td>White</td>
<td>A mixture of TNT for highly explosive warheads</td>
<td>29,900 ft/s</td>
<td>RDX production</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Kinepak</td>
<td>The powder is white, the liquid pink</td>
<td>For blasting</td>
<td>14,100 ft/s</td>
<td>Inactive and ineffective until mixed</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Nitrocellulose</td>
<td>White</td>
<td>Blasting, smokeless powder</td>
<td>21,900 ft/s</td>
<td>Used in non-incandescent powder</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Nitroglycerin</td>
<td>Amber, red, clear, foam means &quot;warning&quot;</td>
<td>For blasting, TNT components</td>
<td>4,900 to 25,400 ft/s</td>
<td>Capable of being absorbed through the skin, causing headache</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Nitroguanidine</td>
<td>White to yellow</td>
<td>Propellant and igniter</td>
<td>25,100 ft/s</td>
<td>One of the military's sensitive explosives</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Nitrostraj</td>
<td>White</td>
<td>Mortar shells</td>
<td>16,000 ft/s</td>
<td>One more of the many forms of nitrocellulose</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Pentalite</td>
<td>White to yellow to ashen</td>
<td>Propellant and igniter</td>
<td>24,500 ft/s</td>
<td>Highly compressed and highly sensitive</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Octol</td>
<td>Yellow orange</td>
<td>Propellant</td>
<td>27,500 ft/s</td>
<td>Excellent in blast effects</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>PETN</td>
<td>White unless painted</td>
<td>For blasting</td>
<td>27,500 ft/s</td>
<td>Highly sensitive densifier</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Picratol</td>
<td>Yellow</td>
<td>Armor piercing</td>
<td>22,900 ft/s</td>
<td>Sensitive</td>
</tr>
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<thead>
<tr>
<th>Picric acid</th>
<th>Tan</th>
<th>Bomb projector</th>
<th>Second</th>
<th>Dangerous when it spoils</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>Yellow to red</td>
<td>Alternative filler</td>
<td>19,00 feet per second</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
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[Page 123:]

[English document]
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[Page 124:]

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Linked Documents

Original Document

- ISGQ-2003-00046659

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- ISGQ-2003-00046659-HT (Multi-Part)
  - cmpc-m/ISGQ-2003-00046659-HT.pdf
  - cmpc-m/ISGQ-2003-00046659.pdf

Translation

- ISGQ-2003-00046659-HT-NVTC

Exploitation Status: NOT AVAILABLE
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### Keyword Categories

**Biographic Information**

**Name:** AL-'AMIRI, SA'ID MAHMUD NAJM  
**Other Attribute:** MILITARY RANK: Colonel  
**Other Attribute:** ORGANIZATION: General Military Intelligence Directorate  
**Photograph Available:**  
**Sex:** Male

### Document Remarks

These 53 pages contain correspondence, dated 24 Sep 2002, within the General Military Intelligence Directorate (GMID), regarding a research study titled, "The Emergence of Al-Wahhabiyyah Movement and its Historical Roots". The file details are as follows: Pages 2-53: Contain correspondence, dated 24 Sep 2002, within the General Military Intelligence Directorate (GMID), regarding a research study titled, "The Emergence of Al-Wahhabiyyah Movement and its Historical Roots", and submitted by the intelligence Colonel Sa'id Mahmud Najm Al- 'Amiri. The study aims at uncovering the links of this movement with the British Government and promoting Muhammad Bin 'Abd-al-Wahab (the founder) and his meetings with the rulers of Al-Sa'ud to pass on their plans to target Islam and causing division among Muslims.

### Batch Information

**Batch Number:** 3129-10  
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**Comments:** INFORMATION ON INTELLIGENCE REPORTS FROM THE DMI ON THE KURDS NEEDS SCREENING ONLY; SHIPPED TO QATAR
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ISGQ-2003-00046659-HT-NVTC (full translation)

Triage page; page is in English.
In the name of God the most compassionate the most merciful

Top Secret

Republic of Iraq
Presidency Headquarters
General Military Intelligence Directorate
Air Defense Security System
Number/ Sect. 2/ Dept. 4/
Date: 9/24/2002

To/ General Military Intelligence Directorate/ 8th Deputy Dir./ Sect.43
Subject/ Forwarding of a Study

Attached to our letter; please find the study prepared by the security officer of the 7th airborne aircraft brigade; the study is titled: (The Essence of Al-Wahabi Movement).

Please review.
With all appreciation.

Attachments:
(1) Study

[CL: Handwritten notes read]
To the section director
Please review; I suggest that you forward to Department 4. Thank you.
Signed on September 30, 2002 with a request to forward to Lt. Walid from Dept. 2 for review and comment

Original letter is signed by the Security Brigadier General; director of Air Defense Security System on; 9/24/2002

Copy to:
Security officer of the 7th airborne aircraft brigade; please activate the struggle against this movement and provide us with all obtained information.
Hand written note reads; please review and comment
(1-1)

2 of 56
In the name of God the most compassionate the most merciful

Republic of Iraq
Presidency Headquarters
General Military Intelligence Directorate
Air Defense Security System
Number/ 8th Deputy Dir./ 43/ HQ
Date: 8/29/2002

2793

To/ Department Two
Subject/ Study

Attached; please find a study titled (The Birth of Al-Wahabi Movement and its Historic Roots) so you can take necessary procedures; per the Air Defense Security System’s letter.

Please review.

Signed by;
Staff Brigadier General; Director of Section forty Three on August 29, 2002

Attachments:
(1) Study

[Handwritten Note] Sect. 2; to be archived in the department’s archive
Republic of Iraq
Presidency Headquarters
General Military Intelligence Directorate
Air Defense Security System
Number/ Sect. 2/ Dept. 4/ 1250
Date: 8/9/2001

Anti-aircraft

To/ General Military Intelligence Directorate/ 8th Deputy Dir./ Sect.43

Subject/ Study

1. Attached to our letter; please find the study presented by the security officer of the Anti-Aircraft Command Al-'Amiri Colonel; Sa'id Mahmud Najm [CL: misprint, the correct name should be; Colonel Sa'id Mahmud Najm Al-'Amiri]

2. The study is tilted (The Birth of Al-Wahabi Movement and its Historic Roots) Please review.

With all appreciation.

Attachments:
Study

Signed by Staff Major General;
Director of the Air Defense Security
9/8/2001

Note to Sect. 2 System
Make use of the study.
August 14.
The Birth of Al-Wahabi Movement
And it’s Historic Roots

Prepared by
Intelligence Colonel
Sa’id Mahmud Najm Al-‘Amiri
The Birth of Al-Wahabi Movement and it’s Historic Roots

Preface
1. The purpose of this study is to learn about the history of Al-Wahabi Movement and the harmful elements it contains.
Al-Wahabi movement claims that; it strives to recant all kinds of polytheism, but such allegations at the time of practice have transformed into the killing of Muslims, destructing, demolishing, and promoting the turmoil. So we can say that such behavior with its pure superficial and discriminating teachings is nothing but a deadly weapon in the hand of the occupation and the enemies of Islam who use Al-Wahabi Movement in the political arena to prevent the unity of Muslims.
We have to frankly say that; Al-Wahabi’s superficial and false teachings, and grasping on to the shell is the main obstacle standing in the way of Muslims’ goal to unit, and the biggest cause of the killing, dispersing, and breaking up of Muslims.
This kind of hostility towards Muslims, antagonizing them, considering them disbelievers, hitting them, insulting them, and hurting them reveals an ugly and dangerous face of Al-Wahabi features which depicts it as a destructive and chaotic group raising the slogan of destruction, savageness and harshness.
2. Al-Wahabi today is subconsciously working in all its power on promoting occupation in all its power in order to achieve its despicable desires. The Wahabis have worn the Muslim robe inside out therefore; they couldn't apprehend any of the Muslim goals, because how is it possible for someone who seeks the help of infidels to speak of unity? They sign treaties of peace and friendship with the criminals, surrender and bow in front of the masters of rotten politics.

3. Therefore; I wanted in my study to focus on the history of this movement from the stand point of its relation with the British government and how Britain had employed all its spies in Muslim countries in order to establish and spread this movement to destroy Muslim religion and create heterodoxies in Islam.

I also wanted to touch on the creator of this movement; Muhammad Bin ‘Abd-al-Wahab, his meetings with Muhammad Bin Su’ud and their agreement to support each other, and in conclusion show opinions of historians and writers who discussed this movement, and the history of the Su’ud Family which many have agreed that it is one of the destructive religious movements that is conceived, extreme and aiming to destroy Islam through Jews and British.

The Purpose:

4. To find the connection between this movement and the British government and how they found the so called; Muhammad Bin ‘Abd-al-Wahab, and his meetings with the leaders of Sa’ud Family to facilitate their suspicious plans which aim at striking at Islam and create division among Muslims.
First Topic:
Britain and its animosity towards Islam
  ✦ Britain and fabrication of beliefs to serve dispersion
  ✦ Britain’s goals to weaken the Muslim religion
  ✦ The British plans to dominate the Muslim countries
  ✦ How Britain deployed its spies and created differences among Muslims.
The classification markings are original to the Iraqi documents and do not reflect current US classification.

Britain and making up of beliefs to serve dispersion

5. Colonialism continues to look for ways to force its power, and still uses its old slogan (divide and rule), and one of the most important methods of achieve that is to create a decadent environment of disbelieving and immoral society therefore; colonialism tops the list of important and major factors which create the environment of disbelieve and immorality in a Muslim society, and in creating a sense of distrust among Muslim groups and false accusations. We will not be exaggerating if we say that the most successful methods used by colonialism to weaken the strength of Muslims and demolish Islam; are the methods of dividing, discriminating and fabricating believes and creating profits.

In order to reveal the reasons which made the colonialism go this rout and the goals desired from it, and the methods used to achieve such goals; we have to mention few things before we go into our main topic.

Britain's objectives from the weakening of the Muslim religion:

6. Colonialism countries face so many obstacles among each other when attempting to dominate powerless countries, for the purpose of plundering the material and immaterial wealth of these countries. It was never as simple as to occupy a country and have its people welcome them with open arms. At minimum, at the very beginning they are faced with many problems and obstacles. There were so many factors that made people oppose the colonialism such as; nationalism, language, culture, and religion. Some of these factors had temporary effects on the fight against colonialism, and lost their effectiveness gradually until they lost their impact eventually. The only factor remained as a well fortified barrier against the goals of colonialism is; the influence of religion on people, with Islam in the forefront. Since the day when the representative of colonialism
stood in the British House of Commons holding the Koran in his hand saying: (Europe has to know that; as long as this book is the guide to all Muslims, we will not be able to establish the foundations for our colonialism policy in these countries) and up to this day, Islam is considered the largest barrier facing colonialism, and the biggest threat to its interests because; Islam has distinguished characteristics each alone stands as a mountain in the way of achieving the goals colonialism the thing that all other religions lack.

The teachings of colonialism [I think that this is a misprint and the correct sentence should be the teachings of Islam] and its political worship rituals, have always been a danger to colonialism and its objectives because; Islam refuses all forms of colonialism and exploitation in any shape or form.

Therefore; Islam finds itself obligated to extend a helping hand to all liberation movements as much as possible "O ye who believe! Take not my enemies and yours as friends (or protectors) – offering them your love"¹, "These are the ones who wait and watch about you"², "Let not the Believers take for protectors Unbelievers, rather than Believers"³ then it puts forth the motto of adhering to God for he is the ultimate master "And hold fast all together, by the Rope which Allah stretched out for you, and be not divided among yourselves"⁴ "A Believer is a brother of another Believer, they are like one body if one part is in pain the rest of the body parts suffer the same way". "Muhammad is the messenger of Allah; and those who are with him are strong against unbelievers, but compassionate amongst each other."⁵ Muslims are responsible one to another and get angry at infidels and don’t get into compromises with them, “Truly Allah loves those who fight in his cause in battle array, as if they were a solid cemented structure”⁶. This meaning has always been the source of inspiration and strength for all Muslims in their struggle against tyrants and arrogant throughout history. Such content of Islam has created in the heart of Islam, all this movement, enthusiasm, creativity, change, and steadiness in fighting injustice. If we were to study all uprisings which took place in the recent century; we would have more clearly found the role of Islamic teaching in stirring those people against injustice, arrogance and oppression. Friend and enemy admit, for example, admit to the dynamics prompted by Islam in the liberation revolution of the Algerian people which threw the French occupation outside the
country. About this wrote two well known writers; (Collette) and (Francis Johnson)7
(No doubt that Islam had a great influence on the Algerians, demand for freedom, and
the Algerians have become aware since day one of the French occupation’s objective to
destroy Islam, and based on this they come to realize that Islam is their way to
liberation, and they all have to

Foot Notes:
1 Al-Mumtahinah: 1 [CL: verse 1 from the Koran Chapter Al-Mumtahinah]
2 Al-Nisa': 141 [CL: verse 141 from the Koran Chapter Al-Nisa']
3 Al ‘Umran: 28 [CL: verse 28 from Koran Chapter Al-‘Umran]
4 Al ‘Umran: 103 [CL: verse 103 from Koran Chapter Al-‘Umran]
5 Al-Fath: 29 [CL: verse 29 from Koran Chapter Al-Fath]
6 Al-Saff: 4 [CL: verse 4 from Koran Chapter Al-Saff]
7 “2 schools” cited from Propagation and Colonialism in Arabic Countries by Dr. Mustafa Khalid;
page 64.

hold on to Islam in order to be liberated).
And when colonialism found it hard to penetrate Islam, it started to look for a successful
way to fight it and started to use all its power and capabilities to remove this obstacle,
and tried all kinds of methods to achieve its objective. Such methods are the following:
A. Direct confrontation
   First, by direct military confrontation such as the Crusaders war, and military
   occupation of Islamic countries as in the case of Libya, Iraq, Afghanistan,
   Algeria and others.
   Second, by attacking Islamic teachings by means of; twisting and reversing
   their principles, accusing Islam, and slandering its sanctuaries.
B. Indirect confrontation
   First, promote immoralities and corruption among Muslims to weaken their
   adherence to religion.
   Second, promote feelings of nationalist and patriotism to divide individuals as
   well as groups into different parties in Islamic countries.
   Third, create division and dissimilarities by spreading accusations, mistrust, and
   suspension among Muslims.

The British Plans to Dominate Islamic Countries
8. In 1973, the autobiography of the British spy Humfer in regards to his work in Iraq and Istanbul was translated, and it included the British plans to dominate the Muslim countries. Great Britain has been, since long time ago, thinking about keeping its influence on its many colonies in India, China, the Middle East and others. It is true that it wasn’t actually controlling big parts of these countries because; it was in the hands of its own people, but its policy was a successful and effective policy, and it used to think twice.¹

a. Once to continue controlling what has been practically controlled.
b. And once to add to its properties what hasn’t been practically controlled.

And based on this, the British government had allocated special committees in every part of these countries particularly to study the task:

-------------------
Foot notes:
¹ Humfer’s Autobiography
Third: The Governments in the Persian States

The British government had secretly signed many treaties with the Persian government and they set out spies and agents in it and resulted in bribery and corrupted administration and the engagement of its kings in corruption and clotted the body of this country.

Reasons for Britain’s fear of the Islamic countries

9. In spite of planting spies and agents in the Islamic countries, and despite the spreading of bribery and corrupted administration the British government was unconfident of the results due to the following reasons:

a. The strength of Islam in the souls of its followers against all schemes the thing that make Muslim Men different than men of other religions. Due to the fact that the Islamic features and characteristics are planted in the Muslim Man and the make him stand steadfast.

b. Islam as a religion

Whereas Islam is a religion of life and control, it is hard to tell the masters that you are slaves. The arrogance of supremacy pushes the human being to superiority no matter how weak or low he is. Therefore, the British government was unable to forge the history of Islam.

c. The awakening of the Islamic awareness

The British government feared that Muslims in their hearts will become aware; the thing that if happens; will result in the failure of all its plans aiming to control. It is true that the Islamic country had reached a great deal of weakness but the existence of a centralized government which the people support and its aspiration is supremacy, money and arms makes the people unsafe.

d. Apprehensiveness of Muslim scholars

The government was extremely apprehensive of Muslim scholars, because Al-Azhar scholars, Iraq scholars and Persia scholars were the toughest barrier in facing the ambitions of the British government; they were extremely ignorant about the modern life principles. They made heaven, which the Koran had promised them of their number one priority so they would not compromise their principles and the
people followed them and the sultan feared them.

How Britain deployed its spies and created its different parties among Muslims

10. The British government held many conferences to remove all reasons for fear and to establish sufficient solutions for all these uneasy problems, but they have not reached a good solution yet and all the reports that they received from their agents and spies were disappointing as well as the results of all these conferences were not good. One time they held a conference in the Ministry that was attended by representatives from each of Britain, France, and Russia. It was discussed at the highest level and the attendees were diplomats and religious men. In this conference they mentioned ways to rip Muslims apart and strip them of their belief, but the results were not at the required level and (it is hard to pull the roots of a tree that had grown to the east and to the west of the Land, but man has to overcome difficulties at any cost)¹

In 1710 A.D. the British Colonies Ministry sent its spies to each of Egypt, Iraq, Tehran, Al-Hijaz, and Estonia to gather information that will help tear apart Muslims and dominate Muslim countries. The ministry had already provided them with sufficient money, sufficient information, possible maps, names of governors, scholars, tribes and family chiefs.

Footnotes

¹ Taken with liberty from the autobiography of Humfer

These spies started to learn the Turkish language and the language of the Arabs (The language of Koran) and the Persian language. Some of them pretended to be Muslims and attended the Muslim mosques and met with men of religion to learn all the Islamic rules, and they learned the holy Koran, the practice of ablution and prayer; they were taught by Muslim scholars. After they stayed for a period of two years spying in the Islamic countries they received orders from the Ministry to go back to London. There were ten spies assigned with the espionage duty, but only six of them returned and as for the other four, one of them became a Muslim and stayed in Egypt, one went to Russia where he was originally from, the third died in the outskirts of the city of Balad near by Baghdad because of a disease spread all over the country, as for the fourth, his whereabouts are unknown. The ministry had followed him until he got to Sanaa in Yemen and his reports were sent regularly to the ministry for a period of a year but was interrupted after that and the ministry has no information about him. The ministry considered the loss of four out of ten a catastrophe because they precisely accounted for each one of them.
11. The ministry had met with the six spies and listened to their reports, evaluated them, and advised them. After six months, the British Colonies’ Ministry sent the trained spy Mr. Humfer to the city of Baghdad in Iraq in order to create disorder between the Sunni and Shiites and find the weak point of Muslims so he can penetrate his body to defuse the unity of Islam. Also, his mission in this trip was to identify the conflicts among Muslims and create an atmosphere of disagreement, expiation, and mistrust among them as well as make up different faiths and form fake colonial religions to enable the colonizer to reach its objectives in creating division and spread disperse among Muslims instead of eliminating Islam and Muslims religious beliefs. The orders given by the British colonizer to its spies in the Islamic countries were in the following fashion (spread fake and made up faiths and beliefs in Islamic regions within fully considered, matured and organized plans where they preach after they evaluate upon suitable, intellectual background among the different classes of people. There should be no rush and should spread these beliefs and preach them, they should not be limited to only popular areas, rather they should be spread among the four groups of Sunni in order to create extreme differences and disputes among these groups hence each group would claim that they represent the true Islam and the others are renegades and infidels and must be killed).

Footnotes:
1 Humfer’s autobiography.

and according to these orders, the spies started carefully to study and to get familiar with the social and political sites in the Islamic societies and their extreme trends; they also started to create the necessary groups to achieve the objectives of their colonial masters. It is obvious that the colonizers didn’t do this first hand; yet to achieve their goals, they were looking for individuals who do not relish strength in faith and fear of God and possess different trends. The colonizer used to excessively offer these individuals financial and moral aids and urge them to establish the various groups. As an example to these, here we point to two groups that fit the subject we are discussing....

a. Al-Shaykhiyyah Group:
An extremist Shiite group which is active in Iraq, and was later called by the name of (Al-Shaykhiyyah), founded by a person called Sheikh Ahmad Al-Ihsani and his student Mr. Kazim Al-Rasht. This group started to praise the virtuous...
imams to the level of God and presented many overstated notions at this level, and to pave the way for the other extremist group (Al-Wahabi) so they can direct accusations and expiation at each other.

b. Al-Wahabi Group:

Next to Al-Shaykhiyyah, the colonizer created another extreme Sunni group called (Al-Wahabiyyah). The British found in Muhammad ‘Abd-al-Wahab many attributes such as the love of glory, immorality, and extreme views so; they came to realize that he is the right person to establish the group they wanted. Thus they started following him step by step until they found the right opportunity; hence they pointed out to him, the birth of the new faith. Afterwards, they ordered him to concur with another well known agent of the seasoned British colonizer that is; Su’ud Bin ‘Abd-al-‘Aziz, and they provided them with the required means to attract followers. Within a given period of fulfilling the duty assigned to them, they killed Al-Hajjaj and everyone who wouldn’t accept their new faith whether he is Shiite or Sunni, was destined to death and plundering, and everyone who thought of visiting the holy tomb of profit Muhammad (God’s blessing and peace be upon him) and the holy sites was treated as if he was (infidel) (polytheist).

12. Al-Wahabi principles are based on the expiation of Islamic faiths and promoting division among Muslims and eliminating the traces of the spiritual Islamic message. Al-Hijaz is the homeland of this group, and recently the activities of this group have increased; everyday they issue a book or an article attacking the Islamic sanctuaries. The Su’ud family spends lots of money in compliance with their masters’ orders to prevent the unity of Muslims, create division among them, expiate them, and to stray each other from the right path. Both groups; Al-Wahabi and Al-Shaykhiyyah are established on wrong views therefore they brought about disorder, blood shedding, and killing of Muslims. Hence, Muhammad Bin ‘Abd-al-Wahab established his mission based on visions of (Ibn Timiah) and his intentions. The later was a fan of (Ibn Tawmart) who claimed to be Al-Mihdi [CL: translates the Guide] in North Africa, and his ideas dominated parts of Spain, Algeria, Tunisia, and Morocco for two centuries; he was nicknamed Mihdi Al-Muwahadin [CL: The guide of those who are united] Then he worked together with Muhammad Su’ud and both their swords and the swords of their followers trickled with blood, and wherever they went, blood was flowing, and they called the Muslims infidels; they killed everyone who didn’t support them and obeyed them. The Wahabis ordeal was big and truly strange to the extent that the Muslim world up to date couldn’t cover up its damages.
Second Topic: 
Al-Wahabi Movement’s Missionary

- Najd in History.
- Al-Wahabi movement and it’s founder Muhammad ‘Abd-al-Wahab
- Muhammad bin ‘Abd-al-Wahab’s trips before the missionary
- His encounter with Muhammad Bin Su’ud in Al-Dar‘iyyah
Najd in History
13. Najd means the elevated land; it is the name designated for the middle part of the Arabic Peninsula which is the largest part of the middle of the island. When the Ottoman State emerged on the political scene in the Arabic Peninsula in 1517, it became satisfied with the nominal authority of this area, and the tribalism was in full swing in Najd; every tribe had its own state, and every group had its own sheikhdom which; takes pride in its authority and praises its name.
Every governor had his own possessions and had no ties to his neighbor, and the Ottoman policy has been mobilized for that purpose. In the twelfth century of Hegira, disorder had dominated Najd, division prevailed, the gap had widened, and emirates had multiplied; the family of Mu'ammar in Al-'Ayniyyah, the family of Su'ud in Al-Dar'iyyah, and the Family of Dawwas in Riyadh; Al-Ahsa' was the emirate of Bani Khalid, Najdan the family of Hazal, Ha'il the family of 'Ali, Al-Qasyim and the Northern borders of Najd the family of Hajaylan, and in Southern Iraq the emirate was for the family of Shabib.

All of the families and the sheikhdoms were in a state of instability and confusion with disturbance spread throughout. These groups had no identified political order or a civilization that is worth mentioning, plus the ruling system was in a tribal form.

Furthermore; there were very little documentation for the history of the area by its own people; 'Uthman Bin Bishir Al-Najdi stated that: (The origin of Najd and its ancient and modern scholars was not to the extent where they paid attention to the history of their land, who built it, what happened in it, who came to it, and who left it; except for very little that was written by few of their scholars) in addition he said: (Then I wanted to gather a collection of facts about the family of Su'ud, their news and their stories, but was unable to find someone who would tell me true information)

As for the religious situation of Najd; during the era of Tasam and Jiryis, they use to worship Al-Tiyil which are houses shaped like cubes looking like cells made of clay rise from 200 to 300 yards in height. Paganism was founded afterwards; the tribes of Taghlib and Bakr Bin wa'il had an idol called ( Dha Al-Ka'bayin) and Magianism grew out of it and was joined by Bani Tamim in the sixth century A.D. Then Christianity got about and became widespread among the tribes of Taghlib and Bakr bin Wa'il; also the religion of Al-Sabi'ah which worships the stars and was adopted by the tribes of Dayran of Bani Tamim, while the people of Najd took up Islam, but after the death of profit Muhammad (God's blessing and peace be upon him) some tribes have recanted and were engaged in a war that ended

Footnotes:
1 Husayn Khalaf Al-Shaykh Khaz'al, The biography of Sheikh Muhammad Bin 'Abd-al-Wahab, Dar Al-Kitab Press, Beirut 1968 A.D.
After the Ottoman nation engaged in wars in Eastern Europe and the defeat that followed; the
Arabic nation became under clear confusion and a state of forfeiture; consequently the control
over Najd and Hijaz which is owned by the Hashemite became nominal.

Al-Wahabi Movement and its Founder Muhammad ‘Abd-al-Wahab

descent to ‘Adnan’. Whereas Mustafa Tawran states that; Muhammad Bin ‘Abd-al-Wahab is a
descend of a family from the Jews of Al-Dunmah in Turkey. Al-Dunmah refers to the Jews who
declared their embracement of Islam in an effort to insult Islam and to escape the pursuit by the
Ottoman sultants. Subsequently; Tawran confirms that Sulayman; the grandfather of the sheikh, is
(Shulman); he is Jew from the merchants of the city of Burstah in Turkey, he had left it and
settled in Damascus; grew his beard; and wore the Muslim turban; but was thrown out for being
voodoo. Then he fled to Egypt and he faced by strong objection so; he left to Hijaz and settled in
Al-‘Ayniyah where he got married and had child whom he called ‘Abd-al-Wahab and claimed
to be from the descent of Rabi’iyah, and that he was born in Morocco. This has also been
supported by sheikh Rifat Salim Kabar in his book, the Jews of Al-Dunmah and the Origin of
the Saudi Wahabis.

Muhammad Bin ‘Abd-al-Wahab was born in Al-‘Ayniyah in Najd in 1703 from a father who
wiped out the faith of Imam Hanbal; he taught jurisprudence and Hadith at Al-‘Ayniyah
mosque. Muhammad was taught in Al-Madinah by sheikh ‘Abdallah Bin Ibrahim Bin Sina’, and
became a student at sixteen years old under Sheikh Hassan Al-Tamimi in Al-Mu’tasim. He was a
fan of Ibn Timyah and received his education at the hand of Sheikh Hassan Al-Islambuli; Judge of
Al-Basra, and Sheikh Zayn-al-Din Al-Mughrabi and Sulayman Al-Kurdi, ‘Abd-al-Karim Al-

‘Abd-al-Wahab got married about twenty times, the first time

Footnotes:
1 Sheikh Khaz’al, Biography of Sheikh Muhammad, Previous reference – page 42
2 Sheikh Khaz’al, previous reference – page 49, also scholar Al-Najdi, the Histori of Najd, previous
reference – page 89
3 Turan, Dr. Mustafa, the Jews of Al-Dunamah, Translation of Kamal Al-Khawjah, Cairo 1989 – page
14.
in Al-‘Ayniyyah and also in Baghdad, she died immediately and he took a spouse the daughter of prince ‘Abdallah Bin Mu’ammam and she gave birth to six boys and six girls.

He died after he suffered from a disease that took his life shortly afterwards on June 2, 1792 and was buried in Al-Dar’iyyah graveyard that was designated to Su’ud family and his grave is known there till this day.

At the very beginning, Muhammad Bin ‘Abd-al-Wahab learned from many of the scholars of Mecca and Al-Madinah; his father ‘Abda-al-Wahab was a good scholar and used to insult him and warn people about him. His brother Sulayman bin ‘Abd-al-Wahab wrote a book to answer him; in his early days, he was fond of reading about those who claim prophecy like; Musaylamah, Sajah, Al-Aswad Al-‘Ansi, and talihat Al-Asadi and such. He has four children; ‘Abdallah, Hasan, Husayn, and ‘Ali.

The supporter of Muhammad bin ‘Abd-al-Wahab and the one who spread his faith was Muhammad bin Su’ud, after that his sons; ‘Abd-al-‘Aziz and Su’ud and then Su’ud bin ‘Abd-al-‘Aziz who humiliated Iraq and prevented Muslims from going to Hajj; thus Hajj was interrupted in his time for years.

15. The origin of the Wahabi movement is that the Arabs, especially those masters of the demons said that; a poor herdsman by the name of Sulayman had a dream that a flame emerged from him, spread throughout the land, and started to burn everyone that had an encounter with it. He told of his dream to someone who interpreted it as; a son of his will establish a strong land. So his dream came true in the ideology of Muhammad bin ‘Abd-al-Wahab. Thus when Muhammad grew up, he became respected [CL: The study has a typo that reads Muhtarifan instead of Muhtaraman] by the people of his town because of that dream which he didn’t know of. In the beginning, he secretly revealed his faith to a group of people followed him; then he traveled to Great Syria, but no one there followed him so; he returned to the Land of the Arabs after he left it for three years, he came to Najd and revealed this faith or (the Movement). Su’ud followed him and they both had strength in each other; Su’ud strengthened his emirate through religion by following Muhammad bin ‘Abd-al-Wahab in his faith, yet bin ‘Abd-al-Wahab promoted his missionary by means of sword. With Su’ud following him and becoming victorious through him, Su’ud became the ruling prince and bin ‘Abd-al-Wahab the religious leader and their children thereafter took over the rank of their predecessors.

After Su’ud became the ruler of his tribe, he conquered two tribes from Yemen and a large number of Arab tribes became subjected to this faith and so did all the Arabs of Najd; they picked the city of Al-Dar’iyyah to be the capital of their country which is situated in the south east of Al-Basra. Fifteen years later, the Su’ud emirate expanded; he had aspiration to grow, and used to take one ten of the livestock, money, honor, even souls. He takes one ten from people by lottery so; he collected enormous amounts of money and his army exceeded hundred

Footnotes:
¹ Sheikh Khaz’al, previous reference – page 333, The History of Najd, previous reference – page 88
and twenty thousand fighters. Muhammad bin ‘Abd-al-Wahab started to emerge in the year of 1143 of Hegira and became famous after he turned fifty where he revealed the false faith in Najd and its dependant territories; starting off with the support of Muhammad bin Su’ud, prince of Al-Dar’iyyah he prompted its people to follow him so they did. Many Arabs obeyed him, until he became strong and the desert feared him. He used to tell them: I am calling upon you to unite and leave polytheism.

Bin ‘Abd-al-Wahab, according to the “History of Najd” book by Mahmud Shukri Al-Alusi; grew up in the town of Al-‘Ayniyyah, the land of Najd, he read religion to his father in accordance with the school of Ahmad bin Hanbal, and ever since he was a little child; he spoke words which Muslims didn’t know and furthermore he was denying them what they have agreed to do. Yet no one helped him in that respect so; he traveled from Al-‘Ayniyyah to Mecca, then to Al-Medina where he learned from sheikh ‘Abdallah bin Ibrahim bin Sayf, and he emphasized Al-Tankir [CL: That is to deny something be it the profit or practices in Islam etc...] over appealing to the profit Muhammad (God’s blessing and peace be upon him) by his tomb. Later on he moved to Najd then to Basra; when he arrived in Basra, he stayed there for a period of time where he learned from Sheikh Muhammad Al-Majmu’i, and lied to its people about many things so they threw him out. He fled there, and after many moves he arrived in a town called Huraymulah in Najd, the town where his father came from; he stayed with him and read to him and showed disapproval of Muslim beliefs in Najd; his father reprimanded him but Bin ‘Abd-al-Wahab wouldn’t stop until they got into a big dispute. Furthermore, he engaged into many arguments with the Muslims of Huraymulah that lasted for two years until his father passed away in 1153 of Hegira and he became bold enough to bring out his beliefs and disapprove of what Muslim have concurred. The scum of people have joined him until the people of the town became fed up with his articles and were determined to kill him so; he moved from Huraymulah to Al-‘Ayniyyah which was governed by ‘Uthman bin Ahmad bin Mu’ammar. Bin ‘Abd-al-Wahab allured him of becoming the king of Najd so; ‘Uthman helped him and he told the people of his disapproval of Muslims and was followed by few of the people of Al-‘Ayniyyah. He demolished the dome of Zayd bin Al-Khattab by Al-Jubaylah which made him important and his news reached Sulayman bin Muhammad bin ‘Aziz Al-Hamidi owner of Al-Ihsa’, as well as Alqatif and its dependant territories so; Sulayman sent a letter to ‘Uthman ordering him to kill bin ‘Abd-al-Wahab and warning him of violating his order. ‘Uthman didn’t care and violated the order so, Sulayman ordered him to leave his kingdom, bin ‘Abd-al-Wahab told him then: if you support me you will rule Najd, but Sulayman didn’t listen to him therefore; he left to Al-Dar’iyyah in 1160 of Hegira (which is the land of Musaylimah the Liar) and its ruler at the time was; Muhammad bin Su’ud, from the tribe of ‘Anayzah. He begged him and allured him of ruling the land of Najd so he followed him and supported him in killing Muslims. Thus he wrote to the people of Najd, their Rulers, and their judges requesting their allegiance. Few of them submitted to him and few didn’t pay him attention so; he ordered the people of Al-Dar’iyyah to fight, so they complied and fought with him the people of Najd and Alhsa’ many times, until some of them submitted to him willingly or unwillingly, and the emirate of Najd became the property of the family of Su’ud helplessly and by force.

Sheikh Muhammad bin ‘Abd-al-Wahab was known among his relatives by his shrewdness and brightness and portrayed as active, polite and extremely hard working. He used to give his followers everything he had; he was taught
by great teachers, wise men, and scholars and he became the herald of this nation. He conformed to Al-Hanafiyyah method, mimicking Imam Aba Hanifah in the fundamentals, but following his personal views when it comes to ramifications. Afterwards he went on giving legal opinions independently based on his own discretion, and he called people upon this. Such these discretions are considered all Muslim denominations, Jews, Christians, and all types of people are infidels, polytheists, and same as idol worshipers; his proof of that is that the glorification and reverence of Muslims for profit Muhammad’s tomb (God’s blessing and peace be upon him), his holy garden, and the tombs of the virtuous, is nothing but worshiping idols. That is the same for the case of Christians and Jews who set up statues of Musa and Christ (Peace and prayer be upon him) in their churches and temples. However; devotion to God is to kneel to the very incumbent of existence and worship him, might and majesty belongs to him, and have no partners with him.

A crowd of his own tribe and the public followed him in that, and he become to have circles that have voice and can come to results. Yet he is still threatening to demolish the dome of God’s messenger Muhammad (God’s blessing and peace be upon him) and all holy tombs. He is putting before his eyes that once he takes over the power, he will make them even with ground and abolish any trace to them. Although this movement or faith emerged and spread during the era of Muhammad bin ‘Abd-al-Wahab in the eighteenth century; yet the very first seed was since the days of Ahmad bin Tamimah in the seventeenth century and his student, bin Maytham Al-Jawziyyah.

Muhammad Bin ‘Abd-Al-Wahab’s Trips Before The Missionary
16. Muhammad bin ‘Abd-al-Wahab’s trip to Mecca was for acquiring education and Hajj, then he went to Al-Medina Al-Munawwarah where he learned religion from narrator; Al-Sayyd Hayat Al-Sundi and the scholar Al-Majdi ‘Abdallah bin Ibrahim Al Sayif in 1723 A.D. Then he returned to his home town afterwards and started to deny openly the acts of obsession with the profit, the guardians, and the holy men, and considered that polytheism. He was opposed with sarcasm for saying that which made him leave Al-Ayniyah in 1724 A.D. passing thru Al-Ihsa and stayed with sheikh ‘Abdallah bin Muhammad Al-Shafi’i Al-Ihsa’i, then he entered Iraq and went to Basra and stayed at the school of sheikh Muhammad bin Al-Majmu’i located in the famous district of Al-Mujamma’a in Basra. Because of his missionary, the people of Al-Basra started to harass him so he left it walking on foot, and almost died of heat and tiresome. He arrived at Al-Zubayr and returned to his family in Huraymulah after his family moved to it as a result of their dispute with its prince.

Then Muhammad bin ‘Abd-al-Wahab left to Baghdad and stayed in Al-Wazir mosque (Al-Malik bin Husayn). He worked in teaching theology to Sheikh ‘Abd-al-Karim Al-Kurdi Al-Shafi’i and Sheikh Sabghatallah Al-Haydari. He was elected Imam to one of the mosques in Baghdad, and there he met sheikh ‘Abd-al-Rahman Al-Suwaydi;
one of Baghdad’s senior scholars. He married a rich woman there, after she died, he inherited lots of money from her and stayed in Baghdad three years. After his wife’s death, Muhammad bin ‘Abd-al-Wahab left to Kurdistan and stayed for one year there; he moved from there to Iran and lived in Al-Abbasi School in Asfahan and was educated by Mirza Khan Al-Asfahani. He stayed for a year then moved to Tehran accompanied by his student from Baghdad; ‘Ali Al-Ghazar. Afterwards he moved to Turkey teaching people the faith of Hanbal although their faith was Hanafi. He left there and returned to Syria where he stayed six months in Aleppo studying Arabic language; then he moved to Damascus where the school of Hanbali teachings is and the home of Timiyyah and Al-Jawziyyah. There he condemned acts of Sufis, Darawish, and Naqshbandies, and their glorifying to the tomb of their sheikh; Muhi-al-Din bin ‘Arabi. Muhammad bin ‘Abd-al-Wahab left Damascus heading to Jerusalem which he then left to Cairo and lived in Al-Azhar and was the student of Sheikh Muhammad Zain-al-Din, he stayed there for two years, and returned to his family in 1738 A.D. This trip enabled him to learn about the common people, and what they do; it also gave him abundant knowledge of the Muslim schools of faith until he announced his calling and was opposed by his father. He remained isolated for two years until the death of his father late 1739 A.D. He was appointed a judge after his father, but because of his calling, the people of the town attempted to assassinate him so; he escaped to Al-‘Ayniyah and was received by its prince; he married Al-Jawharh bint ‘Abdallah bin Al-Mu’ammer from the prince and started his calling from there. He worked in teaching the tribes and together with the prince, they demolished the dome of the tomb of Zain bin Al-Kattab, removed the embellishments, and threw stones at a prostitute. In addition to that, he wrote the book (Al-Tawhid) which made the prince of Al-Hisa order the prince of Al-‘Ayniyah to throw him out so; he left to Al-Dar’iyyah in the year 1745 A.D.1

His Encounter with Muhammad Bin Su’ud in Al-Dar’iyyah
17. After leaving Al-‘Ayniyah, Muhammad bin ‘Abd-al-Wahab headed to Al-Dar’iyyah. He arrived there in the year 1745 A.D. There he met Muhammad bin Su’ud who was nicknamed Al-Sheikh, but he was given the title Prince and the name sheikh was restricted to men of religion. The first meeting between the prince and the sheikh was in the home of Sheikh Ahmad bin Suwaylim Al-‘Arrifi, they both agreed to support each other and to give the religious power to Muhammad bin ‘Abd-al-Wahab while the family of Su’ud will be in charge of the secular power (government). They agreed and shook hands saying (Blood for blood and destruction for destruction)2 For the close relation between the Family of Su’ud and Al-Wahabi Movement, we will have a brief introduction to Muhammad bin Su’ud.
Muhammad bin Su‘ud was born in Al-Dar‘iyyah in 1687 A.D. He is Muhammad bin Su‘ud bin Miqrin bin Markhan bin Ibrahim bin Musa bin Rabi‘ah bin Mani’. His ancestors trace back to the tribe of ‘Anzah, one of the Arabic tribes. Books which support the family of Su‘ud, agree that1; he took the sheikdom of Al-Dar‘iyyah for forty years, he spent half of them, before the arrival of the Sheik, and married one of the sheikh’s daughters and had four boys; Su‘ud and Faysal were killed in his life time, whereas ‘Abd-al-‘Aziz and ‘Abdallah ere left. He died while he was in Al-Dar‘iyyah and was buried there in the year 1765 A.D.

As for the books that do not support his calling; they mention something different. Yusif Hatatah states that (Bin Su‘ud is not related to one of the famous Arabic homes, neither pre Islamic times, nor during Islamic times)2. Yet ‘Abd-al-Wahab Al-Shammari says (Muhammad Bin Su‘ud is of a Jewish descent also, and traces back to the Jewish Mardakhai bin Ibrahim bin Mushi; who was a merchant in Al-Basra, he was approached by a group from the tribe of ‘Anza, and Al-Masalikh subdivision to buy from him; he claimed to be one of them and was extremely generous with them and traveled with them to Najd and his name became Markhan bin Ibrahim bin Musa, men gathered around him because of his money and wealth)3

Yet Nasir Al-Su‘ud; he says in his book (The History of the Su‘ud Family) that the Saudi ambassador in Cairo, ‘Abdallah bin Ibrahim Al-Mufaddal, had paid Muhammad Al-Tamimi thirty five thousand Jinee in the year 1943 A.D. to place a fake tree for the family of Su‘ud and the family of ‘Abd-al-Wahab and merge them together in one tree claiming that they are from the origin of profit Muhammad (God’s blessing and peace be upon him). The Saudis have rewarded him by appointing him a manager for all Saudi libraries 4. Then Al-Shammari goes back to mention that the ancestors of the family of Su‘ud is Jewish because; the name Muhammad bin Su‘ud bin Muqrin bin Makun bin Mardakhai bin Ibrahim bin Mushi, is not Arabic and Arabs do not use names such as (Mardakhai), (Mushi or Makwan) which were changed later to (Markhan, Musa, and Muqrin).

Footnotes:
2 Sheikh Khaz‘al, reference previously mentioned, page 159 – 160, also Al-‘Allamah Al-Najdi is a previous reference, page 49.

18

Footnotes:
1 Same previous reference, page 50.
2 Yusif Kamil Hatatah, a book by the name; Al-Mas‘alah Al-Hijaziyyah [CL: translates; Al-Hijaz Affair]
Third Topic:
Invasions and the Wahabi connections; and the views of writers and historians
- The Wahabi invasions in Najd.
- The Wahabis and Al-Hijaz.
- Al-Wahabi movement and Iraq.
- The Wahabi – British relations.
- Different views of the Wahabi Movement
- Conclusion
The Wahabi Invasions in Najd

18. Sheikh Khaz’al states in his book (Bin Su’ud and Bin ‘Abd-al-Wahab were in full agreement in all of their behaviors as if they were one personality with two functions in life. Thus the prince never took an important decision or started a project without the approval of the Sheikh)¹. After two years of his stay in Al-Dar‘iyyah, Bin ‘Abd-al-Wahab ordered its people to fight other tribes and call upon them to his ideology. His first invasion was on Al-‘Arab [CL: The Bedouins]; they killed them and took their money. In 1746 and 1755 the people of Huraymulah lead by their judge Sheikh Sulayman, brother of Muhammad bin ‘Abd-al-Wahab, threw out the prince of the Su’ud family, consequently; ‘Abd-al-‘Aziz bin Su’ud along with 800 fighters marched towards Huraymulah, killed its people and took possession of it. In 1757 A.D. ‘Abd-al-‘Aziz prepared an army in which he seized (Manfluhah) and wrecked its dam (Al-Rasha) and the fighting went on between them until ‘Abd-al-‘Aziz killed its chiefs, conquered it in 1761, and demolished its homes and domes. In 1747 the emirate of the Su’ud family directed an army which conquered Shadiq, seized its livestock, and killed many of its people. In 1756 Ashiqar was seized and conquered after few invasions. In 1761, they invaded Al-Sadir in Northern Najd. The Su’ud Family forces killed people, burnt houses, seized livestock and money during their invasions.

In Muhammad bin Su’ud’s era, his army engaged in wars and invaded the areas of Riyadh, Najdan, and Ihsa’ in which; Su’ud and Faysal the sons of the Prince were killed upon the attack by Daham bin Daras, owner of Riyadh in 1747 and Riyadh was subjugated to the rule of the Su’ud family following many battles in 1764. In 1765 Prince Muhammad bin Su’ud died leaving ‘Abd-al-‘Aziz behind; who seized Al-Zulfa in 1780 A.D. and Al-Mujamma’a, that was famous for its hostility towards the Wahabi Movement, in 1779 A.D. And with that, the whole region was conquered; with the leadership of Su’ud bin Muhammad. In the year 1774 A.D. Al-Dulm was seized and its owner Zayd bin Zamil and its people were killed. In 1782 A.D. Al-‘Aqm was seized, and 1785 A.D. ‘Antarah was seized, and over there Prince Su’ud bin ‘Abd-al-‘Aziz was acknowledged as crown prince, and Muhammad bin ‘Abd-al-Wahab secluded himself from politics, stayed put at home, and referred matters to Prince ‘Abd-al-‘Aziz bin Su’ud.

In 1790 A.D., Al-Ihsa’ was completely conquered and the Su’ud family reigned over Najd; and stirred its direction to Hijaz where Mecca, Medina, Jedda, Al-Ta’if, and Yanbu’ are; and the reign there was for the Nobles
The classification markings are original to the Iraqi documents and do not reflect current US classification.

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\[1\] Sheikh Khaz’al, previously mentioned reference, page 265.

21 of Mecca, The Hashemite who had absolute power under nominal rule of the Ottoman State\(^1\).

**The Wahabis and Al-Hijaz**

19. Al-Hijaz is the dividing mountains between the high Najd and the low coast line of the Red Sea; its most popular cities are Mecca, Medina, Al-Ta’if, and Yanbu’. It was successively ruled by the Nobles of Mecca, but when Muhammad bin ‘Abd-al-Wahab declared his missionary in Najd; the people of Al-Hijaz started to follow the course of that missionary. After the Sheikh [CL: That is Muhammad bin ‘Abd-al-Wahab] stopped in Al-Dar’iyyah and began to fight his opponents and destroy domes, and the practices that are related to this missionary; the nobles of Mecca joined his opposition and declared their war against the missionary, and decided to do away with it. The first one to confront the Wahabi Movement was the Noble Mas’ud bin Sa’id who submitted reports to the Sublime Port [CL: Ottoman authority] explaining the threat of the missionary to the Islamic Caliphate in Turkey; he gained the blessing from the Sublime Port in which the people of Najd were prohibited from making the pilgrimage and entering Mecca. After his death, his brother (Musa’id) took over the matters of Mecca and kept his brother’s position until he died leaving behind, ‘Abdallah bin Sa’id; who ruled for few days, and his brother (Ahmad) took over. His nephews; the family of Musa’id, arouse against him and forced him out. The emirate was turned over to Surur bin Musa’id who permitted the Wahabis to fulfill the religious obligation of pilgrimage after they pay levy just like foreigners. When the power was turned over to Noble Ghalib; he deployed ten thousand fighters from Arabs, Turks, Egyptians, and Moroccans; with the leadership of his brother ‘Abd-al-‘Aziz and the nobles of Mecca he attacked Najd however; they were faced with strong resistance and noble Ghalib was forced to enter into peace agreement.

After long battles, the Su’ud family with the leadership of ‘Uthman Al-Mudaiqi were able to conquer Al-Ta’if, and Prince Ghalib was forced to leave it in 1803 A.D., two hundred men of its people were killed, its wealth and weapons were seized, and ‘Uthman was appointed its prince\(^2\).

The Su’ud family then was able to rein Mecca after it was turned over by noble ‘Abd-al-Mu’in in exchange for him continuing to be its prince. In the year 1804 A.D., Medina surrendered after the forces of the Su’ud family have laid a strong and strict siege, imposed tax upon its people, seized the treasures located in the grave of profit Muhammad (God’s blessing and peace be upon him), and tried to wreck the dome of the profit’s grave but they were faced with strong resistance so they left it \(^3\).
Thus were the Wahabis able to control Al-Hijaz and make its people believe in the missionary
Furthermore; they were able to impose the ambitious ‘Abd-al-‘Aziz bin ‘Abd-al-‘Aziz so he became
wealthy and began to communicate with the kings and princes of the Arabic and Islamic countries,
explain the objectives of the missionary and its substance' and call upon them to accept it.
The Ottoman State was skeptical about the movement and saw a dangerous threat to setting forth its
power on the Arabic countries and the establishing of the emirates which will succeed it. Therefore; it
authorized Muhammad ‘Ali, the governor of Egypt, to stifle it, and appointed him governor of Al
Hijaz in addition to Egypt. Muhammad ‘Ali sent a military expedition yet it came to nothing so; he
sent another expedition lead by his son; Ibrahim Pasha who gained victory over the Su’ud family and
inflicted enormous losses upon them, seized Al-Hijaz, destroyed Al-Dar’iyyah which is the center of
the Wahabi leadership, and arrested ‘Abdallah bin Su’ud and sent him to Astana where he was
executed.
After that; Turki bin ‘Abdallah bin Muhammad bin Su’ud came into sight in the year 1888. He was
able to bring back the authority over Najd. He started actively uniting his state and spreading his
missionary; he was able to stretch out his rule to reach Al-Ihsa’, assumed Al-Riyadh his capital, and
began communicating with countries in the East and the West to call upon them to accept his
missionary. He described himself as guardian of all Muslims and was called Imam. His son Faysal
succeeded him, he was more eager which scared the Ottomans. Thus; they sent an expedition during
Muhammad ‘Ali’s time and was destined to make triumph over Faysal who managed to escape and
recaptured his power over Najd, and edges of Al-Hijaz and ‘Asir in 1260 of Hegira; He forced the
princes of Masqat, Bahrain, and the coasts of the Arab Gulf to pay annual levy. After his death, his
son ‘Abd-al-Rahman succeeded him in 1288 of Hegira, where the fighting among the Su’ud family
over the reign had started which helped the coming out of the prince of Shamar; Muhammad bin ‘Abd-
al-Rashid. He came to be of widespread authority covered Najd, Al-Ihsa’ up to the Arab Gulf east, and
the mountains of Hawran, Wadi Al-Dawasir, and Wadi Al-Rumman West. He made Ha’il the center of
his state; and was caught in many big conflicts with the Su’ud family, conquered Al-Riyadh, defeated
the Wahabis, and forced ‘Abd-al-Rahman to escape and go to the Kuwaiti sheikhs.
In the year 1900 A.D. 'Abd-al-'Aziz bin 'Abd-al-Rahman, managed to attack Al-Rashid family and reclaimed Al-Riyadh, the conflict between them lasted for twenty years, where the Ottoman government supported the Rashid family which made the Su'ud family get in touch with the British and sign a treaty with them in 1914 A.D. thus England acknowledged the emirate of the Su'ud family over Najd, Al-Ihsa’, Al-Qatif, and Al-Jabal; and promised to help them against any attacks provided that, they do not deal with anyone else but them also; they shall not interfere in the affairs of Kuwait and the Gulf States which; were under the protection of Britain. Also Britain dedicated a financial aid that amounts to forty thousand golden sterling pounds.

Footnotes:


and through this alliance; the Sa’ud family was able to remove the emirate of Al-Rashid family and subjugate them to the authority of the family of Sa’ud Al-Wahabi.

After that, a conflict erupted between the Nobles of Mecca and the Su’ud family and the reason was that Sharif Husayn bin ‘Ali; noble of Mecca, had signed with Britain his famous agreement in which he teamed up with the British and declared a revolution against the Ottoman State and became king in the year 1916 and considered Najd included in his area of reign. ‘Abd-al-‘Aziz refused that, and the conflict between them began with ‘Abdul-‘Aziz coming out victorious when he attached Al-Ta’if and seized it in 1924 A.D. then he proceeded to Mecca then Rabì’ and Medina and seized them.

Thereupon; Sharif Husayn pulled back to Jeddah where he transferred the monarchy to his son ‘Ali who receded for his inability so; it was ascended by ‘Abd-al-‘Aziz and Al-‘Asir in 1930 where he negotiated with the British and signed an agreement with them in which they acknowledged his reign over Najd and Hijaz. In the year 1932 A.D. and his kingdom was called; (The Kingdom of Saudi Arabia).

The Wahabi Movement and Iraq

20. The power in Southern Iraq was in the hand of the Shabib family and the princes of Al-Muttafaq at that time and Thawini bin ‘Abdalah Al-Mutawlli was ruling Al-Muttafaq, and carried out many expeditions over Al-Qasim gaining many victories. He also launched an attack on Al-Dar’iyyah, but before he got to it, the prince of Su’ud took them by surprise and marched an army to meet Thawini and his tribes, a fight erupted among them ended with the defeat of Thawini’s army and his forces, leaving plunder and money and heading towards Safwan where he was chased by the army of Su’ud whom he had defeated and returned victorious to Al-Dar’iyyah. In 1789 A.D. Thawini returned with another expedition on Al-Qasim, and with the direction and the support of the Ottoman State in 179 A.D. Similar to that, the Su’ud family prepared three armies; entrusted the first one to Muhammad bin Mu’ayqil which camped in the village of Al-Ma’ Al-Ma’ruf in Al-Ta’iff, the other one was under
the command of Imishari bin Su’ud which camped in Al-Ihsa’, and the third one lead by prince Su’ud, planned to be a cover for the other two armies. Met after the arrival of Thawini in Al-Ihsa’, and Hasan bin Imshari assumed the general command, and was able to intercept Thawini’s forces who was killed in his tent, in the hands of a slave who was authorized by prince Su’ud in the year 1797; the thing which prompted the army’s anger, destroyed it, and helped the Su’ud family to defeat them, kill them, and chase them until they arrived at The Kuwaiti Sheikhdom.

In retaliation for the attack of Al-Muttafaq tribes; the Su’ud family, the Wababis, set out an expedition on Iraq led by Su’ud. He penetrated the Iraqi border until he went deeply into Suq Al-Shuyukh, killed its people, and violated its sanctuaries which made its escape

1 Darwazah, previously mentioned reference, page 71

and they died drowning in the Euphrates river in the year 1798 A.D. He left it afterwards to go to Samawah, attacked the tribes of Shammar, tribes of Al-Zafir, the family of Ba’iyj and Zaqarit, killed the chief of Shammar (Matlaq), and seized the money and the prizes 1.

In the year 1801 A.D. Prince Su’ud attacked Iraq’s Southern border and proceeded into the Middle Euphrates, (Shattatah Tribes) in ‘Ayn Al-Tamr in Karbala’ and camped out there; he entered the city climbing up its walls in March 23, 1802. There was no army in it so; its people rushed to resist them, but they were not able to face such barbaric attacks, many of them were killed and the Su’ud forces took hold of their money goods, and looted everything inside the dome of Imam Al-Husayn’s (peace be upon him) tomb from valuable statues and precious gems. Furthermore; they took the monument located on the bed of the Imam, sabotaged the bed and ruined it 2.

The forces of the Wahabi family of Su’ud carried out killing, looting, and destroying all Shiite sights in Karbala3.

Darwazah stated that the forces of the Su’ud family attacked all shrines glorified by the Shiite in Iraq; such as the toms of ‘Ali and Husayn (peace be upon them) and others. They destroyed them, and looted their relics, alleging that these shrines; are violations with all their embellishments, the celebrations that take place on their grounds, sacrifices that are offered to them and the prayers and appeals which are cited for them. Furthermore; these forces have murdered all Shiite who opposed them.

In the beginning of the seventeenth century, the Wahabis attacked convoys of pilgrims from the tribes of (Al-Khaza’il) of the people of Iraq near Najd. The threat of the Wahabis increased and they raided the town of (‘Annah) in the year 1800 A.D., they killed its people, and looted their wealth. Also; they raided the village of (Kabisah) but its people resisted them with all their power5.
In the year 1810 A.D. a Gang of Wahabis led by ‘Abdallah bin Mas’ud reached a place near by Baghdad and proceeded robbing people and killing them. As a result of all these atrocities and others, a man from Northern Iraq by the name of ‘Uthman Al-Kurdi, traveled to Al-Dar’iyyah and stayed there claiming that he is seeking

education and religion killed prince ‘Abd-al-Amir bin Su’ud in Al-Ta’if mosque, which is known in Al-Dar’iyyah; in October 3, 1803 A.D. As a revenge for his family, Su’ud was inaugurated their prince. Himli comments by saying:”The new ideology found very little popularity in Iraq; the alleged Wahabi armies were received just like deserters and thieves because; the tribes of Iraq, Sunni and Shiite, were not able to change their faith with one paved by fire and invasion of livestock.

He adds about the invasion of Karbala’ (The rough Wahabis have worked up their way to the holy shrines and started to destroy them.... and on top of these acts, they killed about fifty people near the shrine and 500 others outside the shrine in Al-Sahn... They mercilessly killed everyone they encountered and robbed every house).

The British-Wahabi Relation
21. Humfer mentioned in his biography his relation with Muhammad bin ‘Abd-al-Wahab when he met him in Al-Basra, and how he befriended him and their relationship became very strong to the extent that Humfer was able to stir ‘Abd-al-Wahab in the way that serves the British intelligence without him knowing. In Isfahan, ‘Abd-al-Wahab was approached to fulfill a British plan provided that Britain will protect him, provide him with money and arms, and to give him a small emirate in the outskirts of Najd under the following conditions:
   a. Expiation of Muslims and justify killing them and robbing their money.
b. Demolish the Kaaba and the tombs of the pioneer Muslims, consider them idols, and disrespect the Profit and the Caliphates.

Humfer listed the complete details which led him to this result since its beginning in 1710 A.D. when Britain delegated him to collect information for bracing the ways to break Muslims and control their land in Turkey, Iraq, Egypt, Iran, and Al-Hijaz. He called himself Muhammad and learned Persian, Turkish, and Arabic languages in London; until he reached Turkey and stayed in a mosque for the purpose of learning. He mastered the Turkish and Arabic languages and learned Islamic science for two years; then he moved to Basra and worked as a carpenter claiming to be from Azerbaijan. People believed him because of his looks and his Turkish language. He met Bin

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1 Same previous reference, page 72
2 Loncaric, Mr Steven Homily, Four Centuries of Iraq’s Modern History, Translated by Ja’far Al-Khayyat, third edition, Baghdad 1963 A.D., page 211
3 Same previous reference, page 265.

'Abd-al-Wahab there, the ambitious young man irritable and resentful of the Turkish rule. Humfer says that: (The ambitious young man Muhammad, used to think of himself as wise as the Koran and Sunna, and stipulated the views of the scholars, not just the scholars of his own time and the four Islamic schools of thought yet; the views of Abi Bakr and 'Umar [CL: Muslim Caliphas] too, as he understood the Koran in a way different from them, and he used to say: “I am leaving you with the Koran and the Sunna and didn’t say, I am leaving you with Koran, Sunna, Al-Sahaba [CL: the companions of the profit] and the schools of thought”

Humfer found his long sought goal in Muhammad who used to look down upon the Caliphas and Imams such as Abi Hanifah, and said: (I am more discerning than Abi Hanifah). This Spy mentions that 'Abd-al-Wahab started to explain Koran in light of the views they present to him, not according to the understanding of the profit’s companions and the sheikhdoms, and this is where he became under control, poison his thoughts, cause him to fall into mistakes, and commit sins. He started permitting himself what God had prohibited him from doing. Afterwards; 'Abd-al-Wahab was approached to work for the interest of Britain, and he agreed; and they gave him their big plan to destroy Islam. Following that; ‘Abd-al-Wahab went to see his family along with Humfer whom he claimed to be a slave that he bought from the market; he stayed with him for two years during which the plan to emerge the missionary was concluded. Humfer had gathered the men around him, gave them arms and money, and years after according to Humfer, the British ministry was able to bring Muhammad bin
Su’ud to ‘Abd-al-Wahab’s side and together they assumed Al-Dar‘iyyah, the capital of the new religion 1.

22. The relationship between the Wahabis and Britain didn’t end after Humfer (or Muhammad), as he called himself, completed his mission. Thus Britain worked on emerging the so called Muhammad bin ‘Abd-al-Wahab, and arranged for his meeting with Muhammad bin Su’ud to destroy the Arabic Islamic State, and for the sake of the British interests; the British/ Wahabi relations lasted from the eighteenth century till this date. In the early twentieth century, the British began developing these relationships in a form of treaties, and to fulfill their plans; the Indian government appointed a Jewish British officer by the name (David Shakespeare) and sent him to Riyadh, upon the breakout of the First World War, to represent the British interests. This British officer led one of the Wahabi invasions in 1915 A.D. with ‘Abd-al-‘Aziz bin Su’ud to seize Ha’il along with five thousand individuals who started out from Kuwait to kill the family of Rashid who was against Britain; the family of Shammar was able to defeat them and kill (Shakespeare) 2. Thus the leadership was tended to (Johan Philippi) to coordinate between the Wahabis and Britain, and due to the fact, he changed his name to (Muhammad Philippi) and changed later to Hajj (‘Abdallah Philippi), he grew his beard, gave a monthly salary equal to 500 sterling pounds to ‘Abd-al-‘Aziz and to his father ‘Abd-al-Rahman

Footnotes:
1 Summarized with liberty from Humfer’s autobiography, page 31-49.

and 25 sterling pounds to each of his brothers. Also; he brought 30,000 rifles with their ammunition and formed a religious army that abide by the image of the sheikhs completely, and was called (the Brotherhood Army) their distinctive mark is a (turban) over the head and their motto is (The smell of Paradise is approaching, who wants to be first?) 1.

Philippi led the first meeting between Bracey Cocos, the British envoy to the Arab Gulf, and ‘Abd-al-‘Aziz bin Su’ud in Al-Qasir Camp in 1915; by virtue of which he granted ‘Abd-al-‘Aziz the medal of the British Sultanate for his service to Britain, Bracey Cocos, in that meeting, called on the problem of the Palestinians and the Jews and asked for ‘Abd-al-‘Aziz’s help by giving the Palestinian land to the Jews as a collateral for the endurance of his power, hence he said: (I think this is a guarantee for your endurance as it is in the interest of Britain that the Jews have a homeland and existence, and Britain’s interests are, by all means, in your interest) ‘Abd-al-‘Aziz replied: (Yes; if my acknowledgement means so much to you, I acknowledge thousand times granting a homeland to the Jews in Palestine or other than Palestine) 2

Various views in the Wahabi Movement
23. Historians and writers who have discussed the Wahabi movement and the History of the Su’ud family have differed in their views, some of them consider it a corrective movement, some have ranked
it among the destructive religious movements that are heresiarch extreme, some considered it a foreign movement that has slipped in to destroy Islam by means of the Jews, Britain, the western, and America, others considered it a religious movement at the beginning, but has been made for the purpose of the Su'ud family that is eager to control the Arabic Peninsula in Najd and AL-Hijaz. I deemed it appropriate to list most of the views I have read:

In that respect, Darwazah stated that: (This movement ia ascribed to a scholar from Najd bt the name of Sheikh Muhammad bin ‘Abd-al-Wahab, originally from a town by the name of ‘Ayniyah in Najd. He was educated by Al-Hanbali school of Islamic thought. He was in Iraq and other Arabic countries and witnessed what the Arab Muslims were up to from heresies, religiously and morally forbidden acts, and bad habits which contradict Islam. He began to disapprove that and condemn that, and to call upon them to return to Islam and its attributes in the book of God and his Profit).

Another view states that (During the days of Sultan Salim, injustice grew on the hands of every wicked giant, and so did the mighty power of ‘Abd-al-‘Aziz bin Sa’ud; he made roads scary, by filling them with bombs, and soldiers calling for the heresy of Muhammad)

1 Nasar Al-Sah’id, the history Sa’ud, previously mentioned reference, part 1 page 58-59
2 Same previous reference, page 156-159
3 Darwazah, the Birth of the Modern Religious Movement, previous reference page 70

Bin ‘Abd-al-Wahab flaring up fires every where there is population and structure and calling everyone who believed in one God and spent his day and night praying; infidel. He permitted shedding blood of Muslims and called them by the names which are attributed to infidels)

As for Father Karmaly he says of the Wahabi calling that (they are Sunnis from Ahmad bin Hanbal’s school of thought, or Al- Wahabi because the Wahabis are Hanbalis[ CL: ascribed Ahmad bin Hanbal]. Yet the reformists who are enemies from Najd called them that because they want to ascribe to a new faith and accuse them of being infidels, yet that is not the case, the Hanbalis are Wahabis and the Wahabis are Hanbalis in their faith although the name is new but the religion of the people of Al-Khumaysiyah (a City in Najd) is the religion of the forefathers CL: That is the religion of Profit Muhammad and his Companions] and the religion of the Islamic Sheikh Bin Taymiya the religion of its student sheikh Muhammad bin ‘Abd-al-Wahab).

Whereas ‘Abd- al-Wahab Al-Shammari mentions in his introducing of Al-Wahabi Movement (The Wahabi is the movement of Al-Tunisi in Tunis and a friend of Hasan Khan in Mubal and Amir’Ali in Kalkalta)
The classification markings are original to the Iraqi documents and do not reflect current US classification.

Al-Shammari goes back to say: (The Jewish origins had reflected on the attitude of the Wahabies and the Su’ud family who have used Terrorism, Killing, Slaughtering, and destruction against the Arab Muslims. Through their alliance with the British, the foreigners, and some of Jewish Masonic leaders)4 And Khahni justifies this as follow (when the followers of; Abd-al-Wahab set out destroying domes and removing what was on the grave of the profita God’s blessing and peace be upon him) from ornaments and Jewels; He and his friends were accused of infidelity and atheism. As a matter of fact; There was no need for this annoyance because the base of the Wahabi actions is connected to Sunna-itself because it was the recommendations of the profit (God-, blessing and peace be upon him)s And so does Darwazah to drop charges of the Wahabis when he says (The Ottoman state & Muhammad ‘Ali, have collaborated on spreading a propaganda against the Wahabi missionary and depict it as a distorted faith, or movement, from the book of God and the Sunna of his profit, So in order to make their Muslim soldiers fight them because of their faith and prompt all the skins to approve that just like what Al- Zaydiyyah did with their war on the Zaydi Imams. Although there is no deviation from the book of God and the Sunna of his profit especially in The Wahabi movement there is a calling to return to the book of God and the Sunna of his profit)6

Footnotes:
1Al- Wa’ili, Study of the Su’ud family, previously mentioned reference, page 177.
2 Father Karmily (Al- Khamisiyyah), Lughat Al Arab magazine [CL: The language of the Arabs] 1911 A.D. Page 18
3 Al- Khafni, The Encyclopedia Al- Farq, previous mentioned reform page 68.
4 Al- Shammari, Roots on the Wahabi movement & previously mentioned reference, page 30
5 Al- Khafni, the encyclopedia Al-Farq previous mentioned reforms
6 Darwazah, The Birth of the Arabic Movement previously reference page 72-73

However; the professor attorney Mr. Faryid mentions in his book (The Wahabis are people who followed the method of Muhammad bin ‘Abd- al- Wahab; a man who was born in Al- Dar’iyyah, Arab land form of Najd and Al-Hijaz Ever since he was little he displayed signs of noble descent and, determination, he was also known for his noble deeds among all who resort to him. After he studied Al- Hanfi school of thought in his home land, he traveled to Isfahan, Seeking its scholars and learned from them until his religious information became vast especially in the area or interpreting the Koran. He Returned to his homeland in 1171 Hegira and adopted the faith of Aba Hanifah and used religion as means to achieve the intentions of his prejudice faith or political goals, and used the method of force, adventure and war as means of expanding and attacking. Thus, the Wahabis considered all Muslims infedals and their land is the land of atheism, and should be conquered as long as they don’t believe in the Wahabi missionary that denied all Islamic schools of thought)1
Yet Muhammad Jawad Maghniyyah describes the Wahabi movement saying; (Since the Wahabi movement had emerged in the Arabic Peninsula during the eighteenth century, they have practiced
hostility, killing women, children, and elderly of Arab Muslims in the Arabian Peninsula and what surrounded him from the land of Iraq and of Great Syria. It is not strange that the final goal of Wahabis is to destroy Islam, and create division between Sunnis and Shiites. Darwazah then returns to remind that (No matter how the Wahabi movement originally possessed corrective religious feature, yet the inclusion of Su'ud family in it, the mixing with politics, and the end conclusion which was led by this Great Kingdom; all of that can be considered from the features of the Arabic Renaissance and the modern Arabic movement).

Dr. Al-Khafni describes them in his encyclopedia by saying (Al-Wahabi movement is an elapsed movement driven by Muhammad bin 'Abd-al-Wahab 1115-1206 of Hegira spread out by many. It was said that is a corrective religious notion which transformed the theoretical thoughts of Bin Timiyyah into application. It was also said of Muhammad bin Abd-al-wahab that, he is the chief of the modern corrective religious movement in the Arab Peninsula and he followed the righteous method of the ancestors calling for pure unity and condemning heresies and destroying what had gotten stuck to Islam from delusions. His missionary which he declared in 1143 of Hegira was the first flare for the Arabic renaissance in the whole world and the reform in India, Egypt, Iraq, Great Syria and Morocco and others. Who were affected so; Al-Alusi emerged in Iraq, Al-Afghani in Afghanistan, Muhammad' Abbduh in Egypt, Jamal-al-Din Al-Tunisi in Tunisia Sadiq Hasan Khan in Mubal, and Amir Ali in Kalkata then his company made him become diligent and independent, thus he established an independent faith which was acknowledged by his followers who attended to him, and many people accepted the faith).

But Dr. Maymunah Khalifah stated that (Its is imperative that we judge the Wahabi movement by the standards of its era in order to admit that; it brought on good deed to the region of Najd and rescued it from the state of ciaos and division that prevailed). Then she goes back to say (The Wahabi movement is distinguished by a violent and strong feature; at the time in which it maintained its religious appearance, it became an extreme national political movement in essence aiming for unity and the establishment of an Arabic empire and threw out the Persian and Turkish foreign influence from the region. For that reason, the Wahabis got in conflict with most of their neighbors; everyone who was not a Wahabi was accused of atheism and deviation from what is right).
Lonkirk describes the Wahabi movement by saying: (Since then, the Najdi Empire of Bin Su'ud was known by the Wahabi faith. Thus the believers of this narrow minded, anti-existence, and deserters faith have expanded their tiny state by fighting Muslims whose faith became spoiled in their dealing with their neighbors; each invasion had its religious Fatwah. Their hatred to prosperous deserters surrounding Najd from every direction made them, not just, use extreme violence yet; they committed acts that made many people believe that their intention is to attack Islam itself. As a matter of fact; their toughest citizens or their most savage tribes and fighters knew very little of the Koran and Suuna).4

Footnotes
1 Al-Khafni, Al-Farq encyclopedia, previously mentioned reference, page 681.
2 Al-Sabah, The Kuwait Relations, previously mentioned reference, page 96.
3 Same reference, page 97

The Conclusion
24. The many trips of 'Abd-al-Wahab, his interaction with Muslim Scholars all over the world, and what he had learned and seen have affected his ideological structure. First; he studied Al-Hanbali school of thought, then Al-Hanafi school of thought in Iraq and Turkey, and the Shiite faith in Iran; all of these studies had equipped him with more information about religion and interpretation which made him conceded so; he picked up a new school of thought in which he denied Muslims, many of their traditions and worship principles, and accused them of atheism, the thing that made Muslims hate him more. His father, who was mentioned in the books they wrote, was among the first to oppose he
prevented him from going too far with his missionary. Soon after his father parted with life, he declared his missionary again until his brother Sulayman; judge of Huraymulah, confronted him and accused him of being atheist and heresy, and that is proved in the publications of Sheikh Khaz’al who is close to the Wahabis, and in all issuances of the Islamic world that consider the Wahabi movement destructive.

After ‘Abd-al-Wahab met with Muhammad bin Su’ud and combined their efforts, this religious movement became political with dimensions and goals set for power and religion, in which the movement have tried to control the Arabic Peninsula and its outer skirts and subjugate it to the power of the Saudi Wahabis, by using hostile practices such as killing, captivity, robbing wealth and properties from their opponents in addition to destroying cities, burning them down, demolishing the domes of its holy men, and stealing their treasures as to what happened to the dome of Zayd bin Al-Khattab’s grave in Al-‘Ayniyyah, and what they did to the shrines of ‘Ali and Al-Husayn (peace be upon him) in the cities of Najaf, Karbala’, and others.

The common interests between the Wahabis and the British have agreed in aggression and expansion. They have agreed by means of secret and open treaties, the first have imposed expansion in the Arabic Peninsula and eliminate their opponent from Arabic tribes, and the second goal was to control the countries of the Arab Gulf, rob their wealth and subjugate them to the power of the Su’ud family. In addition to that; they passed the Jewish-British scheme to find a home land for the Jews in Palestine. The Wahabis were able to pass few heresies by mixing them with the Islamic teachings in order to enable weakness of the mind and belief in their calling. However; these myths had surfaces and were cleared up by the efforts of Muslims who have worked hard to expose the hidden evil intentions which the Wahabis were aiming at.

Finally, I ask God almighty and all powerful that I was successful in this modest work of mine, and God is the guardian of success.

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In the name of God the most compassionate the most merciful

General Military Intelligence Directorate
Air Defense Security System

We Have Brought You The Clear Cut News From Saba'

Military Intelligence Directorate

A Study Titled:
The Truth about the Wahabi Movement

Intelligence Colonel
‘Ijayl Ahmad Salih Al-Jumayli
Air Defense Security System
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**The Truth About The Wahabi Movement**

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Introduction
The purpose of this study is to reveal the truth about the traitor Wahabi Movement through its behavior and acts, and the history of the birth of its founder; Muhammad bin ‘Abd-al-Wahab, his connection and relations with foreign powers along with the Su’ud family where both have used the Wahabi Movement as means to achieve their political objectives and their savage treatment with Arab Muslims who refused to accept their Wahabi belief; which disapproves of all Islamic schools of thought whether they are Sunni or Shiite. The Wahabi’s attitude towards the Arab Muslims was nothing but faces of betray, killing of women, children, and elderly, as well as robbing properties and disgrace.

Definition of Al-Wahabi Movement
It is a political and religious movement that is suspected in ideology and practice. It was found by the colonial departments so it can work through it with the traitor Saudi regime in order to fulfill its goals in the Arab Nation and the Muslim world in general by striking at the most important element of their life and that is the Islamic religion. Furthermore; to create doubt in their most cherished shrines and a ciaos in their thinking. They used the rout of power, adventure, and wars for the sake of expansion and aggression. The Wahabis had considered all Muslims infidels and their lands are lands of atheism and must be controlled as long as they don’t believe in their Wahabi missionary which denied all Islamic faiths.

Brief Historic Glance at the Wahabi Movement and its Founder
The Wahabi Movement had emerged in the Arabic Peninsula through the eighteenth century, and the philosophy of Al-Wahabi and the term Wahabi is relative to the founder of this movement “Muhammad bin ‘Abd-al-Wahab” who grew up in the city of Al-‘Ayniyah in Najd and called for fanaticism and excessiveness in Islam so; he was thrown out by the people of Najd and he went to Iraq. He settled in the city of Al-Basra, and set out again to call to his conservative views which contradict the principles of Islam. The people of Al-Basra got upset with him and threw him out because he was telling people of traditions of the profit that were not entrusted in the Books of Sunna. He was also interpreting Koran in ways which were not intended by the God of the skies. He escaped from Al-Basra on foot and almost died of extreme heat, thirst, and hunger. He returned to Najd and settled in the city of “Huraymulah” then he was thrown out of it and returned.

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to “Al-'Ayniyyah” and was behaving as if he was a new profit, talking in the name of the creator his almighty; just like what the deserters did after the death of the seal of the profits and missionaries Muhammad, God’s blessings and peace be upon him, just like Musaylima the liar. Muhammad bin ‘Abd-al-Wahab took advantage of his new location in Al-'Ayniyyah and started evoking trouble and disorder resulting from his order to destroy the dome of the grave of ‘Umar bin ‘Abd-al-Khattab, may God be pleased with him, and all holy shrines, as well as not paying almsgiving and other conduct which contradict religious obligations. This made Muslims of the Arab Peninsula become outraged therefore; the prince of Al-Hisa’ and Al-Qatif, ordered ‘Uthman bin Mu’ammah to get rid of Muhammad bin ‘Abd-al-Wahab so, he was thrown out of Al-'Ayniyyah. Bin ‘Abd-al-Wahab chose to go to Al-Dar’iyyah. He arrived there in 1160 of Hegira to meet an individual who isn’t much different in his wrongful behavior, this individual was Muhammad bin Su’ud bin Muhammad who is a relative of the current Su’ud family.

In the beginning of the eighteenth century, the Su’ud family’s influence settled in the city of Al-Dar’iyyah which prompted Muhammad bi Su’ud to search for a way to achieve his ambitions in expanding his power outside Al-Dar’iyyah and controlling the Land (Najd) by invasion and adventure. He agreed with Muhammad bin ‘Abd-al-Wahab to use the Wahabi principles in politically by considering all Arab Muslims in Arab Peninsula (Infidels who have deviated from Islam and deserted it because they are non Wahabis) Therefore they should be killed and attack their homeland, seize their properties, kill them, and violate their women.

**The Organizational Structure of the Wahabi Movement**

The Wahabi Movement’s organizational structure is a pyramid frame as follow:

a. Comrade. It is the first step that a person newly gained to the faith goes through.
b. Herald
c. Mujahid
d. Chief
e. Trustee
f. Member of the Consultative Council

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g. **Group Leader**

As for the organizational units and their subsidiary cells; they are:

a. The Circle. Designated for a group of comrades and led by Mujahid.
b. Family. A circle of chiefs led by a trustee.
c. Troop. A Circle of trustees lead be a member of the consultative council
d. Annual Conference: nominated to it a chief and above in rank.

**Rituals and Practices of the Wahabi Movement**

Wahabi has its own practices and rituals that are performed during worship ceremonies and through which we can identify its elements and external aspects which are represented by the following:

1. Wearing a short gown (Dishdashah), and long under trousers, preferably white color.
2. Growing of the beard and trimming of the mustache.
3. Walking in groups or being present in groups.
4. They look as follow for the Friday prayers:
   a. They do not pray the Sunna prayer.
   b. They rest their hands on the upper part of their chest.
   c. Stand with their feet semi spread.
   d. Stand in the first raw so others can emulate them in their moves.
   e. Constantly move the index finger in prayer, while reading the greetings.
5. They do not pray in mosques which contain tombs.
6. They do not cite any prayers after the calling for prayer had ended.
7. A Muslim’s saying: Our Master Muhammad, God’s blessing and peace be upon him, (because; they say that he had died) and he is no one; God had sent him and his role is completed.
8. The recommend no visiting of tombs, no building of domes and rooms over the tombs, and make that forbidden.
The classification markings are original to the Iraqi documents and do not reflect current US classification.

9. Considering the reading of Koran in a loud voice before the Friday prayer, a heresy.
10. Forbid TV watching, going to the movies, and taking pictures.
11. Exercise religious slogans during marriage ceremonies.

**The Jewish descent of Muhammad bin ‘Abd-al-Wahab and Muhammad bin Su’ud**

1. The original Arabic sheikhs of Najd as well as the scientific resources, confirm that Muhammad bin ‘Abd-al-Wahab is from a Jewish family from “Al-Dawnamah” in Turkey. The Dawnamah here refers to those Jews who have declared their Islam for the purpose of harming Islam and save themselves from the chase by the Ottoman Sultans.

   The story of those Turkish Jews begins in the seventeenth century when the Jewish (ShaShai Zaybi) claimed that the expected Messiah who told the priests that he will appear in tongues to save the Jews of the world from the oppression which they were subject to during the seventeenth century because of the struggle over faiths in Europe and the Catholic inspection courts. Thus Shabahai had Jewish supporters so; he was convicted by the Ottoman authorities and was notified by Sheikh Al-Islam (An Ottoman religious position) at the Sublime Porte [CL: Ottoman authority] that; he will be executed by hitting him with arrows and if he doesn’t die; the Sultan will change his claim that he is the expected Messiah. When Shibshai felt death in front of his eyes, he denied the Messiah and superficially declared his Islam and that his name is (Sir ‘Abd-al-‘Aziz). But as a matter of fact, he never had gotten rid of his Judaism better yet; his Rabi friends were happy that he superficially declared his Islam because; he saved his life and their movement. Therefore the Turkish Muslims called Shabshai and his Jewish followers who have pretended to be Muslims; the name (Dawnamah). It is a Turkish name which means; the return to the right guidance. Thus Al-Dawnamah played a major role in harming Islam and Muslims, and directly contributed to all factors that destroyed Islamic values in the society and the immorality and bad behavior of Muslims.

   The Jews of Dawnamah who have pretended to be Muslims; continued to practice their Shabathic Jewish traditions which emphasized not to marry Muslims and pretend their adherence to the traditions.
and values of Islam so that; they will not be harassed by anyone. One of the things was for everyone to have two names; one fake Muslim name, and one original Jewish name such as; (Schulman) and his alleged name is Sulayman, one of the merchants in the Turkish city of Burhat. This Jew left Turkey and settled in Damascus/Syria; trading in Islamic religion after he let his beard grow and wore the Muslim turban. Thus he was denied by the people of Syria and they threw him out for his quackery. He fled to Egypt and was received with opposition, he left to Al-Hijaz afterwards and stayed in Mecca. The people of Mecca threw him out for his quackery as well. Finally he settled in a village called Al-‘Ayniyyah, there he found room for quackery and claimed to be of the descent of Rabi’ah and that he was born in Morocco after his father traveled there. Tjen Schulman or (Sulayman) and had a child whom he called ‘Abd-al-Wahab then ‘Abd-al-Wahab had children whom one of them is called Muhammad; the founder of the Wahabi calling.

2. As for his partner in the Wahabi missionary, Muhammad bin Su’ud; he is of a Jewish descent as well ascending to the Jew (Mardakhai bin Ibrahim bin Mushi) who used to sell kernels in Al-Basra. A group from (‘Anzah) tribe, Al-Masalikh moiety; came to buy from him, and when they told him that they were from Al-Masalikh he pretended to be from the same family, but he came to Iraq long time ago and settled in Al-Basra because of a dispute between his father and members of ‘Anzah tribe. Because of this alleged relationship, Mardakhai gave this group generously and loaded the camels for them which made them very happy to have a cousin in Iraq, and when Al-Masalikh intended to leave and return to their homeland, Mardakhai asked them if he can accompany them to his alleged homeland Najd. They welcomed him and so has Mardakhai arrived in Najd and his name became (Farhan Ibrahim Musa). By virtue of his wealth, a number of Christians have gathered around him which made the tribes of Al-‘Ajman, Bani Khalid, and Banu Hajar sense the seriousness of the deceitful Jew and threw him out where he fled to a land by Al-‘Arid called; (Al-Malibaydir wa Ghasibah) known today as (Al-Riyadh) So; he asked ‘Abdallah bin Hajar, the owner of that land, for his permission to stay there and he agreed, but Mardakhai, the Jew, betrayed the man and killed him and his family and seized the land and called it (Al-Dur’iyyah) to settle in it. Later on; Mardakhai married his son who came with him from.
Al-Basra, whose name was (Jack Dan) and he changed to (Al-Qarn). He married him to a woman from (‘Anzah) tribe who gave birth to Muhammad and Su’ud afterwards; hence the descent of the Su’ud family started in Al-Dar’iyyah, which goes back in origin to this Jewish murderer and thief.

The Saudi Wahabi British Jewish Alliances  
The Saudi Wahabi relations with the British go back to the eighteenth century, for they are the ones who worked up with Muhammad bin ‘Abd-al-Wahab the extremist so alleged Wahabi Movement, and they are the ones who brought together him, and Muhammad bi Su’ud in order to combine their efforts in serving the British colonial interests, and destroy the Arabic Islamic principles and values. These relations and cooperation lasted through the nineteenth century. In the early twentieth century, the British began to develop these relations in a form of compacts and agreements after the Wahabis of the Su’ud family had become a great entity in the Arabic Peninsula due to their invasions, inhumanity, and the help of the British. To execute these duties, the British government had prepared a British officer (Jewish) in India by the name of David Shakespeare, and sent him to Riyadh when the First World War erupted to represent the British interests there.

In the early 1915 A.D. Shakespeare led one of the Wahabi invasions along with ‘Abd-al-‘Aziz bin Su’ud to conquer Ha’il. The British intelligence had mobilized an expedition consisting of five thousand individuals, started from Kuwait to kill the Rashid family who were against the British. But the Rashid family, the Shammar family, and the people of Ha’il were capable of defeating this invading power and killed David Shakespeare in that battle. Thus this was a catastrophe to Britain and the Wahabi Su’ud family.

The Jewish Wahabi Saudi relations have continued on and become deep-rooted with time to the extent that the British officials were talking about Palestine and the Jews without any embarrassment or hesitation. In 1945 A.D. and to be exact, on February 17; and in Cairo, ‘Abd-al-‘Azizi bin Su’ud met with the well known, colonialist and British prime minister, and the
guardian of Jews, (Winston Churchill) the man who truly proven to be a friend in the time of hardship and distress, and if it wasn’t for him the Jews would have never reached the minimal of their rights.

Muhammad bin ‘Abd-al-Wahab and Muhammad bin Su’ud and the British Intelligence

In 1973, the autobiography of the British spy “Humfer” has been translated in regards to his work in Istanbul and Iraq, and his relation with Muhammad bin ‘Abd-al-Wahab, the founder of the Wahabi Movement, when he was living in Al-Basra where he met him and befriended him. Thus their relationship became substantial and intimate to the degree which enabled Humfer, the spy, to stir Muhammad bin ‘Abd-al-Wahab the way the British intelligence chose to.

Afterwards, when Muhammad ‘Abd-al-Wahab was in Isfahan; he was openly approached to run the Wahabi Movement in order to fulfill the British plan as a course, in return for Britain protecting him from other governments, and scholars who will attack him by means of money and weapons, in addition to having an emirate, even if it is small, on the outer skirts of Najd.

As for the conditions which Muhammad bin ‘Abd-al-Wahab had put forth; they are to do the following:

1) Expiate all Muslims and permit killing them, steal their money and dishonor their dignity.
2) Demolish Al-Ka’ba for it is an atheist remnant, prevent people from performing pilgrimage, and entice the tribes of stealing pilgrims and killing them.
3) Work hard to prevent the teachings of the caliphs and fight the nobles of Hijaz [CL: The Sharif].
4) Destroy domes, tombs, and holy shrines in Mecca, Medina and everywhere else; considering it atheist and polytheism, in addition to disrespect to the Profit Muhammad, God’s blessing and peace be upon him, his Caliphat, and the Islamic Scholars.
5) Spread confusion and terror in the land.
6) Propagate a modified and deviated Koran.

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Years after the ‘Abd-al-Wahab began his work; the British official circles, were able to win Muhammad bin Su’ud, and asked him to work along with Muhammad bin ‘Abd-al-Wahab. They sent the spy Humfer to inform them that; Muhammad bin ‘Abd-al-Wahab will assume religion, while Muhammad bin Su’ud will assume authority so they can conquer people’s hearts and bodies. Britain was supplying them secretly with sufficient money, and bought them few servants, who were the best British intelligence officers, and trained them in Arabic language and desert fights.

The classification markings are original to the Iraqi documents and do not reflect current US classification.

The Aggression and Savageness of the Wahabis Towards the Arab Muslims

The eighteenth and nineteenth centuries have witnessed invasions and wars of destruction and elimination carried by the Wahabis against the Arab Muslims people of Najd, Iraq, and Great Syria and after that; Al-Hijaz in the early twentieth century.

The Wahabis began to expand in the land of Najd and their struggle with the princes of Riyadh lasted since the year 1746 A.D. that is the year in which the prince of Medina and its people, women and children, to evacuate it because of the savage nature of the Wahabis. But Muhammad bin Su’ud sent his Wahabi army led by his son ‘Abd-al-‘Aziz to other areas of Najd under the pretense of, cleansing Islam from polytheism and heresies. In 1792 A.D. they conquered most of Al-Ihsa’ region and it became the base for their expansion in the eastern part of the Arabic Peninsula.

Besides; the continuous attacks which the Wahabis have launched against Iraq and its tribes as well as the inhumanity practiced in the name of spreading the light of God and his untruly and falsely calling, had made the Iraqi tribes fight the Wahabis in the same way they fight infidel thieves. Therefore the Wahabis poured their severe anger on the Iraqis and their various faiths; hence the Iraqi situation became worse between the years of 1792 – 1797 because the raids were fast and inhumane in their assault on properties and dignities.

Thus, sheikh Thuwayni, sheikh of Al-Muntafik, had confronted them; he was the first Iraqi to lead the fight against them. He gathered around him people of the Arabs of ‘Aqil from Baghdad, and relieves came from other Iraqi cities especially; Kuwait and Al-Zubayr. He tried to go deeper in to kill the Wahabis but he was killed on the hands of a black man whom they have utilized for that purpose. The savage Wahabi invasions continued against the tribes in western part of Iraq, and after one year and few weeks they decided to send a new expedition to Iraq in the summer of 1798 A.D. So; the tribes of Bani ‘Aqil, Al-‘Abyd, Shammar and others gathered under the leadership of Muhammad Beh Al-
Shawi and moved forward to Al-Basra and was joined by the tribes of Al-Zafir, Al-Muntafak, and Bani Khalid. Thus the Bin Su’ud the Wahabi army leader was afraid to face them and agreed to the conditions they presented to him which are; not to attack Iraq, treat the Iraqi pilgrims with kindness, return the cannons the he had seized, and pay a fine. The Wahabi, Bin Su’ud agreed and signed the agreement in the year 1799.

But the Wahabis have violated the agreement and started attacking the Iraqi pilgrims then raided the city of (‘Innah) in 1800 A.D., they killed, robbed, and raided the village of (Kabisah) but its people resisted them vigorously.

They also attacked Karbala’ in 1801 A.D. seeking the holy tombs of the grandchildren of Profit Muhammad, God’s blessings and peace be upon him, permitting the killing of women, children and elders, destroying the tomb of Imam Al-Husayn (May God be pleased with him) and tear out its iron bars, fence and mirrors, furthermore; they looted the inscriptions and the precious findings from the gifts of the Pashas and Princes, they also stole the wall sculpture, pulled out the gold from ceilings, stole chandeliers and fancy rugs, precious hangings and doors set in jewels. This savage and barbaric expedition led by Su’ud bin ‘Abd-al-‘Aziz bin Su’ud.

The Iraqis did not attack the Wahabi ‘Abd-al-‘Aziz bin Su’ud much, but after about one year; an Iraqi attacked ‘Abd-al-‘Aziz and killed him in Al-Dar’iyyah stabbing with a knife in revenge for what the Wahabis had done in Karbala’.

**The British plan to destroy Islam and Muslims**

Revealing the British intelligence documents that aimed to destroy Islam and Muslims within one century, so Islam become old news after being the reality which confronted its top agents working to achieve the fourteen items of the agreement. They ordered to keep the document secretive and warned about disclosing its contents so that Muslims will not be aware of it and take adverse actions, and the document sums up as follow:
1. The positive cooperation with the Caesars of Russia to seize the Islamic region of Bukhara, Tajikistan, Armenia, Kharasan, and others and cooperating with them.
2. The positive cooperation with France and Russia to put together a comprehensive plan to destroy the Islamic world internally and externally.
3. Create disputes and severe conflicts between the Turkish and Persian governments and stir up sectarianism and racialism between both sides.
4. Give part of the Islamic countries to non Muslims; (first) Yathrib to the Jews, (second) Alexandria to the Christians, (third) Yazid to the Parisian Zarusht,

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(fourth) Al-'Amara to Al-Sa'ibah, (fifth) Karaminshah for those who make God out of 'Ali bin Abi Talib, (sixth) Al-Musil for Al-Yazidyyin, (seventh) the Gulf of Dhars to the Hindus, (eighth) Tripoli for Druze, and (ninth) Qarid for Al-Tubiyyin.
5. Planning to squander both Turkish and Persian Islamic governments into the largest number possible of conflicting small local authorities as is the case in India, applying the rule of (Divide and Conquer) and (Divide and Destroy).
6. Plant false religions and faiths in the body of the Islamic countries as follow:
   a. Plant four religions in the body of the Shiite countries as follow:
      1) A religion that idolizes Al-Hussayn bin ‘Ali, and the right location is Karbala’
      2) A religion that worships Ja’far Al-Sadiq, and the right location is Isfahan
      3) A religion that worships Al-Mihdi Al-Maw’ud and the right location is Samirra’.
      4) A religion that worships ‘Ali Al-Rida, and the right location is Kharasan.
   b. Make the four Sunni faiths, independent without connection to each other; they are the only Muslims and the rest are infidels and should be killed and eradicated.
7. Spread immorality among Muslims through adultery, sodomy, alcohol, and gambling.
8. Take an interest in cultivating corrupted rulers in the land that are a tool in the hands of the British.
9. Prohibit the Arabic language as much as possible and expand on non Arabic languages such as, Sanskrit, Bayisiyyah, Kurdish, and Pashto; and expand the scope for local dialects branching off Arabic which entails disconnecting Arabs from the great language which is the language of Koran and Sunna.

The Conclusion

From what was previously mentioned about the acts of those bloody murderers who have distorted Islam and its principles, and using it as the tool to fulfill the Zionist and Colonial aspirations to divide the unity of Muslims, humiliate them and control their lands and fortunes. The Su’ud family and the Wahabis were the tool which was and still is at work to destroy the Arabic Islamic civilization, expiate the nation of Muhammad (God’s blessing and peace be upon him), and their rule was; you’re either a Wahabi or will be killed, robbed, your money will be seized and your dignity is violated.
Resources

2. Autobiography of the British spy; Humfer
3. The Wahabi Movement – A Study and analysis – Al-Anbar branch Command.
Signed by
Intelligence Colonel
‘Ijayl Ahmad Salih Al-Jumayli
Air Defense Security System
April 15, 2002
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- **Agency:** DIA
- **Project:** IRAQI FREEDOM
- **Country Of Information:** IRAQ
- **Title:**
- **Country Of Origin:**
- **Originators Classification:** TOP SECRET

### Translation Information

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### Linked Documents

- **Original Document:** ISGQ-2003-00047996
- **Translation:** ISGQ-2003-00047996-HT

### Related Document Numbers

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<td>Harmony Number</td>
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### Keyword Categories

- **Facilities**
  - Name: EMBASSY OF IRAQ AMMAN
  - Name: GENERAL MILITARY INTELLIGENCE DIRECTORATE
  - Name: MINISTRY OF DEFENSE
  - Name: PRESIDENCY COUNCIL

- **Biographic Information**
  - Name: 'ALI, MAHIR MUSTAFA
  - Name: DAWUD, AHMAD JAMIL
The classification markings are original to the Iraqi documents and do not reflect current US classification.

**Name:** MUSTAFA, MUHAMMAD SHARIF  
**Name:** SHANGAL, 'ABD-AL-JABBAR KHALIL

<table>
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<tr>
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<tr>
<td>ISGQ-2003-00047996 This file contains the following information: -Pages: 2-11 contain correspondence between the Iraqi Embassy in Amman, the General Military Intelligence Directorate, Presidency Council and the Ministry of Defense, concerning the request of a Jordanian Pilot called Muhammad 'Abd-Al-Rahman Al-Hattab, who is originally from Palestine. The pilot, a Yugoslavian Aviation Academy graduate, joined the Iraqi Air Force in 1985/86, and then went to Jordan to continue his military service. He stated that he was ready for any kind of suicide missions in Iraq, on behalf of the Arab and Muslim nations. The correspondence is dated between 8/13/1990 and 9/25/1990. Page: 11 shows his personal letter, which sent to the Iraqi Embassy in Jordan, in which he offered himself for any suicide attack. He stated: &quot;And this is the least of what I can do for Iraq and Saddam Hussein.&quot; The letter contains his address in Jordan and his contacts (mentioned below). Muhammad 'Abd-Al-Rahman Al-Hattab: 1. Phone number 888-343. 2. Address: Amman, Northern Marka/ Al-'Abdallat District/ Fatimah Al-Zahra' Mosque/ near Mansur Supermarket. 3. Date of Birth: 19600526. 4. Place of Birth: Tol Karim -Page: 12 contain his diploma in high professional education as a Pilot. He completed 200 hours of flying. His overall rate is Good. -Page: 12 contains his diploma in high professional education as a Pilot. He completed 200 hours of flying. His overall rate is Good. Page 11 shows his personal letter sent to the Iraqi Embassy in Jordan, in which he offered himself for any suicide attack. He said: &quot;and this is the least of what I can do for Iraq and Saddam Hussein&quot;. The letter shows his address in Jordan besides his contacts (mentioned below). Muhammad 'Abd-Al-Rahman Al-Hattab is as follow: 1. Phone number 888-343. 2. Address: Amman, Northern Marka/ Al-'Abdallat District/ Fatimah Al-Zahra' Mosque/ near Mansur Supermarket. 3. Date of Birth: 19600526. 4. Place of Birth: Tol Karim -Page 12 contains his Diploma in high professional education as a Plane Pilot. He completed 200 hours of flying. His overall rate is Good.</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>
Republican of Iraq
Ministry of Defense
Presidency Office

Air Force
Number: 7905/1/62/2
Dated: 1990/09/25

To the Republican of President
Subject: A request of Jordanian

1. Send this subject from the Military attaché in Jordan to the General Military Intelligence Directorate the request of the Jordanian, Kifah Muhammad ‘Abd Al Rahman Al Hattab, and use his services as a pilot and he is ready for any operation for Iraq and Arab nations.

2. The person mentioned above, worked in the Air Force College during 1985/09/04 to 1986/12/31 as a pilot officer and technical pilot.

3. The Directorate suggested above to answer him with our highly appreciation and to his nation feeling and we will use his services when need it.

4. We support the Directorate suggestion.

Please be reviewed with appreciation.

Singed by:
Staff General
‘Abd Al Jabar Khalil
The Minister of Defense
Dated: 1990/09/25

Copy for
The General Military Intelligence Directorate/ your letter is a top secret 165312 on 1990/09/23.

Document evaluation
Valid for ////9/25

Secret
Republican of Iraq  
Secretary  
General Military Intelligence Directorate  

Number: 165312/Q7/S5/M2  
Dated: 1990/09/23  

Top secret  

To the Presidency Office of Defense Ministry  
Subject: A request  

1- Send this subject from the Military attaché in Jordan to the General Military Intelligence Directorate the request of the Jordanian, Kifah Muhammad ‘Abd Al Rahman Al Hattab, and use his services as a pilot and he is ready for any operation for Iraq and Arab nations.  
2- The person mentioned above, worked in the Air Force College during 1985/09/04 to 1986/12/31 as a pilot officer and technical pilot.  
3- The Directorate suggested above to answer him with our highly appreciation and to his nation feeling and we will use his services when need it.  

Please be reviewed and informed with appreciation  

Signed by:  
Staff Lieutenant General  
Dated: 1990/09/22
General Military Intelligence Directorate
Section 5:

To the Manager of section
Subject: A request

1- The Military attaché in Jordan sent your secret letter 1830 on 1990/08/11, a request of the Jordanian, Kifah Muhammad ‘Abd Al Rahman Al Hattab, and use his services as a pilot and he is ready for any operation for Iraq and Arab nations.

2- The General Air Intelligence Directorate requests to support them more information of the Jordanian in their secret letter 154280 on 1990/09/05.

3- The Directorate answered your secret letter 43335 on 1990/09/15 as follows:
   a. Original from Palestine and he was born 1968 in Tulkram.
   b. Hold a Jordanian passport.
   c. Holding a high school certificate.
   d. His specialization a Fighting pilot.
   e. Address: Jordan
   f. He worked in the Air Force College as a pilot officer and technical pilot in the attached top secret letter from the Administration Air Force Directorate as soon as possible 20681 on 1985/09/04.
   g. Sent to Office of the Arabs liberality movement in the attachment 68879 on 1986/12/31

4- I suggest to inform the Presidency Office of the Defense Ministry
Please be reviewed with appreciation

The sympathizer
Please be reviewed and we suggest to send it to the Presidency Office of the Defense Ministry, answer him with our highly appreciation and to his nation feeling and we will use his services when need it.

Signed by:
Ahmad Jamil Dawud
1990/09/16
To the General Military Intelligence Directorate/ Section 5
Subject: Answering

Concerning to your top secret letter 154280 on 1990/09/05, we informed you the available information of the Jordanian, Kifah Muhammad ‘Abd Al Rahman Al Hattab as follows:

a. Original from Palestine and he was born 1968 in Tulkram.
b. Hold a Jordanian passport.
c. Holding a high school certificate.
d. His specialization a Fighting pilot.
e. Address: Jordan.
f. Total flying hours 200 hours.
g. He worked in the Air Force College as a pilot officer and technical pilot in the attached top secret letter from the Administration Air Force Directorate as soon as possible 20681 on 1985/09/04.
h. Sent to Office of the Arabs liberality movement in the attachment 68879 on 1986/12/31

Signed by:
Staff Colonel
Mahir Mustafa ‘Ali
The Director of Air Intelligence
Dated: 1990/09/15

Top secret
Republican of Iraq
Secretary
General Military Intelligence Directorate

Top secret

Dated: 1990/09/05

154280

To the General Air Intelligence
Subject: A request

The application of the Jordanian, Kifah Muhammad ‘Abd Al Rahman Al Hattab is attached.
Please be reviewed and support us the available information regarding to the person mentioned above and to inform us as soon as possible.

Attachments

Copy of request
Dated 1990/09/03

Signed by:
Staff Major General
The Director of General Military Intelligence
Dated: 1990/09/03

Top secret

Document Evaluation
To the General Air Intelligence  
Subject: A request  

The application of the Jordanian, Kifah Muhammad ‘Abd Al Rahman Al Hattab is attached.
Please be reviewed and support us the available information regarding to the person mentioned above and to inform us as soon as possible.

Attachments
Copy of request
To the Section Manager  
Subject: A request of the Jordanian

1. The Military attaché in Jordan sent your secret letter 1830 on 1990/08/13, a request of the Jordanian, Kifah Muhammad 'Abd Al Rahman Al Hattab, and use his services as a pilot and he is ready for any operation for Iraq and Arab nations.
   b. Left to Jordan to complete his military service.
   c. He is ready for any operation for Iraq and Arab nations under the President order.

2. According to what mentioned above, we suggest:
   • Inform the General Air Intelligence Directorate to send any information available in paragraph (a) above.
   • Inform the Presidency Office about this request.

Please be reviewed with appreciation

The Sympathizer:
Please be reviewed, I support the suggestion with our suggestion to inform the Presidency Office of Defense Ministry with appreciation.

Signed by:  
Captain  
Ahmad Jamil Dawud  
Dated: 1990/08/27

First: collect the information as mentioned in paragraph (b) then we can take action.

(1-1)
To the General Military Intelligence Directorate/ M2/Section 5
Subject: A request of the Jordanian

The application of the Jordanian, Kifah Muhammad ‘Abd Al Rahman Al Hattab and he requested to use his services as a pilot.

Please be reviewed

Attachments

1- Application
2- Copy of certificate.

Signed by:
Staff Colonel
Muhammad Sharif Mustafa
The Military attaché –Amman
Dated: 1990/08/13
By the name of Gad

I am Kifah Muhammad ‘Abd Al Rahman Al Hattab, the fighting pilot, from Jordan. I have been graduated from the Air Force Academy in Yugoslavia and I worked in the Iraqi Air Force during 1985 to 1986 after graduation directly I left to Jordan to complete my compulsory recruitment.
So, now I am ready for any request or call to serve our Arab nations in Iraq under the President’s order.
I am ready for any suicide operation for the Arabs countries and Muslims and that is the minimum thing I can present.

Signed by:
Kifah Muhammad

Phone: 888343
Address: Amman/ Marka Al-Shamaliyah town/ Al ‘Abdlat district / near to Mansur Market.
The classification markings are original to the Iraqi documents and do not reflect current US classification.

Original Document Information

Document #: ISGQ-2005-00017457
Classification:

English Title: Tables of Various Activities of the Iraqi Directorates
Language: ARABIC

Document Date: 19980608
Total Pages: 41

Document Type: LETTER
Agency: DIA
Country Of Origin: IRAQ
Title:

Country Of Information: IRAQ
Originators Classification: SECRET

Translation Information

Translation #
ISGQ-2005-00017457-HT

Classification:

Status
PARTIAL
COMPLETED

Translating Agency
DIA

Linked Documents

Original Document
ISGQ-2005-00017457

ISGQ-2005-00017457-HT (Multi-Part)

Translation

- cmpc-m/ISGQ-2005-00017457-HT-1.pdf
- cmpc-m/ISGQ-2005-00017457-HT.pdf

Related Document Numbers

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This file contains the Full Translation of ISGQ-2005-00017457, pages 3-23. See the attached translation dated 01-08-2005 in the hit list for details. This file includes the security, administrative, and political activities in the Iraqi directorates. Pages 2-41 contain tables about assassinations and overthrowing the government, the weapons and military equipment such as shotguns and flamethrowers, the destruction plan of Iraq from opposition parties such as the Kurdistan Democratic Party (KDP), Hezbollah Party, and Al-De'wah Party. In addition, there were activities on military culture such as, carrying courses and delivering books, as well as, censorship, translating the post letters and discs. Also, included were inspections on the smuggling processes and currency falsification.

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The Political Side for the period from 1 Jul. 1997 to 31 Dec. 1997
The 2nd Semi-annual

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<th>Hezbollah Party</th>
<th>Badr Corps</th>
<th>Al-De'wah Party</th>
<th>Iranian Intelligence</th>
<th>Ila'et</th>
<th>Southern Salvation Movement</th>
<th>Islamic Reform Movement</th>
<th>Supreme Council</th>
<th>Quraysh Kahr Ramada</th>
<th>Mujahidin Al-Thawr</th>
<th>Al-Tawhid Al-Islami</th>
<th>Shi'a Al-Thawr</th>
<th>Islamic Ideology Organization</th>
<th>Liberation Party</th>
<th>Al-Wahhabiyyah Movement</th>
<th>Assyrian Democracy</th>
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## Al-Rusafah

**From 1 Jul 1997 to 15 Dec 1997, the 2nd Semi-annual**

**The Political Side**

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<th>Number</th>
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<td>-Hizballah (4) - National Reconciliation Movement (1) - Kurdish Democratic Party (KDP) (1) - Turkmen Front (1) - Kurdish National Islamic Movement (1) - Al-Da'wah Party (1) - 9th Badr Corps (2) - Kurdistan Democratic Party (KDP) (1) - Hizballah Kurdish Revolutionary Party (1) - Al-Da'wah Party (1)</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

### Seized Items

- **Explosive**
- **Rifle**
- **Pistol**
- **Grenade**
- **Launcher**
- **Printing and Copying Equipment**
- **Cash Money**
- **Other Equipment**

### Penetrated Organizations

- Number: 5

#### Details

- **(A) Iranian Intelligence (B) Hizballah**
- **(C) 9th Badr Corps**
- **(D) 6th Badr Corps**
- **(E) 9th Badr Corps**

#### Arrested

- **(A) 6**
- **(B) 1**
- **(C) 10**
- **(D) 6**
- **(E) 9**

### Foiled Sabotage Acts

- **4**

#### Details

- **Assassination**
- **Bombings**
- **Raided Headquarters**
- **Distribution of Hostile Publications**
- **Defacing Walls**

#### Confiscated Items

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<th>Inactive</th>
<th>Discharged and Transferred</th>
<th>Number of Present Friends</th>
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### Identified Targets

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The classification markings are original to the Iraqi documents and do not reflect current US classification.

## The Political Activity of Baghdad Security Directorate- Al-Karkh- the 2nd Semi-annual
### The Political Side

<table>
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<tr>
<th>Organizations under Observation</th>
<th>Details</th>
<th>Seized Weapons and Equipment</th>
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<td>-Southern Saving Movement</td>
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<td>- Bombings and armed burglary operations on government and Party's Departments (1)</td>
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### The Police Side

- Details
- Seized Weapons and Equipment
- Arrested
- Penetrated Organizations
- Foiled Sabotage Acts
- Confidants and Friends
- Identified Targets
- Notes
Page 6

Diyala Security Directorate
The Political Side

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Number</th>
<th>Details</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>7</td>
<td>- Khaniqin committee member of the Patriotic Union of Kurdistan is meeting in (TC: illegible).&lt;br&gt;- Company Commander of the 3rd Regiment of 81st Brigade of the Kurdish Democratic Party in Irbil&lt;br&gt;- Making a phone call with one of the Senior Staff of the National Conference Group in the Northern Zone&lt;br&gt;- Making a phone call with the Director of Iranian Karminshah Intelligence&lt;br&gt;- Assigning an element to follow-up on a group of individuals participating in the Wahabi religious ceremonies in Khan Bani-Su'd&lt;br&gt;- Making a phone call with one of the Senior Staff of the Corps in Iran&lt;br&gt;- Following-up one of the Senior Staff of the Corps in Iran</td>
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<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Number</th>
<th>Details</th>
<th>Arrested</th>
<th>Seized Weapons and Equipment</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>3</td>
<td>1) Iranian Ila'at&lt;br&gt;2) The 9th Badr Corps&lt;br&gt;3) One infiltrated element from Badr Corps.</td>
<td>3&lt;br&gt;11&lt;br&gt;1</td>
<td>Explosive&lt;br&gt;Rifle&lt;br&gt;Pistol&lt;br&gt;Grenade&lt;br&gt;Launcher&lt;br&gt;Printing and Copying Machine&lt;br&gt;Cash Money&lt;br&gt;Other Equipment</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>Total</td>
<td>15</td>
<td>- 14 Guided Missiles&lt;br&gt;- Ignition system of missile launcher&lt;br&gt;- Three pick-up vehicles</td>
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</table>

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Foiled Sabotage Acts</th>
<th>Details</th>
<th>Arrested</th>
<th>Seized Weapons and Equipment</th>
</tr>
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<tbody>
<tr>
<td>5</td>
<td>by the comrade 'Ali Almadi a member of the Mujahidi Khalq Organization</td>
<td>1</td>
<td>Raids upon the Mujahidi Khalq Camp Headquarters in Al-Khalis&lt;br&gt;Number of Present Friends&lt;br&gt;Number of Recruited Friends&lt;br&gt;Active&lt;br&gt;Inactive</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td>for the Iraqi Communist Party + Iraqi National Conference&lt;br&gt;Distribution of Hostile Publications&lt;br&gt;Defacing walls</td>
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<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Confidants and Friends</th>
<th>Number of Present Confidants</th>
<th>Number of Recruited Confidants</th>
<th>Active</th>
<th>Inactive</th>
<th>Discharged and Transferred</th>
<th>Number of Present Friends</th>
<th>Number of Recruited Friends</th>
<th>Active</th>
<th>Inactive</th>
<th>Notes</th>
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<td>46</td>
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<td>80</td>
<td>11</td>
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<th>Monitored Targets</th>
<th>Notes</th>
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</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>5</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>1- Following-up the frontier strip with Iran (illegible)</td>
<td>4- Following-up the elements from the same ethnicity (TC: illegible)</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>2- Following-up the 9th Badr Corps</td>
<td>5- Following up leader elements of Al-De'wah Party</td>
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<tr>
<td>3- Following-up the Supreme Council of Islamic Revolution</td>
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Activity of Salah-al-Din Security Directorate
From 1 Jul 1997 to 15 Dec 1997
The Political Side

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<tr>
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<td>2</td>
<td>- Observing a group of the Wahabi Movement elements through the source Abu-'Abdallah</td>
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<td></td>
<td></td>
<td>- Observing a group of the Wahabi Movement elements through the source 'Abdallah</td>
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<th>Details</th>
<th>Arrested</th>
<th>Seized Weapon and Equipment</th>
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<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td>Explosive</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Foiled Sabotage Acts</td>
<td>1 Assasination</td>
<td>Bombings</td>
<td>Raids upon the Headquarters</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Confidants and Friends</td>
<td>Number of Present Confidants</td>
<td>Number of Recruited Confidants</td>
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<td>Identified Targets</td>
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237
The classification markings are original to the Iraqi documents and do not reflect current US classification.

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Political Activities of Ninawa Security Directorate
The Political Side

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<th>Details</th>
<th>Arrested</th>
<th>Seized Weapons and Equipment</th>
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<tbody>
<tr>
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<td>1</td>
<td>- Observing a group of the Wahabi Movement in coordination with one of their members and their conversations and meetings were recorded on 26 July 1997</td>
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<td>/</td>
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<td>/</td>
<td>Assassination</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Confidants and Friends</td>
<td></td>
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<td></td>
<td></td>
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<td>/</td>
<td>/</td>
<td>/</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

| Number of Present Confidants   | 89     |         |                          | /       | /        | /            | /        | /       | /       | /       | /                        | /                        | /                        |
| Number of Recruited Confidants| 4      |         |                          | /       | /        | /            | /        | /       | /       | /       | /                        | /                        | /                        |
| Active                         | 4      |         |                          | /       | /        | /            | /        | /       | /       | /       | /                        | /                        | /                        |
| Inactive                       | 4      |         |                          | /       | /        | /            | /        | /       | /       | /       | /                        | /                        | /                        |
| Discharged and Transferred     | /      |         |                          | /       | /        | /            | /        | /       | /       | /       | /                        | /                        | /                        |
| Number of Present Friends      | 266    |         |                          | /       | /        | /            | /        | /       | /       | /       | /                        | /                        | /                        |
| Number of Recruited Friends   | 54     |         |                          | /       | /        | /            | /        | /       | /       | /       | /                        | /                        | /                        |
| Active                         | 27     |         |                          | /       | /        | /            | /        | /       | /       | /       | /                        | /                        | /                        |
| Inactive                       | 27     |         |                          | /       | /        | /            | /        | /       | /       | /       | /                        | /                        | /                        |

Notes
### Page 9

Al-Ta'mim Security Directorate
The 2nd Semi-annual of 1997
The Political Side

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<th>Active</th>
<th>Inactive</th>
<th>Discharged and Transferred</th>
<th>Number of Present Friends</th>
<th>Number of Recruited Friends</th>
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<tbody>
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<td>Identified Targets</td>
<td>Monitored Targets</td>
<td>Notes</td>
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The classification markings are original to the Iraqi documents and do not reflect current US classification.

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<td>Al-Imam Al-Muntazar Group (1)</td>
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<tr>
<td>Al-Imam Al-Hasan Military Group (1)</td>
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<td>Rifle</td>
</tr>
<tr>
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<td></td>
<td>Pistol</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Assessing Traitors (2)</td>
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<td></td>
<td>Grenade</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
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</tr>
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<td>Printing and Copying Machine</td>
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<tr>
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<td></td>
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<td>Cash</td>
</tr>
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<td></td>
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<td>Money</td>
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<td></td>
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<td>Other Equipment</td>
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<th>Number of Recruited Confidants</th>
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Al-BSarah Governorate Security Directorate
The 2nd Semi-annual of 1997
The Political Side

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Explosive</th>
<th>Rifle</th>
<th>Pistol</th>
<th>Grenade</th>
<th>Launcher</th>
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<th>Cash</th>
<th>Money</th>
<th>Other Equipment</th>
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<td>(28) RPG - 7 grenade launcher missile</td>
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<td>Military publications, booklets, insignias and military uniforms</td>
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<table>
<thead>
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<th>Number of Recruited Confidants</th>
<th>Active Confidants</th>
<th>Inactive Confidants</th>
<th>Discharged and Transferred</th>
<th>Number of Present Friends</th>
<th>Number of Recruit Friends</th>
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<tr>
<td>- (72) Launcher Missiles</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>- (3) Different types of vehicles</td>
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<tr>
<td>- (1) 60 mm Mortar</td>
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<tr>
<td>- (5) Guided Missiles</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>- (14) Mortar Rounds</td>
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<td>- (14) Munitions Boxes + BK container</td>
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</table>

<table>
<thead>
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<th>Foiled Sabotage Acts</th>
<th>Number of Confidants and Friends</th>
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<th>Active</th>
<th>Inactive</th>
<th>Discharged and Transferred</th>
<th>Number of Present Friends</th>
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### The Political Side


<table>
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<th>Number</th>
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<th>Seized Weapons and Equipment</th>
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</tr>
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<td>Bombings</td>
<td>Raids upon the Headquarters</td>
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Maysan Security Directorate
The Political Side

The classification markings are original to the Iraqi documents and do not reflect current US classification.
The classification markings are original to the Iraqi documents and do not reflect current US classification.

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Penetrated Organizations</th>
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<th>Details</th>
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<th>Seized Weapons and Equipment</th>
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<td>1 gun, 3 magazines</td>
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<td>Nothing</td>
<td>Assassination</td>
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The classification markings are original to the Iraqi documents and do not reflect current US classification.

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<td>Foiled Sabotage Acts</td>
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244
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Page 15
Al-Qadisiyyah Security Directorate
The Political Side

245
## Habitation

### Security

#### The Political Side

From 1 Jul 1997 to 31 Dec 1997

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Organizations under Observation</th>
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<td>Democratic Confederation Movement (I)</td>
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<th>Active</th>
<th>Inactive</th>
<th>Discharged and Transferred</th>
<th>Number of Present Friends</th>
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<table>
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Page 16

Babil Security
The Political Side
From 1 Jul 1997 to 31 Dec 1997
Page 17

Karbala' Security Directorate
The Political Side

<table>
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<tr>
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<td>Number</td>
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247
The classification markings are original to the Iraqi documents and do not reflect current US classification.

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**Al-Najaf Security Directorate - the 2nd Semi-annual**  
**The Political Side**  
**From 1 Jul.1997 to 15 Dec.1997**

<table>
<thead>
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<th>Organizations under Observation</th>
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<th>Grenade</th>
<th>Launcher</th>
<th>Printing and Copying Machine</th>
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<th>Other Equipment</th>
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248
The classification markings are original to the Iraqi documents and do not reflect current US classification.

## Al-Anbar
### The Political Side

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<th>Pistol</th>
<th>Grenade</th>
<th>Launcher</th>
<th>Printing and Copying Machine</th>
<th>Cash Money</th>
<th>Other Equipment</th>
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<th>Discharged and Transferred</th>
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"The 1st Control Center" The Political Side

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<td>4</td>
<td>Assassination</td>
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<td></td>
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<tr>
<td></td>
<td>Bombings</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>Raids upon the Headquarters</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>Distribution of Hostile Publications</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>Defacing walls</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
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<td></td>
<td>Four operations for Distribution of hostile publications</td>
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<th>Discharged and Transferred</th>
<th>Number of Present Friends</th>
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Notes
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<th>Details</th>
<th>Seized Weapons and Equipment</th>
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<tr>
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<td>- Opposition Group (3)</td>
<td>Explosive, Rifle, Pistol, Grenade, Launcher, Printing and Copying Machine, Cash Money, Other Equipment</td>
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<td>- Iraqi National Conference (1)</td>
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<th>Seized Weapons and Equipment</th>
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</thead>
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<tr>
<td></td>
<td>3</td>
<td></td>
<td>1</td>
<td>Explosive, Rifle, Pistol, Grenade, Launcher, Printing and Copying Machine, Cash Money, Other Equipment</td>
</tr>
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<td></td>
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<th>Number of Present Confidants</th>
<th>Number of Recruited Confidants</th>
<th>Active</th>
<th>Inactive</th>
<th>Discharged and Transferred</th>
<th>Number of Present Friends</th>
<th>Number of Recruited Friends</th>
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</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

| Identified Targets     | 8                             |
| Monitored Targets      | 8                             |

---

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"The 2nd Control Center" The Political Side

The classification markings are original to the Iraqi documents and do not reflect current US classification.

---

**Page 22**

"The 3rd Control Center" The Political Side
From the period of 1 Jul. 1997 to 31 Dec. 1997

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Organizations under Observation</th>
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<td>Coordination was made with one of the elements of the seceding groups and he was released</td>
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<tr>
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<th>Assassination</th>
<th>Bombings</th>
<th>Details</th>
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<tr>
<td></td>
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<td>Arming the elements of Mujahdi Khals with explosive materials</td>
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<table>
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<th>Number of Recruited Friends</th>
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<th>Identified Targets</th>
<th>Monitored Targets</th>
<th>Notes</th>
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</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>The monitored targets are (19) as follows:</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>- (1) Al-Sulaymaniyyah (TC; illegible) Member from the Islamic Union Group</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>- (1) False security commissioner</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>- (1) Element of the Turkmen Front</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>- (1) In charge of the Movement Section of the Democratic Party in Subay</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>- (1) Following-up on the Iranian Itil’at</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>- (1) In charge of the Islamic Union Group in Baziyan Sub-District</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>- (1) Deputy in charge of the Islamic Union Group in Baziyan Sub-District</td>
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<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>- (1) Brigade Commander in the Kurdish Democratic Guards</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>- (1) Member of the false parliament of Kurdistan</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>
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### Table: Success in the Political Sector

| Organizations under Observation | Number | Observing the Turkmen Front | Details
|-------------------------------|--------|-------------------------------|------------
| Penetrated Organizations       | 1      | Details 1                       | Arrested 1 |
| Night Sabotage Acts            |        | Explosive 1                     | Rifle 1    |
| Confidants and Friends         |        | Pistol 1                        | Grenade 1  |
| Confidants                      | 7      | Discharged and Transferred 72   |            |
| Number of Recruit Confidants   | 1      | Number of Present Friends 72    |            |
| Number of Recruited Confidants | 1      | Number of Recruit Friends 33   |            |
| Active                         | 11     | Active 11                        |            |
| Number of Monitored Targets    | 5      | Inactive 22                      |            |
| Monitored Targets              | 7      | Not                             |            |

*The 4th Control Center* The Political Side
The 2nd Semi-annual of 1997
This file contains the following information:

- Page 2: Contains a crossed-out illegible sheet.

- Pages 3-23: Contain tables, dated from 01 July to 31 December 1997, presenting statistics, intelligence reports and arrest orders within the General Security Directorate (GSD) referring to individuals affiliated to movements and parties, such as: Hizballah (Terrorist Organization), Al-Fikir (intellect) Al-Islami Organization, Badr Corps and Al-Tawhid Al-Islami movement. To include kind of weapons caught with them and kind of action they committed, such as: Assassinations and Bombings using Missiles, Rifles and Explosives (no names or specific actions mentioned for these members, only statistical numbers)

- Pages 24 and 28: Contain 2 tables with no date mentioned, presenting the classification and organization of information referring to different topics within GSD administrative issues, such as: Numbers of Prisoners of War, Arrest Orders and Travel Bans

- Pages 25-27 and 39-41: Contain charts and tables, dated from July 1996 to June 1997, presenting the shape and workflow throughout the GSD beginning from the Director and down, classifying each office or department specific work

- Pages 29-33: Contain tables with no date mentioned, presenting numbers and steps of rehabilitation and improvement activities within the GSD in different sectors such as: Educational, Technical, Administrative (training sessions) and Military (neutralizing and detecting explosives) domains

- Pages 34, 35 and 38: Contain tables with no date mentioned, presenting numbers of Iraqi sources within oppositionist parties and movements such as: the Communist Party, within the Iranian Embassy, Republican Kurdistani Party, Islamic Kurdistani Union and Iranian Intelligence (no names mentioned only statistical numbers)

- Page 36: Contains a table showing building campaign procedures done within Abi Gharib prison dated from 08 June 1997 to 08 June 1998, in different ways such as: Medical (improving hygiene), Construction of walls and fences, Security and Educational sectors

*High ranking personnel associated with the file are as follows:

- Comrade 'Ali Ahmadi, member of Mujahidin Khalq
The classification markings are original to the Iraqi documents and do not reflect current US classification.

### Original Document Information

<table>
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### Document Remarks

255
This file contains the following information: -Pages 2-192: Contain correspondence dated 1988-2001, between the Iraqi Intelligence Service (IIS), the Iraqi Embassy in Algeria, the Ministry of Foreign Affairs, the Iraqi Embassy in Tehran, several Sections and Departments regarding information about the Algerian-Iranian relationship to include the following subjects: -Iranian support for the Islamic Groups in Algeria -Information about the visit of 'Abdal-Qadir Hajjar (Member in Algerian National Public Council) to Iran -Visit of the 'Abbasi Madani (Head of the Algerian Islamic Rescue Front) sons to Iran to get the financial support -Iran using the good relation with Al-Sudan to spread the principles and ideology of the Iranian revolution in Africa and Northwest Africa -Iranians Smuggling the high explosive material (C4) to the Islamic Groups in Algeria by the help of Hezbollah through Beirut airport -Reports from Iraq to Algeria about roles of Iran and America in Algerian incidents -Information about Algerian Parliament delegation who leaving the 31st Session for the Arabic Parliaments Union Council -Information about the Iranian financial support for the Armed Islamic Groups, for example, Iran gave Hezbollah 7 Million US Dollar in Jan 1997 -Iranian efforts to France and Italy to solve the Algerian crisis -Information from several radio broadcasts (Israel, Mont Carlo and America voice) about spreading of the nuclear weapons, the Turkish Prime Minister Tasnu Chelar involved in paying 10 Million US Dollar to Syrian Intelligence to kill 'Abdallah Ujalan in 1994, and others -Information about returning the situation to normal between Algeria and Iran -Information auditing card used only inside the IIS containing information at the Algerian Government that Iranian Intelligence supplying money and weapons through the Islamic Movements and Groups in Turki to the Islamic groups in Algeria to do sabotage activities -Information about unveiling the accident of killing Muhammad Budyaf -Several telegrams and articles, some of them written in English and French regarding information about the Khomeini Regime and others say Iraq have no nuclear arms and the crisis between Algeria and Iran -Report titled (Al-Shaykh 'Abbad Madani from Iran point of view) -Information about the Iraqi Naqid Rabah -Information about the visit of Ayah Allah Yazidi to Algeria

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The classification markings are original to the Iraqi documents and do not reflect current US classification.

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**Country of Publication:** IRAQ

**Personalities (persons named in the document):**

**Facilities (facilities named in the document):**

**Keywords:** Iran

**Remarks:**

**Gist:** IIS reports about the deteriorating relations between Iran and Algeria due to the Iranian support of Islamic front in Algeria.

**Linguist Names:**

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The classification markings are original to the Iraqi documents and do not reflect current US classification.

HARMONY NUMBER : ISGQ-2005-00017862
DATE : 17 October 2005

This file is dated 1991-2001 by the IIS. It contains reports about the Algerian-Iranian relations, which deteriorated in early 1991 due to the accusations, by Algeria, of Iranian support to the anti-Algerian government, Islamic Front. The first page of the file is dated January 2001 indicates that the Algerian-Iranian relations was normalizing to a diplomatic level. The reason behind improved relations was due to the initiative of the Algerian 'Abdi-Al-Qadir Hajjar, current Algerian ambassador in Tehran, in reaching an agreement between Algeria and Iran contingent to a change in the Iranian policy towards supporting the armed Islamic front in Algeria.

[TC: all the reports available in this file are not supported by reliable sources and contain IIS analysis of the situation rather than actual facts. The reports do not give actual facts or consistency of sources reporting it.]

Page 14 dated 14 Apr 1998 contains a report by the director of D1/4 to the M4/7/3. The report contains all information available to the D1 about the Iranian role in the Algerian situation, as follows:

1. Members of the opposition Islamic Front for Rescuing Algeria had several visits to Iran asking financial support; some of the members included sons of 'Abbasi Madani the president of the Front, Rabih Kabir in-charge of the Front’s operations abroad, and Jamal Zaituni the former armed groups’ emir who was assassinated by the Algerian authorities in 1996.

2. The Iranian regime uses its relations with Sudan as a bridge to export the ideology of the Iranian revolution to Africa and Northwest Africa, as well as taking advantage of the relations of the Sudanese Islamic Front with other Islamic movements particularly in Algeria.

3. The Iranian regime secretly exports C-4 high explosive material to the groups in Algeria via Hezbullah in Lebanon through Beirut airport and seaport; [TC: from page 16] this information was previously reported to the M1/2 in letter 1376 dated 13 Oct 1996.

4. Iran recently opened a consulate in Wajda, Morocco, despite the nonexistence of Iranian citizens in that city, for supporting, financing and overseeing the operations of the armed groups in Algeria.

Page 36 dated 1 Feb 1998 contains a report by the D1 at the Iraqi embassy in Algeria, about the Iranian support of armed Islamic groups. The report contains the following:

1. Recently a new organization has been formed in Iran, named “Islamic Culture and Relations Organization”. The organization was formed of five agencies that integrated to export fundamentalism abroad. This organization was financed by the Zukat money [TC: Zukat is the money paid by Muslims according to their income, as taxes] and has legal cover as tourist companies and trade companies worldwide.

2. The organization oversees eleven military and ideology training centers of Muslim members worldwide. It specializes in preparing the trainees then sends them back to their country. The most important centers are: Yahun al martyr
center, established in 1993 in Karaj, 40KM from Tehran; Imam ‘Ali center in Zajrir, north of Tehran; Ibak training center; Nahawind training center, specialized in intelligence preparation; the rest of the centers are specialized in military and ideology training as in Imam Hussayn center, Fatih Gharni Husayni, Afizari, Bait Al-Maqdis University in Qum, and the training centers in Manjil Radhban Bandar Imam and Bikhtran and they are supervised by the revolutionary guards and the ministry of foreign affairs.

3. The estimated budget of this organization to spread fundamentalism worldwide for 1997 is USD 270 Million, 7 millions of which was given to Hezbullah in southern Lebanon during January 1998. The Iranian embassy in Damascus is an important center of money distribution and communications in the Arab world. Tourist and trade companies handle that task in Europe, especially in France.

The source of the above information: Secret information from the Algerian intelligence.

Page 67 dated 15 May 1995 contains an information accuracy-check form. On 10 May 1995, the information reported was obtained from the Algerian embassy in Ankara, Turkey. The first secretary at the Algerian embassy, Mishri Kuti, visited the IIS station in Ankara. During the conversation the IIS learned the following: [TC: This document indicates that Mr. Kuti did not provide the information intentionally]

1. The Algerian government has some proofs indicating that during the years 1992-1994, the US and the Iranian intelligence had delivered weapons and money to fundamentalist opposition movements in Alger to carry some destructive operations. The delivery was done via the Turkish Islamic fundamentalist movement.

2. The Algerian government has some proofs indicating that Iran supplies the Algerian fundamentalist movements with weapons and money through the Islamic movements in Sudan.

3. The Algerian government has decided to improve its relations with the United States due to the discovery of US intelligence support to the fundamentalists, which could cause a danger threat to the future of the country.

Page 66: contains an IIS report from their station in Algeria dated Oct. 1995. The report indicates the following:

The Iranian regime is supporting the militant movements in Algeria by recruiting members from France and Algeria and moving them by way of Lebanon to receive training in a camp north of Tehran. The person in charge of the camp is an Iraqi National named Ahmad Sadghi, who is Khami’s representative in al-Quds Forces.

Pages 73-75: contain an IIS report from their station in Ankara, Turkey, dated May 1995. The report claims that the US opened offices for the Algerian Islamic fronts and is harboring some of its members such as Anwar Haddam and Rabih Kabir. It also claims that the US is sending them weapons by way of Turkey.
Page 90 dated 18 Nov 1992 contains a report by D1 section3 to the director of section 4. This report contains information about the deteriorating relations between Alger and Iran. Part of the bad relations [TC: item # 4] was the arrest of an Islamic group and admitting receiving support from Iran, as well as the seizure of weapon cache sent to the group from Iran through Libya and Sudan. [TC: this is the same group mentioned on page 85 that was involved in attacking the Algerian airport]

Page 129 dated 3 Oct 1995 contains a letter from D1 at the Iraqi embassy in Alger to the D2/1. The letter contains the latest information about the Iranian support of the militant groups in Alger, as follows:

1. Iran is training members of the militant groups at a base called Imam ‘Ali, north of Tehran, and another base called Buhar near Karaj River. The trainees receive Islamic Shi’a religious training then commando training to include explosives and attacks.
2. The Algerian trainees were brought to Iran through Lebanon from France and other countries.
3. One of the training instructors is an Iraqi citizen called Hajji Ahmad Sadghi, the representative of Khamini’i at Quds Forces.
Iraqi Intelligence Service (IIS) handwritten correspondence regarding information on the Islamic armed groups in Algeria and article subjected accusing Bin Laden on supporting the Salvias materialistic and logistic.

**Language**: ARABIC

**Document Date**: 20001103

**Total Pages**: 22

**Document Type**: ARTICLE, HANDWRITTEN NOTES/NOTEBOOK, LETTER

**Agency**: DIA

**Country of Information**: IRAQ

**Date Acquired**: 20041130

**Document #**: ISGQ-2005-00019580

**Classification**: SECRET

**English Title**: Iraqi Intelligence Service (IIS) handwritten correspondence regarding information on the Islamic armed groups in Algeria and article subjected accusing Bin Laden on supporting the Salvias materialistic and logistic.

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The classification markings are original to the Iraqi documents and do not reflect current US classification.

**Document Remarks**

**ISGQ-2005-00019580** Page 2 contains a handwritten memorandum regarding the Algerian Salvia Group for mobilization and fight dated 5 Oct 99. Page 3 contains a memo of the Iraqi Intelligence Service (IIS), dated 24 June 99 regarding the Algerian Political Party. Pages 4-7 contain a newspaper article about the latest information on the Algerian Political Party. Pages 8-9 contain an envelope that shows the sender address which is Basil Muhammad, 7 Nisan Post Office, and PO Box number 37024, Baghdad. Page 10 contains the IIS internal memo dated 5 Oct 99, concerning the article published by the Jordanian Woman Newspaper, on the Algeria Salvia Groups, for communication with them. Page 11 contains the Ministry of Culture and Information correspondence dated 21 Sep 99 to the IIS, regarding the article published by the Jordanian Woman Newspaper on the Algerian Salvia Groups published on 24 Aug 99. This article talks about the groups and the places, which are centered in Algeria and their relation with Osama Bin Laden. Pages 12 and 21 contains newspaper article and a piece of a paper subjected accusing Bin Laden on supporting the Salvia materialistic and logistic. Pages 13-14 and 22 contain IIS handwritten correspondence dated 13 Oct 99 from the Iraqi Embassy in Algeria regarding the Iranian activity on supporting armed Islamic groups in Algeria. Pages 15-17 contain handwritten memorandum on the Algeria Islamic groups. Page 18 contains correspondence from the Embassy of Iraq in Algeria dated 14 Dec 99 regarding the article published on the Islamic armed groups. Pages 19-20 contain memorandum from the Islamic armed group, Abu Talhah 'Attar Zawabri talk about the Islamic armed force.

**Batch Information**

**Batch Name:** 4334-3  
**Boxes in Batch:** 1  
**Capture Information:** Capturing Unit: C CO, 91st ENGR BN, 2nd BCT, 1st CAV; Date/Time of Capture: 20041129; Place of Capture: 50 Al-Kadah St. (Justice Province), Baghdad; Coordinates: 38SMB365881  
**Transmittal Information:** Transporting Unit: CMPC-B
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Country of Publication: Iraq | Author (if known): IIS |

Personalities (persons named in the document): Ali Gharzawli, Muhammad Ali Tasskhiri |

Facilities (facilities named in the document): |

Keywords IIS reports on Algerian Islamic militant groups, Algerian Salafist, Iranian backing terror groups |

Remarks: Gist: This 22-pages file contains IIS correspondence regarding the Algerian Islamic Salafist groups and armed militant groups. The file includes an open source report from the Al-Mar’ah Jordanian magazine concerning the Algerian Salafist. Included in the file is an IIS report from source 1104, Ali Gharzawli, chief editor of the Algerian Ministry of Religious Affairs’ Al-‘Assr magazine regarding Iranian backing for the Algerian militant groups.

Linguist Names: |

Date In: 11 Oct 2005 | Date Out: 12 Oct 2005 |

QC Linguist: | Date: October 12, 2005 |


Report/ M4/D1/4/ Number/ 2187 Date: 13 Oct 1999

To: D2/
We received information from our station in Algeria regarding the Iranian activities and methods of support they provide to the Islamic Militant Groups in Algeria, and it is as follow:

1- Iran is considered one of the most important fronts in offering monetary and arms support to militant organizations in Algeria through its embassy, cultural attaché, and other Iranians living abroad. The Iranian embassy in Damascus is the focal point for financing these groups.

2- A number of Algerian Islamists elements that are affiliated with militant groups frequently visit the Iranian embassy in Damascus, and the Syrian authorities are aware of that. As a result, two years ago the Algerian authorities asked Syria to deport all Algerian extremists living in Syria, and to extradite some of them directly to the Algerian Authorities. Syria denied Algeria’s request on the basis that these individuals did not break any established laws in Syria. However, due to Algerian persistence, Syria had to expels some of the Algerian Islamists out of Damascus.

3- Iranian Cultural center in Damascus plays an important role in the coordination and support operations of the Algerian Islamic factions. From Damascus the network branches to Europe covering, Germany, Belgium, France, England, and also Morocco.

4- Some of the Iranians living in Germany regularly conduct meetings with militant groups during which the money is delivered to these groups. The money is delivered to these groups in either France or Belgium then smuggled to Algeria via Morocco.

5- Morocco continues to pressure Algeria to drop its claims of the Western desert, in doing so Morocco was forced to receive a number of Iranian officials to conduct meetings with militant groups there. To guarantee the success of the communication with the Algerians and the Iranians, Iran established a cultural center in the city of Wajdah, which is a city along the Algerian border, even though there is no Iranian presence in that town.

Please review... With regards

D1 Director
[Signature]
11 Oct 1999
To: The respected Director of D1  
Subject: Algerian Islamic Groups

Attached is the missive number 190 from the Algerian station on 10 Sep 99, which includes a copy of a report from our trusted source (1104) Ali Gharzuli, chief editor of the Algerian Ministry of Religious Affairs’ Al-‘Assr magazine, regarding how the Algerian Islamic Groups obtain money and weapons.

[TC: repetition of the exact same information listed on page 13 and 14]

To: The respected Director of D1  
Subject: Information

Attached is the missive from the Algerian station, which includes a report from our trusted source (1104) containing information regarding Iranian mediation between the Algerian authority and the armed militant Islamic groups which is as follow:

1- Former cultural advisor of the late Khumayni and president of the Iranian Islamic Culture and Relations Association, an organization headquartered in Tehran and tasked with recruiting skilled Islamic personalities inside and outside Iran, Mr. Muhammad Ali Taskhiri visited Algeria late October 2000 where he participated in an “Abu-Ferras Al-Hamdani” function that was held at Al-Awrassi hotel in the Algerian capital from 31 Oct 2000 to 03 Nov 2000. The function was organized by a Kuwaiti establishment called Ja’azah [TC: meaning the prize in Arabic] “Abd-el ‘Aziz Sa’ud Al-Bayatin” for poetry.

2- The aforementioned assured the Algerian authority that Iran would exert every effort to contact the largest number of Algerian Islamic leaderships that help the armed militant groups to convince them to join the efforts of civil peace and cease the support of militant work in Algeria.

(1-2)
The classification markings are original to the Iraqi documents and do not reflect current US classification.

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**Document Remarks**

ISGQ-2005-00034061 Pages 2-4 contain correspondence from the Iraqi Intelligence Service (IIS) to the Assistant Director of IIS, concerning scientific ideas prepared by the Biologist Employee 'Uday Salim Mahdi raising producing viruses and germs for the purpose of polluting the water tanks for the US camps in Kuwait and Saudi Arabia which was rejected and evaluated as hard to be executed and it is against the United Nation resolutions and it might cause political and military troubles for Iraq and the IIS. The IIS ordered that these documents related to this idea should be destroyed to avoid any future troubles with the UN and the inspection committees. Document dated 22 Oct 2000.
In the Name of God, the Compassionate, the Merciful

The Republic of Iraq
Intelligence Service

To: Honorable Deputy Director of Intelligence Service for Operations
Subject: Scientific ideas

In reference to the report prepared by the biologist Uday Salim Mahdi (Part 1) and in response to your directive to discuss with the concerned section in Directorate 4 the possibility of including the ideas and information that came in the report in a letter to the President of the republic or the military industry commission, the section has indicated the following:

1. Refer the information related to the encryption method to D18 since it is the directorate concerned with the creation of algorithms for encryption for our service and all state establishments.
2. There is no scientific material that makes it necessary to refer to the President of the Republic or the military industry commission.
3. The concerned section recommends that the staff member above to destroy all of the documents related to his research to avoid any inconvenience with the inspection groups or the possibility of it reaching the country's enemies.

Please review. Respectfully,

[Signature]
General Security Section Director
22 October 2000
The report by Mr. Uday Salim Mahdi sent to us with your communication above was reviewed and we decided the following:

1. The first idea in the report submitted last August by the individual mentioned above and its details were reviewed and they were referred to the nuclear energy organization for further study. The initial report indicated that the idea was unrealistic and cannot be practically implemented.

2. Regarding the second idea regarding a new method of encryption, we propose referring it to D17/2 since it is the directorate concerned with implementing encryption algorithms for the service and for all centers of the Iraqi government for evaluation and recommendation regarding its content.

3. The third idea regarding the production of viruses and bacteria that could be used to contaminate enemy water supplies in American military bases in Kuwait and Saudi Arabia, we say the following:
   a. This is not a new idea. Furthermore, the preparation of viruses and bacteria in limited quantities is easy and can be replaced with various other poisons available in large quantities. The execution of the operation is difficult from a security, practical, and logistic aspect [continue on next page]
The classification markings are original to the Iraqi documents and do not reflect current US classification.

ISGQ-2005-00034061

[Page 4:]

Secret and Confidential

The Republic of Iraq
The Presidency of the Republic
Intelligence Service

[continue from previous page] which has to do with how to store the viruses and bacteria and keep it alive and effective until it is used; and also how to carry it to water and food supplies in the military bases of the enemy and ensuring it is not detected or killed with decontaminants and disinfectants used; in addition to the very dangerous repercussions both political and military.

b. Producing these viruses and bacteria and using is considered a biological weapon banned by the Security Council resolutions. The current directives from the political leadership does not allow handling it because if found it would cause a grave political problem for Iraq. For this reason, we see that it is important that Mr. Uday must stop the research and production of this material and destroy everything that have to do with this topic including material and documents, because the enemies might get hold of it and present it to the United Nations which would cause the country and our intelligence service problems and give the director of the special commission a reason to put the area where the research was done under continuous surveillance. Furthermore, if a decision was made to carry out an operation of this kind, the material required can be found in the local markets.

Please review. Respectfully,

[Signature]
[Illegible]
12 November 2000

2-2

Secret and confidential
The classification markings are original to the Iraqi documents and do not reflect current US classification.

Original Document Information

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Keyword Categories

Keywords

- FINANCES
- CONTRIBUTIONS
- TERRORIST RELATED
- ORGANIZATION
- INTELLIGENCE
- POLITICAL ACTIVITY
- SECURITY/INTELLIGENCE AGENCIES
- IIS - IRAQI INTELLIGENCE SERVICE
- ADMINISTRATIVE
- SALARIES

Facilities

- ABU NIDHAL ORGANIZATION
- HAMAS MOVEMENT
- HAMID ABU MUHAMMAD GROUP

Biographic Information

- AL-TAYYIB, MAHMUD
- MUHAMMAD, HAMID

271
Page 1: CMPC-B documents GIST sheet with the following summary notes: IIS provided money to Palestinian organization groups in Baghdad to support Abu-al-Tayyib Palestinian Intel, Hamid Abu Muhammad Group, and Hammas movement.

Page 2: An approval note dated 2002/4/2, classified secret, to Intelligence Unit 2 of the IIS from its Director to dispense a three months grant of $1500 for Walid Rashid (salary).

Page 3: Copy of grant receipt for the $1500, 3-months salary, in favor of Walid Rashid.

Page 4: Secret and confidential letter to the Director of the IIS from his Deputy regarding monthly financial allowances allocated to three different Palestinian organizations whose offices are located in Iraq. Those organizations are: a) Abu al-Tayyib office (named after the Palestinian Security Agency Director), Mahmud al-Natur Abu al-Tayyib who is in connection with Unit 4 of the IIS. Dispensed amount was 200,000 Iraqi Dinars [equivalent to $100.]

b) Hamid Abu Muhammad Group. This group was formed after its separation from "People's Frontier for Palestine Liberation" in 1976. It was named after its new Director, Hamid Abu Muhammad who resides in Beirut, Lebanon. It is specialized in foreign activities. Dispensed amount was 100,000 Iraqi Dinars [equivalent to $50.]

c) Hamas Movement Office in Baghdad. Amount dispensed was $500.

d) The financial allowances for Abu Nidhal Organization were terminated after the closing of their office in Baghdad based on a presidency decision.
**Original Document Information**

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**English Title:** Intelligence letters sent to Iraqi embassies in Washington D.C., Switzerland, Algeria, France, Jordan, and Iran regarding budget renewals and request for information on groups of people.

**Language:** ARABIC

**Document Date:** 20021102

**Total Pages:** 8

**Title:** Intelligence letters sent to Iraqi embassies in Washington D.C., Switzerland, Algeria, France, Jordan, and Iran regarding budget renewals and request for information on groups of people.

**Country Of Information:** IRAQ

**Translation Information**

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**Linked Documents**

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**Exploitation Status:** NOT AVAILABLE

**Translation Status:** NOT AVAILABLE

**Related Document Numbers**

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**Keyword Categories**

**Keywords**

- ORGANIZATION
- HEADQUARTERS
- INTELLIGENCE
- OPPOSITION
- ORGANIZATION
- MINISTRIES
- FOREIGN

**Biographic Information**

**Name:** AGHA, MULLAH KAREEM
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<td>This file contains intelligence letters sent to Iraqi embassies in Washington, D.C., Switzerland, Algeria, France, Jordan, and Iran. Topics of the letters range from budget renewals to requests for information on groups of people and plans for opposition. There is one letter regarding the execution of a planned operation in the Gaza strip, Israel, to be supplied by Iraq and executed by &quot;some Islamic Jihad groups&quot;; also a letter in regards to transferring different type of weaponry to be transported from Pakistan to Afghanistan through the Eastern boarders to the Mujahideen in Iran.</td>
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ISGZ-2004-031727-HT-NVTC (full translation)

Ministry of Foreign Affairs (Please refer to the whole number)
Office of the Minister
Bureau of Researches and Data Analysis / 2

Number: 2100
Date: 01/15/2000

Confidential

To: The Embassy of the Republic of Iraq / Washington / United Nations
   Bureau of Researches and Data Analysis / 2

Re: G x 24

Mr. Marwan has been assigned to follow the case of the source (G x 24) and his special
file has been sent as soon as possible to essentially determine what is required to form
new intelligence cells.

Intelligence Agency
Bureau of the (UI) Director

The (UI) looks like 'al-Hijaz' but that is a city or a geographical region in Saudi Arabia.
Ministry of Foreign Affairs
Office of the Minister
Bureau of Researches and Data Analysis / 2

Number: 2122
Date: 11/02/2002

Confidential

To: The Embassy of the Republic of Iraq / Washington / United Nations
   Bureau of Researches and Data Analysis / 2

Re: Central Intelligence

Please send the special report regarding the director of the US Central Intelligence Agency and those about the directors of the American Intelligence divisions in Europe according to what was contained in the report of cooperation with our station from the American Intelligence and as soon as possible.

Intelligence Agency
Bureau of the (UI) Director
Ministry of Foreign Affairs
Office of the Minister
Bureau of Researches and Data Analysis / 2

Number: 1456
Date: 02/14/2001

Confidential

To: The Embassy of the Republic of Iraq / Switzerland
   Bureau of Researches and Data Analysis / 2

Re: New Budget

Please create a special committee to follow up with the expenditures of the station for the surveillance of the al-Nunah and what is called the Iraqi Opposition so that we can provide you with the new budget.

Intelligence Agency
Bureau of the (UI) Director
Ministry of Foreign Affairs
Office of the Minister
Bureau of Researches and Data Analysis / 2

Number: 1219  
Date: 01/12/2002

Confidential

To: The Embassy of the Republic of Iraq / Algeria
   Bureau of Researches and Data Analysis / 2

Re: Intelligence

Please provide us with complete information concerning the activities of the US and Israeli intelligence in South Africa and their make-believe fronts.

Intelligence Agency
Bureau of the (UI) Director
Ministry of Foreign Affairs (Please refer to the whole number)
Office of the Minister
Bureau of Researches and Data Analysis / 2

Number: 4551
Date: 02/12/2000

Confidential

To: The Embassy of the Republic of Iraq / France / the Iraqi School
   Bureau of Researches and Data Analysis / 2

Re: Directives

Enclosed you find information issued by the leadership of the apparatus concerning methods of dealing with traitors in Europe. They are to be held in total secrecy.

Intelligence Agency
Bureau of the (UI) Director

279
Ministry of Foreign Affairs
Office of the Minister
Bureau of Researches and Data Analysis / 2

Number: 224685
Date: 04/26/2001

Confidential

To: The Embassy of the Republic of Iraq / Jordan
   Bureau of Researches and Data Analysis / 2

RE: Jihad Operation

You will be supplied with the necessary equipment for the operation that will be carried out in Gaza by Jihadi Islamic groups away from the watchful eyes of the Mossad and the American and Jordanian intelligence agents.

Intelligence Agency
Bureau of the (UI) Director
Ministry of Foreign Affairs
Office of the Minister
Bureau of Researches and Data Analysis / 2

Number: 919
Date: 01/14/2002

Confidential

To: The Embassy of the Republic of Iraq /Iran
   Bureau of Researches and Data Analysis / 2

Re: The Mujahiddin

Various weapons shall be transported from Pakistan to Afghanistan via the eastern border and Iran will deliver them to the mujahiddin in the movement by way of Mulla Muhammad Karim Agha

Intelligence Agency
Bureau of the (UI) Director
The classification markings are original to the Iraqi documents and do not reflect current US classification.

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The classification markings are original to the Iraqi documents and do not reflect current US classification.
Document Remarks

ISGZ-2005-002023 Saddam Hussein informed the Iraqi Intelligence Service (IIS) to set the relationship with the Tunisian Islamic Revival Movement; there is information about the Fatah Movement, such as when it was established and what other name it used; IIS indicated that their office in Baghdad shall be restricted; there is information on the Hamas Movement, when it was founded and it's strategy of work; Iraqi government decided to open its' universities to Tunisian students, Saddam Husayn, wanted the director of the Tunisian Islamic Revival Movement to visit Iraq, names of Iraqi charge' de affairs' in a number of countries, a message from Abu Nafi' to Khalid al-Tamimi, alias Abu Walid discussing how he met Muhammad Risan al-'Adani, in jail and what he shared with him; he stated that Abu Diyaa, the director of 'Abd al -Hadi Ahmad Chalabi's office, was sent to Kuwait, for wireless radio training, the letter ended by indicating that Muhammad Risan and Abu Diyaa were executed in 6 April 1996, the message faxed to Abu Walid at 008253322369 and cell phone number 0082024978739, the file has personal information, for Mahadi Salman Muhammad Jasim, Hatim 'Abass Muhammad 'Ali al-Jabawi and Hadi manhal Ta'iah 'Abdallah

Batch Information

Batch Number: 4334-1

Boxes in Batch: 1

Transmittal Information Date/Time of Arrival:20041228
The classification markings are original to the Iraqi documents and do not reflect current US classification.

**ISGZ-2005-002023-HT-NVTC (partial translation)**

(TC: Handwritten letter)

Iraqi Eagle Emblem
Republic of Iraq
Presidency of the Republic
The Secretary

"Personal and Top Secret"

2716 M4
19 / 10 / 1995

Number /1/15/89/4514/K
Date: 24/Jamadi Awal/1416 H
18/January/1995

Mr. Director of Intelligence Service
Subject /Tunisian Islamic Revival Movement

Based on your letter number 140/1/4/4/1667 of 27/9/1995, the President Leader (may God protect him) ordered the following:

"Yes, all relations should be frozen until further notice...You were supposed to pay attention to the change in the Tunisian Government’s position."

Please take the necessary action... with appreciation.

(Signed)
Secretary of the President of the Republic
18/10/1995
Top Secret

Mr. M S4
Subject: The President’s Orders, May God Protect Him

1. Background
We refer to the memo of M 4 / 7 / 3 number 507 of 24 / 2 / 96 regarding the President’s orders, and to our letter to the Secretary of the Presidency of the Republic regarding the Tunisian Islamic Revival Movement number 1467 of 27 / 9 / 95, and to the letter of the Secretary of the Presidency of the Republic number 4514 / K of 18 / 10 / 1995 containing the President Leader’s orders to freeze all relation with the Revival Movement until further notice.

2. Implemented Actions
a. A circular was dispatched to all heads of missions explaining our special relations with all political opposition organizations and movements operating in countries with whom we officially have good political relations.

b. We have written to our Ambassador in Khartoum, Mr. Abdul Samad Hamid Ali to freeze the relations with the Tunisian Islamic Movement until further notice.

c. Our Ambassador in Yemen, Muhsin Khalil, was informed of the necessity to freeze all relations with the Movement until further notice.

(Signed)
Hafez Husein al-Ta’i
(Illegible)
25 / 2 / 1996

Please review and forward to M 4 / 7 in order to bring it to attention of the Director of the Service....with appreciation
Presidency of the Republic
Intelligence Service

Mr. M. D 1
Subject – The Opposition Tunisian Revival Movement

Based on the President Leader’s orders, may God protect him, regarding the relations with the Tunisian Islamic Revival Movement which was relayed in the Presidential letter 4514 of 18 / 10 / 1995, the following procedures were executed:

1. We have dispatched a circular to all embassies regarding our special relations with the opposing organizations and movements in countries with whom we have good political relations.

2. A letter was prepared to be sent to Mr. Abdul Samad Ali, our ambassador in Khartoum containing the orders of the President Leader.

3. Mr. Muhsin Khalil, our ambassador in San’a, was informed of the orders during a meeting with the Director General of M 4.

Please review….with appreciation

(Signed)
Director of Section 4
19 / 12 / 1995
Presidency of the Republic
Intelligence Service

(Document page 13)
(TC: Handwritten Document)

1. Fatah Movement – Revolutionary Council “Abu Nidal Group”

a. This movement was established in 1979 when Sabri al-Banna “Abu Nidal”, who was the Chief of Fatah’s office in Baghdad, split from the Yasser Arafat group. In 1982, the movement was expelled from Iraq, but relations were re-established with them in 1989. They reopened their office in Baghdad and were supported by the government with a monthly payment of (20) twenty thousand Dinars.

b. On 29 / 9 / 1993, the President Leader approved to limit the relations with this movement and prevent them from granting them the pre-1983 privileges. This was triggered by the fact that a continued strong relationship with them will lead to negative reactions, at a time when they were of little use to Iraq.

c. Opinion
Continue having relations with them through Section 2 and exploit the information they provide to the State. Provide M 5 with information about their locations in the country.

(1-3)
Top Secret
2. 15 May Organization (Abu Ibrahim)

This organization split from the Popular Front for the Liberation of Palestine- Military Wing, and was established in 1980. It adopted the national agenda, and the military attacks against Israeli and foreign targets. It receives support funds of one hundred thousand Iraqi Dinars a month because its leader, Husein Ibrahim is a resident of the country.

Opinion
Continue to manage our relations with this organization through Section 2, and have them establish a periodic direct contact with its leader.

3. Popular Front for the Liberation of Palestine / Military and Foreign Scopes

This organization was established after the death of Dr. Wadi Haddad in 1979. It is presently headed by the Palestinian Salim Abu Salem, known as (Hamed Abu Muhammad. They have one office in Iraq which is run by Sudqi Aref al-Attari (Abu Firas). On 18 / 7 / 1995, the Director of the Intelligence Service authorized the continuation of our relationships with this organization.

Opinion
Keep the relationship with this organization at the present level through Section 2 because we might benefit from the organization’s officials and movements in the future.
4. Hamas Movement

a. This is a religious, political and military organization that was established on 14 January, 1987 in the Gaza Strip. Later on, it established office in a number of Arab and foreign countries. It executed numerous military and suicidal operations inside Israel which lifted the morale of the Palestinian people. This brought the movement to the forefront of exposure and attention in a very short period of time, which other Palestinian movements failed to achieve.

b. It believes that armed struggle is the only way to liberate Palestine, and refuses the principle of negotiating with Israel.

c. It receives financial support from Iran

d. We have official relations with the movement, as per the directives of the President Leader (May God protect him). Our relations are still in their infancy stage.

e. Opinion
Maintain an ongoing relationship because of the present political circumstance our country is facing.
In the Name of Allah the Compassionate, the Merciful

Personal and Top Secret

Number: (Blank)
Date: (Blank)

Mr. Muhsin Khalil
Ambassador of the Republic of Iraq – San’a

Greetings:

We take this opportunity to express our appreciation for the efforts you are exerting on the Yemeni arena in serving our or glorious Iraq under the leadership of our President Leader Saddam Hussein, may God protect him and bless him.

At this juncture, I would like to advise you that a decision was taken to freeze all relations with the Tunisian Islamic Revival Movement until further notice due to the sensitivity of the Iraqi – Tunisian relations at the present time.

In closing, please accept our best wishes for your continued success.

With appreciation,

(No Signature)
Your Brother
Abu Anas
/ 10/1995
In the Name of Allah the Compassionate, the Merciful

Personal and Top Secret

Number: 596  
Date: 23 / 10 / 1995

Mr. Abdul Samad Ali  
Ambassador of the Republic of Iraq – Al-Khartoum

Greetings:

We take this opportunity to express our appreciation for the efforts you are exerting on the Sudanese arena in serving our Glorious Iraq under the leadership of our President Leader Saddam Hussein, may God protect him and bless him.

At this time we would like to refer to your letter number 10 of 3 / 9 / 1995. It has been decided to freeze all relations with the Tunisian Islamic Revival Movement until further notice due to the recent developments of Iraqi-Sudanese relations which are at a sensitive stage.

In closing, please accept our best wishes for your continued success.

With appreciation

(Signed)
Your Brother
Abu Anas
23 / 10 / 1995
Presidency of the Republic
Intelligence Service

Mr. Director General of M4
Subject:- Relations with the Opposition Revival Movement

Reference your written remark of 9 / 9 / 1995, we would like to report the following:

1- Previously, we have obtained the President leader’s approval to continue our contacts
and relations with the above movement in a secret manner, and to receive their
dele ge in Baghdad as long as his visits are kept secret. Also, to accept their students
in Iraqi universities. (Clip number 1)

2. We have asked our Ambassador in San’a, per our letter 575 of 7 / 10 / 1993, to contact
the Tunisian Muhammad Bin Salem, representative of al-Finushi in San’a to advise
him that we have agreed to receive a Movement’s representative to discuss the visit of
al-Finushi to Iraq. (Clip number 2). (TC: Rashid Finushi is the leader of the Tunisian
Islamic Revival Movement.

3. Per their letter number 9 / 1 / 15 of 13 / 1 / 1994, the Embassy in San’a advised that
they have informed the representative of the movement of the above information under
item 2, and that he will seek al-Finushi’d opinion on the subject. (Clip number 3)

4. On 13 / 8 / 1994, our Ambassador in San’a expressed his reservations on the subject of
maintaining our relations with the said Movement. Based on this, the Director of the
Intelligence Service decided, on 27 / 8 / 1994 to take over the matter from our
Ambassador in San’a.
5- On 12/2/1995, the Director of the Service decided to have all the issues pertaining to this matter be handled and followed up by our Ambassador in San’a. (Clip number 4)

6. Per their letter number 50 of 21/2/1995, the Embassy in San’a notified us that the Ambassador took charge of this matter. Based on the Ambassador’s request, our agent in San’a contacted the Tunisian Muhammad Bin Salem, al-Finusgi’s representative in London in order to enquire about Salem’s probable visit to San’a. Salem promised to send his representative to San’a because he had problems with his French passport.

7. The Ambassador (our agent) in San’a advised us per his letter number 1 of 25/2/1995 that he had met the representative of Rashid al-Finushi, Hamid Azzouz, and informed him that the approval of accepting a number of Tunisian students in the Iraqi Universities had been obtained. Azzouz mentioned that al-Finushi would like to send a letter to Vice President Taha Yassin Ramadan. A letter was sent to the Vice President on 14/3/1995 who cabled San’a to advise them of the proposed date of al-Finushi’s visit on condition he uses a passport other than his Tunisian one. (Clip number 5)
8- The Tunisian Adel Mohammad, representative of Sheikh Rashid al-Finushi in Sudan, contacted our Ambassador in Khartoum and told him that he had been in contact with the Iraqi officials through our Ambassador (our agent) in San’a. These contacts came to a halt because Yemen had imposed strict restrictions on the movement of holders of certain passports. That is why al-Finushi authorized him to inform us that all meetings and communications should be made through Sudan.

9. Opinion

1. We suggest we maintaining our relationship with the Tunisian Adel Mohammad (representative of Sheikh Rashid al-Finushi in Sudan) through our Ambassador in Sudan (because he represents the Intelligence Service there). We should insist that this relationship remains secret, because such a relationship will negatively impact our relationship with the Tunisian government especially at these critical times our country is going through. We also should stop the communicating with the Movement through our Ambassador in Sana’a.

2. We should request the following from the representative of al-Finushi in Sudan:
   a. Name of the new representative of the Movement to be assigned in Iraq his citizenship and the type of passport he carries before we approve his arrival.
b. Names and number of students which the Movement plans to send to Iraq. Also their specialties and their present place of residence (Tunis or other Arab countries) accompanied with brief background information on each.

3. Notifying the Secretariat of the Presidency of the Republic of any developments of the relationship and advise it of the results of the above listed enquiries.

Please review… and order as you see fit.

With appreciation,

(Signed)
M. D.1
16/9/1995
Mr. M/D1
Subject/ Rashed Al-Finushi

Reference the written comment of your excellency of 27/7/1995, Mr. Hafez Hussein contacted by phone M5 and the National Command who advised him that there is no memo or opinion regarding the extension of an invitation to Rashi al-Finushi to visit Iraq.

Please review….with appreciation,

(Signed)
Director of Section 4
28 / 5 / 1995
The letter from our station in Tunisia revealed that our friend, the Tunisian Abdul Majid al-Sahrawi, Assistant Secretary General of the Tunisian Union of Transport, and who has strong relations with our Station in Tunis, confirmed information he obtained from Tunisian government sources that the Tunisian Government will be upset if Iraq invited Rashid al-Finushi to attend the Fourth Conference of the Arab Popular Forces which will be held in Baghdad next June. This will impact the relations between our two countries. We have informed them not to invite al-Finushi to attend the conference.

Opinion
In order to avoid any embarrassment in the future, we find it beneficial to inform the National Command and the Conference of the Arab Popular Forces to abstain from inviting any elements who oppose the governments of countries where we have
operations. We should identify all such elements so that our political relations with these regimes will not deteriorate. Our present situation does not allow such problems.

With appreciation,

(Signed)
Hafez Husein Ahmad
Official of Section 4
27 / 5 / 1995

(Document page 66)

Presidency of the Republic
Intelligence Service

Director of the Intelligence Service
Subject: Relations with the Tunisian Islamic Revival Movement

Further to our discussion with your Excellency this morning 29 / 4 / 94 regarding the Tunisian Ambassador’s letter where he requested we cable him our directives, I suggest that we send him a cable along these lines:

1. Iraq has no relations with Tunisian Islamic movements, including the Tunisian Islamic Revival Movement headed by Sheikh Rashed al-Finushi.

2. Iraq has never made any financial or any other form of aid or contribution to the above mentioned movement.

3. The Tunisian regime should be made aware that there are hostile parties, Arab and foreign, who are trying to distort Iraq’s image in order to sabotage the Iraqi-Tunisian relations. This is a part of the American-Israeli plan which is hostile to Iraq.

4. We have repeatedly asked our Tunisian counterpart to have open and genuine cooperation free of obstacles. They always expressed their desire to develop our relations along these lines.
Please review...order as you see fit...with appreciation

(Signed)
Director General of Section 4
30 / 10 / 1994

Approve
Signed
Director of Section 1
30 / 10

Mr. Director of Section 4
Please do the necessary
(Signed)
31 / 10

(Document page 75)

Presidency of the Republic
Intelligence Agency

Mr. Director of the Intelligence Service
Subject: Relations with the Tunisian Islamic Revival Movement

We would like to inform your Excellency of the following:

1. Our Ambassador in Tunis, Munthir al-Talak, had met with the Tunisian Minister of State for Foreign Affaires, Said Bin Mustafa. When our Ambassador admonished the Tunisian Minister about Iraq’s frozen assets in Tunis and the refusal to release them, the Tunisian Minister said that his information confirm that part of the frozen funds goes to the enemies of Tunis. We believe he meant the Tunisian Islamic Revival Movement. Earlier, during our meeting with the Minister of Interior, Abdullah al-Qallal, and in the presence of our Ambassador, the Minister confirmed to us that his government is aware of all the movements al-Finushi makes, and has relations with many al-Finushi’s aides who furnish him with information, one of which was a rumor that Iraq had given al-Finushi a sum of (500) five hundred thousand Dollars. (Clip number 1)
2. Based on the above, our Ambassador in Tunis requested us to send him directives on the manner he should handle the subject of the Islamic Revival Movement. Your approval was obtained on 30/10/1994 to direct the Ambassador to convey the following to the Tunisian Government:

(Document page 74)

Presidency of the Republic
Intelligence Service

a. Iraq has no relations with Islamic Movements, including the Revival Movement.

b. Iraq has not presented financial or any other type of aid to al-Finushi or his movement.

c. The Tunisian regime should be cautious against hostile parties and organizations, Arab and Foreign, whose objectives are to destroy the Iraqi-Tunisian relations. Iraq’s intention is to establish genuine cooperation with the Tunisian government free of obstacles. (Clip No. 2)

2. In his letter, our Ambassador drew your Excellency’s attention to the following:

a. He talked with the Secretary General of the Socialist Democrats Movement, Mohammad Mawa’da, regarding the existence of groups who have interest in destroying the relations between Iraq and Tunisia, and that some elements of the Tunisian Security Organization were involved.
b. Mawa’da talked to the Tunisian Minister of Interior and later met with him in an
effort to convince him to meet with our Ambassador.

c. The Minister of Interior assured our Ambassador that his government knows well
that Iraq had no relations with the Islamic Revival Movement in the past and

-2-

(Document page 73)

Presidency of the Republic
Intelligence Service

hoped that they will have no relations with them in the future as well. He indicated
that his government knows the party that is aiding the Movement mentioning Libya
by name, and that they had evidence to prove it.

d. During the meeting, the Minister of Interior seriously raised the subject of the
Tunisian students in Iraq. He said he wanted this subject to be resolved as his
government possesses information on all their activities.

e. Our Ambassador confirmed to the Minister the necessity to cooperate on this subject
by signing an agreement between the Tunisian and Iraqi Ministries. However, till
this date our Embassy has not received any reply to the Ambassador’s suggestion,
and on his part the Tunisian Minister did not follow it up.

f. The Secretary General of the Socialist Democrats Movement, Mohammad Mawa’da,
explained that the source of information regarding Iraq’s support of the Islamic
Revival Movement is a Tunisian security officer. He works under cover as a press
agent and has close ties to Kuwait. Our Ambassador in Tunis promised to obtain his
name in order to confirm Mawa’da’s claim. (Clip number 3)

Please review….with appreciation

(Signed)
Director General of Section 4
4/11/94

(Document page 96)

Presidency of the Republic
Intelligence Service

Mr. M. D1
Subject: Opposition Tunisian Revival Movement

1. Background
The leader of the opposition Tunisian Revival Movement, Rashed al-Finushi, expressed his desire to visit Iraq with an Egyptian colleague called Youssef Nadda in order to meet with the President Leader, may God protect him.

2. Procedures
a. We referred the subject to the Secretary of the Presidency of the Republic in our letter number 2098 of 12/10/1991. (Clip number 1)
b. The President Leader, may God protect him, approved the visit of al-Finushi alone as per the Presidency of the Republic letter number 6460 of 29/10/1991. (Clip No. 2)

c. The above leader lives in London and communicating with him is a major task. Therefore, we requested our Ambassador in Sudan to contact him through Dr. Ali Osman Taha, the Assistant Secretary of the Sudanese National Islamic Front and extend to him an invitation to visit Iraq and meet with the president leader. (Clip number 3.)

d. We were informed by Dr. Ali Osman Taha that it is difficult for al-Finushi to visit Iraq because his exit from Britain is full of problems.

e. The Tunisian Mohammad Bin Salem, executive member of the political bureau of

-1-

the Revival Movement contacted our embassy in Sudan and asked to meet with an official who has the authority to coordinate the visit, as he is al-Finushi’s representative in Sudan. He suggested to meet with such an official in either Amman, San’a or Khartoum because he carries a French passport and therefore cannot visit Baghdad.

f. Our Ambassador in San’a (our intelligent agent there) was asked to contact the Tunisian Mohammad Bin Salem, who resides in San’a, to explore al-Finushi’s intentions of visiting Iraq and listen to other issues which he might present. Salem suggested that the Revival Movement should have a permanent representation office in Baghdad and a representative who would reside there, and that a number of Tunisian students should be admitted to Iraqi universities. (Clip number 4)

g. The above issues were relayed to the Secretary of the Presidency of the Republic per
our letter 8204 of 27 / 9 / 1992 in order to obtain the President Leader’s approval. Approval of the President Leader was obtained on condition that the relationship and the coordination with the said movement remains a secret and free of propaganda. The President Leader also approved accepting a number of Tunisian Students in Iraqi Universities. (Clip number 5).

h. Our Ambassador in San`a was entrusted with contacting the Tunisian Mohammad Bin Salem to notify him of the President’s approval of their suggestions and to follow up the visit of al-Finushi to Baghdad so we may take the necessary preparations. (Clip number 6).

i. We are still following up the above issues with our Ambassador in San`a.

Please review…. with appreciation.

(Signed) M.D.1 / 4  
26 / 5 / 1994

(Signed) R. Q 4  
25 / 5 / 1994
In the Name of Allah the Compassionate, the Merciful

Iraqi Eagle Emblem

Republic of Iraq
Presidency of the Republic
Intelligence Service

IRAQI
INTELLIGENCE SERVICE
IRIS

Top Secret

Number / 14 / D / 1 / 4 / 2793
Date / 12 / Jamadi Thani / 1412 H
8 / 12 / 1991 AD

To/ Secretary/ Presidency of the Republic
Subject/ Tunisian Rashid al-Finushi
Reference to the Presidency of the Republic’s top secret letter 7211/K of 9/12/1991, please find hereunder the results of our follow up of the above person:

1. As a result of the pressure applied by the Tunisian Government, the Algerian Government, Al-Finushi secretly left Algiers for Sudan and remained there for a while. Again, the Tunisian government applied pressure on the Sudanese government which forced Al-Finushi to move to Britain, after he was successful in obtaining a political asylum entry visa.

2. After settling down in Britain and obtaining a legal residence permit in Britain, we shall contact him for the purpose of inviting him to visit the State and meet the President Leader, may God protect him.

Please review...we shall inform you of future developments...with appreciation.

(Signed)
Director of Intelligence Service
18/12/1991

(1-1)
Top Secret
The classification markings are original to the Iraqi documents and do not reflect current US classification.

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<td>ISGZ-2005-002426 This file contains information from the Iraqi Embassies; in Morocco, Algeria, Sudan, Bahrain, and Pakistan. It also contains a letter which was sent from the Iraqi Embassy in Pakistan about Al Qa’dah activities; sending operatives to (where the USA has interests) Saudi Arabia, Kuwait, Bahrain and other countries and contacting and sending money to the Algerians Salafy Organization (Page 62). And it also contains a letter to the director of the Iraqi Intelligence Service answering his concerns, about the mailboxes in different counties which are used by IIS agents (Page 65)</td>
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### Translation Form

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<th>Translation Number: ISGQ-2003-0002426a-HT-DHM2A</th>
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<tr>
<th>Author (if known):</th>
<th>Iraqi Ministry of Foreign Affairs</th>
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|-------------------------------------------------|-------------------------------------------------------------|

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**Gist:** This 176-pages file is split into three parts a, b, and c. The file contains correspondence, memos, expense reports, and source payments mainly from the Iraqi embassy in Algeria to the Ministry of Foreign Affairs. A comprehensive country study done on Somalia is included in the file as well as a one-page report on Al-Qa’eda’s activities in Algeria.

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<table>
<thead>
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<table>
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<table>
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<tr>
<th>Date:</th>
<th>August 26, 2005</th>
</tr>
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</table>
PART A

Page 3 – An open source article in Arabic titled “Indonesian Minister of Foreign Affairs states that the news regarding a Shimon Perez visit to Indonesia is false, and we do not recognize Israel”.

Page 4 is blank.

Page 5- contains test results for IIS officers in the African section M4/D1.

Page 6 – is a memo from the Iraqi embassy in Khartoum, addressed to the office of the Foreign Affairs Minister dated 05 Jan 02. The memo states that the requested personal information was sent in a memo numbered 16 and dated 05 Jan 02.

Pages 7-9, 18-40, and 42-60 are a part of a book containing a comprehensive foreign country study on Somalia, describing and analyzing its political, economic, historic, religious, social, military, national security systems and instantiations, and current issues. The book provides a general understanding of the society studied by the author with emphasis on the people who make up the society, their origins, dominant beliefs and values, their common interests and the issues on which they are divided, the nature and extent of their involvement with national institutions, and their attitudes toward each other and toward their social systems and political order.

Page 11- is a memo from the Iraqi embassy in Rabat, addressed to the office of the Minister of Foreign Affairs dated 27 Sep 01 and titled “The Moroccan Anas Bou Salamatti”. The memo states that Anas Bou Salamatti works for the Abu-Dhabi news channel in Beirut since 2000.

Page 12- is a memo from the Iraqi embassy in Rabat, addressed to the office of the Minister of Foreign Affairs dated 27 Sep 01 and titled “The Iraqi Nassir Hassan ‘Ulwan”. The memo states that Nassir Hassan ‘Ulwan returned to Baghdad June of 2001.

Page 13 – is mainly blank, towards the bottom of the page is written “code name Ghazwan your memo# 191 dated 30 Jun 01”.

Pages 14-17 contain memo from the Iraqi embassy in Rabat, addressed to the office of the Minister of Foreign Affairs dated 27 Sep 01 and titled “Document”. The document is a cover letter for an attachment regarding a meeting between the Algerian Minister of Parliamentary Relations Mr. Nur-al-Din Talib and the Tunisian parliament envoy. Pages 15-17 are the actual report.

Page 41 – is a memo from the Iraqi embassy in Khartoum, addressed to M1 division 2 dated 15 March 03 and titled “A Study”. The memo states that the attachment sent along with the note is a study on Somalia prepared by the Sudanese Military Staff College.
PART B

In the name of God the merciful and compassionate

Embassy of the Republic of Iraq
Islamabad

Number: 67
Date: 17 Jan 2003

To: Ministry of Foreign Affairs/ Office of the Minister/ D.B.T.M/D1
The respectful Director of D1
Subject/ Al-Qa’eda Activities

Attached is a report, furnished by source code number 6841, which includes the following:

1- Al-Qa’eda dispatched elements and personnel with fake passports to Arabic Countries under fictitious alias to target American interests in countries such as Saudi Arabia, Kuwait, and Bahrain.

2- The Yemeni (Abu-Muhammad) was sent to Algeria carrying a passport with the name of Saydi Ahmed Habiballah, to contact the Algerian “Salafist group for the calling of Jihad” and deliver money to them; however he was killed in an armed skirmish between Algerian security forces and the above-mentioned group. Algerian authorities were able to trace his real name and his families address in cooperation with the Yemeni embassy in Algeria. His real name is (‘Imad ‘Abdul-Wahid Rahman ‘Ulwan) from the “Ta’iz” village and he was a member of Al-Qa’eda.

Please review...........with regards

[TC: couple of illegible signatures at the bottom of the page and the document is classified secret]

Page 3 contains identical information to page 2; the only difference is that page three claims that 65 soldiers in the Algerian security forces lost their lives during the skirmish with the Salafist group.
Page 4 is an IIS memo addressed to M4 division 7 and dated 03 Feb 2001 reporting the Directors orders to stop using certain mailboxes in Greece, Morocco, Yemen, Algeria, and Spain.

Pages 5-12 are correspondence between IIS, Ministry of Foreign Affairs, and Embassies in various locations regarding the security of mailboxes. Also included is a 3-pages report containing a 3-stages plan to confirm securing a number of mailboxes used by Embassy and IIS personnel overseas.

Pages 18-19, 20-21, 24-28, 30-32, 34-35, 38-39, 41-43, 45-47, 50-51, and 53 are copies cash disbursement receipts from the Iraqi embassy in Algeria; there are two different types of receipts, one type for the embassy’s monthly expense records and the other is the actual cash disbursement receipt with the recipient’s signature most of which are source payments and gifts. Include the following information:

<table>
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<th>Recipient</th>
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<td></td>
<td>30 Jan 2003</td>
<td>Page 19</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>20</td>
<td>$300</td>
<td></td>
<td>30 Jan 2003</td>
<td>Page 21</td>
</tr>
<tr>
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<td>Page 26</td>
</tr>
<tr>
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</tr>
<tr>
<td>30</td>
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<td>Source Code#7796</td>
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</tr>
<tr>
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<td>$300</td>
<td>Source Code#1161</td>
<td>13 Jan 2003</td>
<td>Page 39</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>41</td>
<td>12,000</td>
<td>The Mauritanian Abdul-Qader Naji Mustafa who volunteered to be a human shield for Iraqis</td>
<td>12 Jan 2003</td>
<td>Page 43</td>
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<td>12 Jan 2003</td>
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The classification markings are original to the Iraqi documents and do not reflect current US classification.

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Pages 22-23, 29, 33, 36-37, 44, 47-48, 54-60 are copies of station expenses receipts mainly purchase of gifts, dinning, and office supplies receipts.

Page 40 is blank.

Page 52 is a coversheet accompanying the Algerian station accounting report for the month of February 2003, the sheet addressed to the Ministry of Foreign Affairs, office of the Minister and dated 20 Mar 2003.

**PART C**

Pages 1-19 are copies cash disbursement receipts from the Iraqi embassy in Algeria. Most of the receipts are payments for gifts, dinning, phone receipts, and car rental receipts.

Pages 20-56 are a part of a book containing a comprehensive foreign country study on Somalia, describing and analyzing its political, economic, historic, religious, social, military, national security systems and instantiations, and current issues. The book provides a general understanding of the observed society with emphasis on the people who make up the society, their origins, dominant beliefs and values, their common interests and the issues on which they are divided, the nature and extent of their involvement with national institutions, and their attitudes toward each other and toward their social systems and political order.
The classification markings are original to the Iraqi documents and do not reflect current US classification.

This page is intentionally blank.
This file contains financial paperwork that belongs to the Iraqi Army Intelligence. Most are receipts and invoices. Some receipts show payments to a few Kurdish People who were working as consultants for the Army. The file also contains a request for money to be paid to the Sudanese fighters in Iraq [Page 153] and a list of officers who received payment.
<table>
<thead>
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| Capture Information | Capturing Unit: JDEC-B | Date/Time of Capture: 20050323 | Place of Capture: BAGHDAD, IRAQ-GEN MIL INTEL HQs | Coordinates: 38SMB39972945288 |

| Transmittal Information | Transporting Unit: JDEC-B | Date/Time of Arrival: 20050331 |

| Comments | Target CJ0769, 0297736, Athir Mohammad Ali Hasan al Dulaemi, aka Abu A'esha, is an explosives expert that tested positive three times for explosive traces. |
The classification markings are original to the Iraqi documents and do not reflect current US classification.

**Translation Form**

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| **Country of Publication:** Iraq | **Author (if known):** More then one |
| **Personalities (persons named in the document):** Please see below |
| **Facilities (facilities named in the document):** the Military Intelligence Directorate, the 999 Branch and other branches, Anti Aircraft Launching in Al-Razazah |
| **Keywords:** Secret project, Sudanese Fighters |
| **Remarks:** All names and dates in this document were translated including pages 151 and 152 referring to the Sudanese Fighters. |
| **Gist:** this document contains financing an unknown project, bonuses, unknown material and normal expenses. |

| **Linguist Names:** |
| **Date In:** 09/14/2005 | **Date Out:** 09/19/05 |
| **QC Linguist:** |
| **Date:** September 21, 2005 |

Page 2-5
Payment voucher authorized by the Staff Lt. General of the Military Intelligence Directorate [TC: name illegible] to Major 'Ali Mukhlf Hamad for the amount of (10,000) Ten Thousand Dinars dated 10/01/1995. This amount was for miscellaneous spending.
Page 9:
Payment voucher authorized by the Staff Lt. General of the Military Intelligence Directorate [TC: name illegible] to Naji Zuhayd 'Ali for the amount of (13,000) Thirteen Thousand Dinars dated 09/30/1995. This amount was for purchasing expenses.

Page 12
Payment voucher authorized by the Staff Lt. General of the Military Intelligence Directorate [TC: name illegible] to the Warrant Officer, 'Ali Latif Sa'id for the amount of (3,000) Three Thousand Dinars dated 09/27/1995. This amount was for bonuses expenses.

Page 14
Handwritten letter sent by Dr. Colonel, Ahmad 'Aid Khalaf to the Branch Director [TC: no name] titled “Medicine Requests” dated 09/25/1995. The Colonel indicated that the medicine inventory is completed.

Pages 15, 17
Payment voucher authorized by the Chief Lt. General of the Military Intelligence Directorate [TC: name illegible] to Chief Major General, 'Abd-al-Karim Ahmad Farhan for the amount of (160,000) One Hundred Sixty Thousand Dinars dated 09/26/1995. This amount was for unidentified special project. Page 17 included an authorization letter signed by Lt. Colonel, Muhammad Raghib 'Ali, for the amount of (160,000); he also mentioned that this amount should be taken from a secret budget [TC: no further information].

Page 18
Payment voucher authorized by the Staff Lt. General of the Military Intelligence Directorate [TC: name illegible] to the Lt. Colonel, Basim Sabri [TC: last name could be Muhammad or Mahma] for the amount of (10,000) Ten Thousand Dinars dated 09/26/1995. This amount was for the budget of the Military Intelligence Academy expenses [TC: no other information].

Page 20:
Handwritten letter sent by Major Sulayman Muhammad Kazim to the Staff Officer [TC: no name] titled “Visit” dated 09/25/1995. The Major announced that the General Director [TC: no name] has visited the Western Group on 09/24/1995, and he issued the following orders:

1- He granted fifty thousand Dinars to the western division Intelligence.
2- He granted bonuses (Five Hundred Dinars each) for the following names for their efforts during his visit:
   a. Warrant Officer 'Abass Ahmad Jasim
   b. Private 1st Glass Mazin Ahmad Sattar
   c. Private Soldier 'Ujayl Naf' Latif
   d. Private Soldier 'Amar Hadi Naji
   e. Private Soldier Sattar Jabar Isma'il
   f. Private Soldier Talib Jasim Salih
Page 21 contains a payment voucher for the amount of Fifty Thousand Dinars received by Lt. Colonel Fahd Mahdi Hilal dated 09/26/1995.

Page 23 contains a payment voucher for the amount of Three Thousand Dinars received by Warrant Officer 'Ali Nuar Hamdan dated 09/26/1995.

Page 24 contains a payment voucher for the amount of Three Thousand Dinars to Warrant Officer Yasin Ibrahim Hasan from 999 Battalion as a settlement after his resignation, dated 08/24/1995.

Page 27 contains a payment receipt from the GMID for the amount of 2000 Dinars signed by Private Soldier Dia' Ibrahim on behalf of 1st Lieutenant 'Ubayd Qasim 'Abass from 999 Battalion dated 09/18/1995.

Page 28 contains a payment receipt from GMID for the amount of 1,000 Dinars received by Nahida Salman, the mother of Warrant officer Nazar Fuwad, dated 08/18/1995.

Page 29
Letter sent by Staff Officer Na'im Raja' to the Assistant Supervisor [TC: no name] dated 09/19/1995. The officer indicated that the General Director [TC: no name] has met with following officers on 09/18/1995:
1- 'Adil Amin 'Amran
2- Muhammad 'Ali Mahmud
3- Hatim Ahmad Hatim
4- Isma'il Ibrahim Suhayl
5- 'Ubayd Qasim 'Abass
All of them are officers with the Military Intelligence and have been either promoted or transferred.

Page 37-39
Payment voucher authorized by the Staff Lt. General of the Military Intelligence Directorate [TC: name illegible] to the Colonel Zaid Khamis Yasin for the amount of (78,750) Seventy Eight Thousand Seven Hundred Fifty Dinars dated 09/26/1995. This amount was for Special projects.

Page 40-41
This page contains a payment voucher written to Colonel Haydar 'Aziz for the amount for 6,500 Dinars as a bonus for a collaborator.

Page 50
Payment voucher from GMID received by Major Ibrahim 'Abass Majid dated 09/23/1995. The amount of One Hundred Thousand to be distributed to the following:
1- Advisor Tahir Husayn Al-Jabari
2- Advisor Suarah Fatah Faraj
3- Advisor 'Uthman 'Abd-al-Rahman 'Abd
4- Advisor Karim Ahmad [TC: illegible]
5- Advisor 'Aziz Ahmad 'Ali
Pages 51, 56, 59
Payment vouchers authorized by the Staff Lt. General of the Military Intelligence Directorate [TC: name illegible] to the 1st Lieutenant 'Us Dari, Captain 'Abdallah Ibrahim and Walid Ibrahim for the amount of (10,000) Ten Thousand Dinars each dated 09/23/1995. This amount was for the Corps’ budget.

Page 58
Payment voucher from GMID [TC: Secret Foreign Classification] in the amount of 10 thousand dinars authorized by the Director of the 1st Branch [TC: name illegible] to source number (192) received by Captain 'Abdallah 'Aliwi dated 09/21/1995.

Page 65
Payment voucher authorized by the Staff Lt. General of the Military Intelligence Directorate [TC: name illegible] to the Warrant Officer Muhammad Ibrahim Zahir for the amount of (135,000) One Hundred Thirty Five Thousand dated 09/21/1995. This amount would be used for bonuses.

Page 66
Handwritten letter sent by Special Division Staff Officer, Ahmad Fadil Husayn to the Division Director [TC: no name] titled “Bonus” dated 09/19/1995. The following Paratroopers performed an outstanding job at the parachute parade; therefore the Staff Officer requested a bonus for them:

1- Deputy Officer – Carpenter – Muhammad Ibrahim Zahir
2- Deputy Officer – Blacksmith – Sa‘id ‘Abd Jawad
3- Draftee – Blacksmith – Bilal Mun‘im Ibrahim
4- Draftee – Blacksmith – Muhammad Shakir Muhammad
5- Draftee – Painter – Jasim Naji Sharqi

Page 77
Handwritten note [TC: Secret Foreign Classification] sent by Staff Brigadier General, ‘Abd-al-Hamid Jabar Tawfiq, Commander of the 5th Corp. to the General Military Intelligence Directorate [TC: no name] titled “Sending a messenger” dated 09/20/1995. The note was written and sent with the 1st Lieutenant Namir Idris authorizing him to receive (10,000) Ten Thousand Dinars.

Page 79
Payment voucher authorized by the Chief Lt. General of the Military Intelligence Directorate [TC: name illegible] to the Deputy Officer Hadi Jabir Salman for the amount of (10,000) Ten Thousand Dinars, dated 09/19/1995. This amount was for printing invitation cards [TC: no further information]

Page 84
This page contains only the following names and signature:
1- Major Walid Ibrahim 'Abd-al-Razaq  
2- Colonel Zayd Khamis Yasin  
3- Staff Major Khalis Muthanah Salih

Page 85
This page contain a memo from GMID indicating that Hadi Jabr had received (6000) Six Thousand Dinars and one bottle of whisky for an anticipated dinner function held at the Guest House of the Military Directorate, dated August 3, 1995.

Pages 86-91
Payment voucher authorized by the Staff Lt. General of the Military Intelligence Directorate [TC: name illegible] to the Colonel Nazhan Jasim Ahmad for the amount of (150,000) One Hundred Fifty Thousand dated 09/19/1995. This amount would be used to buy materials [TC: the type of material is not clarified]. A letter was sent to the Lt. Colonel Salman 'Ubayd Samir to form a committee included Major Mazin Khalil Ibrahim and 1st Lieutenant Amir 'Abdallah Husayn; this committer would be in charge of purchasing materials needed for equipment maintenance [TC: the type of equipment is not clarified].

Page 98
Payment voucher Paid to the order of 'Azam Jabir for the amount of (1,000) One Thousand Dinars as bonus dated 09/16/1995.

Page 99
Letter from GMID to the 9th Division dated 09/11/1995 containing the following names:  
1- Staff Brigadier General Sultan Ahmad 'Asfur (to be transferred)  
2- Intel Soldier Fathi Sultan Salim (to be transferred)  
3- Ten thousand Dinars bonus for the employee 'Azam Jabir

Page 106
Payment voucher Paid received by Major Basil Majid for the amount of (50,000) Fifty Thousand Dinars as a bonus for a source dated 09/16/1995.

Page 112
Letter indicating that Staff Brigadier General Muzhir Taha has published a book containing information on fighting terrorist groups and the new Iranian undercover agents dated 09/13/1995.

Page 114
Payment voucher Paid to the order of the former Advisor for the National Defense 104 Regiment, 'Arsah 'Ali Rustum Jaramka, for the amount of (46,000) Forty Six Thousand Dinars dated 09/02/1995. This payment voucher was signed by Lt. Colonel 'Abd-al-Karim Hasan Zahir or Tahir, Colonel Salman Shalshal Mazlum and Staff Major General S'ad 'Abd-al-Ghani.
Page 115
Payment voucher paid to the order of the former Advisor for the National Defense 34\textsuperscript{th} Regiment, Sa'id As'ad Shatinah, for the amount of (23,000) Twenty Three Thousand Dinars dated 09/05/1995. This payment voucher was signed by Lt. Colonel 'Abd-al-Karim Hasan Zahir or Tahir, Colonel Salman Shalshal Mazlum and Staff Major General S'ad `Aabd-al-Ghani.

Page 116
Payment voucher paid to the order of the former Advisor for the National Defense 73\textsuperscript{rd} Regiment, Sa'id Mahmud Qalsiukah, for the amount of (39,000) Thirty Nine Thousand Dinars dated 09/03/1995. This payment voucher was signed by Lt. Colonel 'Abd-al-Karim Hasan Zahir or Tahir, Colonel Suliman Shalshal Mazlum and Staff Major General S'id `Aabd-al-Ghani.

Page 117
Payment voucher paid to the order of the former Advisor for the National Defense 19\textsuperscript{th} Regiment, Muhammad Qadir 'Aziz Al-Surjay, for the amount of (19,000) Nineteen Thousand Dinars dated 09/04/1995. This payment voucher was signed by Lt. Colonel 'Abd-al-Karim Hasan Zahir or Tahir, Colonel Suliman Shalshal Mazlum and Staff Major General S'id 'Aabd-al-Ghani.

Page 118
Payment voucher paid to the order of the former Advisor for the National Defense 61\textsuperscript{st} Regiment, Majid Shikh Baiz Hasan [TC: this payment was received by Khalil 'Ubad 'Aziz], for the amount of (57,000) Fifty Seven Thousand Dinars dated 09/08/1995. This payment voucher was signed by Lt. Colonel 'Abd-al-Karim Hasan Zahir or Tahir, Colonel Suliman Shalshal Mazlum and Staff Major General S'id 'Aabd-al-Ghani.

Page 119
Payment voucher received by Colonel Salman Shalshal Mazlum in the amount of 182 thousand dinars to be paid to following Advisors as salaries:
   1- Hamzah 'Abass [TC: illegible]
   2- Suarah Fatah Faraj
   3- 'Abdallah Husayn 'Uthman
   4- Muhammad Hamah Amin Al-Zarari

Page 120
Payment voucher paid to the order of the former Advisor for the National Defense 216\textsuperscript{th} Regiment, Muhammad Hamah Amin Al-Zarari [TC: this payment was received by Kukiz 'Umar Haji], for the amount of (45,000) Forty Five Thousand Dinars dated 08/25/1995. This payment voucher was signed by Lt. Colonel 'Abd-al-Karim Hasan Zahir or Tahir, Colonel Salman Shalshal Mazlum and Staff Major General S'id 'Aabd-al-Ghani.

Page 121
Payment voucher paid to the order of the former Advisor for the National Defense 292\textsuperscript{nd} Regiment, 'Abdallah Husayn 'Uthman Khushtawi [TC: this payment was received by Kukiz 'Umar Haji], for the amount of (45,000) Forty Five Thousand Dinars dated 08/25/1995.

324
08/25/1995. This payment voucher was signed by Lt. Colonel 'Abd-al-Karim Hasan Zahir or Tahir, Colonel Salman Shalshal Mazlum and Staff Major General S'id 'Abd-al-Ghani.

Page 122-123
Payment voucher Paid to the order of the former Advisor for the National Defense 82nd and 22nd Regiment, Sawadah 'Abbas Mannid [TC: this payment was received by 'Abdallah Muhammad Amin], for the amount of (46,000) Forty Six Thousand Dinars dated 09/03/1995. This payment voucher was signed by Lt. Colonel 'Abd-al-Karim Hasan Zahir or Tahir, Colonel Salman Shalshal Mazlum and Staff Major General S'id 'Abd-al-Ghani. Page 123 contains similar voucher for Hamzah 'Abbas Mannid

Page 124
Payment voucher received by Colonel Salman Shalash Mazlum to be disbursed as salaries to following Advisors:
1- Khurshid Al-Sa'daniyah
2- Husayn Sa'id Al-Barzinji

Page 125
Payment voucher Paid to the order of the former Advisor for the National Defense 253 Regiment, Khurshid As'ad Shitana [TC: this payment was received by Bashar As'ad Shitana], for the amount of (52,000) Fifty Two Thousand Dinars dated 08/29/1995. This payment voucher was signed by Lt. Colonel 'Abd-al-Karim Hasan Zahir or Tahir, Colonel Salman Shalshal Mazlum and Staff Major General S'id 'Abd-al-Ghani.

Page 126
Payment voucher Paid to the order of the former Advisor for the National Defense Regiment 262, Husayn Shaykh Sa'id al-Barzinji [TC: this payment was giving to Muhammad Shaykh Sa'id Al-Barzinji], for the amount of (57,000) Fifty Seven Thousand Dinars dated 09/03/1995. This payment voucher was signed by Lt. Colonel 'Abd-al-Karim Hasan Zahir or Tahir, Colonel Salman Shalshal Mazlum and Staff Major General S'id 'Abd-al-Ghani.

Page 128
Handwritten letter sent by the Northern region Staff Officer [TC: no name] to the Assistant Supervisor [TC: no name] titled "Gift" dated 09/13/1995. The letter indicated that Corporal Nabil Fadil Mahmud was admitted to the hospital on 09/09/1995 for surgery and suggest that a gift is sent to him.

Page 133
Promotional letter written from the Staff Colonel, Director of Intelligence of the Southern Region [TC: no name] to the General Military Intelligence Directorate [TC: no name]
The classification markings are original to the Iraqi documents and do not reflect current US classification.

titled “Miscellaneous spending” dated 09/07/1995, requesting to hand the Miscellaneous spending funds to warrant officer ʿAbd-al-Jabar Muhammad Ismaʿıl.

Page 134
Payment voucher authorized by the Staff Lt. General of the Military Intelligence Directorate [TC: name illegible] received by Staff Lt. Colonel Hafiz ʿUad Khalif for the amount of (44,000) Forty Four Thousand Dinars dated 09/12/1995. This amount was for salary expenses [TC: no other information].

Page 135, 137, 138, 139
Handwritten letter sent by the Staff Brigadier General, Naji Daham ʿAli, to the deputy chief [TC: no name] titled “Gifts” dated 08/30/1995. The letter referred to the General Director attending a shooting rang training for the 999 Battalion, which took place at the Anti Aircraft range in Al-Razazah. The general director authorized granting bonuses to the instructors and officers from the 999 battalion who participated in the training course. List of instructors receiving the bonus:

1- Staff Brigadier General Majil Salih Farah
2- Colonel Muhammad Khadar Hasan
3- Colonel ʿAbd-al-Amir Suliman
4- Lt. Colonel Muhsan Husayn Hasan
5- Lt. Colonel Ghalib Jasim
6- Major Khalid Ahmad ʿLuan
7- Major Karim Nayah
8- Deputy Officer Badray Rahim
9- Deputy Officer ʿAli Husayn Faz`
10- Corporal Naʿim Amanah or Amalah

The following list NCO receiving the bonus:
1- Deputy Officer Jasim Nada Hamzah
2- Deputy Officer Thaʿir Muhammad Saʿday
3- Deputy Officer Majid Yafū or Yaqū Bulis
4- Deputy Officer Riad ʿAlī Mahmūd
5- Deputy Officer Jasim Muhammad Dhiab
6- Sergeant Monitor ʿAlaʿ Muhammad Jābir
7- Sergeant Monitor Nijam ʿAid
8- Jawal Hidar Radi [TC: no title]

The following list contains names of officers who received the bonus:
1- Captain Basil Muhsan Sahīn
2- Captain Haqi Ismaʿil Ahmad
3- 1st Lieutenant Nafʿ Husayn Salīh
4- 1st Lieutenant ʿImad Muhammad Hasan
5- 1st Lieutenant Qīs Hasan Hilāl
6- 1st Lieutenant Riad Mahmūd ʿAbdallāh
7- Lieutenant Bilal Sʿid Idrias
8- Lieutenant Raʿid Dawūd Sulīman
9- 'Imad Ibrahim Salih

Page 141
Payment voucher authorized by the Staff Lt. General of the Military Intelligence Directorate [TC: name illegible] received by enlisted R'id Husayn for the amount of (42000) Forty Two Thousand Dinars dated 09/12/1995. This amount was for general expense.

Page 142
Handwritten note written by Colonel Ta'ir Ibrahim Muhammad (the head of the officers’ restaurant) to the Director of the 7th Branch [TC: no name] dated 09/07/1995. The colonel requested an amount of (4,200) Four Thousand Two Hundred Dinars for printing material.

Page 143
Payment voucher authorized by the Staff Lt. General of the Military Intelligence Directorate [TC: name illegible] to the Staff Major Nizar Sharif for the amount of (10,000) Ten Thousand Dinars dated 09/12/1995. This amount was for the 7th Branch expenses.

Page 149
Payment voucher authorized by the Staff Lt. General of the Military Intelligence Directorate [TC: name illegible] received by Lieutenant Sabah Ibrahim Khalil for the amount of (5,000) Five Thousand Dinars dated 09/12/1995. This amount was for the Navy Command expenses.

Page 151
Payment voucher authorized by the Staff Lt. General of the Military Intelligence Directorate [TC: name illegible] in the amount of (750,000) Seven Hundred Fifty Thousand Dinars dated 09/11/1995. This amount was a loan for the Sudanese fighters [TC: no further information]

Page 152
Letter [TC: Top Secret Foreign Classification] sent by Staff Lt. General of the Military Intelligence Directorate [TC: no name] to the Brigadier General Naji Daham 'Ali titled “Check Posted” dated 09/11/1995. The Staff Lt. General requested an acknowledgment receipt for the (750,000) Seven Hundred Fifty Thousand Dinars and a monthly expense report [TC: no further information]. This letter was cc to the Office of the Sudanese Affairs.

Page 153
Letter sent by the Accountant Officer of the Directorate [TC: no name] to the Deputy chief [TC: no name] titled “Assigning Funds” dated 09/11/1995. This letter contains the following information:
1- The amount of (750,000) Seven Hundred Fifty Thousand Dinars was reviewed with Brigadier General Naji Daham 'Ali concerning the Sudanese fighters.

2- Monthly expenses were about (750,000) Seven Hundred Fifty Thousand Dinars.

3- The accounting dept. requested that the general director approves the amount of (750,000) Seven Hundred Fifty Thousand Dinars to be paid monthly to the Sudanese fighter.

Page 154
Payment voucher authorized by the Staff Lt. General of the Military Intelligence Directorate [TC: name illegible] received by Major Najid Muhammad 'Ali [TC: illegible] for the amount of (5,000) Five Thousand Dinars dated 09/11/1995. This amount was for miscellaneous spending.

Page 156
Payment voucher authorized by the Staff Lt. General of the Military Intelligence Directorate [TC: name illegible] received by Colonel Nazhan Ahmad Jasim for the amount of (5,000) Five Thousand Dinars dated 09/10/1995. This amount was for the spending of the 9th Branch.

Page 157
Payment voucher authorized by the Staff Lt. General of the Military Intelligence Directorate [TC: name illegible] to the Captain 'Adil Hasan Jamil for the amount of (5,000) Five Thousand Dinars dated 09/07/1995. This amount was for the spending of the 2nd Corps' intelligence.

Page 156
Payment voucher authorized by the Staff Lt. General of the Military Intelligence Directorate [TC: name illegible] warrant officer Sabah Mishawah for the amount of (10,000) Ten Thousand Dinars dated 09/06/1995. This amount was a bonus issued for fighter 'Ali Akbar Shah.

Page 168
Letter [TC: Secret Foreign Classification] sent by Staff Major General [TC: no name] to the 9th Branch Directorate [TC: no name] titled “The General Director’s Meetings” dated 08/23/1995. The Staff Major General discussed the following:

1- Transferring Colonel Sami Ahmad Jawad’s to the Borders Intelligence Division.

2- Transfer Draftee Riyad Nijam 'Antir from the 9th Branch (Transportation), to the Western Intelligence Division, which will allow him to be near his resident.

3- The Twelfth Branch will conduct the following:

a. The possibility of deploying fighter 'Ali Akbar Shah and his detachment to the intelligence center in Khaniqin in order to receive their rations similar to the officers.
b. Rectifying the salaries of the fighters in each detachment.
c. The importance of providing the fighter 'Ali Akbar Shah an Iraqi citizenship.
d. Give a bonus of (10,000) Ten Thousand Dinars to the above-mentioned fighter.
e. Fairness in distributing bonuses and efforts to capture infiltrators.

Page 179
The following table contains the General Military Intelligence Directorate Officers’ names and ranks:

<table>
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<tr>
<th>#</th>
<th>Rank</th>
<th>Name</th>
</tr>
</thead>
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<tr>
<td>1</td>
<td>Captain</td>
<td>'Abdallah Ibrahim 'Liwai</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>2</td>
<td>Major</td>
<td>Muthan Khalil Ibrahim</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>3</td>
<td>Lt. Colonel</td>
<td>Mushalim 'Ali Ibrahim</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>4</td>
<td>Lt. Colonel</td>
<td>Amjad Fadil Khadir</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>5</td>
<td>Lt. Colonel</td>
<td>Mahmud 'Abdallah Hamad</td>
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<tr>
<td>6</td>
<td>Major</td>
<td>'Abass 'Id 'Ali</td>
</tr>
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<td>7</td>
<td>Major</td>
<td>'Abd-al-Sattar Khalifa 'Ali</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>8</td>
<td>Major</td>
<td>Ahmad Sami 'Abd-al-Latif</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>9</td>
<td>Major</td>
<td>Baha’ Qasim Muhammad Salih</td>
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<td>Rahim 'Abdallah Ni`mah</td>
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<td>11</td>
<td>Lt. Colonel</td>
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<td>Walid Ahmad 'Abdallah</td>
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<td>21</td>
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<td>Jasim Muhammad Jarallah</td>
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<tr>
<td>22</td>
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<td>'Abd-al-Karim Salih Muhammad</td>
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The following table contains names that received an amount of (1,500) Fifteen Hundred Dinars:

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<td>Captain</td>
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<td>2</td>
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<td>Muthnah Khalil Ibrahim</td>
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<td>Major</td>
<td>'Abass 'Abd 'Ali</td>
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<tr>
<td>7</td>
<td>Major</td>
<td>'Abd-al-Sattar Khalifah 'Ali</td>
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<tr>
<td>8</td>
<td>Major</td>
<td>Ahmad Sami 'Abd-al-Latif</td>
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<td>9</td>
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<td>Baha’ Qasim Muhammad Salih</td>
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<tr>
<td>Rank</td>
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<tr>
<td>Lt. Colonel</td>
<td>Rahim <code>Abdallah Ni</code>mah</td>
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<td>Lt. Colonel</td>
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<td>Major</td>
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<td>Captain</td>
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<td><code>Ali Sha</code>ban `Ali</td>
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<td>Nabil Sajid Jabbar</td>
<td></td>
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<td>Captain</td>
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<td>Major</td>
<td>Sarhan <code>Abdallah </code>Anzi</td>
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<td>Major</td>
<td>Nijam `Abd-al-Sattar</td>
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</tr>
<tr>
<td>Captain</td>
<td>Muhammad `Abd-al-Rahman</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>
The classification markings are original to the Iraqi documents and do not reflect current US classification.

| 3 | Lt. Colonel | 'Adil 'Abd Sa'd |
| 3 | Lt. Colonel | R'id Khalid Jamil |
| 4 | Major       | Dawud Salih Dawud |
| 5 | Lt. Colonel | 'Ali Harijah 'Ali |
| 6 | Major       | Wadi' 'Abd-al-Rahman Wahib |

**Page 183**
Payment voucher authorized by the Staff Lt. General of the Military Intelligence Directorate [TC: name illegible] received by Major Hamid Karim Latif for the amount of (5,000) Five Thousand Dinars dated 09/06/1995. This amount was for the air surveillance and intelligence expense.

**Page 187**
Payment voucher authorized by the Staff Lt. General of the Military Intelligence Directorate [TC: name illegible] received by Major Tamir Himayd for the amount of (5,000) Five Thousand Dinars dated 09/06/1995. This amount was a loan for the 1st Branch.

**Page 189**
Payment voucher authorized by the Staff Lt. General of the Military Intelligence Directorate [TC: name illegible] received by Staff Lt. Colonel Hafiz 'Uad Kalif for the amount of (10,000) Ten Thousand Dinars dated 09/06/1995. This amount was for the 999 Battalion's expenses.
**Original Document Information**

- **Document #:** ISSO-2003-00008237  
- **Classification:** [Redacted]
- **English Title:** Correspondence belonging to the Ministry of Foreign Affairs regarding a report on the visit of Al-Shikh Ahmad Yasin and Khalid Mash'al, the leaders of HAMAS, a Palestinian Organization
- **Language:** ARABIC
- **Document Date:** 19980629
- **Document Type:** LETTER
- **Agency:** DIA
- **Country Of Information:** IRAQ

**Translation Information**

- **Translation #:** ISSO-2003-00008237-HT-NVTC  
- **Classification:** [Redacted]  
- **Status:** FULL COMPLETED
- **Translating Agency:** NVTC

**Linked Documents**

- Translation: ISSO-2003-00008237-HT-NVTC

**Exploitation Status:** NOT AVAILABLE
**Translation Status:** NOT AVAILABLE

**Related Document Numbers**

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**Keyword Categories**

- **Names:**
  - HAMAS
  - IRAQI EMBASSY IN SUDAN

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333
This file contains: A memo from Embassy of Iraq, dated 6/29/1998 stating that Iraqi Embassy in Khartoum, Sudan informed them about Sheikh Yassin, Hamas Palestinian Leader, accompanied by Khalid Mashaal, Head of Political Hamas Movement, and Mousa Marzouq, a political member visited with senior Sudanese leaders, including President, Hassan Al-Turabi and the Foreign Minister for the period of 5/27 to 6/12/1998. The most important subjects mentioned were: It stated that Sudanese government had allocated a permanent office for Hamas in Khartoum, in addition to two agricultural plots of land as an endowment in Khartoum Province. The revenues of the agricultural land would be used to support the Palestinian people. Khartoum governor said that these investment projects would be submitted to the Arab League as an example to be replicated for supporting Hamas in all Arab and Islamic countries (June 1998). Memo was signed by Mohamad Said Al-Sahaf, Minister of Foreign Affairs, Dated 6/28/1998. Additionally, the Hamas Leader met with students, young men, and women leadership and with the Ambassador to Sudan.
The Iraqi Embassy in Khartoum has informed us in its letter no. 1/3/52, dated 6/9/1998 that Sheikh Ahmad Yasin, the spiritual guide of Hamas; the Islamic resistance movement, has visited Sudan accompanied by Khalid Mush’al, head of the political office and its member Musa Marzuk, from 5/27 to 6/12/1998, upon an invitation from Hasan al-Turabi; Secretary General of the Arab Islamic Convention. The visit included the following:

1- The movement leader met with most of the leadership, including the Sudanese president, Mr. Turabi, the vice-president and the foreign minister, and ended by meeting with some unofficial Sudanese leaderships.

2- Meetings were arranged between Sheikh Yasin, and women, students, and youth leaderships, as well as African academic institutions such as the International African University and other Scientific and Research Centers.

3- The Sheikh also met with the accredited heads of diplomatic missions in Khartoum. It is noteworthy to mention that the Sudanese government had allocated a permanent office for Hamas in Khartoum, in addition to agricultural land and country estate as an endowment in Khartoum Province. The revenue from these endowments will be used to support the Palestinian people. Khartoum governor stressed that these investment projects would be submitted to the Arab League to publicize the idea to support the movement in all the Arab and Islamic countries.
The embassy mentioned that the attention given to this visit stemmed from the following:

A. Sudan’s insistence and determination to abandon its reconciliation policy with the United States of America, as it is certain that whatever concessions it is willing to offer, it will get nothing in return.

B. Sudan’s inclusion in Sheikh Ahmad Yasin’s Arab tour carries a political dimension because Sudan is an important factor in the movement’s future, just like other Arab countries visited by the Sheikh; they are all considered countries that are capable of offering financial support.

C. Perhaps the visit symbolizes a Sudanese message to what was previously and lately said about a Sudanese-Israeli normalization of relations.

Please review. With appreciation.

Signed by
Mohammad Sa’id al-Sahhaf
Foreign Minister

Mr. Director, Presidential Bureau
Please review
With appreciation

Reviewed
7/1

Hamdan Muhammad Hassan
Director, Political Office

D. Talib
15/17
6/30 1887

(2-2)
The classification markings are original to the Iraqi documents and do not reflect current US classification.

Query returned 24 of 929552 total documents.
Displaying hit: 22

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<td><strong>English Title:</strong> Arab volunteers who arrived in the country by way of Syria, total of 646 (report date 3/28/03)</td>
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<td><strong>Document Date:</strong> 20030402</td>
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<td><strong>Inclusive Pages:</strong> 13</td>
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<td><strong>Document Type:</strong> HANDWRITTEN NOTES/NOTEBOOK, LETTER, MILITARY INVENTORY, MISCELLANEOUS LOOSE PAPERS, PERSONNEL ROSTER, POLICE REPORT</td>
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</tr>
</tbody>
</table>
This file contains correspondence regarding: GDS letters, which are secure by nature; to include letters from Mosul reporting the total Arab volunteers, who came by way of Syria a total of 646 (report date 3/28/03), it includes Jordanians, Algerians, Turks, Saudi’s, but the majority are Syrians, and with the coordination of the Ministry of Defense, who sent them to Al Sadr Hotel to stay in Baghdad, to help defend Iraq against the coalition aggressors, also letters from GDS in Erbil, informing of 10 Iraqi sheiks (page 9 and 12) and one Mosul faculty member (page 10), who signed their names for volunteering.
In the name of Allah, The Merciful, The Beneficent

Republic of Iraq
Presidential Headquarters

Department of Public Security

SECRET

Date: 2 April, 2003

The Secretary
Headquarters of the Republic

Subject: Volunteers

With reference to our letter number 190 of 29/3/2003, we wish to inform the respected headquarters of the following:

1. The total number of volunteers up to 28/3/2003 reached 646, which includes two Turks, two Saudis, three each of the following nationalities: Jordanians, Algerians, Lebanese and the rest are Syrians. They were all sent to the concerned authorities in the Ministry of Defense, as directed.

2. We noticed an accumulation of Arab volunteers who ended up being inhabited in [ineligible name] Hotel, in Baghdad. There was talk amongst them that they came here as volunteered to fight, but they were not sent to any fighting battle, in spite of their being here for a long time since their arrival in the country.

With appreciation, we remain
The Manager,
Department of Public Security
With reference to our letter addressed to the Secretary of the President Headquarters, we were informed by the Department of Public Security, [illegible word] Province that the number of volunteers, up to 28/3/2003, has reached 646, which included two Turks, two Saudis, one Algerian, one Jordanian, one Lebanese and the rest were Syrians. They were all sent to the concerned authorities in the Ministry of Defense as per directions.

With appreciation,

Manager,
Political Tracking & Coordination Dept.

Page 3 of 19

In the name of Allah, The Merciful, The Beneficent
Republic of Iraq
Presidential Headquarters

Department of Public Security
SECRET

Date: 26 March, 2003

The Secretary
Headquarters of the Republic

Subject: Volunteers

We wish to inform you that the total number of volunteers reached 104 Syrians, and two others, one Turkish and other Saudi. They will participate in the ultimate unjust battle against the American-British invasion. They were all sent to the concerned authorities in the Ministry of Defense, as directed.

With appreciation, we remain

The Manager,
Department of Public Security

Page 4 of 19

In the name of Allah, The Merciful, The Beneficent
Republic of Iraq
Department of Public Security

[The typed body of the letter is illegible]

A handwritten footnote reads as follows:
Tracking Department

To be written to the Headquarters:

We noticed an accumulation of Arab volunteers who ended up being inhabited in a Hotel, in Baghdad. There was talk amongst them that they came here as volunteers to fight, but they were not sent to any fighting battle, in spite of their being here for a long time since their arrival in the country.

General Manager

Page 5 of 19

In the name of Allah, The Merciful, The Beneficent

Department of Public Security

Internal Memorandum

| TO:       | The (respectable) General Manager |
| FROM:     | Manager of Tracking and Coordination |
| Subject:  | Volunteers |
| Date:     | 30/3/2003 |

We were informed by the Province of [illegible] of the following:
The number of volunteers that arrived at their province via Syria has reached 104 of Syrian nationality. Two of them are Turks, and a Saudi Arabian. These are volunteers to fight the ultimate war against the wicked Americans. They were sent to the proper authorities in the Ministry of Defense as per directions.

Manager of Tracking and Coordination
26/3/2003

Page 6 of 19

Duplicate of Page 5 of 19

Page 7 of 19

In the name of Allah, The Merciful, The Beneficent

Department of Public Security

Date: 29/3/2003

To The Department of Public Security

Subject: Volunteers

With reference to our letter number 255 of 28/7/2003, the total number of volunteers has reached 646. They were sent to the responsible authorities in the Ministry of Defense in accordance with the directions.

Security Manager, Province of [illegible]
29/3/2003
In the name of Allah, The Merciful, The Beneficent

Department of Public Security

SECRET

Date: 28/3/2003
To: General Manager
Department of Public Safety
Subject: Volunteers

Reference your letter 2524 of 30/3/2003, the number of volunteers, up to 28/3/2003, have reached a total of 537 which includes two Turks, two Saudi Arabians, one Algerian, one Lebanese, one Jordanian, and the rest are Syrians. We have already sent them to the responsible authorities in the Ministry of Defense as per your directions.

Signed by: Manager,
Province of [illegible]

Department of Public Security
SECRET

Date: 24 March, 2003
The Secretary
Headquarters of the Republic
Subject: Volunteers

We wish to inform you that the total number of volunteers reached 106 (One Hundred & Six). One hundred and four (104) from our brother country Syria, one Turkish and the
one Saudi. They came to participate in the ultimate unjust battle against the American-British, and the Zionist invasion. They were all sent to the concerned authorities in the Ministry of Defense, as directed.

With appreciation, we remain

The Manager, Department of Public Security
Governorate of

Page 12 of 19

In the name of Allah, The Merciful, The Beneficent

Republic of Iraq
Presidential Headquarters

Department of Public Security

SECRET

Date: 1 March, 2003

The Secretary
Headquarters of the Republic

Subject: Volunteers

We wish to inform your respected Headquarters that the following citizens came to the Department of Public Security in the Province of Arbeel and expressed their willingness to volunteer in the defense of the great Iraq and to execute any duties assigned to them:

2. Sediq Bakr Al Sawaf, a citizen from the province of Menwi
3. Sultan Tewfick Ahmed, a citizen from the province of Menwi
4. Mohamed Mohamed Shazi, Chief of the Tribe of Zarazia.
5. Hussein Goha Nakeer Al Mazouri, Head of the Tribe of Mazouria
6. Nayef Mohamoud Karim, Head of the Tribe of Belbas
7. Ghazi Beik Khoushnaw, Head of the Tribe of Khoushnaw
8. Hameed Khorshid Al Khaki, citizen of al Kalk district
9. Saad Allah Mohamed Saleh Al Herky, citizen from Nenowi province
10. Dr. Ismail Saleh Ibrahim Al Khaki, Lecturer at the University of Al Musel.
Signed by:
The Manager, Public Security
1 March 2003

Page 13 of 19         Duplicate of page 12 of 19

Page 14 of 19

In the name of Allah, The Merciful, The Beneficent
Republic of Iraq
Presidential Headquarters

Department of Public Security

SECRET

Date: 2 April, 2003

To: Governorate 151

Subject: Volunteers

We are informed by the Public Security Director of the Governorate of Arbeel that a retired First Lieutenant Adly Aly Khalf Fathy, came to their directorate and declared his willingness to volunteer for fighting the great Iraq, and expressed his wish to execute all duties assigned to him.

Signed, Manager 65
2/4/2003

Cc: Director, Arbeel Governorate
FYI with appreciation.

Page 15 of 19         Duplicate of Page 14

Page 16 of 19

In the name of Allah, The Merciful, The Beneficent

Department of Public Security

Internal Memorandum

TO: The (respectable) General Manager
FROM: Manager of Tracking and Political Coordination
Subject: Volunteers
Date: 30/3/2003

344
Greetings and appreciation:

We are informed by the Directorate of Public Security of Arbeel that since the unjust American-British aggression on our dear country, the citizens listed on the attachment came to declare volunteering to defend the great Iraq.

Manager, Tracking & Political Coordination
30/3/2003

In the name of Allah, the Beneficent, the Merciful
SECRET
Department of Public Security
GOVERNORATE OF ARBEEL

25 March 2003
To: Department of Public Security 65
Subject: PATRIOTIC POSITION

We want you to know that since the unjust American-British invasion on our dear country, many citizens came to our department and announced their volunteering to defend the great Iraq against this foreign aggression. Some of the names are:

2. Sediq Bakr Al Sawaf, a citizen from the province of Menwi
3. Sultan Tewfick Ahmed, a citizen from the province of Menwi
4. Mohamed Mohamed Shazi, Chief of the Tribe of Zarazia.
5. Hussein Goha Nakeer Al Mazouri, Head of the Tribe of Mazouria
6. Nayef Mohamoud Karim, Head of the Tribe of Belbas
7. Ghazi Beik Khoushnaw, Head of the Tribe of Khoushnaw
8. Hameed Khorshid Al Khaki, citizen of Al Kalk district
9. Saad Allah Mohamed Saleh Al Herky, citizen from Nenowi province
10. Dr. Ismail Saleh Ibrahim Al Khaki, Lecturer at the University of Al Musel.
11. Retired 1st Lieutenant Taha Aly Khalaf Fathi
Please be informed of the above. With appreciation,

Director, Public Security for [illegible]
28/3/2003
Page 19 of 19    Duplicate of page 18

END OF TRANSLATION
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**Keyword Categories**

- BIOGRAPHIC INFORMATION
- RELIGION
- NAME
- FAMILY INFORMATION
- ADDRESS
- ADMINISTRATIVE
- REGULATIONS
- EVALUATIONS
- CORRESPONDENCE
- SECURITY/INTELLIGENCE AGENCIES
- GENERAL SECURITY DIRECTORATE
- MINISTRIES
- INTERIOR

**Document Remarks**

This file contains: Iraqi General Security Directorate GSD report, about Iraqis who were deported to Iraq from Jordan, the reasons for deportations were visa violations, crossing the borders illegally and breaking Jordanian local law, (page 2-24) in 2001; GSD banned two Iraqis from traveling in 1988; a report by the Province of Anbar General Security Directorate, about the US Army attacks. This report shows that by 31 March 2003 about 2,500 foreign fighters entered Iraq through Syria (page 26); Israelis infantry troops entered Iraq through Jordan (page 27) and other details (page 26-29)
The classification markings are original to the Iraqi documents and do not reflect current US classification.

<table>
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<td><strong>Capture Information</strong></td>
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<tr>
<td><strong>Transmittal Information</strong></td>
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In the Name of Allah the Most Beneficent the Most Merciful

464
4/4
Anbar Security Directorate
#: 1783
Date: 04/31/2003
To [Intelligence [Not legible]/Section C
Subject: The daily status (position) of the enemy

Below is the daily status of the American and British aggression against our militant nation.
This is for your information, with regards

Security Brigadier General
Security Director of al-Anbar province
04/3/2003

A copy of it to:
[Not legible]
This is for your information with regards
The Syrian authorities prevented the Syrian citizens among the volunteers from entering the nation until they obtain official passports and tickets.
The number of volunteers who entered the country until today 03/31/2003 is (2500) volunteers. When these volunteers were blocked by the Syrian authorities, they organized demonstrations denouncing the American aggression in the area of Bukmal. They vilified the Arab leaders and paid tribute to President Saddam Hussein.

The Syrian Red Crescent brought considerable amount of medical assistance and food into the country and delivered them to the Iraqi Red Crescent representatives in al-Qa’im bordering complex. Among the assistance there were two ambulances.
Several Iraqi families entered the country through the Passports office in al-Qa’im. These families were in Syria for jihad purposes against the American invaders.

(1-4)
We have information according to which the Zionist entity smuggled considerable numbers of its ground forces to the country from the Jordanian borders.

As a follow up to our memo number 1771 dated 04/2/2003 paragraph (9) we would like to inform you about the following:

At 100 in 04/2/2003 the Director of the power plant talked by phone with the engineer Jabir Sulayman who lives in Hadithah in English and by orders from the invading forces who are inside the plant and asked him to show him how to operate one of the units by Diesel given the fact that all units are not operating. He also informed him that they are in good condition but the number of soldiers inside the plan determined.

At 2:00 on 4/02/2003 a commando force and Special Forces that was approximately equal to company raided the al-Qadisiyyah dam and electric power plant but they did not succeed in achieving their objective in view of the intensity of the hostile fire. The force is still in the area near the dam inside a residence for al-Qadisiyyah dam irrigation project.

At 4:00 of the same morning the helicopters of the enemy landed on the body of the dam and reinforced the existing hostile forces already there.

The intensity of the mutual firing lead to the stoppage of all power generating units. The enemy has [not legible] a portion of the water who controlled the plan. We have confirmed that the number of armored vehicles was (7) on of which was damaged.

The firing of the enemy from the planes led to the destruction of Jaysh al-Quds Army tanks and the strategic warehouse of al-Qadisiyyah dam irrigation project as well as the electric power and the destruction of the anti-aircraft resistance that belongs to the 480th brigade. Currently there is no ground resistance. Several fighters were martyred and others were injured.
6. At 100 Thursday morning on 4/1/2003 al-Quds army units that were on the second side of Rawah district were shelled by hostile helicopters which led to the martyrdom of one of the fighters and the injury of two others. We have information according to which armored carriers crossed via Rawa Bridge to al-Jazirah area. Their number is about 15. 20 armored carriers were confronted by the force that was already there with light and medium machine guns. It was costly but vain. They were not confronted with launchers since they did not have any. It was clear that the comrades did not commit to their combat partisan duties. They abandoned their posts at night and went to sleep in their barracks despite the warning of the secretary of Rawa section in that regard. No action was taken regarding this subject. At 10.00 of this day 04/02/2003 three enemy armored vehicles set a barrage on the road leading to al-‘Angharah village which is located near the district of ‘Anh. They searched the civilian vehicles and the extremities of a reservoir. They also blocked the bridge leading to the aforementioned village. On 4/2/2003 there were several armored vehicles near route 160. They stopped one of the buses and made the passengers get off them. They hit them then they left them. In the night of between 4/1 and 2/2003 an enemy armored vehicle raided the war project on route 110. The lock was broken, the employees were interrogated. They were questioned about the military force in that place. They fired shots in the air. We have learned that an armored vehicle was patrolling in the Western area near route 160 and inquire about the shepherds over there.
and about the missile bases. They were carrying with them pictures of missiles and their bases. At 11.30 of that day the enemy planes shelled the food warehouse under the control of al-Ramadi in the area of al-Ta’min. There were no casualties. On 4/2/2003 an enemy missile fell in the area of al-Bu’saf al-Ramadi Island but did not explode and there were no casualties. On 02/02/2003 four citizens were injured in the area of al-Hasi under the al-‘Amiriyyah region in Fallujah resulting from tampering with an unknown object.
Original Document Information

Document #: ODP1-2005-007411

Classification: ********

English Title: Security reports regarding and Iranian leader Ramadan Zada who did secret visits to Lebanon and Jordan and met with Hamas and al-Jihad leaders to transport mortar rounds to Palestine through Lebanon and Jordan to be used on Israeli targets

Language: ARABIC

Document Date: 20010719

Total Pages: 4

Document Type: COLLECTION, FOREIGN INTELLIGENCE REPORT

Agency: DIA

Project: ******** IRAQI FREEDOM

Country Of Information: IRAQ

Original Document

English Title: Security reports regarding and Iranian leader Ramadan Zada who did secret visits to Lebanon and Jordan and met with Hamas and al-Jihad leaders to transport mortar rounds to Palestine through Lebanon and Jordan to be used on Israeli targets

Language: ARABIC

Translation Information

Translation #: ODP1-2005-007411-HT-NVTC

Classification: ********

Status: FULL COMPLETED

Translating Agency: NVTC

Related Document Numbers

Document Number Type: ODP1-2005-007411

Keyword Categories

Keywords

BIOGRAPHIC INFORMATION; NAME; ORGANIZATION; NATIONALITY; SECURITY/INTELLIGENCE AGENCIES; IIS - IRAQI INTELLIGENCE SERVICE
ODP1-2005-007411 contains security reports regarding an Iranian leader visiting Palestine, Lebanon, and Jordan. The Iranian leader Ramadan Zada had done secret visits to Lebanon and Jordan while he met with Palestinian leaders from two organizations Hamas and Islamic al-Jihad. It contains information regarding Zada wanting to transport many mortar rounds to Jordan through Lebanon. In addition, Zada throughout his meeting with Hamas and al-Jihad leaders to organize transporting the mortars to the west bank to be used against the Israeli targets and residents. It includes reports regarding HIZBALLA (HEZBOLLAH), wants to find a way to organize its situation inside the Palestinian lands through Cadres who previously worked in Lebanon.

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This information was received from positive sources:
A high ranking Iranian Officer at the Palestine Office visited Lebanon and Jordan.

Recently, at the end of June 2001, Ramadan Izadah [ph] made a secret visit, to Lebanon and Jordan. In Lebanon he met with Palestinian leaders from both Hamas [ph] and al-Jihad al-Islami [ph] of Syria and Lebanon, who arrived to take part in the meeting.

He also met with Jihad and Hamas leaders in Jordan, and discussed the mechanism of equipping both Hamas and Jihad with heavy weapons “cannons”. The cannons are to be transported to Jordan from some of the neighboring countries, and then it would be taken into Palestinian territories.

Our information confirmed that:
Zadah [ph] could have organized the arrival of hundreds of mortar shells to Lebanon from Jordan. Lately the Jordanian authorities announced the seizure of a quantity of those shells, while a Lebanese citizen was trying to bring it on a truck to Jordan. We were informed that the truck was loaded from the Hezbollah [ph] warehouses in the Bekaa [ph] valley of Lebanon.

-Zadah [ph] un-officially entered Lebanon and Jordan many times in the recent period, as a business man. He previously attended the Iranian Products Fair in Jordan, which took place at the ‘Amman International Exposition for Cars.

During the meeting with the heads of Hamas and Jihad, Zadah [ph] attempted to arrange the arrival of these shells into the West bank. Information confirmed that some trucks loaded with these types of shells had entered Jordan. It was concealed in the secret chambers of cars loaded with Lebanon’s fruit which enter Jordan according to the Agricultural Protocol between the two countries.

-Zadah [ph] also asked the leaders who met him at the Iranian Embassy in ‘Amman to start using those shells in the West Bank territories against Israeli targets and settlements.

-Zadah [ph] urged those who met with him to send Mujahideen for training at one of the key camps in the Bekaa areas called “Jenta” camp. This training camp was opened in
1996 and can hold up to 100 trainees. It is managed by a training unit of the Iranian army believed to be from the Revolutionary Guard.

Capable cadres from Hezbollah take part in the training. Our source recognizes some of these trainers as:
1-'Abdul 'Aziz Hamiyya [ph] – Guerilla War Trainer
   A high ranking officer in the party in the Bekaa – a Lebanese citizen

(Document Page 4)

Frantic activity by Hezbollah toward cadres from Fath [ph] inside areas of the Palestinian Authority.
- Hezbollah [ph] has never hesitated in finding ways or techniques, to penetrate, and establish its presence inside the Palestinian territories, by using Fath cadres who previously served in Lebanon.
  The information confirms that:
  The party uses some Fath cadres who now work within the party, after having left Fath. Among them
  1-‘Amer ‘Ala’ Eddine [ph]
  2- Jamal Sleiman [ph]
  3- Nabil Khattab [ph]
  The party calls on these individuals to investigate and suggest some other Fath cadres which the party could call upon for establishing a military cooperation against Israel. The party utilizes the nationalistic feeling of those it contacts, and determines the possibility of having these contacts accept to perform coordination tasks in this present situation which engulfs the Palestinian people and their Intifada.
The classification markings are original to the Iraqi documents and do not reflect current US classification.
The classification markings are original to the Iraqi documents and do not reflect current US classification.

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### Keyword Categories

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<td>WAR CRIMES; EXECUTION; TERRORISM; TRAINING</td>
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Document Remarks

ISGQ-2003-00002541 This file contains the following information:  - Pages 2-6, 8, 17, 24, 31-42, 50, 53-64: Contain correspondence by Staff Major General Ayyub Mahdi Salih, the Secretary General of the Fedayeen Saddam and the Presidential Office. 'Uday Saddam Hussein, the Supervisor of the Fedayeen Saddam, in handwritten notes, grants 10 Million Iraqi Dinars on 1 Oct 2000 and an extra five Million Dinars on 2 Oct 2000, rewarding officers and members of Fedayeen Saddam Organization who performed "The Just Execution Duties". On 7 Oct 2000, Staff Brigadier General Nizar Fathi Muhammad, also, receives 100,000 Iraqi Dinars to give away for the same cause. In addition, correspondence covers terminating members from their duties and training non-Iraqi Arabs in Ba'th Training Camps. - Pages 7, 9-16, 18-23, 25-30, 49: Contain lists of Officers and Warrant Officers of the Fedayeen Saddam Organization with the amounts of Dinars they received for executing the Special Duty. The lists of the Officers include Major Generals and Brigadier Generals. The Officers in Charge of the Forces that imprisoned the Brokers and Middlemen and the Interrogators, also, received bonus. A Committee headed by Staff Major General Ayyub Mahdi Salih set a point system for the bonus grants. - Pages 43-48, 52: Contain correspondence, dated 2000, from Fedayeen Saddam Organization with the Ministry of Industry, Baghdad Company for Soda Drinks, the Ministry of Trade, the MIC and the Ministry of Transportation requesting the release of Fedayeen from these entities to perform the Fedayeen duty. Lists of 18 Special Fedayeen Group is exempted from any other duties. - Pages 65-79: Contain correspondence, dated 1998-2000, between the Presidential Office and the Secretary General of the Fedayeen Saddam regarding the curriculum of training the Arab volunteers from Egypt, Palestine, Jordan, the Gulf and Syria sacrificing for the cause including lists of their names.

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</table>
By the Name of God, Most Merciful Most Compassionate

Reference/13/
Date: Oct 2000

To: Fedayeen Saddam Secretariat
Subject: Honoring

Mr. Supervisor of the Fedayeen Saddam has ordered to issue five million (5,000,000) Iraqi Dinars as rewards for personnel in charge of collecting munitions.

To review please and do the necessary… with appreciation.

Staff Major General
Fedayeen Saddam Secretary
2 Oct 2000
Page 3
By the Name of God, Most Merciful Most Compassionate

Republic of Iraq
Presidency of the Republic
Fedayeen Saddam Security Commission
Reference /1/25/3782
Date: 7 Oct 2000

Top Secret

To: Fedayeen Saddam Al-Ayubi Command/Security
Subject: Confirmation

According to the order of the General Secretary of Fedayeen Saddam, we confirm giving Staff Brigadier General Nizar Fathi Muhammad, one hundred thousand (100,000) Iraqi Dinars as per administrative requirements for the Fair Punishment Duty.

To review please and inform us...with appreciation.

[Signature]
Staff Brigadier General
Senior Staff Officer of Fedayeen Saddam Security Commission
7 Oct 2000

A copy to
Fedayeen Saddam Secretariat/please review...with appreciation
Fedayeen Saddam Basrah Force/Security - for the same reason, Major 'Abd-al-Rahim Juwad Kazim received 75,000 Iraqi Dinars, please do the necessary and inform us.
Fedayeen Saddam Misan Force/Security - for the same reason, as Staff Colonel Muhammad 'Umar Muhammad Sa'id received 75,000 Iraqi Dinars, please do the necessary and inform us.
Fedayeen Saddam Al-Muthanna Force - for the same reason, Captain Ya'qub 'Ab'ub 'Abd-al-'Aziz received 75,000 Iraqi Dinars, please do the necessary and inform us.

(1 – 1)

Top Secret

Page 4
By the Name of God, Most Merciful Most Compassionate
To: Head Staff/Accounting  
Subject: Honoring

According to our letter number 3769, on 1 Oct 2000  
Mr. Supervisor of Fedayeen Saddam has ordered to issue five million 5,000,000 Iraqi Dinars as rewards for individuals who followed and implemented the orders, which were carried out against all immoral people.

Signed by:

Staff Major General  
Ayub Mahdi Salih  
Fedayeen Saddam General Secretariat  
2 Oct 2000

A copy to  
Fedayeen Saddam Secretariat/please review...with appreciation  
Staff Major General Makki Mustafa Humudat/ please review...with appreciation

(1 – 1)
Reference /13/2139
Date: 1 Oct 2000

To: Head Staff
Subject: Honoring

Mr. Supervisor of Fedayeen Saddam has ordered to issue five million 5,000,000 Iraqi Dinars as rewards individuals who followed and implemented the orders that were carried out against all immoral people.

Signed by:

Staff Major General
Makki Mustafa Humudat
1 Oct 2000
By the Name of God, Most Merciful Most Compassionate

Major General Makki

An amount of five million Dinars to be added to the ten million Dinars, to reward the people who were responsible for implementing orders being carried out against immoral people.

1/10/00

Page 7

A list of officers who are assigned to perform duty by the supervisor:

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>No.</th>
<th>Name</th>
<th>Award Amount</th>
<th>I.D</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>1-</td>
<td>Major General Ayyub Mahdi Salih</td>
<td>500,000</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>2-</td>
<td>Major General Wisam 'Abd Alhafiz Ahmad</td>
<td>400,000</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>3-</td>
<td>Major General Hasan Hamad Thawi</td>
<td>300,000</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>4-</td>
<td>Staff Brigadier General Salah 'Abd Al-Sattar</td>
<td>300,000</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>Ahmad</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>5-</td>
<td>Staff Brigadier General Jamal Bakr Hasan</td>
<td>250,000</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>6-</td>
<td>Staff Colonel Muhsin 'Abd Al-Karim Mahmud</td>
<td>200,000</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>7-</td>
<td>Staff Colonel Ahmad Saddaq Battah</td>
<td>200,000</td>
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<tr>
<td>8-</td>
<td>Staff Colonel Muhammad Fahad Salih</td>
<td>200,000</td>
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<tr>
<td>9-</td>
<td>Major Yusif Husayn Muslih</td>
<td>150,000</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>10-</td>
<td>Major Muhammad Hasan Hurayyiz</td>
<td>150,000</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>11-</td>
<td>Captain Ibrahim Ahmad 'Abdullah</td>
<td>150,000</td>
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</table>
To: Head Staff/Accountings  
Subject: Amount Delivery Order  

Mr. Supervisor of Fedayeen Saddam has ordered to reward officers and Fedayeen who were responsible for doing their duties with ten million Iraqi Dinars. Attached is a list of their names. The money will be issued from the combat force allowances.

Please review and do the necessary about paying the amount...with appreciation.

Attached  
Six lists  

Signed by:  

Staff Major General  
Ayyub Mahdi Salih  
Fedayeen Saddam General Secretary  
1 Oct 2000  

A copy to  
Staff Major General Makki Mustafa Humudat/ please review...with appreciation  

(1 - 1)
7. Al-Najaf Force

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<td>Lieutenant Colonel Marwan Talib Khalaf</td>
<td>5</td>
<td>35,750</td>
</tr>
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<td>Major Ahmad Hasan Shawqi</td>
<td>//</td>
<td>//</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>3</td>
<td>Major Husayn 'Ali' Abbas</td>
<td>//</td>
<td>//</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>4</td>
<td>Major 'Abd Al-Rahman Hashim 'Abd Al-Rahman</td>
<td>//</td>
<td>//</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>5</td>
<td>Major Fa'iz Husayn Jasim</td>
<td>//</td>
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</tr>
<tr>
<td>6</td>
<td>Captain Salah Zabin Najim</td>
<td>//</td>
<td>//</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>7</td>
<td>First Lieutenant Hammad 'Abdullah Ahmad</td>
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8. Al-Qadisyyah Force

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<td>Major Ghalib Namus Nasir</td>
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<td>Major 'Ali Jasim Musa</td>
<td>//</td>
<td>//</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>3</td>
<td>Major First Lieutenant Muwaffaq 'Abd Al-'Abbas</td>
<td>//</td>
<td>//</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

9. Al-Muthanna Force

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>No.</th>
<th>Name</th>
<th>Points</th>
<th>Award Amount</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>1</td>
<td>Major 'Ali Ahmad Kan'an</td>
<td>5</td>
<td>35,750</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>2</td>
<td>Major Sa'ad Khalifah 'Awayyid</td>
<td>//</td>
<td>//</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>3</td>
<td>Major 'Abd Al-Rahman Mahdi Salih</td>
<td>//</td>
<td>//</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>4</td>
<td>Major Ahmad Fakhri Za'al</td>
<td>//</td>
<td>//</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>5</td>
<td>Captain Ya'qub 'Ayyub 'Abd Al-'Aziz</td>
<td>//</td>
<td>//</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>6</td>
<td>First Lieutenant 'Ala' Hindi Salih</td>
<td>//</td>
<td>//</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>7</td>
<td>First Lieutenant Karim 'Abbud Jabir</td>
<td>//</td>
<td>//</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>
**Page 10**

A list of officers who are assigned to perform duty by the supervisor

1. **Baghdad/Rusafa**

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>No.</th>
<th>Name</th>
<th>Points</th>
<th>Award Amount</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>1</td>
<td>Major Haytham Tariq Husayn</td>
<td>5</td>
<td>35,750</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>2</td>
<td>Captain Ziyad Qahtan Rashid</td>
<td>//</td>
<td>//</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>3</td>
<td>First Lieutenant Safi Tahir</td>
<td>//</td>
<td>//</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>4</td>
<td>Aswan 'Ali Salman</td>
<td>//</td>
<td>//</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

2. **Baghdad/ Al-Karik**

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>No.</th>
<th>Name</th>
<th>Points</th>
<th>Award Amount</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>1</td>
<td>Lieutenant Colonel 'Imad Anwar Dawud</td>
<td>5</td>
<td>35,750</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>2</td>
<td>Major Hisham Muhammad 'Abd Al-Hamid</td>
<td>//</td>
<td>//</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>3</td>
<td>Major Khalid Hasan Thahi</td>
<td>//</td>
<td>//</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>4</td>
<td>Captain Sabah Nizar 'Alwan</td>
<td>//</td>
<td>//</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>5</td>
<td>First Lieutenant 'Ali Nazim Saddam</td>
<td>//</td>
<td>//</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>6</td>
<td>Major Muhsin Thallaj Farhan</td>
<td>//</td>
<td>//</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>7</td>
<td>First Lieutenant Tahir Hasan Salim</td>
<td>//</td>
<td>//</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

3. **Security Commission**

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>No.</th>
<th>Name</th>
<th>Points</th>
<th>Award Amount</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>1</td>
<td>Major Qasim Shannan Jabbar</td>
<td>5</td>
<td>35,750</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>2</td>
<td>Major 'Amir Juwad Kazim</td>
<td>//</td>
<td>//</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>3</td>
<td>Major Layth 'Abdullah Jasim</td>
<td>//</td>
<td>//</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>4</td>
<td>Major Muwaffaq Muhammad Hasan</td>
<td>//</td>
<td>//</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>5</td>
<td>Captain Ziyad Khalifah Jassam</td>
<td>//</td>
<td>//</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>6</td>
<td>First Lieutenant 'Ali Taha Muhammad</td>
<td>//</td>
<td>//</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

*(1-4)*

**Page 11**

4. **Diyala Force**

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>No.</th>
<th>Name</th>
<th>Points</th>
<th>Award Amount</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>1</td>
<td>Major 'Aqid Yusif 'Ali</td>
<td>5</td>
<td>35,750</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>2</td>
<td>Major Muhammad Khalil Falih</td>
<td>//</td>
<td>//</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>3</td>
<td>Captain Layth Musrib Dahham</td>
<td>//</td>
<td>//</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

5. **Babil Force**

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>No.</th>
<th>Name</th>
<th>Points</th>
<th>Award Amount</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>1</td>
<td>Colonel La'iq Mish'al Qadduri</td>
<td>5</td>
<td>35,750</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>
The classification markings are original to the Iraqi documents and do not reflect current US classification.

### 6. Karbala' Force

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>No.</th>
<th>Name</th>
<th>Points</th>
<th>Award Amount</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>1</td>
<td>Lieutenant Colonel Majid 'Id Khashim</td>
<td>5</td>
<td>35,750</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>2</td>
<td>Major Muhammad Wasan Humaydi</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>3</td>
<td>Captain 'Abd Al-Hafiz Khidir 'Abdullah</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>4</td>
<td>Captain Husayn Mahmud 'Abdullah</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>5</td>
<td>Captain 'Adnan Yusif 'Awwad</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>6</td>
<td>Lieutenant Husayn Thahab Ghazwan</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

### 10. Maysan Force

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>No.</th>
<th>Name</th>
<th>Points</th>
<th>Award Amount</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>1</td>
<td>Major Qaydar Taha 'Abid</td>
<td>5</td>
<td>35,750</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>2</td>
<td>Major Jamal Hatim 'Ubayd</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

### 11. Basrah Force

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>No.</th>
<th>Name</th>
<th>Points</th>
<th>Award Amount</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>1</td>
<td>Staff Major Zaydan Salih Yasin</td>
<td>5</td>
<td>35,750</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>2</td>
<td>Major Khalid Hashim Muhammad</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>3</td>
<td>Major 'Abd Al-Rahim Juwad Kazim</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>4</td>
<td>Major Salah Mutaliq Falih</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>5</td>
<td>Major Kazim Husayn 'Ali</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

### 12. Al-Ayubi Force

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>No.</th>
<th>Name</th>
<th>Points</th>
<th>Award Amount</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>1</td>
<td>Staff Brigadier General Nazar Fathi Muhammad</td>
<td>5</td>
<td>35,750</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>2</td>
<td>Staff Lieutenant Colonel 'Ajami Yunis Khalaf</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>
The names of the Fedayeen who performed the right act:

1- The Fedayeen who performed the beheadings:

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Name</th>
<th>Award Amount</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>1) Al-Fida'i Sa'ad 'Izziddin 'Arif</td>
<td>150,000</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>2) Al-Fida'i 'Abd Al-Wahhab Husayn</td>
<td>//</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>3) Al-Fida'i Hilmi Qasim</td>
<td>//</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>4) Al-Fida'i Rashid 'Abbas</td>
<td>//</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>5) Al-Fida'i Walid Mitlaq</td>
<td>//</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>6) Al-Fida'i Husayn Rashid Baqir</td>
<td>//</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>7) Al-Fida'i Sa'ad Khalil</td>
<td>//</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>8) Al-Fida'i Nuri Husayn Thajil</td>
<td>//</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>9) Al-Fida'i Hasan Kazim Jamil</td>
<td>//</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>10) Al-Fida'i Captain Khalid 'Ulaywi</td>
<td>//</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>11) Al-Fida' Sattar 'Abd Al-Hasan Furayh</td>
<td>//</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

2- The names of the Fedayeen who held the heads and transferred the corpse:

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Name</th>
<th>Award Amount</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>1) Al-Fida'i Safa' Na'im</td>
<td>100,000</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>2) Al-Fida'i 'Ali 'Abd Al-Sahib</td>
<td>//</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>3) Al-Fida'i Muhammad Hilu</td>
<td>//</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>4) Al-Fida'i Marwan 'Ali Jabir</td>
<td>//</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>5) Al-Fida'i Ahmad Yusif</td>
<td>//</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

3- The names of the Fedayeen who performed filming the task

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Name</th>
<th>Award Amount</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>1) Al-Fida'i Khalid Kazim Fahad</td>
<td>50,000</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

Page 14

A list of officers’ names who provided the special administrative requirements for the special mission:

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>No.</th>
<th>Name</th>
<th>Points</th>
<th>Award Amount</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

12
<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>No.</th>
<th>Name</th>
<th>Points</th>
<th>Award Amount</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>1</td>
<td>Staff Major General Juwad Kazim</td>
<td>3</td>
<td>21,250</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>Hammadi</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>2</td>
<td>Staff Brigadier General Sa'di 'Abd Al-Razzag</td>
<td>//</td>
<td>//</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>3</td>
<td>Staff Brigadier General Nizar Fathi Muhammad</td>
<td>//</td>
<td>//</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>4</td>
<td>Staff Brigadier General Thamir Kamil Tawfiq</td>
<td>//</td>
<td>//</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>5</td>
<td>Staff Brigadier General Ibrahim Dhiyab Khalaf</td>
<td>//</td>
<td>//</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>6</td>
<td>Staff Brigadier General Ra'ad 'Abd Mahdi</td>
<td>//</td>
<td>//</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

Page 15

A list of officers' names who participated in the investigation

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>No.</th>
<th>Name</th>
<th>Points</th>
<th>Award Amount</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>1</td>
<td>Staff Major General Juwad Kazim</td>
<td>3</td>
<td>21,250</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>Hammadi</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>2</td>
<td>Staff Brigadier General Sa'di 'Abd Al-Razzag</td>
<td>//</td>
<td>//</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>3</td>
<td>Staff Brigadier General Nizar Fathi Muhammad</td>
<td>//</td>
<td>//</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>4</td>
<td>Staff Brigadier General Thamir Kamil Tawfiq</td>
<td>//</td>
<td>//</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>5</td>
<td>Staff Brigadier General Ibrahim Dhiyab Khalaf</td>
<td>//</td>
<td>//</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>6</td>
<td>Staff Brigadier General Ra'ad 'Abd Mahdi</td>
<td>//</td>
<td>//</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>
The classification markings are original to the Iraqi documents and do not reflect current US classification.

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>No</th>
<th>Name</th>
<th>Points</th>
<th>Amount</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>7</td>
<td>Staff Brigadier General Thamir 'Abd Al-Karim</td>
<td>//</td>
<td>//</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>8</td>
<td>Staff Colonel Ahmad Radi Faraj</td>
<td>//</td>
<td>//</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>9</td>
<td>Staff Colonel Akram Hashim Radi</td>
<td>//</td>
<td>//</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>10</td>
<td>Staff Colonel Salman Hamid Tahir</td>
<td>//</td>
<td>//</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>11</td>
<td>Staff Colonel Thamir Ramadan</td>
<td>//</td>
<td>//</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>12</td>
<td>Staff Colonel Muhammad 'Umar Muhammad</td>
<td>//</td>
<td>//</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>13</td>
<td>Staff Colonel Sabah Ahmad Hammadi</td>
<td>//</td>
<td>//</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>14</td>
<td>Staff Colonel Qusay Wa'dallah</td>
<td>//</td>
<td>//</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

**Page 16**

The Fedayeen and Warrant Officers who participated in the mission:

1- Members of the General Secretariat and Public Relations:

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>No</th>
<th>Name</th>
<th>Points</th>
<th>Amount</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>1</td>
<td>Arkan 'Abd Al-Razzaq Jassam</td>
<td>2</td>
<td>14,500</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>2</td>
<td>'Awad Jarallah Mushari</td>
<td>2</td>
<td>14,500</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>3</td>
<td>'Ali Shnaw Kazim</td>
<td>2</td>
<td>14,500</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>4</td>
<td>Rasim Hasan Muhammad</td>
<td>2</td>
<td>14,500</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>5</td>
<td>Ziyad Tariq Juwad</td>
<td>2</td>
<td>14,500</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>6</td>
<td>Malik Kazim Hasan</td>
<td>2</td>
<td>14,500</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>7</td>
<td>Radi Hasan Miqt'a</td>
<td>2</td>
<td>14,500</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>8</td>
<td>Ahmad Hatim Ibrahim</td>
<td>2</td>
<td>14,500</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>9</td>
<td>Miqdam Jabir Ibrahim</td>
<td>2</td>
<td>14,500</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>10</td>
<td>Ahmad Ja'far Salih</td>
<td>2</td>
<td>14,500</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>11</td>
<td>Ra'id 'Abd Al-Razzaq</td>
<td>2</td>
<td>14,500</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

2- Members of the Command Forces in all the Governorates:

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>No</th>
<th>Name</th>
<th>Points</th>
<th>Amount</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>1</td>
<td>90 Warrant Officers and lower ranks</td>
<td>1</td>
<td>7,150</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>2</td>
<td>153 Fedayeen members</td>
<td>1</td>
<td>7,150</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>
Reference / 
Date /Oct/2000

Decision

Fedayeen Saddam Supervisor
/10/2000

Mr. Supervisor of Fedayeen Saddam
Greetings and Appreciation

Subject: Names of the Participants in the Special Duty

According to your orders about forming a committee to distribute the five million (5,000,000) Iraqi Dinars to the officers and Fedayeen who carried out the special duty, we would like to clarify the following:

1. The committee was formed according to Secretariat letter number 3768, on 1 Oct 2000 (Slip A).
2. The money was paid to the following categories:
   A. List of commanders' names that participated in "Arresting Operations" (Appendix A)
   B. List of officers' names that participated in "Investigation Process" (Appendix B)
   C. List of officers' names contributed in preparing the administrative requirements (Appendix C)
   D. Fedayeen, warrant officers and officers that participated in the special duty (Appendix D)

Please review.....with appreciation

Signed by:

Staff Colonel
Qutaybah Sa'id Hamu

Staff Brigadier General
Salah 'Abd-al-Sattar Ahmad

Staff Major General
Ayyub Mahdi Salih
Reference //
Date /Sep/2000

Decision

Supervisor of Fedayeen Saddam
/Sep/2000

Mr. Supervisor of Fedayeen Saddam
Greetings and Appreciation

Subject: Participants' names involved in implementing the special duty
According to the orders of his Excellency, below are names lists of individuals participated in doing the special duty, as follows:

1. The name of officers assigned with duties by Mr. Supervisor (Appendix A).
2. The name of commanders who participated in "Arresting Operations" (Appendix B)
3. The name of Fedayeen who implemented the fair judgment (Appendix C)
4. The name of officers who participated in the "Investigation Process" (Appendix D)
5. The name of officers who contributed in preparing the administrative requirements (Appendix E)
6. The name of Fedayeen, officers and soldiers who participated in the special duty assignment in all governorates (Annex F)

Please review...with appreciation.

Signed by:

Staff Major General
Ayyub Mahdi Salih
General Secretary
30 Sep 2000
By the Name of God, Most Merciful Most Compassionate

Republic of Iraq  
Presidency of the Republic  
(Fedayeen Saddam)  
Secretariat

Reference / 13/  
Date /Oct/2000

To: Military Industrialization Commission  
Subject: Order

Mr. Supervisor of Fedayeen Saddam has ordered to terminate the Fedayee Sa'd 'Iz-al-Din 'Arif, who is an employee in Al-Yarmuk General Company from Fedayee work.

To review please and inform the above-mentioned company...with appreciation

Staff Major General  
Secretary of Fedayeen Saddam  
18 Oct 2000
By the Name of God, Most Merciful, Most Compassionate

Fedayeen Saddam Secretariat
Headquarters
Al-Qari'ah Fedayee Force
(Supplies and Administration)

Reference /3/3/2/254
Date: 1 Feb 2001

To: Babil Fedayeen Saddam Force
Subject: Transfer of a Suicidal Fedayee

In reference to Fedayeen Saddam Secretariat letter, number 114, on 16 Jan 2001, we are sending you the suicidal Fedayee (Muhammad Hassuni Kazim Radi) with his termination letter, according to the Second Section order, dated 3 Feb 2001.

Please review and inform us...with appreciation

Signed by:

Special Forces Staff Lt. Colonel
Mahmud Ibrahim Mahmud
Commander of Al-Qari'ah Fedayee Force
1 Feb 2001

A copy to
Fedayeen Saddam Secretariat/your above letter please be informed...with appreciation
Fedayeen Saddam Head Staff – Administration/ please be informed...with appreciation
Umm Al-Ma'arik/2 Military Division Command/ please be informed...with appreciation
Force Security Officer/please, be informed and mark it
First Company/to acknowledge the mentioned Fedayee
Page 33

Fedayeen Saddam Secretariat
Headquarters
Al-Qari'ah Fedayee Force
(Supplies and Administration)
Reference /3/3/2/254
Date: 1 Feb 2001

To: Misan Fedayeen Saddam Force
Subject: Returning Suicidal Fedayeen

In reference to Fedayeen Saddam Secretariat letter, number 114, on 16 Jan 2001, we are sending you the suicidal Fedayeen who were terminated. Their termination letters were issued according to the Second Section orders, dated 3 Feb 2001.

1. Suicidal Fedayee Husayn Rashid Baqir
2. Suicidal Fedayee Safa' Na'im 'Aziz

Please review and inform us...with appreciation

Signed by:
Special Forces Staff Lt. Colonel
Mahmud Ibrahim Mahmud
Commander of Al-Qari'ah Fedayee Force
1 Feb 2001

A copy to
Fedayeen Saddam Secretariat/your above letter please review...with appreciation
Fedayeen Saddam Head Staff – Administration/ please review...with appreciation
Umm Al-Ma’arik/2nd Military Division Command/ please review...with appreciation
Force Security Officer/ please review
Administrative Officer/ please review
3rd Company/
Fedayeen Saddam Secretariat
Headquarters
Al-Qari'ah Fedayee Force
(Supplies and Administration)
Reference 3/3/2/254
Date: 31 Jan 2001

To: Al-Basrah Fedayeen Saddam Force
Subject: Returning Suicidal Fedayeen

In reference to Fedayeen Saddam Secretariat letter, number 114, on 16 Jan 2001, we are sending you the list of the suicidal Fedayeens’. Their termination letters were issued according to the Second Section orders 2 Feb 2001.

1. Suicidal Fedayee Hasan Kazim Jamil
2. Suicidal Fedayee Hilmi Qasim (Illegible)

Please review and inform us when they join you…with appreciation

Signed by:

Special Forces Staff Lt. Colonel
Mahmud Ibrahim Mahmud
Commander of Al-Qari'ah Fedayee Force
31 Jan 2001

A copy to
Fedayeen Saddam Secretariat/your above letter please be informed…with appreciation
Fedayeen Saddam Head Staff – Administration/ please be informed…with appreciation
Baghdad Al-Karkh Fedayeen Saddam Force/ the above-mentioned letter
Umm Al-Ma’arik/2nd Military Division Command/ please be informed…with appreciation
Force Security Officer/ please review
Administrative Officer/please review
Third Company/
Page 35

Fedayeen Saddam Secretariat
Headquarters
Al-Qari'ah Fedayee Force
(Supplies and Administration)
Reference /3/3/2/180
Date: 24 Jan 2001

To: Al-Rasafah Fedayeen Saddam Force
Subject: Returning Suicidal Fedayee

In reference to Fedayeen Saddam Secretariat letter, number 114, on 16 Jan 2001, we are sending you the suicidal Fedayee Rashid 'Abbas Mash'an. His termination letter was issued according to the Second Section orders, dated 29 Jan 2001.

Please review and inform us...with appreciation

Signed by:

Special Forces Staff Lt. Colonel
Mahmud Ibrahim Mahmud
Commander of Al-Qari'ah Fedayee Force
24 Jan 2001

A copy to
Fedayeen Saddam Secretariat/your above letter please be informed...with appreciation
Fedayeen Saddam Head Staff – Administration/ please be informed...with appreciation
Umm Al-Ma'arik/2nd Military Division Command/ please be informed...with appreciation
Force Security Officer/please...review
First Company/
Fedayeen Saddam Secretariat
Headquarters
Al-Qari'ah Fedayee Force
(Supplies and Administration)
Reference /3/2/1820
Date: 24 Jan 2001

To: Baghdad Al-Karkh Fedayeen Saddam Force
Subject: Returning Suicidal Fedayee

In reference to Fedayeen Saddam Secretariat letter, number 114, on 16 Jan 2001, we are sending you the suicidal Fedayee 'Ali 'Abd-al-Sahib Kazim Al-'Azzawi. His termination letter was issued according to the Second Section orders, dated 25 Jan 2001.

Please review and inform us...with appreciation

Signed by:

Special Forces Staff Lt. Colonel
Mahmud Ibrahim Mahmud
Commander of Al-Qari'ah Fedayee Force
24 Jan 2001

A copy to
Fedayeen Saddam Secretariat/your above letter, please be informed...with appreciation
Fedayeen Saddam Head Staff – Administration/ please be informed...with appreciation
Umm Al-Ma'arik/2 Military Division Command/ please be informed...with appreciation
Force Security Officer/please be informed
First Company/
Reference / 13/114
Date 16 Jan 2001

To: Al-Qari'ah Force

Subject: Group (18)

In reference to your letter, number 83, on 11 Jan 2001.

1. The Fedayeen (who were mentioned before) are treated as any suicidal Fedayeen in Al-Qari'ah Force regarding the administrative and training fields. They cannot be sent back to their units unless they submit a request to be dismissed from Al-Qari'ah Force.

2. There are no nicknames for the special members in the Fedayee work except Al-Qari'ah Force.

This instruction must be followed.

Please review and do the necessary... with appreciation

Signed by:

Staff Major General
Ayyub Mahdi Salih
Fedayeen Saddam General Secretariat
16 Jan 2000

(1 - 1)
Page 38

Fedayeen Saddam Secretariat
Headquarters
Al-Qari'ah Fedayee Force
(Supplies and Administration)
Reference /3/3/2/83
Date: 11 Jan 2001

To: Fedayeen Saddam Secretariat
Subject: Group (18)

Please provide us with a formal copy of your letter number 2641, on 18 Dec 2000, so we can take the required procedures about returning the Fedayeen from Group 18 to their units.

Signed by:
Special Forces Staff Lt. Colonel
Mahmud Ibrahim Mahmud
Commander of Al-Qari'ah Fedayee Force
11 Jan 2001

Attached is a copy of the letter

1. They are treated as all of the Fedayeen in Al-Qari'ah, regarding the administrative and training fields, the Fedayeen are not sent back to their units unless they submit a request to be dismissed from Al-Qari'ah Force.

2. There are no nicknames for the special members in the Fedayee work except Al-Qari'ah Force, and this instruction is to be followed.
Page 39

By the Name of God, Most Merciful Most Compassionate

33

Notification 13
9 Jan 2001

To: Head Staff – Operations

According to our notification, no. 1708, on 31 May 2000
Enclose is a copy of the Military Industrialization Commission letter, number 4715,
on 26 Jan 2000.

Please review and do the necessary…with appreciation

Attached
(1) A copy of letter

__________________________
Staff Major General
Fedayeen Saddam General Secretary
9 Jan 2001
Page 40

By the Name of God, Most Merciful, Most Compassionate

Republic of Iraq
Presidency of the Republic
Military Industrialization Commission

Reference 6/3/4715
Date: 26 Dec 2000

(Order)

According to our order, number 1863, on 27 May 2000. The below listed individuals are no longer involved in the Fedayee work/Fedayeen Saddam formations.

1. Ahmad Yusif Shalash / Al-Fida' General Company
2. Marwan 'Ali Jabir Hasan Al-'Umar / Al-Qa'qa' General Company

Signed by:
Jabriyyah 'Ilaywi Yasin
On behalf of /Military Industerlization Minister
25 Dec 2000

General Manager review please

A copy to/
Presidency of the Republic /Fedayeen Saddam /in reference to your letter, number 3641, on 18 Dec 2000, please review…with appreciation

Al-Fida' General Company…To do the necessary…with appreciation
Al-Qa'qa' General Company

Personnel Affairs /with the priorities

Yanha 24/12

Inform 19/1
By the Name of God, Most Merciful, Most Compassionate

Reference / 13/2642
Date 18 Jan 2001

To: Military Industrialization Commission/Financial and Administration Directorate

Subject: Order

Mr. Supervisor of Fedayeen Saddam has ordered to terminate the Fedayee Sa'd 'Iz-al-Din 'Arif, who is an employee in Al-Yarmuk General Company from Fedayee operations.

Please review and inform the above-mentioned company...with appreciation

[Signature]
Staff Major General
Fedayeen Saddam General Secretary
18 Oct 2000

A copy to
Fedayeen Saddam Military Division Command/please review...with appreciation

(1 – 1)
By the Name of God, Most Merciful Most Compassionate

Reference / 13/2641
Date 18 Jan 2001

To: Ministry of Industry and Minerals/Minister's Office
   Subject: Termination

In reference to your letter no. 15728, on 28 May 2000 and our letter number 831, on 21 May 2000.
Please review and dismiss the Fedayee Rashid 'Abbas Mash'an, an employee in the Baghdad Soda Drinks Company...with appreciation

Staff Major General
Fedayeen Saddam General Secretary
18 Oct 2000

A copy to
Ministry of Commerce - Minister's Office/your letter, number 14821, on 22 May 2000, and according to our above-mentioned letter for the same purpose regarding the Fedayee Nuri Husayn Thajil – employee at Grains Trading Company...with appreciation

Ministry of Transportation and Communication/your letter, no. 7925, on 22 May 2000, and according to our above-mentioned letter for the same purpose regarding Fedayee Husayn Karim Sakhi Faris – employee in the Railroads General Company...with appreciation

Military Industrialization Commission/your letter, number 1863, on 27 May 2000, and according to our above – mentioned letter for the same purpose regarding the listed below Fedayeen:
1. Fedayee Ahmad Yusif Muhammad Shalash – Al-Fida' General Company
2. Fedayee Marwan 'Ali Jabir Hasan Al-'Umar – Al-Qa'qa' General Company
...with appreciation

(1 – 1)
Reference /13/735
Date 5 May 2000

To: Head Staff
Subject: Order

On May 4 2000 the respected Mr. Supervisor has issued an order in regard to the
Fedayeen whose names are contained in the attached list:

1. The above referenced Fedayeen are transferred to the Special Missions
   Company and assigned to the headquarters which is located at Al-
   Qubbah Al-Falakiyyah.
   (TC: Al-Qubbah Al-Falakiyyah = Astronomic Dome)
2. The Fedayeen are not to be assigned any duty without the Respected
   Supervisor's approval.

Please review and do the necessary to implement his Excellency order, and provide us
with the Fedayeen units' address, in order for them only to perform Fedayee duties
...with appreciation.

Signed by
Staff Major General
Ayyub Mahdi Salih
Fedayeen Saddam General Secretary
5 May 2000

5 May

A copy to:
Mr. Respected Supervisor / please review Sir...with appreciation.
Public Relations Commission / please review and for the same above purpose...with
appreciation.
Security Commission /

Attachment
List (1)
Page 52
In the Name of God the Compassionate the Merciful

H/E the Supervisor of Fedayeen Saddam
Subject: Exclusion
Greetings,
Attached herewith a group of (18) names to be excluded from their jobs and be available for Fedayeen and special missions which is assigned directly by you.

Regards,

1- Sa'ad 'Izziddin 'Arif Muhammad Al-Alusi
2- Nuri Husayn Thajil Musawil
3- Rashid 'Abbas Nash' an Shuwayt
4- 'Abd Al-Wahhab Husayn 'Alwan Husayn
5- Walid Mitlaq Khlayf Kazim
6- Marwan 'Ali Jabir Hasan Al-'Umar
7- Sattar 'Abd Al-Husayn Faraj 'Abd Al-'Abbas
8- Sa'ad Khalil Ibrahim Jasim
9- Safa' Na'im 'Aziz Nashmi
10- Hasan Rashid Baqir Hassun
11-Muhammad Hassuni Kazim Radi
12-Hilmi Qasim Ahmad Salman
13-Husayn Kazim Jamil Fayiz
14-'Abd Al-Nasir Muslih 'Ayid
15-Ahmad Yusif Muhammad Shalash
16-Husayn Karim Sakhi Faris
17-'Ali 'Abd Al-Sahib Kazim 'Asal
18-Muhammad Hilu 'Alwan Mansur

Signed Faris Jum'ah Hassan (TC: Handwritten note ‘Brigadier Ayub: Take the necessary steps immediately’ Uday May 4)

Supervisor of Group 18

Note has been written as:
1- To instruct me secretly to assign and guide them to their locations to the Special Brigade.
2- Excluded from their work and they shall be available for Fedayeen missions.
3- They should not be assigned or ordered to perform any duties without orders from H/E the Supervisor.
4- A copy shall be sent to H/E the Supervisor.
Ref. no /5/2/
Date Aug 2000

To Staff Head – Administration

Subject/ Volunteer

With reference to your letter, # 8963 dated 11 Aug 2000. The journalist's name is Nazirah Nadim Jamil
Kindly, review and take the necessarily procedures ...with regards.

Staff Major General
General Secretary of the Fedayeen Saddam
12 Aug 2000
Ref. no /5/2/1619

Resolution
To be send to Secretariat of the Country as per Saddam's order on (the Arabs)

Fadayeen Saddam in Charge
19 Nov 2000

Mr. Fidayeen Saddam in Charge

Dear Sir

Subject/Volunteer
Here is the Top-Secret letter from the Office of the Secretariat of the Country, # 35327 dated 11 Nov 2000 and accompanied with an Arab citizen's (Taysir Ibrahim Husayn) request in which he desires to be a volunteer in Fidayeen work for defending Iraq and Palestine.
Kindly, review...with regards.

Staff Major General
Ayyub Mahdi Salih
General Secretary  
18 Nov 2000  

Arab Ba'th Socialist Party  
Office of the Secretariat of the Country  

Top Secret  

To / Presidency of Republic / Fedayeen Saddam Secretariat  
Subject / Volunteer  
We attach the following Arab citizen' photos (Taysir Ibrahim Husayn) to the letter of Al-Hamzah Branch Command (Sayyid Al-Shuhada'), # 36/8761 dated 27 Sept 2000.  
Kindly, review and inform us...regards.  

Comrade  
'Adnan Dawud Salman  
General Director of the Secretariat of the Country  
11 Nov 2000  

To be presented to the in Charge  
18 Nov
Ref. no /5/2/919
Date: 28 July 2000

Resolution
I agree

Fedayeen Saddam in Charge
31 July 2000

Mr. Fedayeen Saddam in Charge
Dir sir

Subject: Information

In reference to your comment it is possible to convert it to the National Command similar to the other Arabs in the letter from the Security Committee # 398 dated 10 July 2000. We would like to point out the following:

1- On 29 Nov 1997, [letter (A)] mentioned that a number of the Arab Ba'th Party members and friends of Iraq announced their desire to be volunteers in the Fedayee work, as to have the honor of defending Iraq.

2- Your Excellency has ordered to select appropriate places to train the above-mentioned comrades. Staff Major General Talib Mansur (the ex-Secretary) explored Al-Nahrawan area in which he found two camps. The first camp belongs to the Arab Liberation Front (Sudan) while the second one belongs to the First Training Center of Baghdad (used for weapons and artillery training). The results are submitted to you in accordance with the letter (B).
3- The Presidency of the Republic - Secretary according to the Top-Secret letter of the Fedayeen Saddam # 989 dated 3 Dec 1997 [letter (c)]. It includes that there is no school for training the Fedayeen. The letter also consists of a suggestion by the Ministry of Defense in order to receive the Arab Volunteers in the Main Training Center of Baghdad/3.

4- The Presidency of the Republic - Secretary addressed the National Command/National Organization Office according to its Urgent and Secret letter # 73 dated 5 Jan 1998 [letter (D)]. It includes the approval of sending the volunteers to the Main Training Center of Baghdad/3.

5- On 20 January 1998, we had the letter of the National Command - General Secretariat Office # 224 dated 17 Dec 1998 [letter (E)]. It states that the Office has to coordinate with the Ministry of Defense about sending the volunteers to the above-mentioned center on 2 Feb 1998.

6- On 26 Dec 1998, a copy of the personal and Top-Secret letter from the Presidency of the Republic - Secretary # 416 dated 23 Dec 1998 [letter (F)] addressed to the National Command/National Organization Office. Therefore, a list of the Arab volunteers' was sent.

7- On 5 Feb 1998, the personal and Top-Secret letter from the Presidency of the Republic Secretary # 416 dated 23 Dec 1998 [letter (H)] was received. It includes stopping the work of the two letters mentioned in the above paragraphs (4 and 6). In addition, the letter (H) indicates that the volunteers along with the Ba'ath Party members and independents are included in this training through the Ba'ath Party branches coordination with the General Secretariat Office and the Secretary of the Country.

8- We suggest excusing the Fedayee (Journalist) from the Fedayee work.

Kindly, review ... regards.
Ref. / security /398
Date: 10 July 2000

Resolution

I approve. Thus, the principles cannot be exceeded and it is possible to send the subjects to the National Command similar to the other Arabs. Major General Ayyub has the priorities.

Fedayeen Saddam in Charge
21 July 2000

Mr. Fedayeen Saddam in Charge

Subject: Information

In reference to your comments about the letter, # 378 dated 5 July 2000 (What is the opinion? And why it has not existed?).

I would like to demonstrate the following:
1- The common procedure in case of security issues about the Fedayeen is to call and meet him/her at our headquarters to verify their information. The concerned person is requested to write a report about the security issue against him/her.
2- The Ba'th Party and security reports concerning the journalist, Nazirah Nadim Jamil, affiliated to Al-Majidah Regiment of Fedayeen Saddam, it is shown that she is Lebanese. Nazirah Nadim Jamil, who came with her husband ('Abd-al-Sattar) on 4 July, was called to the Information of the Staff Head of Fedayeen Saddam to verify from her information. Major Qasim
Shannan Jabbar and Warrant Officer Mustafa Isma'il 'Abd-al-Qadir (Security Committee) met with her. She presented us her attached report (A).

3- During the conversation, the above-mentioned Fedayee said that her husband has been working as physiotherapist.

4- After verifying the names of the weight evaluation committee, it is shown that her husband is a member of the Security Committee.

5- Our opinion is to excuse her from the Fedayee work.

**Suggestion**
To excuse her from the Fedayee work
Kindly, review.

Staff Brigadier General
Jamal Bakr Hasan
Senior Staff Officer of Security Committee of Fedayeen Saddam
10 July 2000
The Head (in-charge) of the Fedayeen Saddam has written a comment in the margin, "I approve. Thus, the principles cannot be exceeded and it is possible to send the subject to the National Command similar to the other Arabs". In addition, "Major General Ayyub has the priorities" as to our letter, # 398 dated 10 July 2000. Attached are copies of our letters, # 378 and 398 dated 10 July 2000.
Kindly review and inform us ...with regards.

Attachments
(2) Copies of letters

Staff Brigadier General
Jamal Bakr Hasan
Senior Staff Officer of Security Committee of Fedayeen Saddam
23 July 2000
Ref. no /Security /378
Date 5 July 2000

Resolution
What is the opinion? And why has it not existed?

Fedayeen Saddam in Charge
July 2000

To / Mr. General Secretary of Fedayeen Saddam

Dir Sir

Subject /Information

After verifying the information and identity of Fedayee (Journalist) Nazirah Nadim Jamil, who is a member of Al-Majidah Regiment. The following information was pointed out:

1- The Nazirah Nadim Jamil is Lebanese and married to a physiotherapist ('Abd-al-Sattar Jabr), who has been working at Bin Sina Hospital. Her husband is a member of the Weight Check Committee for the Formation Officers of Fedayeen Saddam.
2- Her family lives in Lebanon and she has traveled annually there after getting the approval from the Ministry of Information and Culture. Kindly, review ...with regards.

Staff Brigadier General
Jamal Bakr Hasan
Senior Staff Officer of Security Committee of Fedayeen Saddam
5 July 2000

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<table>
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<tr>
<th>Approval</th>
<th>97</th>
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<tr>
<td>Remarks (TC: two or more words are illegible) To take the necessarily procedures</td>
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Mr. 'Uday Saddam Hussein
The Fedayeen Saddam in Charge

Subject/Letter
Here is the Top-Secret letter of the Presidency of the Republic-Secretary, # 6855 dated 23 Nov 19997. It is about the Arab Ba'th Party members and friends who are staying in the country who want to volunteer.

1- The Fedayeen Training Center Camp in Al-Nahrawan belongs to the Arab Liberation Front (Sudan) and it has no training courses right now. However, it needs to have some training cadres and to coordinate the administrative issues.

2- The First Training Center of Baghdad has been visited in Al-Nahrawan, and it is ready to receive more than 500 Fedayeen on 9 Dec 1997. This center is used for artillery and light weapons training.

Kindly Review ...with regards

Staff Major General
Talib Mansur Najm
Secretary of Fedayeen Saddam Office
29 Nov 1997
Page 63

Republic of Iraq
President of Republic
Secretary

Top Secret
Ref. no/ 6855/K
Date 23 Nov 1997

Comrade 'Uday Saddam Hussein
Fedayeen Saddam in Charge

Subject/ Volunteer
The National Organization Office in the National Command informed us that the numbers of Arab Ba'th Party members and friends staying in the country for the honor of defending Iraq are:

1- 37 volunteers of the well-trained personnel for the Fedayee.
2- 546 volunteers who have not been trained for the Fedayee work, but they have been trained within the popular army sectors.
3- 137 volunteers have not been trained on using weapons.

Hoping to complete the training courses and places
With regards

Major General
'Abid Hamid Al-Mahmud
Secretary of President
23 Nov 1997
Republic of Iraq  
Presidency of Republic  
Fedayeen Saddam  
Ref. no /Training /989  
Date 3 Dec 1997  
Top secret

To /Presidency of Republic – Secretary  
In reference to the Top-Secret letter of Presidency of Republic-Secretary, # 6855 dated 23 Nov 1997, we would like to point out the following:

1- There is no available school for training the Fedayeen Saddam  
2- We suggest referring the subject to the Ministry of Defense in order to receive the Arab volunteers in the Main Training Center of Baghdad beginning 12 Jan 1998. We are attaching the training course of the volunteers.

Kindly review …regards  
Attachments  
A raining course

'Uday Saddam Hussein  
2 Dec 1997
### Arab Volunteers Training Course for the Fedayee Work from 2-22 Jan 1998

<table>
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<th>Time and Date</th>
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<td>Situations of grenade shooting</td>
<td>How to shoot the grenades</td>
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</table>
Republic of Iraq
Presidency of Republic
Secretary
Ref. no /11/1/97/73/K
Date 5 Jan 1998

Secret & Immediately

To /National Organization Office
Subject/Volunteer

In reference to your letter, #S/1/284 dated 18 Nov 1997, it is approved to affiliate the volunteers with the Third Main Training Center of Baghdad, and take the necessary procedures and coordinate with the Ministry of Defense.

With regards

Major General
'Abid Hamid Al-Mahmud
Secretary of President
5 Jan 1/1998

Cc
Mr. Minister of Defense / in reference to your letter, # Training /5/1/10277 dated 27 Dec 1997....to take the necessary procedures...

Regards

Mr. the Fedayeen Saddam in Charge/in reference to your letter, # 989 dated 3 Dec 1997...kindly review

Regards
Page 68

Information
1 Aug 2000

To /Staff Head – Administration – Political Guidance
Security Committee
Our letter, # 919 dated 28 July 2000 is herewith attached.
Kindly review ...with regards.
Attachments
(1) Copy of letter

Staff Major General
General Secretary
1 Aug 2000
To / Fedayeen Saddam Secretariat  
Subject / Information  
In reference to your letter, # 2523 dated 1 Aug 2000, we have found nothing about the name of the Fedayee (TC: Nazirah Nadim Jamil) according to your letter, # 919 dated 28 July 2000. Kindly provide us with her name so she can be excused from the Fedayee work. Kindly, review ...regards.

Staff Lieutenant General  
Qays 'Abd-al-Razzaq Muhammad Juwad  
Chief of the Staffs of Fedayeen Saddam  
Aug 2000
To the Comrades of Al-Zawra' Division Command/Subdivision 828

Subject/Volunteer

Comrade Salute
I am Taysir Ibrahim Husayn Al-Sutari and I live in Building 54, Apartment 1. I am committed to the national duty in the Palestinian National Security Forces of the occupied territories as a Lieutenant. I am volunteering myself for the suicidal work for defending Iraq. Unfortunately, my leave was finished yesterday, and consider myself from this moment on as a suicidal bomber for defending Iraq. I am well prepared of any duty inside or outside Iraq or in Palestine. It is a pleasure and pride that you are the uncles of my children.

Waiting for your orders

Active Member
Taysir Ibrahim Husayn Al-Sutari
19 Sept 2000

Long Live for Glory and Immortality
Long live Palestine
Long live Nation
May Glory and Immortality be upon our Martyrs

(1) God bless this Nobel Arab citizen for his national feelings
(2) He shall join his national duty
(3) The section shall be addressed

Comrade
Yusif Fayyad Al-Dulaymi
Secretary of Al-Zawra' Division Member
Sept 2000
Supply & Administration
Administration
Ref. no///10780
Date Aug 2000

To / Staff Major General Sakr Hashim Hasan / Commander of Al-Majidah Regiment
Subject / Fedayee Works

In reference to the letters of Fedayeen Saddam Secretariat, # 1598 and 2523
dated 12 Aug 2000 and 1 Aug 2000, the Fedayeen Saddam in Charge has
approved on excusing the Fedayee (Journalist Nazirah Nadim Jamil) from
Fedayee Work.
Kindly, take the necessarily procedures.

Staff Lieutenant General
Qays 'Abd-al-Razzaq Muhammad Juwad
Chief if the Staffs of Fedayeen Saddam
Aug 2000

cc
Secretariat of Fedayeen Saddam / kindly, review ....regards
Security Committee of Fedayeen Saddam
Accounts Department
Computer Department
Ref. no /5/2/1598
Date 12 Aug 2000

To / Staff Head – Administration
Subject /Information

In reference to your letter, 8963 dated 11 Aug 2000, the Fedayee's name is Nazirah Nadim Jasim (journalist).
Kindly, review ....regards.

Staff Major General
Ayyub Mahdi Salih
General Secretary of Fedayeen Saddam
12 Aug 2000

[TC: Page 73 contains one illegible word with a number (876) only]
Ref. no M/64/224
Date 17 Jan 1998

Arab Ba'th Socialist Party
National Command
General Secretariat Office

To /Comrade 'Uday Saddam Hussein /Fedayeen Saddam in Charge
Subject /Arab Volunteers' join

In reference to the letter of the Presidency of the Republic/Secretary, #
11/1/92/73K dated 5 Jan 1998, and addressed to your Excellency. It includes
having the approval of the Arab volunteers to be affiliated. In coordination
with the Ministry of Defense, their join date to the Baghdad Third Main
Training Center is set for Monday 2 Jan 1998. A chance for the students who
have an important number in training are given time off to complete their
half-year exams.

Comrade
Jasim Muhammad Khalaf Al-Rikabi

Head of the Secretariat Office
17 Jan 1998
The classification markings are original to the Iraqi documents and do not reflect current US classification.

### Page 75

**Numbers of the Fedayee Work Volunteers**

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Order</th>
<th>Country</th>
<th>Trained personnel on the Fedayee work</th>
<th>Non-trained personnel on the Fedayee Work but they know how to use weapons</th>
<th>The non-trained personnel on using weapons</th>
<th>Total for each country</th>
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Republic of Iraq
Presidency of Republic
Secretary
Ref. no 11/1/97/474/Karbala'
29 Jan 1998

National Command / Secretariat Office
National Command / National Organization Office

Subject/Volunteers of Fedayee Work

The following has been approved:

1- Stop working upon our two letters, # 73 and 416/K dated 5 and 23 Jan 1998.

2- The volunteers as well as the rest of the Ba'ath Party members and independents are included in training the people through the Ba'ath Party branches coordinating with your Office and Secretariat of the Country.

3- Through training and desire, the ones who are fit for the Fedayee work could be chosen to serve in the Fedayee. For the schools and universities, the training will be during the summer vacations.

Major General
'Abid Hamid Al-Mahmud
Secretary of the President
28 Jan 1998
Cc
Comrade /Taha Yasin Ramadan / National Command Member / in reference to your attached memorandum ... regards
Mr. Minister of Defense ... kindly review concerning this
Mr. the Fedayee Saddam in Charge ... regards
Comrade Head of Secretariat Office ... to take the necessarily procedures

Page 77

Top Secret & Personal

Republic of Iraq
Presidency of Republic
Secretary
Ref. no 11/1/97/416/Karbala'
23 Jan 1998

National Command / National Organization Office
Subject / Volunteers of Fedayee Work

It is approved for the volunteers mentioned in your letter, # S/one/17 dated 12 Jan 1998
To take the necessarily procedures ... with regards.

Major General
'Abid Hamid Al-Mahmud
Secretary of the President
12 Jan 1998

Cc
Mr. Minister of Defense
The Fedayeen Saddam in Charge

As to our letter, # 73/k dated 5 Jan 1998; we are sending a list of the Arab volunteers' numbers.
Kindly review ... regards
Fedayeen Saddam Secretariat
Headquarters
Al-Qari'ah Commando Force
Administration
Ref. no 3/2/1760
Date 24 Dec 2001

To /Al-Karkh Force of Fedayeen Saddam
Subject /Returning Fedayeen

In reference to the letter of Fedayeen Saddam Secretariat Office, # 114 dated 16 Dec 2001, we are sending back the below enlisted personnel since they do not wish to work with our force. We discharged them in accordance with the Second Department orders on 26 Jan 2001.

1- Fedayee Nuri Husayn Najil
2- Fedayee Ahmad Yusif Muhammad
3- Fedayee Husayn Karim ‘Ali
4- Fedayee Marwan ‘Ali Husayn

Kindly, review and inform us ...regards.

Staff Lieutenant Colonel (Special Force)
Mahmud Ibrahim Mahmud
Commander of Fedayee
23 March 2001

Cc
Fedayee Saddam Secretariat / in reference to your above-mentioned letter ...regards
Staff Head of Fedayeen Saddam /Administration /kindly, review ...regards
To /Al-Rusafah Force of Fedayeen Saddam
Subject /Returning Fedayeen

In reference to the letter of Fedayeen Saddam Secretariat Office, # 114 dated 16 Dec 2001, we are sending back the below enlisted personnel since they do not wish to work with our force. We discharged them in accordance with the Second Department orders on 24 Jan 2001.

1- Fedayee Sattar 'Abd-al-Husayn Farij
2- Fedayee Muhammad Hilu 'Alwan

Kindly, review and inform us ... regards

Staff Lieutenant Colonel (Special Force)
Mahmud Ibrahim Mahmud
Commander of Fedayee
23 March 2001

Cc
Fedayeen Saddam Secretariat / in reference to your above-mentioned letter ... regards
Staff Head of Fedayeen Saddam /Administration /kindly, review ... with regards
Al-Karkh Force of Fedayeen Saddam / concerning your affiliated Fedayee Marwan 'Ali Jabr for the same purpose above...kindly review ...with regards
The classification markings are original to the Iraqi documents and do not reflect current US classification.

Out Security Officer / kindly, review
Second Regiment / for releasing them on the date mentioned above
First Regiment / for releasing them on the date mentioned above
The classification markings are original to the Iraqi documents and do not reflect current US classification.

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**English Title:** IIS Information about Ansar Al-Islam Group (Political Affiliation)

**Language:** ARABIC

**Document Date:** 20020618  
**Total Pages:** 20  
**Inclusive Pages:** 19  
**Oversized Pages:**

**Document Type:** LETTER  
**Format:** PAPER ORIGINAL

**Agency:** DIA  
**Project:** IRAQI FREEDOM

**Country Of Information:** IRAQ

**Title:**

**Country Of Origin:**

**Translation Information**

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**Keyword Categories**

**Biographic Information**

**Name:** 'ABDULLAH, WASHMAN RASUL
**Other Attribute:** ORGANIZATION: Kurdistan National Party

**Name:** AGHA, TAL'AT HADI

**Name:** AL-BARZANI, MAS'UD
The classification markings are original to the Iraqi documents and do not reflect current US classification.

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Document Remarks

ISGQ-2005-00016212 This file contains the following information: -Pages 2-3, 19-20: contain memos dated, 15 May 2002, presented to the Director of the IIS Third Section. It contains information addressed from the Guard Battalion of United Nations at the Northern Region about Ansar Al-Islam Party, Kurdistan National Party and Labor Turkey Party: The information is about the Iranian role to resolve the disagreement between the Ansar Al-Islam Party and Kurdistan National Party, who has drawn back big number of his fighters for stabilization the good faith. It refers to the instructions of Ansar Al-Islam concerning the women clothes and educations. In addition, it indicates that an insurgency work for the Labor Turkey Party has kidnapped the Washman Rasul 'Abdallah, Chief of Anjuman Committee, accusing him of cooperating with the Kurdistan National Party. -Page 4, 9: Contain IIS memos, dated 6 Jun 2002, declaring that the IIS and the Iraqi Embassy in Tunis have caused the failure of unmentioned delegation. -Pages 5, 13: Contain blank sheets. -Page 6-8: Contain letter dated 17 Jun 2002, issued by Directorate # 40 of IIS. The letter is classifying information collected by IIS sources such as: They confirm the information that refers to - Al-Mulla Karikyar's travel to Iran for discussing his problems with Talibani - Jalal Talibani and Mas'ud Barazani have a meeting with American Delegation at Berlin - Ayyub Ni'mah Qadir (IIS Source) provided information about a meeting between Muhammad Haj Mahmud Kulkhanah, the Socialist Party Supervisor and Fadil Mitni Mirani, a member in the Political Office of Mas'ud Al-Barazani Group. - The IIS has succeeded to convince Libya not to meet the Kurds' delegation. -Pages 10-12: Contain letter dated, 14 May 2002, from IIS Directorate # 4/2/2/1 to IIS Directorate # 40. It contains information confirming that HAMAS is the organization, which has attacked Barham Ahmad Salih, who says that he has the documents, which indicates that Jund Al-Islam Group and other groups separated from it have arranged organizations in Kurdistan under the
direction of Al-Qa'ida. In addition, the letter refers to the Turkey Delegation, who came to Iraq to meet officials from the Turcoman Front. Ansar Al-Islam asked Group # 140 to pay, monthly, 3 Million Dinars and to release the individuals that accused of attacking Barham Salih. -Pages 14-18: Contain correspondence dated 7 May 2002, between IIS Sections, the General Military Intelligence Directorate and the Presidential Office. The correspondence contains information about rumors saying that a group of Osama Ben Laden Insurgency exists at the Northern Region. -Page 18: Contains a letter dated, 30 Apr 2002, from IIS Directorate # 5 to IIS Directorate 57. It contains information about the attempt of an Ansar Al-Islam member to explode him self in Kalar Suq.

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| Transmittal Information | Transporting Unit: CMPC-B | Date/Time of Arrival: 20041129 |
Presidency of Republic
Iraqi Intelligence Services (IIS)

Mr. Head of the Section
Subject: Information

Here is the letter of M5/4/14/3 including the monthly report of the United Nation Guards working in the Northern Region. The significant points of this letter are:

1- The Kurdistan National Party started withdrawing a large number of its fighters in order to strengthen confidence between this party and Ansar Al-Islam. Iran has facilitated the process of holding the meetings to compromise disputes between them.

2- Although Ansar Al-Islam has changed its name from Jund Al-Islam to Ansar Al-Islam, it still keeps its ideology. They, Ansar Al-Islam, impose strict measures on women education and their dress.

3- On 25 Jan 2002, a gang consisted of three Turkish Labor elements kidnapped the Chairman of Angoman Committee, Washman Rasul 'Abdallah from Razkah Village, being accused of the collaboration with the Kurdistan National Party. However, he was released on the same day. The same group, also, kidnapped a girl in the same village.

4- On 6 Feb 2002, a 100-peron group from Bardah Farman Camp demonstrated peacefully in front of the United Nations Headquarter to bring attention to their cause.

5- The Turkish Labor Party Command decided avoiding violence and urged its activists to join the democratic organizations such as Kurdistan National Party and Kurdistan National Association.

Page 3
Top Secret

Presidency of Republic
Iraqi Intelligence Services

Mr.:
Subject:

7- The Iraqi forces are positioned at the Tigris River, south of Fishkhabur area. The Iraqi Government has increased its soldiers in 'Ayn Safni area.

8- Opinion
We previously received information mentioned in the M5 letter from our sources working in the northern area and there is nothing new in it. Kindly review ... regards

Head of Department 3
15 May 2002

Top-Secret
In reference to your letter, # 397 dated 13 June 2002.
   1- Information mentioned in points (1 and 3) of your above letter is correct as stated before.
   2- We have no information about point (2) of your above-mentioned letter.
   3- Regarding point (4), the delegate's visit has failed by the IIS working with the co-operation of our ambassador in Trebles, regardless of the subject. The visit is postponed until further notice.
Kindly review ...regards

On behalf of Had M40
18 June 2002
Page 5

In the Name of Allah the compassionate the Merciful

Presidency of Republic
Iraqi Intelligence Service

Mr.:  
Subject:  

(TC: this page is blank)
Page 6

Presidency of Republic
Iraqi Intelligence Service

Top-Secret
Mr.: Head of M40
Subject: Evaluation of Information

In reference to your notice dated 13 June 2002, the following is our evaluation of the information mentioned in your letter M4/2/2/1:

1- We confirm the information of point (1). Our information says that Al-Mullah Kraykar has traveled to Iran to negotiate with the Iranian regime concerning the tense situation with Jalal Al-Talibani Group. Mullah Kraykar will then go to Europe. The source, Ayyub Ni'mah Qadir, informed us that a Turkish military delegate visited Halabjah, finding out the contact points between Ansar Al-Islam Organization and Jalal Al-Talibani Group.

2- We have no information that Mas'ud Al-Barazani and Jalal Al-Talibani have sent a joint letter addressed to the US Foreign Affairs Department. During the meeting with the US delegate in Berlin, Mas'ud Al-Barazani and Jalal Al-Talibani stressed on the comprehensive conciliation between them and unifying the government and parliament.

3- Regarding point (3), the information is correct. The source, Ayyub Ni'mah Qadir, informed us that a meeting was held between Muhammad Haj Mahmud Kulkhanah, Head of the Communist Party, and Fadil Mutni Mirani, a Political Office member of Mas'ud Al-Barazani Group.

4- For point (4), the Kurdish tribes delegate's visit to Libya has not taken place with the IIS efforts and the assistance of our ambassador in Trebles in convincing Libya, regardless of the subject. The visit has been postponed until further notice.

Kindly review, M4 will be answered about our evaluation of the information.
Regards
Deputy Director of M40
17 June 2002

1-1
Top-Secret

To: M40

Ref no. 397
Date 13 June 2002

President of Republic
Iraq Intelligence Services
Information
M4/2/2/1

Page 7

One of our trustable sources informed us the following information:

1. On 27 May 2002, Mullah Kraykar arrived suddenly in Iran (Head of Ansar Al-Islam Organization) for negotiations with several Iranian officials on the tension witnessed in the region between Jalal Al-Talibani Group and Bak Group in addition to the Turkish Military Commission existing in Halabjah. The Bak Group is worried about any foreign co-operation with Jalal Al-Talibani Group. The information says that the target of this visit is to have a unified attitude and to guarantee the Iranian continuous support to that group.

2. Jalal and Mas'ud Groups have sent a joint letter addressed to the US Foreign Affairs Department on holding parliament elections in the Northern region. In the letter, the two groups have suggested attending a US committee to resolve the disputes between them.

3. Hammah Haji Mahmud, Secretary of the Kurdistan Communist Party, met one of the Group (130) officials. The meeting took place in Iran with the attendance of one of the Iranian regime representatives.

4. By an invitation from the Libyan President Mu'ammar Al-Qadhafi, a number of the heads of the Iraqi Kurdish tribes will visit Libya. It is decided that Al-Qadhafi will give them the Salah-al-Din insignias. The invitation is addressed to each of the following:
A. Sheik Mazhar Mustafa Kaki Hayran  
B. Aku 'Abbas Mamind  
C. Sa'id Mahmud Bik Khalifah  
D. Karim Fattah Hammah Rida  
E. Tal'at Hadu Agha

Khushnaw tribe  
Aku tribe  
Bradusit tribe  
Hamawand tribe  
Siyan tribe

Kindly review and inform us about your evaluation of the information
...regards

On behalf of Head of M4
12 June 2002

Notice: Point (4) is sent to D1/4...regards
In reference to your letter, #341 dated 14 May 2002. We have been provided the same information mentioned in your above letter by several sources.

Kindly review ...regards

On behalf of Head of M40
18 May 2002
Ref. no 341  
Date 14 May 2002

To: M40

One of our trusted sources informed us on the following information:
1. Barham Ahmad Salih confirmed that the armed attack against him was prepared by Al-Tawhid and Hamas Groups. He indicated that Jund Al-Isalam and the dissident groups have built bases in Kurdistan upon Al-Qa'idah instructions and worked according to its ideology.
2. On 19 April 2002, a Turkish delegate has entered the northern area via Ibrahim Al-Khalil checkpoint to negotiate with the Turcoman Front. This front declared the state of emergency in order to provide the required protection for the delegate. The organization said that it is engaged of purchasing weapons from the local markets.
3. Ansar Al-Islam negotiated with the Group (140) to fix a date for a cease-fire agreement between both sides. Ansar Al-Islam requested:
   A- To be paid 3 million Dinars a month.
   B- Group (140) shall retreat from Batrah and Horman areas.
   C- Releasing the accused people of assassinating Barham Salih

On behalf of the Director of M4  
13 May 2002
On 15 May 2002, M4/2/2 has informed us the following:

1- Baraham Salih that Hamas and Al-Tawhid Movement was behind the armed attack against him. He indicated that he has documents indicating that Jund Al-Islam and the dissident groups have built bases in Kurdistan upon al-Qa'idah instructions.

2- On 19 April 2002, a Turkish delegate has entered the northern area via Ibrahim Al-Khalil checkpoint to negotiate with the Turcoman Front. This front declared the state of emergency in order to provide the required protection for the delegate. The organization said that it is engaged of purchasing weapons from the local markets.

3- Ansar Al-Islam negotiated with the Group (140) to fix a date for a cease-fire agreement between both sides. Ansar Al-Islam requested:
   a. To be paid 3 million Dinars a month.
   b. Group (140) shall retreat from Batrah and Hurman areas.
   c. Releasing the accused of assassinating Barham Salih

4- Information mentioned in point (6) has been previously provided by several sources

Kindly review. We suggest answering M4 that the information mentioned above has been previously provided.

Head of Department 3
18 May 2002
The Northern Region Intelligence Directorate informed us that Al-Barastin Organization of the Group (130) captured the persons who are believed to be affiliated to the Islamic Movement and Jund Al-Islam in Duhuk and surrounding villages.

Kindly review noticing that Head of the Section 3 has been informed of what is mentioned above...regards

Head of Department

May
Page 13

In the Name of Allah the compassionate the Merciful

Presidency of Republic
Iraqi Intelligence Service

Mr.:  
Subject:  

(TC: this page is blank)
Attached herewith is a General Military Intelligence Directorate (GMID), # 26630 dated 24 April 2002
Kindly review the information mentioned in the above-mentioned letter. It is rumored that there are terrorists from Bin Ladin Group in the region aiming at making a pretext for the US forces interference to capture those elements...regards

Head of Department 1
7 May 2002
Republic of Iraq
Presidency of Republic
General Military Intelligence Directorate
Ref. no M7 Section3/Department2/26630
Date 24 April 2002

Top-Secret

To the Presidency of the Republic- Secretary of the National Security Council
Subject: Information

We have been provided with the following information

1- On 14 April 2002, a number of journalists having the nationalities of 
(Swedish, German and French) have arrived Salah-al-Din Resort. The 
traitors' groups organized meetings with several families (so-called 
"Martyrs") at Zarkawi hall in Arbil. Falak-al-Din Kaki who claimed that there are 181 missing persons in 1988 by which he raised a memo to the United Nations in the name of those families, attended the meeting.

2- Upon the traitors' groups, it is rumored in the self-government territories that there are terrorists from Bin Ladin Group in the northern area. Being there, those terrorist will generate risks and instability to the region. The target of this is to make a pretext for the US forces interference to capture those elements.

3- We suggest having the security systems informed about the information mentioned-above.

Kindly review...regards

Staff Lt. General Director of GIMD
23 April 2002
Page 16

Republic of Iraq
Presidency of Republic
Iraq Intelligence Services

Ref. No...
Date...

(TC: this page is blank)
Republic of Iraq
Presidency of Republic
Iraqi Intelligence Services

Ref. no 2542
Date 6 May 2002

Secret

To: M5/1/1
In reference to your letter, #4963 dated 30 April 2002. We have no information currently about the subjects of your above-mentioned letter.

Kindly review ... regards

On behalf of Head of M40
6 May 2002
Republic of Iraq
Presidency of Republic
Iraqi Intelligence Services

Ref. no 4963
Date 30 April 2002

MR.: Head of M57

We are informed by one of our sources that someone attempted to conduct suicidal operation in front of one of the mosques in Klar market but he was revealed. The information states that this person is affiliated to Jund-al-Islam Group.
Kindly review verifying the information above and inform us...regards

On behalf of the Director of M5

30 April 2002

cc
Mr. Head of M58
M4 Department 2
M40

For the same purpose...regards
Mr. Director of M5  
Subject: Information

1- M51 informed us about the results of the efficiency to penetrate the mail of UNOPIS (Mines removal) in Arbil through its source 382A and to get documents that are herewith attached. The documents are summarized as follows:

A- In the frame of strengthening the confidence between Ansar Al-Islam and the Kurdistan National Party, the Kurdistan National party started withdrawing a large number of its fighters. Iran has facilitated the process of holding the meetings to resolve the disputes between them.

B- The inhabitants revealed that Ansar Al-Islam has imposed strict measures upon the women education and their dress. Although Ansar Al-Islam has changed its name from Jund Al-Islam to Ansar Al-Islam, it still keeps its original ideology. Some reports said that Jund Al-Islam does not desire to have an initiative of conciliation with the Kurdistan National Party leading to more fighting operations.

C- On 25 Jan 2002, a gang consisted of three Turkish Labor elements kidnapped the Chairman of Angoman Committee, Washman Rasul 'Abdallah from Razkah Village, accused of collaboration with the Kurdistan National Party. However, he was released after one day of his arrest. On the same day, the group, also, kidnapped a girl in that village.

D- On 6 Feb 2002, a 100-peron group from Bardah Farman Camp demonstrated peacefully in front of the United Nations Headquarter to bring attention to their cause.
E- The security situation in Arbil is peaceful and helps to keeps the UN activities contentious.

F- In Duhuk, several report of the Turkish media, said that the Labor Party Command has decided avoiding violence. The party Command urged its activists to join the democratic organizations such as Kurdistan National Party and Kurdistan National Association.


H- Several reports indicated that the Iraqi dynamic forces consisting of artillery, armor and infantry are positioned at the Tigris River, south of Fishkhabur area, without any provocative offensive activities affecting the region subjugated to the borderlines between Iraq and Self-Government Governorates. The Iraqi Government has increased its soldiers in 'Ayn Safni area for defensive purposes. The reports stated also that the security situation is peaceful and stable.

2- In light of what was stated before we suggest approving on:

A- Sending the information to M40

B- Honoring M40 source from M51 for his exerted efforts

Kindly review ... regards
ISGQ-2005-00019583 Pages 2-11 correspondence from the Iraqi Embassy in Algeria to D 1/4 in regards to a detailed handwritten report on Muslim groups finances, and weapons sources. The report shows that Iran is one of the most financing sources for Muslim groups in Algeria through their embassy in Syria and some of the European countries, also in sending weapons using the Moroccan borders to Algeria.
The classification markings are original to the Iraqi documents and do not reflect current US classification.

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Date/Time of Capture: 20041129
Place of Capture: 50 Al-Kadah St. (Justice Province), Baghdad
Coordinates: 38SMB365881

**Transmittal Information**
Transporting Unit: CMPC-B
Date/Time of Arrival: 20041129
In the name of Allah, the Most Merciful, the Most Compassionate
Embassy of Iraq Republic
Algeria

Ref: / 190/
Date: 10 Sep 99

Secret

To / Directorate 4/1
Subject / Information

The following is the report of our source (1104) about the method of the Algerian Armed Islamic groups to obtain money and weapons.

Kindly, look into...with appreciation

Signature
(SATTS: M. D. B. T. M/2)
10 Sep 99

Mr. Muhammad
Signature
18 Sep

-Secret-

Adresse: 4, Rue Arezki Abri
Hydre – Alger
B. P. 249
Tel: 69 31 25 – 69 38 88
Fax: 69 10 97
Telex: 66098
Sources of arming the armed groups

Iran is considered one of the most important countries that finances the armed groups in Algeria through its embassy, the cultural legation and some Iranians living outside.

First, our sources confirm that the most important point to finance the Armed Islamic Groups with money to buy weapons is the Iranian Embassy in Damascus; the embassy plays the role of the mediator between the Iranian authorities and the Armed Islamic Groups in Algeria.

Syria knows very well that there are a lot of Algerians visiting the embassy, but Syria never interfered, the thing that upset
the Algerian authorities, which asked Damascus two years ago, through the Ministry of Foreign Affairs and its embassy in Damascus, to expel the Islamic Algerians living in Syria. The authorities also asked Syria to extradite some Islamic Algerians to Algeria, but Syria refused the request under the pretence that all Islamic Algerians living in Syria or visiting it did not violate the limits of entertainment and they did not violate the laws of the country.

Under the insistence and importunity of the Algerian authorities, Syria was forced to expel some of the suspected Islamic names in Damascus, and the others stayed
The Iranian Cultural Center in Damascus, near "Al-Marjah" Square, plays the same role too; where some Islamic persons visited the center from different Armed Islamic organizations (The Islamic Army for Salvation, the Armed Islamic Group)

From Damascus, the network ramifications toward Europe in the following countries:

- Germany
- Belgium
- France
- England
- Morocco

Second, Germany comes after Damascus
In Germany, Some Iranian personages supervise regular meetings with the Armed Islamic Group, and some money deliverance operations are carried out there too.

As to weapon purchase, it is done through:

France and Belgium, smuggled later through Morocco.

Third, Morocco spared no effort to exert pressure on Algeria to stop supporting the Western Sahara; one of the most important pressures is receiving tens of Iranians to hold meetings with the Armed Groups in Morocco. To guarantee the success of contact operations
between the Iranians and the Algerians, Iran opened a cultural center in Wajdah City, although there are no Iranians in that Moroccan city.

Our sources confirmed that weapons are delivered from Iran to the above-mentioned center in Wajdah city directly, where some Algerian armed members are trained to use the weapons smuggled later through the borders.

Fourth, what is happening in the eastern borders
with Tunisia and Libya arouse the suspicions about the possibility of smuggling weapons through that side that extends to 1000 km; especially the tough desert area between Libya and Algeria.

A number of armed engagements took place between the Algerian border observers and some unknown armed groups.

The Iranian embassy in Tunisia tried to play a suspicious role, but the good relations between Tunisia and Algeria prevented
Tunisia to be a weapon crossing point to Algeria. Nevertheless, the questions remained posed, especially with the existence of the adept Iranian Diplomat Mr. "Sa'idi", who is considered the joint between the Iranian Embassy in Tunisia and every Algerian and Arab visits the country. Mr. Sa'idi is fluent in Arabic, but we don not have proofs on his engagement with the Algerian armed groups.

The Libyan role remains suspicious,
especially if we take into consideration the mass migration and escape of some Islamic group members through the common borders to Libya, which allowed them to live on its ground. However, their role and their conditions remain unknown.

As a reminder, Sheikh "Ali Taskhiri," a well-known Iranian personage, is considered one of the Iranian personages that has a vast knowledge in the Algerian file, and he has a big role in bringing tens of Algerians to study
in Iran since 1979.

We have no information about his recent role, because he kept himself out of sight, maybe due to illness.

We should also take into our consideration the successive visits of some Islamic group members to Iran, especially in the last years.
Captured Iraqi documents have uncovered evidence that links the regime of Saddam Hussein to regional and global terrorism, including a variety of revolutionary, liberation, nationalist, and Islamic terrorist organizations. While these documents do not reveal direct coordination and assistance between the Saddam regime and the al Qaeda network, they do indicate that Saddam was willing to use, albeit cautiously, operatives affiliated with al Qaeda as long as Saddam could have these terrorist-operators monitored closely. Because Saddam’s security organizations and Osama bin Laden’s terrorist network operated with similar aims (at least in the short term), considerable overlap was inevitable when monitoring, contacting, financing, and training the same outside groups. This created both the appearance of and, in some ways, a “de facto” link between the organizations. At times, these organizations would work together in pursuit of shared goals but still maintain their autonomy and independence because of innate caution and mutual distrust. Though the execution of Iraqi terror plots was not always successful, evidence shows that Saddam’s use of terrorist tactics and his support for terrorist groups remained strong up until the collapse of the regime.
The classification markings are original to the Iraqi documents and do not reflect current US classification.

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