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Visit by Professor Yigael Yadin.  
(Israeli Deputy Prime Minister).

ISRAEL

March 1980

Referred to	Date	Referred to	Date	Referred to	Date	Referred to	Date
<del>5.3.80</del>							
<del>7.3.80</del>							
<del>11.3.80</del>							
<del>12.3.80</del>							
3.4.80							
PREM 19/285							

FILE

Israel  
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3 April 1980

Call by Mr. Yadin

The Prime Minister has seen your letter to me of 2 April on the question of contacts with the Egyptian Military Intelligence authorities. She is content that the matter should not be pursued further.

MODBA

G. G. H. Walden, Esq.,  
Foreign and Commonwealth Office.

*KB*

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This is a copy. The original  
has been extracted and  
retained under Section 3(4).



Foreign and Commonwealth Office

London SW1A 2AH

2 April 1980

*Prime Minister* <sup>(2)</sup>

*Dear Michael,*

*amb*

*Print*

Call by Mr Yadin

At the end of your letter of 12 March you recorded Mr Yadin's suggestion that contact should be made with the Egyptian military intelligence authorities to discuss the situation in Saudi Arabia.

Paragraphs deleted and retained under  
Section 3(4).

*Wayland*

10 June 2010

*For our  
8-22*

(G G H Walden)

M O'D B Alexander Esq  
No 10 Downing Street

SECRET



10 DOWNING STREET

From the Private Secretary

 ✓ Minister Sec.  
 ✓ Israel: Nov 79: CD for Israel.  
 ✓ Middle East Situation Pt 2.  
 12 March 1980

Dear Paul,

Call by Mr. Yadin

Mr. Yigael Yadin, the Deputy Prime Minister of Israel, called on the Prime Minister this afternoon. He was accompanied by the Israeli Ambassador.

Mr. Yadin and the Prime Minister began by discussing the state of the Israeli economy. Mr. Yadin said that the Israeli Government were faced with an extremely serious situation. The methods they had adopted were not dissimilar to those being pursued by the Prime Minister. They had decided to impose a 6% reduction on every Ministry, to cut subsidies severely and to increase incentives to exporting industries. The last few months had seen a reduction in the inflation rate for the first time in many months. Nonetheless the situation remained very serious. The reduction in subsidies on bread and milk products had affected both the consumers, and, because of reduced sales, the farmers. Social problems were consequently becoming acute. Nonetheless the programme for tackling the economic crisis was one of the very few issues on which there was near unanimity in Cabinet.

Particular gravity was lent to the crisis by Israel's shortage of oil. The wells which had been returned to Egypt had previously provided some 30% of Israel's supplies. The Camp David Agreement provided for Egypt to supply the same amount of oil to Israel but at market ie spot prices. The Israeli Government expected to spend three times as much next year as this on oil. Moreover, it was not always easy to find suppliers even at spot prices. Mr. Yadin referred to Israeli hopes that the UK might be able to help at some stage. The Prime Minister said that we were not yet self-sufficient in oil and that even when we were existing agreements with the European Community and IEA would inhibit our freedom to supply third parties. Mr. Yadin made it clear that he had not expected to hear anything different.

Turning to the Arab/Israel dispute, Mr. Yadin said that he thought the current tendency to link the need to consolidate Arab opinion against the Soviet invasion of Afghanistan with the finding of a solution of the Arab/Israel dispute was misguided. If Saudi Arabia and the other Arab states did not already realise the gravity of the Soviet threat, nothing was going to make them do so. The linkage between the two problems was merely creating a pretext for the Governments concerned to do nothing about the Soviet threat.

/ The linkage

The linkage contributed to a solution of neither problem. The Prime Minister said that the Arab presentation of linkage tended to be rather more complex than Mr. Yadin had suggested. They frequently said, for instance, that the failure of the Americans to press Israel harder to find a solution to the Palestine problem made it difficult for Arab Governments to accept their help in facing the Soviet threat. It was clear in any case that a solution acceptable to all those involved would facilitate the region's response to the Soviet invasion of Afghanistan.

Mr. Yadin did not dissent from this last point. When asked by the Prime Minister whether the Camp David talks were likely to make any further progress, Mr. Yadin admitted that the talks were not going well at present. He added that indeed the situation might well get worse before it began to get better. Nonetheless he still believed that success was possible. Neither Mr. Begin nor President Sadat nor President Carter could afford a failure. The breakthrough might not come until the very last moment. It might well necessitate a further summit meeting at Camp David. But agreement would, according to Mr. Yadin, be reached. Meanwhile, the negotiations were extremely delicate and the activities of outsiders were not always helpful. Mr. Yadin said that, speaking very frankly, he would be inclined to say to the Europeans "if you cannot contribute, please keep quiet". He was particularly worried about the activities of the French who, as so often, seemed intent on being mischievous.

The Prime Minister said that she was concerned about the position of King Hussein. The West Bank had once been part of Jordanian territory, yet he was not being consulted in any way at present. Mr. Yadin said that the Camp David Agreement contained references to Jordanian involvement in the discussions. King Hussein had been invited to Camp David, but had refused the invitation. Mr. Yadin said that he himself thought that King Hussein ought to be a partner in the negotiations. His own guess was that President Sadat was aiming at a second Camp David in June or July at which he would secure an agreement which was less than 100% successful on the autonomy issue; and that thereafter he would suggest that King Hussein and the representatives of the Palestinian residents on the West Bank should be invited to carry discussions further. The difficulty for President Sadat was of course to achieve a satisfactory measure of progress on the autonomy issue by July.

There was a brief reference to the question of settlements in the occupied territory. The Prime Minister said that she had made plain to Mr. Begin that she saw no sense in putting up new settlements on territory occupied by Israel in 1967. Mr. Yadin said that he had noted the Prime Minister's reference to "new" settlements. The difficulty about the previous week's UN resolution had, of course, been that it had called for the dismantling of all settlements in the new territories. The Prime Minister did not respond to this beyond repeating that Mr. Begin was familiar with her views on the point.

/ On the general

On the general situation in the Middle East, Mr. Yadin said that President Sadat was deeply worried about the Soviet threat. Looking at events in Libya, Ethiopia, Iran and Afghanistan he felt encircled. He thought that Saudi Arabia was "next in line" and was highly critical of the Saudi regime for its failure to recognise the danger. The incident at the Great Mosque had been far more serious than was generally acknowledged. President Sadat was also critical of the Americans for their failure to develop a strategy for dealing with the Soviet challenge. He thought the Americans should have made more of an attempt to assign roles to eg the Egyptian, Saudi and Israeli Governments. All three Governments would be willing to respond to a clear lead. Mr. Yadin concluded the conversation by suggesting that the Prime Minister should delegate a representative to get in touch with the Egyptian military intelligence authorities to discuss with them their assessment of the situation in Saudi Arabia. The Prime Minister said that she would consider this further.

*Yours ever*

*Michael Alexander*

Paul Lever, Esq.,  
Foreign and Commonwealth Office.

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Israel



Foreign and Commonwealth Office

London SW1A 2AH

11 March 1980

Dear Michael,

for 2 hrs

Call on the Prime Minister by the Deputy Prime Minister of Israel

// The Prime Minister has agreed to see Professor Yadin at 4.30 pm on 12 March. I attach a brief and a personality note.

Yours etc

Paul

(P Lever)  
Private Secretary

M O'D B Alexander Esq  
10 Downing Street  
LONDON

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CALL ON THE PRIME MINISTER BY THE DEPUTY PRIME MINISTER OF ISRAEL,  
4.30 pm, 12 MARCH

Points to make

1. Continue to support Egypt-Israel treaty and to hope autonomy negotiations will succeed. Genuine autonomy capable of attracting Palestinian participation needed if achievements so far are not to be put at risk.
2. Talk of a British or European initiative considerably exaggerated. No intention of disrupting current efforts and our thinking only at preliminary stage. Discussing our policy, as usual, with European partners. But believe a new Security Council resolution associating principles of 242 with legitimate Palestinian claims could be a useful step towards wider Arab acceptance of 242.
3. Media have greatly exaggerated significance of French acceptance of self-determination. Nine accepted this concept last year, as we have pointed out. Self-determination does not necessarily mean an independent state. It can only be exercised within a negotiated settlement which provides for Israel's security. But unless a settlement is broadly acceptable to the Palestinians as a whole, it will not last.
4. No change of view on PLO. Continuing to urge them to modify their views. But important factor which should be brought into the peace process if possible (though not with status as exclusive spokesman for the Palestinians).
5. Israel should not underestimate strength of views on settlements. Policy incompatible with need for Israeli withdrawal and for building of confidence in the area. Urge very serious consideration before further steps which will lose Israel more friends abroad.

## Essential Facts

1. Mr Yadin is making a private visit to London from 11-16 March. He is to address the annual dinner of the Anglo/Israel Association on 13 March. A personality note is attached.
2. Mr Yadin's views on Arab/Israel are quite moderate and constructive, far more so than those of other members of Mr Begin's Government. With the Defence Minister Mr Weizman, and the former Foreign Minister, Mr Dayan, he has argued that Israel should grant a fuller version of autonomy to the Palestinians than her negotiators have so far been prepared to offer. He has also sought to curb the rapid expansion of Jewish settlement in the occupied territories encouraged, in particular, by Mr Sharon and the National Religious Party. He is reported to be opposed to current plans for establishment of an expanded Jewish presence in the centre of Hebron. But his influence (and that of his two Democratic Movement Cabinet colleagues) is strictly limited. Popular support for the Democratic Movement is now very small and Mr Yadin's political future is doubtful.
3. The appointment of Mr Yitzhak Shamir as Israel's Foreign Minister to replace Mr Dayan (who resigned last October) was announced on 9 March. This is unlikely to have any marked affect on Israel's foreign policy, though it will emphasise the hardline composition of the Cabinet. Mr Shamir is on the right of the Herut movement but is a supporter of Mr Begin and has been mentioned as one of his possible successors. He was previously speaker of the Knesset.
4. Mr Yadin can be expected to raise reports of a British/European initiative and other changes in British policy. In a recent public speech he accused Britain of not supporting the Camp David agreements and of attempting to disrupt the peace process by launching a diplomatic initiative to placate the PLO. Since then we have explained carefully to the Israelis, both here and in Tel Aviv, the background to our thinking. Their suspicions have since been revived by our confirmation that President Giscard d'Estaing's endorsement of self-determination for the Palestinians is in line with our views and those of the Nine as a whole. The Israelis made a formal protest, in sorrow rather than anger, on 7 March (tel Aviv telno 102 attached). The Prime Minister will wish to assure Mr Yadin that our basic views remain unchanged and that our commitment to Israel's future is unequivocal.

5. President Giscard has also said that the PLO will have to be involved in peace negotiations, though he has not said that they should do so as sole legitimate representative of the Palestinians. This too is broadly in line with our views. We do not accord the PLO the exclusive status they seek as sole legitimate representative of the Palestinians but we have accepted that they are an important factor in determining the views of the Palestinians overall and that the future of the Palestinians will have ultimately to be settled in a manner acceptable to the Palestinians themselves.

#### Autonomy Talks

6. The latest round of talks in the Hague produced no real progress. The Americans are anxious to focus the talks on the difficult issues (water, state land, East Jerusalem etc) but the Israelis have so far managed to avoid this. New working groups have been set up but there looks to be little that they can achieve without greater political flexibility on the part of Israel, particularly on the extent of the powers of the proposed self-governing authority. US views are close to those of the Egyptians. The next plenary round of talks is scheduled for 26 March.

125 YADIN, Professor Yigael

Deputy Prime Minister since 1977.

Born Jerusalem 1917, son of Professor Eliezer Sukenik who discovered the first Dead Sea Scrolls. Hagana 1933. Wingate's "Night Squads" 1936-9. MA, Hebrew University with thesis on Arabic inscriptions in Palestine 1945. Director of Military Operations in 1948-9 War. He took a leading part in Rhodes negotiations 1949. Chief-of-Staff 1949-52. Research in England 1952-4, for doctorate on "The Wars of the Sons of Light against the Sons of Darkness", which he obtained at Hebrew University 1955. Archaeological field-work at Hatzor 1955-8, and in the Dead Sea area 1960-1, when he discovered the Bar Kochba Letters. He excavated Masada 1963-5 and published a book on it. His acquisition of more Dead Sea Scrolls from an antiquities dealer in Jerusalem immediately after the Six Day War was a notorious focus of controversy. Sabbatical year, Brown University USA 1969-70. Entered politics with his Democratic Movement for Change in 1977 and won 15 Knesset seats, an unprecedented success. This rapidly turned sour when the negotiations between the DMC and Likud on joining the Government were delayed and mishandled, and divisions in the DMC became apparent. The DMC joined the Cabinet in October 1977 but the little enthusiasm left was dissipated in squabbles over the next nine months. The Democratic Movement's seven Knesset members are a disappointing memorial to the high hopes for the DMC of early 1977. Yadin is personally blamed for the failure, with some justice: his political skills were simply too weak to keep the disparate elements of the party together.

Speaks fluent English. A lively personality and is a gifted lecturer. His wife died of a heart ailment in February 1976. 2 daughters. His brother, Yosef, is one of Israel's leading actors.

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TO IMMEDIATE FCO

TELEGRAM NUMBER 102 OF 7 MARCH

INFO PRIORITY CAIRO WASHINGTON UKMIS NEW YORK PARIS ROUTINE  
BEIRUT DAMASCUS AMMAN AND JERUSALEM

MY TEL NO 99: ARAB/ISRAEL: PALESTINIAN SELF-DETERMINATION

1. THE ASSISTANT DIRECTOR-GENERAL WITH RESPONSIBILITY FOR EUROPEAN AFFAIRS IN THE ISRAEL MINISTRY OF FOREIGN AFFAIRS ASKED ME TO CALL ON HIM TODAY.
2. SASSOON, SPEAKING FROM A BULKY BRIEF IN TONES OF SORROW RATHER THAN ANGER, SAID THAT HE WAS UNDER INSTRUCTIONS TO LODGE A PROTEST ON THE STATEMENT BY THE FCO SPOKESMAN ON 4 MARCH COMMENTING ON PRESIDENT GISCARD'S STATEMENT IN KUWAIT ON PALESTINIAN SELF-DETERMINATION. HE WISHED TO EMPHASISE AT THE OUTSET THE ISRAEL GOVERNMENTS AWARENESS OF THE FACT THAT THERE WERE "BIG DIFFERENCES" BETWEEN HMG'S ATTITUDE TOWARDS THE CAMP DAVID PROCESS AND THAT OF "SOME OTHER COUNTRIES". HE RECALLED THAT HMG HAD WELCOMED THE CAMP DAVID AGREEMENT AND THE PEACE AGREEMENT BETWEEN EGYPT AND ISRAEL. THERE WAS NO DOUBT IN HIS MIND ABOUT OUR POSITION ON THESE TWO DOCUMENTS.
3. HOWEVER, ISRAEL HAD FROM TIME TO TIME BEEN "SURPRISED" BY POSITIONS TAKEN, OR STATEMENTS MADE BY REPRESENTATIVES OF HMG, WHICH DID NOT APPEAR CONSONANT WITH OUR ENDORSEMENT OF THE CAMP DAVID PROCESS. HE WISHED IN PARTICULAR TO DRAW ATTENTION TO THE USE OF THE TERM "SELF-DETERMINATION" PER SE IN THE FCO'S SPOKESMAN'S STATEMENT. THIS CONSTITUTED A STEP BEYOND THE FORMULATION USED BY THE IRISH FOREIGN MINISTER IN THE UN GENERAL ASSEMBLY LAST SEPTEMBER. IT WAS HARD TO DESCRIBE IT AS HELPFUL - AND THIS WAS AN UNDERSTATEMENT - AS FAR AS THE PEACE PROCESS WAS CONCERNED.
4. SASSOON WENT ON TO STRESS THAT IN THE CONTEXT OF PRESENT EVENTS, THE ARABS WOULD CERTAINLY INTERPRET THE USE OF THE EXPRESSION "SELF-DETERMINATION" AS IMPLYING BRITISH APPROVAL OF THE CONCEPT OF A PALESTINIAN STATE. HE WAS NOT SAYING THAT THIS WAS HMG'S VIEW OF ITS MEANING. BUT (HE WISHED AGAIN TO EMPHASISE) THE ARABS WOULD CERTAINLY TAKE IT THIS WAY. AS WE KNEW, THERE WAS A CONSENSUS IN ISRAEL ON THE IMPOSSIBILITY OF ANY SUCH "HYPOTHETICAL" STATE BECAUSE OF THE THREAT THAT THIS WOULD POSE TO HER SECURITY. TO

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/SPEAK OF

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SPEAK OF "SELF-DETERMINATION" NOW, WHILE THE AUTONOMY NEGOTIATIONS WERE AT SUCH A DELICATE STAGE, WAS TO PLACE AN OBSTACLE IN THE PATH OF THEIR SUCCESSFUL CONCLUSION. AT THIS POINT, SASSON DREW ATTENTION TO MR BEGIN'S DECLARATION AT THE END OF HIS SPEECH IN THE KNESSET YESTERDAY (MY TELEGRAM NO 101) THAT THE ISRAEL GOVERNMENT WOULD "UNDER NO CIRCUMSTANCES AGREE TO A PALESTINIAN STATE".

5. SASSON ALSO EXPRESSED THE ISRAEL GOVERNMENT'S "SENSE OF PUZZLEMENT" ABOUT THE TIMING OF THE SPOKESMAN'S COMMENTS SO SOON AFTER PRESIDENT GISCARD'S STATEMENT IN KUWAIT. SINCE THE INTRODUCTION OF THIS "NEW ELEMENT" AS NOT IN ACCORDANCE WITH THE CAMP DAVID AGREEMENT, AND IN FACT CONTRADICTED IT, THE SPOKESMAN'S COMMENTS WOULD HARDLY FACILITATE THE AUTONOMY NEGOTIATIONS. ISRAEL WAS PARTICULARLY PUZZLED IN THE LIGHT OF HER BELIEF THAT HMG WISHED TO SEE THESE NEGOTIATIONS SUCCEED AND AN AGREEMENT ON AUTONOMY IMPLEMENTED. MOREOVER, IN ARAB MINDS, AS HE HAD SAID, "SELF-DETERMINATION" EQUALLED "PALESTINE STATE". THEY DID NOT SEE THE ACHIEVEMENT OF SUCH A STATE AS AN INTERIM ARRANGEMENT. YET THE PARTIES TO THE CAMP DAVID AGREEMENT WERE CLEAR THAT THE AUTONOMY NEGOTIATIONS WERE INTENDED TO OBTAIN SUCH AN ARRANGEMENT, AND NO MORE.

6. SUMMING UP, SASSON SAID THAT OUR RECENT VOTE FOR THE SECURITY COUNCIL RESOLUTION ON SETTLEMENTS, TAKEN TOGETHER WITH THE FCO SPOKESMAN'S STATEMENT, CONSTITUTED ACTS WHICH WERE "NOT PARELLEL" WITH THE CAMP DAVID PROCESS AND WERE INDEED OBSTACLES TO IT. ISRAEL REMAINED DETERMINED TO IMPLEMENT THE PEACE TREATY IN FULL AND HAD BEEN FAITHFUL TO IT IN SPIRIT AND LETTER. SHE WAS DETERMINED TO ACHIEVE A SUCCESSFUL OUTCOME OF THE AUTONOMY NEGOTIATIONS. IF THERE WERE AGREEMENT, THE PALESTINIAN ARABS ON THE WEST BANK WOULD HAVE TO DECIDE WHETHER OR NOT TO PARTICIPATE IN ELECTIONS. IT WAS IMPORTANT THAT AN INTERNATIONAL CLIMATE BE CREATED IN WHICH THEY WOULD BE ENCOURAGED TO DO SO. REFERENCES TO "SELF-DETERMINATION" WOULD NOT BE HELPFUL IN THIS CONTEXT. THEY WOULD INDEED ENCOURAGE THE PALESTINIANS ON THE WEST BANK TO HOLD OUT FOR A BETTER OFFER I.E. A PALESTINIAN STATE, WHICH WAS A "PHANTOM".

7. AT A NUMBER OF POINTS THROUGHOUT HIS STATEMENT, SASSON STRESSED THAT HE WAS NOT SPEAKING TO ME IN THE SAME TERMS AS HE HAD USED WITH "ANOTHER GOVERNMENT" (AN OBVIOUS REFERENCE TO MR CIECHANOVER'S PROTEST TO THE FRENCH AMBASSADOR; MY TELEGRAM NO 99). HE WAS ADDRESSING A FRIENDLY GOVERNMENT WHICH HAD WELCOMED CAMP DAVID. KNOWING BRITAIN'S INFLUENCE WITHIN THE EUROPEAN COMMUNITY,

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HE HOPED THAT OUR POSITIVE ATTITUDE TOWARDS THE CAMP DAVID WOULD REFLECT ITSELF IN THE COMMUNITY'S DISCUSSIONS ON MIDDLE EASTERN QUESTIONS.

8. I CONFINED MYSELF TO RESTATING THE POINTS MADE BY THE SPOKESMAN ON 4 MARCH, STRESSING THE CONTINUITY BETWEEN WHAT HE HAD SAID AND THE RELEVANT SECTION OF THE IRISH FOREIGN MINISTER'S SPEECH LAST SEPTEMBER. I ALSO EMPHASISED HIS INSISTENCE THAT ANY SOLUTION MUST RECOGNISE THE PALESTINIAN RIGHT TO SELF-DETERMINATION WITHIN THE FRAMEWORK OF A NEGOTIATED SETTLEMENT. THIS QUALIFICATION WAS EXTREMELY IMPORTANT. SASSON REMAINED UNMOVED. WHATEVER OUR INTENTIONS, THE BRITISH PRESS WAS NOW WIDELY INTERPRETING THE SPOKESMAN'S COMMENTS AS REPRESENTING A FURTHER SHIFT TOWARDS THE ARABS. I SAW NO POINT IN PROLONGING AND ESSENTIALLY STERILE EXCHANGE AND ENDED THE CONVERSATION BY UNDERTAKING TO REPORT SASSON'S DEMARCHE TO YOU.

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Israel



10 DOWNING STREET

From the Private Secretary

7 March, 1980.

Dear Nalash,

I write to confirm that Mr. Yadin, the Israel Deputy Prime Minister, will be seeing the Prime Minister at 1630 on Wednesday, 12 March.

You promised to let me have briefing by close of play on Tuesday, 11 March.

Yours,

Caro de Stepan

Malcolm Adams, Esq.,  
Foreign and Commonwealth Office.

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*Israeli*

5 March 1980

Visit by Professor Yigael Yadin

You wrote to me on 3 March about Professor Yadin's visits. The Prime Minister would have liked to have received Professor Yadin but unfortunately she will be leaving London on 13 March immediately after Questions for a visit to Yorkshire and will not be returning to London until 15 March. Since 13 March is a Cabinet day, there is, I fear, no possibility of the Prime Minister seeing Professor Yadin. The Prime Minister would be grateful if you could arrange to ensure that Professor Yadin is aware of the reasons for her inability to see him.

MICHAEL ALEXANDER

Paul Lever, Esq.,  
Foreign and Commonwealth Office.

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Prime Minister  
 It is not really possible for you  
 to see him: 13 March: Cabinet +  
 questions followed by departure on train;  
 14 March in train to Yorkshire.

Foreign and Commonwealth Office

London SW1A 2AH

3 March 1980

Dear Michael,

Regret?

Print 4/3

Can we explain  
 why - in our  
 reply, not

VISIT BY PROFESSOR YIGAEI YADIN TO LONDON

The Israeli Deputy Prime Minister, Professor Yadin is making a private visit to London from 13-15 March. He has asked whether it would be possible to arrange a call on the Prime Minister. I enclose a personality note.

Lord Carrington agrees that it would be useful if the Prime Minister could find time to see Professor Yadin. His influence (and that of his two Democratic Movement Cabinet colleagues) on the policies of Mr Begin's Government is strictly limited, and his political future must be in doubt. Yadin's own views on Arab/Israel and, for example, the questions of autonomy and settlements in the occupied territories are moderate and constructive by Israeli standards, and in marked contrast with those of other members of Mr Begin's Government. On the other hand, in a recent public speech he accused Britain of not supporting the Camp David Agreements and of attempting to disrupt the peace process by launching a diplomatic initiative to placate the PLO. A meeting at this time would provide a timely opportunity to attempt to correct these misapprehensions and to urge the need for early and constructive progress in the autonomy negotiations.

Mr Yadin will arrive at Heathrow at 9.10 am on 13 March. He is to address the Annual Dinner of the Anglo-Israel Association at the Savoy at 7.30 pm on that day, but will be free at any other time on 13 March or on 14 March, preferably before 5.30 pm when the Sabbath begins. He leaves on 15 March.

Yours ever

Paul  
 (P Lever)

M O'D B Alexander Esq  
 10 Downing Street



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