Israel International Relations: Israel - Qatar Relations

Qatar’s Connections to Terror
Early Contacts and Trade Ties
Strained Relations and Closure of Trade Offices
Mediation Efforts and Renewed Engagement
The Gaza Focus
War in Gaza and Qatar’s Role
Impact of Al Jazeera and its Anti-Israel Bias
The “Qatargate” Scandal
Qatar’s Relationship with the U.S.
Boycott of Qatar by Arab Countries and Use of American Jews
Qatar’s Contributions to U.S. Universities
Challenges and Future Outlook
Operation Summit of Fire

The relationship between Israel and Qatar is complex and multifaceted, characterized by periods of both overt and clandestine engagement alongside significant tensions. Despite the absence of formal diplomatic relations, the two nations have maintained channels of communication and, at times, cooperation, primarily driven by regional dynamics and pragmatic interests, particularly concerning the Israeli-Palestinian conflict and the Gaza Strip.

Qatar’s Connections to Terror

Qatar, a hereditary monarchy, has long pursued a foreign policy shaped by its ideological alignment with Islamist movements. It has provided political and financial support to groups such as Hamas, al-Qaeda, the Taliban, Al Nusra Front, Al Shabaab, and ISIS. Doha has hosted senior leaders from these organizations, including top Hamas officials and Yusuf al-Qaradawi, a cleric who justified suicide bombings against Israelis. The Qatar-based International Union of Muslim Scholars has issued religious rulings calling for jihad against Israel.

Between 1993 and 1996, Qatar employed and sheltered Khalid Sheikh Mohammed (KSM), who would later mastermind the 9/11 attacks, as well as other terror plots, including the 1993 World Trade Center bombing and the murder of journalist Daniel Pearl. A high-ranking Qatari official reportedly warned KSM of a pending FBI operation, enabling his escape. During his time in Qatar, KSM also supported terror operatives and received funding through government channels.

In addition to its harboring of terrorists, Qatar reportedly acquired U.S.-made Stinger missiles through illicit channels and refused to disclose their origin. Its leadership has publicly identified with Wahhabi ideology and expressed familial ties to its founder. These actions have deepened Israeli and American concerns that Qatar continues to empower violent Islamist groups, undermining regional stability and efforts toward peace.

Early Contacts and Trade Ties

Informal ties between Israel and Qatar emerged following the Oslo Accords in September 1993. That same month, the first secret meeting took place between the Israeli and Qatari foreign ministers. This intermittent relationship evolved into formal relations in April 1996, with trade offices established in each other’s territories. These offices operated as embassies in all but name, marking Qatar as the first Gulf Cooperation Council (GCC) state to grant Israel de facto recognition. During this period, Israel even considered the possibility of purchasing gas from Qatar. In 1996, then-Israeli Prime Minister Shimon Peres made an official visit to Qatar. Qatar also engaged in the multilateral talks launched after the Madrid Conference, expressing its willingness to cooperate and support the peace process, contingent on progress in the Israeli-Palestinian track.

Strained Relations and Closure of Trade Offices

The election of Benjamin Netanyahu as Israeli Prime Minister in May 1996 and the subsequent opening of the Western Wall tunnel led to a deterioration in relations. Despite this, Qatar hosted the Israeli trade minister at an economic summit in Doha in 1997, causing Arab outrage. As the Israeli-Palestinian peace process stagnated and Israeli actions drew criticism, Qatar faced increasing pressure to distance itself from Israel. Following the outbreak of the Second Intifada in 2000, Qatar closed the Israeli trade office in Doha in November 2000 under regional pressure, although secret meetings and unofficial cooperation reportedly continued.

Mediation Efforts and Renewed Engagement

As Qatar’s regional diplomatic ambitions grew, it repeatedly offered to broker peace between Israel and Arab states. In 2003, the foreign ministers of both countries met in Paris to discuss peace efforts. Following Israel’s disengagement from Gaza in 2005, an Israeli trade office reopened in Doha, paving the way for further high-level meetings. In 2008, Israeli Foreign Minister Tzipi Livni made a historic visit to Qatar. However, relations took another downturn during Israel’s Operation Cast Lead in Gaza in 2008-2009, leading Qatar to suspend official ties once again and close the trade office. Despite this, Qatar offered to assist in brokering a ceasefire.

The Gaza Focus

Since the mid-2010s, the relationship has been significantly shaped by the situation in the Gaza Strip. Qatar has become a key financial lifeline for Gaza and has played a crucial mediating role between Israel and Hamas. With Israel’s permission, Qatar has donated substantial funds for humanitarian relief, infrastructure projects, and the payment of salaries in Gaza. This cooperation, driven by a mutual interest in preventing further escalation, has led to frequent, though often indirect, communication between Israeli and Qatari officials. Qatar’s envoy to Gaza has played a significant role in these efforts.

Despite Qatar’s support for Hamas, the Israeli government under Benjamin Netanyahu approved the transfer of Qatari funds to Gaza. Qatar donated over $1.1 billion to Gaza between 2012 and 2018 with the Israeli government’s permission. Netanyahu’s reasons for approving this support included the belief that the funding would calm Hamas-sponsored protests from Gaza along Israeli borders, reduce the motivation for terror attacks, prevent a humanitarian crisis, and be vital for preserving regional stability. Additionally, it was assumed that without Qatari financial aid, Hamas might strengthen its ties with Iran. The transfer of Qatari money was also seen as a way to avoid further escalation and a potential war with Hamas.

War in Gaza and Qatar’s Role

Following Hamas’s October 7, 2023, attack, Qatar has acted as a mediator and is viewed as holding significant diplomatic leverage over Hamas. Mossad Director David Barnea visited Qatar multiple times to negotiate the release of Israeli hostages in Gaza, while a Qatari delegation established a liaison office in Israel to coordinate the exchange of Israeli and Palestinian prisoners. Qatar played a vital role in securing the first release of Israeli hostages. At the same time, Qatar continued to host Hamas leaders, and its financial support for Hamas has been labeled as material support for terrorism. Critics argue that Qatar possessed levers it has opted not to activate to pressure Hamas into releasing hostages. Despite its mediation efforts, Qatar has faced accusations of blaming Israel for the war instigated by Hamas. In November 2024, Qatar announced the suspension of its mediation efforts between Hamas and Israel until the involved parties showed a willingness to end the war. Reports in November 2024 indicated that Hamas offices were temporarily closed in Qatar due to pressure from the Biden administration. A few weeks later, however, aides to President-elect Donald Trump advised Qatar to return the Hamas leaders to Doha.

Impact of Al Jazeera and its Anti-Israel Bias

Al Jazeera, an international television network owned by Qatar, has become a significant source of contention due to its strong anti-Israel stance. The network has faced accusations of amplifying Islamist propaganda and disseminating anti-Israel rhetoric that inflames the Arab world, including praising terrorist operations against Israel and promoting a subversive discourse. Al Jazeera’s reporting on the Israeli-Palestinian conflict is perceived as heavily biased, emphasizing Palestinian casualties while downplaying or misrepresenting Israeli perspectives and suffering. Some Al Jazeera journalists were identified as Hamas operatives during the Israel-Hamas war. The network has consistently opposed the normalization of relations between Arab states and Israel, and Israel has frequently criticized Al Jazeera’s coverage, ultimately shutting down its office in Israel in May 2024.

The “Qatargate” Scandal

In early 2025, Israeli authorities launched an investigation dubbed “Qatargate,” focusing on allegations that two of Prime Minister Netanyahu’s media advisors, Jonatan Urich and Eli Feldstein, were compensated to promote Qatari interests in Israeli media. Police suspect that the two received payments—some funneled through the U.S.-based lobbying firm ThirdCircle—to disseminate pro-Qatar messaging from the Prime Minister’s Office, particularly emphasizing Qatar’s role in mediating with Hamas over Egypt. The Qatari government has denied the allegations. The investigation has expanded to include journalists amid concerns about media complicity. The scandal has raised alarms due to Qatar’s ties to Hamas and its purported influence within Netanyahu’s inner circle.

A Haaretz exposé in May 2025 reveals that aides to Netanyahu, including Israel Einhorn and Yonatan Urich, received indirectly from Qatar for a campaign to improve its global image ahead of the 2022 World Cup. The funds were funneled through a British firm linked to a former Mossad agent because Perception, Einhorn’s company, couldn’t contract directly with Qatar. The campaign, known as “Project Lighthouse,” is now under criminal investigation in Israel, with Urich and others under house arrest. Despite denials from Perception, restored messages show links to Qatari entities even during the war in Gaza in 2024.

Qatar’s Relationship with the U.S.

Qatar’s foreign policy is marked by its independence and willingness to engage with various actors, even those in conflict with each other. Qatar maintains close ties with the United States, hosting the U.S. Central Command regional headquarters (CENTCOM) at Al-Udeid Air Base. This strategic relationship with the U.S. adds another layer to its complex connection with Israel. Relations between Trump Administration officials and Qatar evolved through private ties and public ambivalence.

In September 2024, Donald Trump met Emir Tamim and Prime Minister Mohammed Al Thani at Mar-a-Lago, calling the Emir a “great and powerful leader,” reflecting ongoing personal-level engagement with Qatar. On his first presidential visit to the Gulf nation in 2017, Trump called Qatar “a funder of terrorism at a very high level.” However, during his 2025 visit to Doha, the president praised Qatari Emir Sheikh Tamim bin Hamad al-Thani as an “outstanding man.”

Despite the administration’s more public alignment with Saudi Arabia and the UAE, several officials maintained personal or financial links with Qatar. FBI director Kash Patel consulted for Qatar through his firm Trishul; Attorney General Pam Bondi lobbied for Qatar at Ballard Partners; EPA Administrator Lee Zeldin had Qatari ties via Heritage Advisors; Envoy for Middle East Peace Steve Witkoff had prior financial dealings with the country and praised it on multiple forums. Despite the administration’s harsh rhetoric on radical Islam, it avoided directly condemning Qatar’s support for groups like Hamas. 

Boycott of Qatar by Arab Countries and Use of American Jews

In 2017, Saudi Arabia, the UAE, Bahrain, and Egypt launched a boycott against Qatar, primarily due to Qatar’s close affinity with the Muslim Brotherhood and its outreach to Iran. To counter this isolation and improve its image in the United States, Qatar attempted to use American Jewish and pro-Israel organizations. The strategy involved donating to Zionist American organizations, hiring a media advisor identified with the Jewish right in the U.S., and launching extensive lobbying among Jewish communities. The Qataris seemingly believed that the “Jewish lobby” in the U.S. could provide a counterweight to the Gulf boycott and highlight Qatar’s importance to American interests in the Middle East. The boycott was ultimately lifted as part of a US-brokered agreement in 2020, during the final days of the first Trump Administration.

Qatar’s Contributions to U.S. Universities

Qatar has become a major donor to American colleges and universities, ranking among the top foreign contributors. Between 2001 and 2021, Qatar reportedly donated approximately $4.7 billion to these institutions. Examples of this funding include the establishment of American university campuses in Doha, such as Georgetown University’s School of Foreign Service in Qatar. Concerns have been raised about the potential impact of this funding on academic freedom, institutional values, curriculum development, and faculty recruitment, especially given Qatar’s poor human rights record. Some worry that the funding might influence the education of future U.S. decision-makers by encouraging further scrutiny of Israel and discouraging criticism of Islam and Qatar. However, there is no concrete evidence that Qatari funding directly leads to a detrimental influence on U.S. higher education or national security, with Qatar’s most significant donations often directed towards benign purposes like medical centers.

Challenges and Future Outlook

In May 2025, the Prime Minister’s Office (PMO) denied a report claiming it blocked a Knesset bill to designate Qatar as a “terror-supporting state,” a move initiated by several right-wing MKs and proposed initially by Economy Minister Nir Barkat. The bill, which sought to create a new legal category that would ban donations, trade, and diplomacy with Qatar, accused the Gulf state of backing terror groups like Hamas and Hezbollah. While the National Security Council reportedly halted the bill at the PMO’s request due to security establishment opposition, the Shin Bet and Mossad claimed they weren’t consulted. The PMO called the report “fake news” and insisted the bill is still under serious consideration.

In the aftermath of the Israel-Hamas war, Israel seeks to reduce Qatar’s influence in Gaza. Looking ahead, the normalization of formal relations between Israel and Qatar seems unlikely in the near term, mainly due to Qatar’s dedication to the Palestinian issue and the potential backlash from Arab public opinion. Nevertheless, Qatar’s ability to mediate and provide crucial humanitarian aid makes it a significant player in the region, particularly in relation to Gaza. The relationship is likely to continue to be driven by pragmatic considerations and the ongoing need to navigate the complexities of the Israeli-Palestinian conflict.

Operation Summit of Fire

Israel conducted a strike against senior Hamas leaders in Doha, Qatar, on September 9, 2025. Operation Summit of Fire targeted Khalil al-Hayya, Hamas’s chief negotiator in hostage and ceasefire talks. 

Since the U.S. has its largest base in the Middle East in Qatar, it would have detected the incoming aircraft. Reports indicated that President Trump was informed in advance of the planned strike and approved it. Netanyahu made clear, however, who was responsible: “Today’s action against the top terrorist chieftains of Hamas was a wholly independent Israeli operation. Israel initiated it, Israel conducted it, and Israel takes full responsibility.”

Qatar strongly condemned Israel’s strike in Doha, framing it as an unjustified attack on a residential area known to house Hamas negotiators, their families, diplomats, and journalists, which killed a Qatari security officer and injured civilians. Doha characterized the operation as a blatant violation of its sovereignty and international law, likening Israel’s actions to extremist behavior that undermines peace efforts. Qatari leaders accused Israel of arrogance, lawlessness, and indifference to the hostages’ fate, arguing the strike deliberately sabotaged ceasefire negotiations and prolonged Palestinian suffering. At the UN, Qatar stressed its record of mediating hostage releases and humanitarian aid, called on the Security Council to uphold international order, and vowed to continue its diplomatic role under the Emir’s leadership toward a ceasefire, humanitarian relief, and a two-state solution.

On September 29, 2025, Israeli Prime Minister Benjamin Netanyahu apologized to Qatari Prime Minister Mohammed bin Abdulrahman Al Thani for the airstrike. The apology, made during a White House meeting with President Donald Trump, was a key Qatari condition for resuming its mediation with Hamas on a Gaza ceasefire and hostage deal. The strike, aimed initially at Hamas leaders, failed to achieve its target but angered Arab leaders and the White House, with Trump previously demanding assurances that Israel would not strike Qatar again. Israel also agreed to compensate the slain officer’s family.

On the same day, President Donald Trump issued an executive order reaffirming the United States’ security commitment to Qatar, citing their longstanding military and diplomatic partnership. The order declares that any armed attack on Qatar’s territory, sovereignty, or critical infrastructure will be regarded as a threat to U.S. peace and security, prompting a U.S. response through diplomatic, economic, or, if necessary, military means. It directs joint contingency planning between U.S. and Qatari forces, requires the Secretary of State to reaffirm these assurances and coordinate with allies, and emphasizes continued partnership with Qatar in mediation and conflict resolution, while clarifying that the order creates no enforceable rights.

Sources: “History of the Qatari-Israeli alliance,” Qatarileaks, (January 12, 2018).
Michal Yaari, “Issue Palestinian the by Nurtured Relations,” Mitvim, (March 2020).
Giorgio Cafiero, Claire Fuchs, “Understanding Israel’s Relationship with Qatar,” American Conservative, (September 8, 2020).
Elie Podeh, “Are Israel and Qatar allies or enemies? - opinion,” Jerusalem Post, (December 15, 2023).
Mitchell Bard, “Arab Funding of American Universities: Donors, Recipients, and Impact,” AICE, (May 2024).
Elliot Abrams, “Why All the Criticism of Qatar?” Council on Foreign Relations, (June 19, 2024).
“Qatar,” BICOM, (December 2024).
“Deal of the Century: Solving the Middle East,” Vandenberg Coalition, (January 2025).
Mitchell Bard, “Qatar is now the deep state in the Trump administration,” JNS, (February 12, 2025).
Emily Jacobs, “Lee Zeldin reveals Qatar ties in financial disclosures,” JewishInsider, (February 10, 2025).
Natalie Ecanow, “To Make Progress on Gaza Hostages, Raise the Pressure on Hamas’ Sponsor: Qatar,” The Sun, (March 14, 2025).
Natalia Ecanow, “Qatar’s Footprint in the American Higher Education System,” FDD, (April 2, 2025).
Ben Sales, “‘Qatargate’ and the web of huge scandals rocking Israel, explained,” Forward, (April 3, 2025).
Michael Milstein, “Israel’s Qatar dilemma: Ally, mediator or enemy?” Ynet, (April 5, 2025). 
Khaled Abu Toameh, “Qatar’s Muslim ‘Scholars’ Call For Death And Destruction,” Gatestone Institute, (April 7, 2025).
Nava Freiberg, Lazar Berman, “Netanyahu says hostage deal was ‘about to materialize,’ but Qatar wouldn’t help,” Times of Israel, (May 5, 2025).
Bar Peleg, “Qatar Paid Netanyahu’s Aides for World Cup Campaign via U.K. Firm,” Haaretz, (May 12, 2025).
Yigal Carmon, “Qatar’s Support For Anti-U.S. Terrorist Activity And Attacks,” MEMRI, (May 12, 2025).
Michael D. Shear, Adam Rasgon, Tariq Panja, With Trump Visit, “Qatar’s Image Makeover Scores Another Success,” New York Times, (May 14, 2025).
Tal Shalev, Maureen Chowdhury, Catherine Nicholls, Elise Hammond, Tori B. Powell, Max Saltman, Billy Stockwell, Mohammed Tawfeeq, “Israel targets Hamas leadership in Qatar strike,” CNN, (September 9, 2025).
Or Shaked, “Qatar received backing from members of the Security Council; Ambassador Danon to the Qatari Prime Minister: “History will not forgive.”” Israel Hayom, (September 11, 2025). [Hebrew]
Barak Ravid, “Scoop: Netanyahu apologizes to Qatar for violating sovereignty with airstrike,” Axios, (September 29, 2025).
“Assuring the Security of the State of Qatar,” White House, (September 29, 2025).