Table of Contents

The Arab lobby’s strategy for shaping U.S. policy and influencing the next generation of leaders begins on college campuses. Given the hostile environment toward Jews prevalent on campuses today, there is a valid concern that it might be fueled by Arab funding. Legitimate fears have also been raised about the broader implications of foreign donations on national security, research, and instruction. In response to these concerns, AICE has updated its landmark report, Arab Funding of American Universities: Donors, Recipients, and Impact.

The report documents the pressure on universities to avoid teaching or research that might offend Arab donors. It also highlights concerns about the potential influence of Arab governments on U.S. universities, including the acceptance of funding from countries with poor human rights records and limited freedoms. This raises questions about potential compromises to academic freedom and institutional values.

The Department of Education (DoE) has complicated assessment efforts by failing to clarify fund usage, changing data from previous reports, misreporting information, and omitting donations. Consequently, evaluating the influence of Arab funding requires greater reliance on limited published data beyond DoE reports.

Given that caveat, the data published in early 2025 revealed that since 1981:

Colleges and universities received over $62 billion from foreign sources.
Nearly one-fourth, or $14.6 billion, came from Arab individuals, institutions, and governments.
Three countries account for 83% of Arab funding: Qatar ($6.6 billion), Saudi Arabia ($3.9 billion), and the UAE ($1.7 billion).
Arab funders made 13,847 contributions to 290 institutions in 49 states (excluding Alaska) and the District of Columbia.
Nearly three-fourths of the Arab contributions, worth over $10.7 billion (73% of the total), do not list their purpose.
Most donations with a description of their use are for financial assistance to the roughly 30,000 students from Arab countries (mostly from Saudi Arabia and Kuwait). This is only $1.9 billion or 13% of the total funding.
Arab funding has grown significantly, with nearly one-third of donations made since 2020. In the year since the last DoE report, a record $1.5 billion was contributed.
Cornell is by far the largest beneficiary, with donations totaling $2.3 billion, followed by Carnegie Mellon ($1.05 billion), Georgetown ($1.016 billion), and Texas A&M ($1.015 billion).
Due to lax compliance and enforcement, billions of dollars in contributions were not reported to the DoE.

The report also found that:

Universities receiving Arab funding have faculty who are apologists for radical Islam and vitriolic critics of Israel who support the anti-Semitic Boycott, Divestment, and Sanctions (BDS) movement.
Arab funding raises concerns about the education of future decision-makers, including those attending elite universities and prestigious institutes, and its potential impact on U.S. policy.
Arab states are primarily motivated to support universities to enhance their image, train their citizens, and discourage criticism of Islam rather than disparage Israel or Jews.
Arab funding may compromise U.S. national security.
It is challenging to determine whether Arab funding influences faculty or whether it flows to faculty whose views are already aligned with those of the donors.
No evidence links Arab funding of universities to student demonstrations following the October 7, 2023, Hamas invasion of Israel, anti-Semitism, or hostility toward Israel.
Today’s anti-Semitism is less about foreign dollars and more about decades of ideological capture.

The report recommends a series of measures to address these concerns:

Establish clear guidelines for foreign funding to ensure it does not compromise academic freedom or national security.
Lower the reporting threshold from $250,000 to $50,000.
Mandate full disclosure of donor identities and the purpose of all foreign gifts—including previously unreported contributions—and make this information public on university websites and in financial reports.
Require similar reporting to state authorities.
Disclose by country of origin, the number of foreign students, and the amount of tuition received.
Reveal all revenue generated from campuses in foreign countries and fees received from individuals or entities in those countries to manage and maintain them.
Empower the DoE to enforce compliance with reporting requirements and mandate that its reports include complete information on donor identities, whether governmental or individual, and the use of funds received.
Task congressional committees to investigate the impact of foreign funding on national security.
Create a blue-ribbon committee of scholars to assess the impact of foreign funding on academic freedom, campus culture, and attitudes toward Jews and Israel.
Consider banning or capping funding from non-democratic countries that abuse human rights or pose a security threat to the United States.
Require the closing of campuses in foreign countries that compromise national security or conflict with U.S. foreign policy objectives.
Investigate the impact of Arab funding on teaching, curricula, faculty hiring, outreach programs, and research priorities.

Conclusion: The report emphasizes the importance of increased transparency and accountability in foreign funding to safeguard academic integrity and prevent external influences on research agendas, curricula, and faculty hiring decisions. It calls for a principled approach to ensure that universities serve the interests of students and society, rather than foreign donors.

The Problem: Lack of Transparency

This paper does not seek to vilify Arab funding sources. Rather, it presents a principled case for greater transparency to protect academic integrity, promote open intellectual exchange, and prevent external funding from influencing research agendas, curricula, or faculty hiring decisions. Concerns are growing that some faculty members’ views on Middle East issues may be indirectly shaped—or even incentivized—by foreign donors, raising troubling questions about academic independence.

Under Section 117 of the Higher Education Act of 1965, universities are required to disclose foreign gifts and contracts of $250,000 or more. The Department of Education (DoE) issues public reports based on that information biannually. Yet for years, this requirement was widely ignored. Universities often failed to report, and the DoE essentially looked the other way. As a result, the public only learns of many foreign contributions when institutions voluntarily publicize them, typically to announce new programs or endowed positions.

A turning point came in 2019–2020, when the DoE began demanding more detailed disclosures. In 2020, the department initiated investigations into whether universities were complying with the law. It dismissed claims that the reporting burden was unreasonable, citing implausible examples—such as Yale reporting no foreign gifts for four consecutive years or Case Western Reserve reporting none for 12. The DoE argued that if institutions can track tuition payments, they can trace foreign contributions.

Key concerns of the U.S. government regarding undue foreign influence are:

Failure of researchers to disclose support from outside activities or foreign organizations in federal grant applications that may overlap with the grant scope or over-commit researchers.
Sharing confidential information by researchers serving as peer reviewers of federal grant applications.
Undisclosed significant financial conflicts of interest.
Misappropriation or unlawful transfer of U.S. intellectual property, data, or unpublished research results.
Unlawful transfer of research materials and samples.
Presence of agreements with foreign entities that may impose obligations on researchers that are contrary to university policies or federal grant requirements.
Data security and cyberattack vulnerability.^{^[1]}

In his first term, Trump’s DoE found that foreign sources hostile to the United States were “targeting their investments to project soft power, steal sensitive and proprietary research, and spread propaganda.” It flagged the absence of sufficient institutional safeguards to manage the risk “that foreign money buys influence or control over teaching and research.” The department expressed particular unease about anonymous donations from China, Saudi Arabia, Qatar, and Russia.^{^[2]}

The DoE under the Biden administration yielded to university requests to shield donor identities, substantially weakening transparency.^{^[3]} Today, the public often learns only the donor’s country of origin and, occasionally, whether the funds came from a university, an oil company, or a governmental body.

Even more troubling, the Biden DoE obfuscated the threats of foreign funding and made it difficult to assess the impact by deleting dates, altering previous reports, misreporting information, and erasing some donations altogether. This erosion of transparency made it more challenging to evaluate whether foreign funds compromised the independence of U.S. academic institutions.

History

As documented in The Arab Lobby, Middle Eastern governments have long recognized the strategic value of American universities as institutions capable of shaping public opinion, policy perspectives, and the biases of future diplomatic elites. These regimes understood that by funding academic programs, they could help cultivate a generation of specialists predisposed to see the region through their own lens and to work, directly and indirectly, on their behalf.^{^[4]}

As former English diplomat John Kelly observed:

The rulers of the Arab oil states are neither simple philanthropists nor disinterested patrons, They expect a return upon their donations to institutions of learning and their subsidies to publishing houses; whether it be in the form of subtle propaganda on behalf of Arab or Islamic causes, or the preferential admission of their nationals, however unqualified ... or the publication of the kind of sycophantic flim-flam about themselves and their countries which now clutters sections of the Western press and even respectable periodical literature.”^{^[5]}

These expectations were not merely speculative. As early as the 1950s, American oil interests, such as Aramco, laid the groundwork for what would become a systematic funding strategy. Colonel William Eddy—a former intelligence officer, Aramco adviser, and State Department representative to Saudi Arabia—offered a candid explanation of this approach in a 1956 letter to his son: “ARAMCO contributes to institutions like Princeton, the Middle East Institute, at [sic] Washington, and the American University of Beirut not only because these centers prepare future employees, but because they also equip men to come out to the Near East in the Foreign Service, or in teaching or in other capacities, which strengthens the small band of Americans who know the Arabs and understand them.”^{^[6]}

Gulf rulers, in particular, wanted Americans to see them as more than greedy autocrats controlling the world’s oil spigot. As Abdulhamid Sabra, then-chair of the history of Islamic science at Harvard, put it: “The Arab nations know they have a stake in American education. They are not well enough understood, and they know it will benefit them when Americans know more about them than how many barrels of oil are being imported, and what it costs.”^{^[7]}

The first donation to an American educational institution appears to have been made in 1969 to tiny Ricker College in Houlton, Maine, which closed in the mid-1970s. It received funding from King Faisal of Saudi Arabia, the government of Kuwait, and Aramco to support the first undergraduate program on the Muslim world in the United States, offering academic credit to students spending their junior year abroad at a college in a Muslim country.

As early as 1976, Arab governments and individuals began making significant gifts to universities to create chairs and centers in Arab, Middle Eastern, and Islamic studies. More than 90 universities sought assistance from Saudi Arabia, but the first endowment was established at USC with a $1 million donation (equivalent to approximately $5.7 million today). Though universities usually jealously guard their prerogatives to choose their faculty and typically refuse to allow donors a say in hiring, Saudi donors were permitted to approve the appointment of the King Faisal Chair in Islamic Studies. Willard Beling, an international relations professor who had worked for Aramco, was given the position. USC president John Hubbard, whose office displayed a photo of himself with Saudi King Khalid, boasted in a 1978 interview that the Saudis had moderated their oil policy “because of the USC connection.”^{^[8]}

Investigative journalist Steven Emerson suggested that USC’s selection as the first recipient of Saudi aid might have been related to the fact that many Saudis attended the school, including future ministers of industry, commerce, and planning. This pattern continued over time: donations often flowed to institutions with personal or political connections to Arab elites.

The strategic nature of these contributions was not lost on the donors. As ARAMCO World—the publication of the Saudi oil conglomerate—noted in its May/June 1979 issue: “When a bank draft arrives from an Arab country to help finance a U.S. university program, or help to fund its scholarship needs, there is little publicity given to the gift although it is invariably received with quiet rejoicing.” The publication listed several donations that had been made by that date and before the period covered by DoE reports:^{^[9]}

Kuwaiti businessman Faisal al-Marzook donated $250,000 to the University of Hartford to fund the construction of playing fields named for his father.
Kuwait donated $1 million to endow a medical chair at St. Luke’s Hospital, an affiliate of Columbia University.
Saudi Arabia donated $200,000 to Duke University for an Islamic and Arabian Studies program.
Sultan Qabus of Oman gave $100,000 each to the Universities of Pennsylvania and Georgetown, and to Johns Hopkins SAIS, to develop Arab studies programs, and $25,000 for the appointment of a professor of Near Eastern science at New York University.
Libya contributed $750,000 for the al-Mukhtar Chair of Arab Culture at Georgetown University and $88,000 to support an interdisciplinary program on Arab development at the University of Utah.
The United Arab Emirates (UAE) donated $250,000 to support a visiting professorship of Arab civilization at Georgetown University.
Kuwait endowed the only chair in the history of Islamic science in the world at that time at Harvard University.
Two-thirds of the funding for Georgetown University’s Center for Contemporary Arab Studies was contributed by a group of Arab countries. The center’s board of advisors includes representatives from Egypt, Jordan, Libya, Qatar, Oman, Saudi Arabia, and the United Arab Emirates.

The dean of Georgetown’s Walsh School of Foreign Service, Peter Krogh, who was a member of a coalition trying to cut U.S. aid to Israel, solicited all the Arab embassies and missions in Washington in 1975 for a new Center for Contemporary Arab Studies. “I went to all of them,” Krogh said, “whether they had diplomatic relations with the United States or not, whether they were moderate or radical, whatever their stripe” (emphasis added).^{^[10]}

The first country to contribute was Oman. Funds from the UAE, Egypt, Jordan, Qatar, Iraq, and Saudi Arabia followed. Kuwait and Oman each gave $1 million in 1980.^{^[11]} After the UAE gave Georgetown $750,000 to endow a chair in Arab studies that year, university president Rev. Timothy Healy said the gift would “help to continue the slow growth of understanding and the work of peace about which all of us at Georgetown care.”^{^[12]} But the gesture, presented as philanthropic, was also strategic. It marked a turning point in how Gulf Arab states began to institutionalize influence within American higher education—by embedding their perspectives directly into academic programs.

After the fall of the Soviet Union and the revolution in Iran, Hasib Sabbagh, a Palestinian businessman with ties to Yasser Arafat who had served as a conduit between the Palestine Liberation Organization (PLO) chairman and President Jimmy Carter,^{^[13]} and Palestinian historian Walid Khalidi feared the United States would see the Middle East as its new enemy. “It was all too easy to pounce on Islam as the new universal threat to Western civilization,” Khalidi believed, because of “the virtually total ignorance of the American public about Islam, as well as on the activities in the United States of a few militant extremists who were Muslims.” The two men believed “an institute dedicated to promoting ecumenical dialogue housed within a major university could” possibly “ward off negative sentiment toward the Middle East and promote positive engagement with the region.” They chose Georgetown “partly because it was a Catholic institution (Hasib himself being Catholic) and partly because Georgetown already had a thriving center for Arab studies, an indication of its openness to the Islamic world.”^{^[14]}

In 1993, Sabbagh’s Swiss Fondation pour l’Entente entre Chrétiens et Musulmans contributed $6.5 million to fund a Center for Muslim-Christian Understanding, which its first director, John Esposito said, “addresses stereotypes of Islam and dangerous misunderstandings of Islam and Muslims, and deals with issues and questions such as the clash of civilizations, and the compatibility of Islam and modern life – from democratization and pluralism to the status of women, minorities, and human rights.”^{^[15]} Arnold observed that much of the work of what is now called the Prince Alwaleed Bin Talal Center for Muslim-Christian Understanding (ACMCU) focuses less on the problem of terror than on how the U.S. war on terror hurt Muslim-Americans and Islamophobia.

Why does a Jesuit University house such a center, given that Christianity is banned in Saudi Arabia? “It only discusses Christianity in the context of its relationship to Islam (or other religions) and does not separately analyze Christian theology and ecclesiology for its own sake,” Arnold noted. “As a result, ACMCU’s courses help Christians to ‘understand’ Muslims, but they do little to help Muslims understand Christians.”^{^[16]}

Given the donor, it is not surprising the center is not for Muslim-Christian-Jewish understanding, but Esposito offered an indirect explanation when he posted on his Facebook page a link to a petition by American Muslims objecting to an initiative “to build relationships of understanding, respect, and trust between North American Muslim and Jewish communities.” They called it a “betrayal of the Palestinian people.”^{^[17]}

ACMCU now has close ties to Qatar. “At least seventeen faculty members have worked with institutions backed by the Qatari regime, worked for Qatari regime entities, or written for Qatari regime media,” according to an investigation by the Middle East Forum, the Pearl Project, and the Clarity Coalition. Qatar also funds a fellowship at Georgetown’s Center for Contemporary Arab Studies.^{^[18]}

In 1982, the Saudi royal family made a $600,000 donation—the largest single gift—to Harvard’s Semitic Museum to preserve photographs of Middle Eastern life. When concerns emerged about the source and intent of the funding, Assistant Curator for Archives Ingeborg O’Reilly insisted, “We would never be able to accept a gift with strings or conditions attached to it” and emphasized that “in this case, there were no strings and no conflict of interest at all.”^{^[19]}

Yet this assurance raises more questions than it answers. When funding flows from governments that tightly control political discourse at home, it is difficult to imagine that such gifts come with no expectations, explicit or otherwise.

Since that time, donations from Arab states have quietly flowed into American universities, steadily creating endowed chairs, research centers, and academic programs that shape the intellectual environment surrounding Middle Eastern studies. These efforts have borne fruit. The Arab lobby has successfully cultivated significant influence over the field, ensuring that a growing number of faculty across the country promote narratives that are pro-Arab (often emphasizing the Palestinian cause), sharply critical of Israel, and frequently silent on the dangers of radical Islam.

These are not incidental outcomes; they align closely with the stated objectives of key donors. Saudi Arabia, for example, has made clear that it seeks “to encourage and develop communication between Islamic culture and other cultures, to encourage greater understanding of the true nature of Islam by clearly explaining the beliefs of Muslims and correcting false conceptions and caricatures, and to show that Islam welcomes knowledge with enthusiasm.”^{^[20]}

In practice, this mission often means funding academic work that presents Islam and the Arab world in a favorable light while discouraging scholarship or public discourse that might offend donor sensibilities. Universities are willing enablers. College presidents—whose success hinges on their fundraising prowess rather than on academic leadership—see dollar signs when they look to the Middle East and have been prospecting for petrodollars for decades.

Most foreign gifts are not overtly political. However, the academic community recognizes that substantial funds are available to institutions that avoid antagonizing Arab donors. The risk is that universities—guardians of free inquiry—will self-censor, not under explicit threat, but in a subtle response to the gravitational pull of financial gain. In doing so, they compromise their mission and allow external actors to influence what should remain independent academic discourse.

How Big are the Incentives?

According to the DoE, between 1981 and February 28, 2025, U.S. colleges and universities received a staggering $62.4 billion from foreign sources, and nearly one-quarter – $14.6 billion – came from Arab individuals, institutions, and governments representing 14 countries and the Palestinian Authority.^{^[21]} This marks a 12% increase—roughly $1.5 billion—over the previous year, underscoring the growing scale and pace of Arab financial involvement in American higher education.

When The Arab Lobby was published in 2010, the DoE reported that between 1986 and 2007, Arab donors made more than 100 contributions totaling just over $320 million. At the time, that seemed substantial—especially since nearly half came from Saudi Arabia and most were made after 9/11, as the Saudis sought to rehabilitate their image in the United States. Yet that total now appears minuscule considering more recent figures. One of the largest donations in the earlier report—nearly $85 million—was a 2005 contract between Qatar and Carnegie Mellon University (CMU) to support an information and technology council, likely tied to the university’s new campus in Doha. As I noted in the book, even that earlier tally almost certainly captured only a fraction of actual foreign contributions, given weak reporting requirements and lax oversight.

The February 2025 report reveals just how much the landscape has changed. In total, 290 institutions in 49 states (missing Alaska) and the District of Columbia received 13,847 separate foreign contributions—a 12% increase from February 2024. These include:

8,001 unrestricted contracts totaling $9.4 billion.
3,549 restricted contracts worth $3.6 billion.
1,718 unrestricted gifts amounting to $1.3 billion.
579 restricted gifts totaling $324 million.

Although only gifts and contracts of $250,000 or more are required to be reported, DoE lists 8,248 smaller contributions—many far below that threshold—adding up to an additional $403 million. Some were as little as a single dollar, raising questions about why such trivial amounts were disclosed and whether universities or donors had strategic motives for doing so. It is particularly notable that so many of these sub-threshold contributions came from Arab sources. What might appear to be token sums could, in fact, represent symbolic gestures of influence or deliberate efforts to establish a financial foothold within key institutions.

Prior to 2020, the DoE only reported the country of origin, omitting any details about the specific source—whether governmental, corporate, or individual. This lack of detail made it virtually impossible to determine the intent or potential influence behind any given gift. The current report is an improvement but still leaves significant gaps. Of the 13,847 contributions recorded in 2025:

6,378 donations (46%), worth $4.4 billion, were explicitly from government sources.
2,327 donations (15%), worth $2.7 billion, were not from government entities.
5,137 donations (37%), worth $6.7 billion, had no information about the source at all.

This lack of transparency is more than a bureaucratic oversight—it’s a systemic failure that prevents the public from understanding who is financing American education and why. When the source of more than a third of all foreign contributions remains undisclosed, meaningful oversight becomes not just difficult, but effectively impossible.

Who are the Funders?

Three countries contributed 83% of all Arab funding. Qatar, which did not begin investing in U.S. institutions until 2002, is by far the leading source – 1,223 donations worth nearly $6.6 billion (45% of the total). Much of this money is funneled through the Qatar Foundation (QF), established in 1995 by then-Emir Sheikh Hamad bin Khalifa Al Thani and his wife Sheikha Moza bint Nasser to “realize their ambitious vision for the future of Qatar.” Nasser, the mother of the current Emir, is the foundation chair.^{^[22]} The Qataris deny that they are “the largest foreign donors to U.S. universities.”^{^[23]} Still, they have invested roughly $2 billion more than Germany, England, and China (Hong Kong is counted separately and would add $2 billion to China’s total, still leaving it a distant second with under $6 billion in contributions).

Table 1
Sources of Funding by Country

	Donations	Amount	Largest	Recipient
Qatar	1,223	$6,572,557,546	$163,575,804	Cornell University
Saudi Arabia	7,890	$3,916,047,714	$43,000,000	MIT
UAE	1,618	$1,729,553,169	$75,000,000	University of Texas MD Anderson Cancer Center
Kuwait	1,765	$1,523,461,640	$284,318,526	University of Missouri, Kansas City
Oman	839	$399,422,378	$138,964,576	Washington State University
Egypt	152	$175,574,380	$31,831,520	Harvard University
Bahrain	69	$105,678,420	$25,770,000	California State University, Northridge
Jordan	99	$64,738,944	$25,175,000	UCLA
Iraq	47	$53,995,660	$39,108,635	University of Arkansas
Morocco	38	$50,104,152	$10,000,000	MIT
Lebanon	57	$30,172,418	$2,500,000	Harvard University
Palestinian Authority	28	$12,178,899	$900,000	Indiana University of Pennsylvania
Libya	13	$7,651,143	$2,210,000	Tufts University
Syria	5	$2,605,641	$1,240,939	University of South Florida
Tunisia	4	$1,293,701	$574,650	Harvard University
Total	13,847	$14,645,035,805

The next biggest spenders after Qatar are Saudi Arabia, which made 7,890 contributions totaling over $3.9 billion (27% of the total), and the UAE, with 1,618 donations worth nearly $1.8 billion (12%). Including Kuwait, which made 1,765 donations totaling $1.5 billion, the top four Arab donors account for a staggering 94% of all Arab giving and 23% of total foreign contributions to U.S. universities.

While it’s no surprise that the Gulf states dominate the donor list, it is striking that Egypt—despite its dire economic straits—ranks as the sixth largest Arab donor.

“Palestine”

The DoE did not assign any money to the Palestinian Authority in the October 2023 report. It previously attributed 19 donations to the non-existent “State of Palestine” — a designation our previous report noted was at odds with official U.S. policy, which does not recognize such a state. Even more problematic, the DoE labeled four additional donations as originating from the “Palestinian Territory, Occupied”—another inaccurate term. The more appropriate attribution would be either “disputed territory” or, preferably, the “Palestinian Authority,” which reflects the political entity exercising some degree of governance.

The February 2024 report listed 24 donations worth $11.6 million from “Palestinian territories.” The February 2025 update added four more, bringing the total to $12.17 million. However, the terminology remains problematic. What exactly constitutes the “Palestinian territories”? Does it refer to areas under PA control? The entire West Bank? East Jerusalem, while claimed by the Palestinians, is under Israeli sovereignty. Roughly 60% of the West Bank remains under full Israeli control per the Oslo Accords and cannot reasonably be defined as part of a Palestinian jurisdiction. The designation “Palestinian Authority” would be more accurate and consistent with U.S. policy. It is also unlikely that any of these funds originated from Israeli-controlled areas.

A previous report said Brown received two donations totaling $643,000 in 2020 to support a professorship in Palestinian Studies. Oddly, the October 2023 report attributed these gifts to Panama. This was corrected in the 2024 report, which reassigned one donation to the Palestinian territories and removed the duplicate second donation. The same single entry appears in the 2025 report.

Yet confusion persists. The most recent filing still lists two same-day donations from “England” totaling $271,876 for the same Brown professorship, raising questions of duplication—or misattribution of a PA-linked donor. Similarly, the UAE is shown giving two identical gifts of $67,969 for the same purpose, which may be duplicates.

Neither the DoE nor Brown would confirm the names of the donors, except for the larger gift, which it acknowledged came from the Munib and Angela Masri Foundation based in PA-controlled Nablus.

A new 2024 donation of $285,899 went to Virginia Polytechnic Institute and State University, again without a disclosed purpose. The bulk of the remaining 21 contracts—totaling $9.7 million—went to Indiana University of Pennsylvania, which seems a surprising recipient. These gifts were not from a government entity and may have come from a private donor with a personal connection to the school.

The stated purposes for these gifts were inconsistent:

Six had no stated purpose, though they were likely intended for financial aid.
Five appeared to be errors, showing tuition payments for students from India.
Three were marked for students from “Palestine/West Bank,” as if the two were distinct places.
The rest were for students from “Palestine.”

Previous reports attributed tuition contracts to the Arab American University, Ramallah.

Harvard also received donations once attributed to the “State of Palestine”: $275,000 in 2017, $775,000 in 2018, and $525,000 in 2019. At the time, the DoE did not disclose the donor or the purpose of the gifts. In 2025, the DoE revised the records—lowering the amounts slightly to $250,000, $750,000, and $500,000, respectively—and labeled the purpose as financial aid. Two additional $25,000 donations in 2018 and 2019 were also listed, but with no stated purpose.

The only donation in the report clearly tied to the Palestinian Authority itself was the one to Virginia Tech. This raises uncomfortable questions. The PA survives on foreign assistance—especially from the U.S. and Europe. Why, then, is it sending money to American universities? For American taxpayers, it raises another question: why should the U.S. subsidize the PA if it has funds to spare on overseas donations?

Funding Has Increased Dramatically

Since the last DoE report, Arab donations to U.S. universities have continued to climb. Qatar led with an additional $608 million (up 10%), followed by Saudi Arabia with $394 million (up 11%), the UAE with $243 million (up 16%), and Kuwait with $165 million (up 12%). Overall, Arab funding has increased significantly over the past decade, accounting for 82% of all recorded donations since 1981.

Figure 1
Funding by Year

The data is based on the date funds were received, as reported by the DoE. When that information was unavailable, the contract start date was used for calculation purposes.

Most contributions have come since 2018, with annual totals consistently exceeding $1 billion. In 2023, donations reached a record high of nearly $1.4 billion. The 2024 figure currently stands at $981 million; however, this number is incomplete, as additional disclosures are expected later in 2025.

Which Universities Benefit the Most?

Unsurprisingly, Arab states have directed a significant share of their funding to Ivy League universities, which collectively received about one-fifth of all Arab donations—roughly $2.5 billion. But the distribution is strikingly uneven: Cornell alone accounts for $2.3 billion of that total. Excluding Cornell, Ivy League institutions received just 3% of all Arab funding.

Harvard ranks among the top recipients among all universities, raking in nearly $358 million. Columbia—ground zero for much of the post-October 7 protests against Israel—received a comparatively modest $70 million. More puzzling is the minimal funding reported by Yale and Princeton: Yale disclosed just 28 donations totaling under $20 million, while Princeton reported only four contributions worth less than $4 million. These surprisingly low figures raise questions about underreporting—or selective disclosure.

Table 2
Donations to Ivy League Schools

School	Grants	Amount
Cornell University	165	$2,303,867,111
Harvard University	347	$357,985,374
Columbia University	176	$70,303,534
University of Pennsylvania	84	$24,434,777
Yale University	28	$19,706,158
Brown University	93	$15,345,423
Princeton University	5	$3,690,000
Dartmouth College	9	$2,862,620

As shown in Table 3, aside from Cornell, the largest cumulative Arab donations went to Carnegie Mellon ($1.05 billion), Georgetown ($1.02 billion), and Texas A&M ($1.01 billion). Together with Cornell, these institutions dominate the funding landscape. The top five universities alone received 42% of all Arab donations, while the top 12 accounted for 59%—underscoring the concentration of this financial influence.

What is Being Funded?

Until 2020, the DoE did not report how universities used foreign gifts. Even today, most of that money remains shrouded in secrecy. More than 70% of all contributions, worth almost $11 billion (73% of all Arab funding), have no description.

Nowhere is the opacity more troubling than in the case of Qatar, the single largest Arab donor. Out of 1,223 separate Qatari contributions, only one-quarter list a purpose. That means the American public—and the U.S. government—remain in the dark about how nearly $5 billion from a regime that funds Al Jazeera, hosts Hamas leadership, and bankrolls Islamist organizations globally is being used on U.S. campuses.

A total of 4,072 contributions (29% of the total) list a purpose. These donations total $3.9 billion, and even those that do identify a purpose are often vague. Some 3,720 contributions (80%) were designated for tuition, scholarships, or other financial aid, totaling $1.9 billion—about half of all funds with an identified purpose, and just 13% of total Arab gifts. The remaining funds are allocated across a diverse range of projects, including medical research on glioblastoma and osteoarthritis, studies of protein malonylation during aging, neurorecovery therapy, 3D magnetic memory devices, advanced porous materials, and corrosion testing. Other funding supports unnamed researchers on unspecified topics.

The largest single donation, exceeding $284 million, was for tuition reimbursement at the University of Missouri-Kansas City during the Spring 2023 semester. This is an astounding sum in any circumstance, but for a single semester’s tuition, it suggests the support for thousands of Kuwaiti students.^{^[24]}

The only other donation in the top 20 that did not originate in Qatar was the $139 million Oman gave to Washington State University to support Omani students. After the Kuwaiti gift, the next three largest donations, ranging from $149 to $155 million, were contributed to Cornell for the Weill Cornell Medicine program in Qatar. Texas A&M received four of the largest donations for its Qatar campus. Eight contributions, each in the odd amount of $99,999,999, were also given to Cornell without a stated purpose, although it is likely they were also intended for the Medical Center.

Saudi Arabia’s largest gift was $43 million, with an unspecified purpose, to MIT. Strangely, the two largest Saudi donations in the prior year’s report – $74 million to the University of Idaho in 2021 and $47 million for Chapman University for tuition were removed.

Table 3
Top 12 Recipients of Funding from Arab Sources

University	Donations	Amount
Cornell University	165	$2,303,867,111
Carnegie Mellon University	57	$1,049,056,831
Georgetown University	104	$1,015,981,277
Texas A&M University	390	$1,014,977,610
Northwestern University	136	$770,074,880
University of Colorado Boulder*	423	$640,383,296
Virginia Commonwealth University	72	$380,059,069
Harvard University	347	$357,985,374
Pennsylvania State University	211	$332,436,524
University of Missouri**	155	$310,447,374
MIT	166	$259,718,423
George Washington	1,255	$257,086,087
Total		$8,692,073,856

*Total, including Colorado Springs and Denver campuses – 574 donations for $799 million.
**Most of the total was from one donation of $284 million from Kuwait.

What is particularly concerning is that none of the more than $2 billion received by CMU and Georgetown – the second- and third-largest recipients of Arab funds – is accounted for in the DoE report.

Unaccountable Millions and Anti-Israel Indoctrination: Brown’s Palestinian Studies Chair

While many critics assume that Arab donations are for political purposes, this presumption cannot be substantiated from the information divulged in the DoE reports. The exceptions are contributions made for a professorship in Palestinian Studies at Brown University. This is a case study in the deficiencies of DoE reporting. The October 2023 report, for example, misattributed two contributions for the chair to Panama. Those do not appear in the 2025 report. Donors from England are still listed as making two contributions for the same amount ($271,876) on February 6, 2020, for the professorship. This could be a duplicate, and there is no way to determine whether the donor is a Palestinian living in England or a British individual or entity. Similarly, the UAE gave two gifts of $67,969 for the position on the same day in 2022. The largest contribution, whose donor was unidentified, was $643,000 in 2020. Brown later acknowledged the Palestinian contributor was the Munib and Angela Masri Foundation.

Contributions to establishing a chair in Palestinian Studies at a prestigious Ivy League school were undoubtedly intended to promote the Palestinian narrative to students who are expected to become influential. The chair, named after the Palestinian poet Mahmoud Darwish, was actually funded by a coalition of nine different donors, including E. Paul Sorensen, an alumnus who supported a graduate stipend in Palestinian Studies, Basem Salfiti, Rasha Abu Ghazaleh Farouki, and the Masri Foundation.^{^[25]} The other donors were not mentioned in the announcement, and a department representative would not disclose their names.^{^[26]}

Munib Masri is a wealthy Palestinian who founded the Palestine Development and Investment Company (PADICO) and an oil and gas company. He is a vocal supporter of the BDS movement who also contributed to Columbia’s Edward Said Chair in Middle Eastern Studies.^{^[27]}

From the outset, the concern was whether the Brown chair would serve as a vehicle for anti-Israel political indoctrination. A.J. Caschetta, a lecturer in English and Political Science at the Rochester Institute of Technology, speculated, “Brown’s Watson Institute for International and Public Affairs, its Center for Middle East Studies, and its New Directions in Palestinian Studies research initiative will now collaborate in a synergistic venture, spending money and hiring teachers to indoctrinate students and ‘inform the community’ about the evils of Israeli colonialism, while stamping its imprimatur on the virtues of the Palestinian cause.”^{^[28]}

These fears were validated when Beshara Doumani, a long-time advocate of the BDS campaign, was appointed as the chair’s first occupant. Doumani later became president (2021–2023) of Birzeit University, notorious for its militant students associated with terror groups such as Hamas and the Popular Front for the Liberation of Palestine (PFLP).^{^[29]}

The Committee for Accuracy in Middle East Reporting and Analysis (CAMERA) examined Doumani’s courses and found troubling ideological bias. In one syllabus, Doumani described the creation of Israel as a manifestation of “European capitalist expansion and imperialist conquest that has devastated Indigenous populations”—a sentence that has more in common with revolutionary propaganda than scholarship.

Referring to Israel as a “settler-colonial state” is not just academically dishonest; it’s a well-worn anti-Semitic trope. The Jewish people are not foreign colonizers in Israel; they are its indigenous population. The idea that Israel was born out of capitalist imperialism is a fabrication, contradicted by both history and law. As CAMERA notes, “Jews were attacked in 1948—not the other way around.”

CAMERA documented other Brown professors pushing a similar narrative. Ariella Azoulay, for instance, taught that students should question how Jews were “whitened” and “disrupted the world they shared with Muslims”—a bizarre racialist theory that echoes white-supremacist ideas in reverse. Abdel Razzaq Takriti, in a course titled “Modern Palestinian History,” described Israel as “one of the longest-running and most significant settler colonial realities in modern history.” And Adi Ophir, in a course on Zionism and racism, likened Jewish Israelis to Nazis, referring to “Kristallnacht mobs thirsty for Palestinian blood.”

The event titles sponsored by Brown’s Middle East Studies Department make the agenda unmistakably clear:

Siri, Is Zionism Settler-Colonialism? The pre- and post 10/7 discourse on the Israeli-Palestinian Conflict in Academia and Activism.
Responsibility to imagine: A future for Israelis and Palestinians without Zionism.
The Israeli Working Class and Israel’s “Fascist Turn.”
Does International Law Matter? The Israeli Occupation and Beyond

These are not academic inquiries. They are activist slogans dressed up as scholarship.

Table 4
Twenty Largest Donations From Arab Sources

Institution	Donor	Amount	Purpose
University of Missouri - Kansas City	Kuwait	$284,318,526	Tuition
Cornell University	Qatar	$163,575,804	Weill Cornell Medicine/Qatar
Cornell University	Qatar	$159,772,293	Weill Cornell Medicine/Qatar
Cornell University	Qatar	$154,974,110	Weill Cornell Medicine/Qatar
Cornell University	Qatar	$151,000,000	Weill Cornell Medicine/Qatar
Cornell University	Qatar	$148,864,293	Weill Cornell Medicine/Qatar
Washington State University	Oman	$138,964,576	Tuition
Cornell University	Qatar	$137,255,000	Weill Cornell Medicine/Qatar
Texas A&M University	Qatar	$100,781,337	Qatar Campus
Cornell University	Qatar	$99,999,999	Unknown
Cornell University	Qatar	$99,999,999	Unknown
Cornell University	Qatar	$99,999,999	Unknown
Cornell University	Qatar	$99,999,999	Unknown
Cornell University	Qatar	$99,999,999	Unknown
Cornell University	Qatar	$99,999,999	Unknown
Cornell University	Qatar	$99,999,999	Unknown
Cornell University	Qatar	$99,999,999	Unknown
Texas A&M University	Qatar	$99,022,925	Qatar Campus
Texas A&M University	Qatar	$95,360,463	Qatar Campus
Texas A&M University	Qatar	$88,192,330	Qatar Campus

What’s Missing?

Due to years of lax compliance and minimal enforcement, many U.S. universities have failed to disclose the full extent of foreign gifts they’ve received—or have reported only partial amounts. The DoE’s 2025 report reflects major revisions to past figures. For example, the total value of foreign contributions reported between 1986 and 2000 was initially listed in 2024 as $22.5 million. That figure has now been revised upward to $78.4 million. Across the entire period from 1986 to 2023, the total was raised by $2.6 billion, from $10.8 billion to $13.4 billion.

Still, a great deal of information is missing. No date of receipt is listed for half of the total funding ($7.3 billion). Some previously reported funding has been removed. The end date for 227 contracts worth more than $1 billion is missing.

Under the Trump administration, DoE cracked down on noncompliance. That pressure prompted some universities to disclose previously unreported gifts and contracts. Still, glaring gaps remain. According to the Network Contagion Research Institute, more than $4 billion in donations from Qatar, Saudi Arabia, and the UAE went undocumented between 2014 and 2019 alone (See Table 5).^{^[30]} Earlier, the Institute for the Study of Global Antisemitism and Policy (ISGAP) found that at least $3.4 billion in foreign gifts and contracts were not reported from 1986 to 2018.

The most egregious example involves the QF, which funneled nearly $4.9 billion to six U.S. universities operating campuses in Doha. Of that, only 60%—about $1.9 billion—was reported. That means nearly $3 billion in Qatari contributions remain unaccounted for.^{^[31]}

Transparency around foreign donations typically emerges only when universities choose to publicize new chairs or programs—or when investigative journalists uncover them. Specific descriptions of gifts in this report are derived from these sources.

In earlier cases, foreign influence was openly celebrated.

For example, in 1980, Oman donated $750,000 to Georgetown to establish the Seif Ghobash Chair in Arab Studies, currently held by BDS supporter Marwa Daoudy and the Sultan Qaboos bin Said Professor of Arabic and Islamic Studies. The same year, Kuwait donated $3 million ($12 million in today’s dollars) for the Sheikh Sabah Al Salem Al Sabah Chair. Oman made an undisclosed contribution in 1993 for the Sultanate of Oman Chair (Georgetown reported three donations that year from Oman worth $4.9 million), which is held by BDS supporter Rochelle Davis. In 2007, an unidentified donor gave an undisclosed amount for the Clovis and Hala Salaam Maksoud Chair in Arab Studies held by BDS supporter Fida Adely.^{^[32]} Qatar also funded two positions for undisclosed amounts: the Hamad bin Khalifa Al-Thani Professorship in the History of Islam and the Hamad bin Khalifa Professorship of Indian Politics.

In 1993, Saudi Arabia sponsored two endowed chairs at Johns Hopkins—one in molecular medicine, another in oncology and pediatrics.^[33] The same year, Saudi King Fahd donated $5 million to establish the King Fahd Chair for Islamic Studies at Harvard.^[34]

The Sultan Endowment for Arab Studies was established in 1998 at the University of California, Berkeley, with a $5 million gift from the Prince Sultan Charity Foundation.^[35] According to the university, “The Sultan Program supports teaching, research, and public outreach on topics related to the Arab and Arab-Islamic world, with the overarching goal of promoting a deeper understanding of this important region.”^[36]

Table 5
Undocumented Funding Sources^[37]
(2014-2019)

Qatar	$2,706,240,869
Saudi Arabia	$1,065,205,930
United Arab Emirates	$431,396,357
Total	$4,202,843,156

Palestinian billionaire Hasib Sabbagh, the original donor for the Center of Muslim-Christian Understanding at Georgetown, funded the Hasib Sabbagh Professorship of Cell Biology at Harvard in 1998. He also endowed the Diana Tamari Sabbagh Chair in Middle Eastern Studies at Rice.^{^[38]} The chair at Rice has been converted to a fellowship. It was formerly held by Samih Al-Abid, who promulgates the canard comparing Israel to Afrikaner South Africa and accuses Israel of creating “Bantustan-like communities” while omitting any mention of terrorism in his analysis of the failure of the Oslo Accords.^{^[39]} The fellowship is now in Middle East Energy Studies and held by Jim Krane, who implied that Israel’s “marginalization of the Palestinians” was the reason for the Hamas-Israel war rather than the October 7, 2023, Hamas massacre of Israelis.^[40]

In 1999, the government and the people of Oman funded the Sultan of Oman Professorship in International Relations at Harvard. The size of the gift was not reported that year. The Sultan was described in a study of Harvard professorships as a “courageous supporter of the Camp David peace accords and an active participant in the search for peace in the Middle East.”^{^[41]}

Tarek Masoud holds the chair. In a message to friends and colleagues, he admitted growing up in Saudi Arabia, and that his “nightmares were often populated by the Israeli soldiers I saw on the news.” He says he has a greater understanding “that Israel is more than just an armed camp that daily heaps indignities upon Arabs,” but admits “those early impressions remain powerful.” He says when he befriends an Israeli, “part of my brain cannot help thinking about what they might have done to Palestinians.” He expressed sympathy for the Israeli victims of October 7 and acknowledged Gazans are imprisoned by a “deranged mafia,” but says they are also at the mercy of “a fearsome military power that lurks just over a high wall and that periodically rains fire upon them under the heartless euphemism of ‘mowing the lawn.’” These comments were made as if Israel arbitrarily decided to bomb Gaza without provocation.^{^[42]}

Saudi funding at Harvard also deepened in 2001 when businessman Khalid al-Turki contributed an additional $500,000 to a $1.5 million fund for Harvard’s contemporary Arab studies program. That same year, the university accepted support from deeply controversial figures: the H.E. Sheikh Ahmed Zaki Yamani Islamic Legal Studies Fund and the Bakr M. Binladin Visiting Scholars Fund—Binladin being Osama’s brother and Yamani the OPEC leader who orchestrated the 1973 oil embargo. The commemorative book published on the fiftieth anniversary of the establishment of Harvard’s Center for Middle Eastern Studies noted that the federal government, Harvard, and Aramco funded the Center’s outreach program.^{^[43]} Harvard has at least 13 chairs that appear to be financed by Arab sources; two have no identifiable donors or creation dates, and at least eight have no disclosure of funding. The list produced by Neetu Arnold, a research fellow with the National Association of Scholars, dates only to 2005, so additional positions may have been created since then.^{^[44]}

Georgia Tech accepted nearly $26 million from Saudi Arabia. At least $7.5 million, undisclosed in the DoE report, came from Aramco. The funds were directed to train Aramco employees in cybersecurity, information security, and other high-demand tech skills.^{^[45]}

Notably absent from the DoE’s public records are two of the most politically charged donations: the $20 million each to Harvard and Georgetown from Saudi Prince Alwaleed bin Talal in 2005. Prince Alwaleed is infamous for having his post-9/11 donation rejected by New York Mayor Rudy Giuliani due to his call for America to reconsider its support of Israel.

Alwaleed wanted to strengthen Islamic studies in American universities. Harvard received the money for “a university-wide program with an endowed chair, three senior professorships, and support for research, tuition, fees, and stipends for graduate students” and “an Islamic Heritage Project designed to preserve and digitize historically significant Islamic materials and make the resulting images available via the Internet.”^{^[46]} In 2005, Harvard also received $5 million from Prince Talal for postgraduate education and research at the Harvard Medical School Dubai Center.^{^[47]}

The Georgetown funds went to expand its Center for Muslim-Christian Understanding (renamed the Alwaleed Bin Talal Center for Muslim-Christian Understanding).^{^[48]} Georgetown did report other gifts from the prince of $4 million (2005), $3 million (2006), $4 million (2007), $5 million (2009), and $6 million (2010), but it remains unclear whether these were part of or in addition to the $20 million.

Columbia University provides another cautionary tale. In 2003, Columbia resisted complying with federal and state requirements to report foreign gifts. The university took money from the UAE and others to endow a chair in Middle East studies named after Edward Said, a vehement anti-Zionist, thereby institutionalizing an anti-Israel faculty position on the campus. Predictably, the chair was filled by an outspoken critic of Israel, former Palestine Liberation Organization (PLO) spokesman Rashid Khalidi. For many months, efforts were made to determine the source of the estimated $4 million allocated for the position. Still, the university refused to disclose the information until bad publicity forced it to reveal the names of the donors.^{^[49]} The university later established a Center for Palestine Studies, which Khalidi, the center’s co-director, said was funded through the university’s Middle East Institute.^{^[50]} According to its 2018-2019 Annual Report, the center received funding from 18 donors, none of which were identified as foreign gifts.^{^[51]} Subsequent reports did not provide any information about donors.^{^[52]}

Until 2013, the $84 million contribution to Carnegie Mellon University (CMU) in 2005 was the most significant Arab donation ever made. No purpose is listed in the DoE report, but other sources disclosed it was for a council for information and technology. Arnold found that CMU did not report nearly $700 million it received from Qatar between 2010 and 2022.^{^[53]}

Because it fell below the $250,000 threshold, Harvard did not have to report a 2011 gift of $150,000 from the Palestinian Monetary Authority to establish an annual graduate public service fellowship, supporting a student from the “occupied Palestinian territories” for three years. Harvard did acknowledge individual donations of unspecified amounts from Palestinian businessman Bashar Masri to fund fellowships for Palestinian students attending the school. These may have also been below the required threshold for informing the DoE, as they do not appear in the department’s reports.

The purpose is not listed in the DoE report, but likely, the $3 million Oman contributed to the College of William and Mary in 2011 was for the Sultan Qaboos Chair for Middle East Studies.^{^[54]}

In 2012, Northwestern announced that its Engineering and Arts School had received two research grants from the Qatar National Research Fund, which was established in 2006 to foster collaboration between Qatar and internationally recognized researchers. The grants, each worth $1,050,000 over three years, exemplify the benign nature of many grants. One went to Professor John Troy, chair of biomedical engineering, for a project with researchers at Qatar University to develop a brain-connected prosthetic that could restore vision for people who have gone blind due to diseases like glaucoma. The other award went to a team working with Texas A&M University at Qatar to develop and test new high-performance lubricants for use in hot, dusty desert environments. Neither grant appears in the DoE report.^{^[55]} According to The Daily Northwestern, QF awarded 17 grants between 2012 and 2018 to faculty who partner with Qatari institutions, ranging from $650,000 to $5 million.^{^[56]} These are not identified by DoE either.

In 2012, MIT signed a memorandum of understanding to expand its research and education partnership with Saudi Aramco.^{^[57]} The amount of money involved was not disclosed. The 2025 report shows that since 2021, MIT has received over $2 million from Aramco, nearly $500,000 for “a designated principal investigator,” and the rest for scholarships for Saudi students. More than $200 million of MIT’s $260 million in Arab donations is unaccounted for.

Johns Hopkins received “an undisclosed but ‘transformational’ amount” from the UAE to build a hospital that opened in 2012. In 2018, the UAE gave $50 million to Johns Hopkins Medicine to create the Sheikh Khalifa Stroke Institute.^{^[58]}

Cornell, Stanford, the University of California, Berkeley, and the University of Texas at Austin all entered into lucrative relationships with the King Abdullah University of Science and Technology (KAUST) worth $25 million or more over a five-year period.^{^[59]}

UT Austin also received $165,000 (below the threshold required to report) from the QF in 2013 to promote Arab language instruction in a local school district. It also partnered with the Foundation to create a Teacher Leadership Program to prepare K-12 teachers to address Middle East topics.^{^[60]}

Yale failed to disclose a $10 million donation it received in 2015 from Saudi businessman Abdallah Kamel to establish the Abdallah S. Kamel Center for the Study of Islamic Law and Civilization at Yale Law School. Kamel’s company had been suspected of financing Hamas, and reports suggested the gift may have actually come from his father, Saleh Kamel, whose company was allegedly linked to Al-Qaeda funding. The controversy sparked backlash and ultimately led Yale to remove the public announcement of the gift from its website.^{^[61]}

In 2015, the Al Jalila Foundation in Dubai partnered with Harvard Medical School “to cultivate the next generation of local medical talent in line with the vision to position the UAE at the forefront of medical innovation.” The foundation was created by the ruler of Dubai, Sheikh Mohammed bin Rashid Al Maktoum. The foundation also provided funds to NYU Abu Dhabi^{^[62]} and research fellowships from 2014 until at least 2018 to the University of Pennsylvania, the Cleveland Clinic, and the University of Alabama.^{^[63]} No reports list this foundation as a donor to any of these universities.

In 2016, the University of New Haven signed an agreement to support King Fahd Security College in Riyadh in developing a Bachelor’s program in Security Studies.^{^[64]} It did not report any funding from Saudi Arabia until 2019, when it recorded only one contract for $1.3 million and two monetary gifts totaling $7.8 million.

In 2016, Babson Global, a wholly owned subsidiary of Babson College, entered a partnership with Lockheed Martin, Emaar (a Saudi real estate firm), and Prince Mohammad bin Salman’s MiSK Foundation to establish the Prince Mohammad bin Salman College of Business and Entrepreneurship. The college was established to promote the crown prince’s agenda of increased economic growth, tourism, and social mobility in Saudi Arabia. Babson Global was expected to receive about $52.2 million over a 10-year period that began in 2014.^{^[65]} DoE does not identify any funding from MiSK or any money received by Babson Global. The college received only $2.4 million since 2014 and nothing since 2019.

In 2017, Harvard announced that Prince Turki bin Abdullah bin Abdulaziz Al Saud was providing an undisclosed amount for the Project on Saudi and Gulf Cooperation Council Security at the Kennedy School of Government. The school also presumably receives funding for the Evidence of Policy Design initiative with the Saudi Ministry of Labor. Another undisclosed amount comes from the MiSK Foundation for a summer leadership development course. According to Shera Avi-Yonah, “While Harvard websites make no mention of the group, MiSK’s site lists the university as an official partner.^{^[66]}

Many foreign contributions take the form of consulting contracts. Journalist Michael Sokolove noted “at least 25 universities have contracts with Aramco; Sabic, the petrochemical company; or the King Abdulaziz City for Science and Technology, a government research facility in Riyadh.” These are apolitical, Sokolove says, focused on the “technical aspects of oil and natural gas extraction and processing.”^{^[67]}

In 2018, Crown Prince Mohammed bin Salman visited Boston. Several new agreements between Saudi Arabia and MIT were announced.^{^[68]} No funding was mentioned. Sokolove said the total was $23 million.^{^[69]} This has yet to be reported ($5.4 million in unidentified monetary gifts from Saudi Arabia were reported in 2018). These were the new projects:

A collaborative agreement between Saudi Aramco and MIT focused on global energy, climate, and environmental sciences, as well as the transformation and sustainable development of the energy sector.
An extension of the Ibn Khaldun Fellowship program at MIT with the support of King Abdulaziz City for Science and Technology (KACST). The program brings post-doctoral Saudi women scientists and engineers to MIT to conduct research and advance as leaders in their respective fields.
A collaborative agreement between SABIC and MIT that focuses on designing and testing a novel reactor for the combustion pyrolysis of methane.
A collaborative agreement between KACST and MIT will further support the Center of Complex Engineering Systems in advancing interdisciplinary research in complex engineering systems such as air and rail transportation systems, urban development, and improving electrical grid and water distribution networks.
A collaborative agreement between KACST and Brigham and Women’s Hospital for the Center of Excellence for Biomedicine to focus on three critical medical research projects.
A collaborative agreement between King Abdullah University of Science and Technology (KAUST), Research Products Development Company RPDC, and Saudi VAX. This agreement will establish the Saudi Vaccine and Bio-manufacturing Center at KAUST.

Bin Salman’s foundation was already a member of MIT’s Media Lab, which focuses on computing and technology and requires an annual commitment of at least $250,000.^{^[70]} However, these contributions are either not reported or, if they are, not attributed to Bin Salman’s MiSK Foundation or the prince.

In 2020, the Munib and Angela Masri Foundation committed to a multi-million-dollar grant to the University of Texas at Austin to create a century-long endowment at the University’s Jackson School of Geosciences. “Since its inception, this endowment has funded the prestigious Masri Graduate Fellowships for students from Palestinian, Jordanian, and Lebanese universities, supporting advanced research in water, land use, energy, climate, and environmental resilience.” The foundation is based in Nablus, but no donations to UT Austin from the PA are recorded in the DoE report.^{^[71]}

The Lebanon-based Hariri Foundation, established by the former Lebanese Prime Minister, has made several donations to universities through a nonprofit organization based in the District of Columbia – Hariri Foundation-USA. This setup allows universities to avoid reporting them as foreign gifts (but the foundation must list its grants on U.S. tax returns). In 1992, for example, the John F. Kennedy School of Government at Harvard University and the American University of Beirut initiated a joint research program aimed at reforming the Lebanese public sector. A year earlier, the foundation endowed the Rafik Hariri Professorship of International Political Economy at Harvard, and in 2009, it funded fellowships at the Carr Center for Human Rights. The foundation also offers a scholarship program at Boston University, funding high school students to attend a program affiliated with MIT.^{^[72]}

Cashing In On Foreign Campuses

In their pursuit of Gulf wealth, U.S. universities have gone far beyond soliciting donations for campus programs. Many have actively courted autocratic regimes by offering to establish entire departments of Middle East, Arab, or Islamic studies—contingent on financial backing. These efforts have expanded to include the opening of satellite campuses in the Gulf, with lucrative contracts often tied to the host country’s priorities. Today, more than a dozen universities and affiliate programs have established campuses in Qatar, the UAE, Lebanon, and Saudi Arabia. While the model may seem novel, it echoes the founding of the American University of Beirut in 1866 as a Western academic outpost in the region. Today, however, the stakes are higher: these modern partnerships raise urgent questions about academic freedom, institutional independence, and the price of access to authoritarian funding.

Abu Dhabi, UAE

One of the most high-profile and controversial examples of university entanglement with Gulf wealth is New York University’s partnership with the UAE. Then-president John Sexton was dubbed the “Emir of NYU” in a New York Magazine exposé that revealed how the university had accepted what amounted to a “blank check” from Abu Dhabi to become the first American liberal arts college to operate as a co-equal with its home campus abroad. The UAE reportedly committed $50 million to launch the project and pledged to finance not only the Middle East campus but also parts of NYU’s operations in New York.^{^[73]}

The backlash was. “It was negotiated secretly and announced to the rest of us with only a veneer of serious faculty consultation,” one NYU professor said. “But we knew it was a fait accompli.” Faculty members also raised concerns about the implications for academic freedom under an authoritarian regime and the potential long-term damage to NYU’s academic credibility.^{^[74]}

The DoE report omits any reference to gifts linked to the Abu Dhabi campus. Yet the timeline of contributions tells its own story. In the year preceding the New York Magazine article, NYU received $20 million from the UAE. It was awarded nearly $34 million in 2010 and another $22 million in 2013. All told, NYU has received $193 million of its $231 million in Arab state donations from the UAE alone—making the financial relationship as consequential as it is controversial.

Johns Hopkins Medicine International signed a management agreement with Al Rahba Hospital in 2008.^{^[75]} No funding identified with the program was reported.

The MIT & Masdar Institute Cooperative Program was a collaborative project with Abu Dhabi in which MIT provided advice and guidance to the Masdar Institute. The program ran from 2006 until May 2018. No funding identified with the program was reported.^{^[76]}

Sharjah, UAE

American University has a partnership arrangement with AU Sharjah, founded in 1997. The DoE report does not indicate any funds contributed to support it. Since 2004, AU has received only $4.4 million from the UAE.^{^[77]}

Al Ain, UAE

In 2006, Johns Hopkins Medicine International signed a 10-year management contract (amended in 2010 to management services) with Abu Dhabi Health Services Company (SEHA) for services at Tawam Hospital.^{^[78]} No funding associated with the program was reported.

Dubai, UAE

Boston University Institute of Dental Research and Education opened in Dubai in 2008. No funding identified with the program was reported.

In 2006, the Dubai Harvard Foundation for Medical Research was created with the support of the ruler of Dubai, Sheikh Mohammed bin Rashid Al Maktoum. Among the founders was Prince Alwaleed Bin Talal Al Saud, who created a medical and biomedical research fellowship. The chair of the board is the dean of Harvard Medical School. The foundation “supports cutting-edge collaborative research and seeks to establish sustainable research and education programs focused on diseases relevant to the population in the broader Middle East region.”^{^[79]} No funding identified with the program was reported.

In 2015, Harvard Medical School opened a global health center in Dubai. No funding explicitly associated with the program was reported to the DoE.

Michigan State opened a campus in Dubai in 2008 but was forced to close it in 2010 due to financial losses. The funding from the UAE was unreported.

Johns Hopkins Medicine International signed a three-year contract with Clemenceau Medicine International in 2018 to provide oversight, development, and training services for Clemenceau Medical Center Dubai Healthcare City. The funding from the UAE was unreported.

Rochester Institute of Technology opened its Dubai campus in 2008. RIT announced it would build a $136 million 30-acre campus funded by the UAE government.^{^[80]} In a past report, DoE listed three contributions worth more than $19 million for academic programs with RIT Dubai FZE and the Dubai Silicon Oasis Authority. The October 2023 report lists that amount for UAE contributions, but the purpose has been deleted. The 2025 report listed three donations for the RIT Dubai program, worth $19.5 million, two ten-year contracts, each valued at $10.2 million and $8.9 million, respectively, and a one-year contract worth $290,000.

Baylor University was the latest university to establish a campus in the region. In 2024, Baylor College of Medicine signed a Memorandum of Understanding to establish a medical college in Dubai. Dr Paul Klotman, President, CEO, and Executive Dean of Baylor College of Medicine, said, “We are extremely pleased to further explore this opportunity to develop a branch campus and build a strong relationship with this outstanding medical system. American Hospital Dubai is known for its cutting-edge technology and innovation, and we look forward to working closely together on training medical students.”^{^[81]} No funding for the project appeared yet in the DoE report.

Ras al Khaymah, UAE

George Mason was one of the first institutions to launch a campus in the UAE. It opened in 2005 but closed in 2009 without graduating a single student.^{^[82]} It was funded by a government-supported foundation known as the RAK Education Company (Edrak), which reduced its support by roughly half, making it untenable for the campus to remain open.^{^[83]} An earlier report indicated GMU received $2.2 million over four years for the campus. That information does not appear in the 2025 report.

Beirut, Lebanon

Johns Hopkins Medicine International and Clemenceau Medical Center entered into an affiliation agreement in 2002 to provide consultation services for designing and developing the hospital, which opened in 2006. The deal has been extended to 2026.^{^[84]} No funding identified with the program was reported.

Riyadh, Saudi Arabia

Johns Hopkins Medicine signed an affiliation agreement with the King Khaled Eye Specialist Hospital (KKESH) from 2010 until 2016.^{^[85]} No funding identified with the program was reported.

In 2018, Johns Hopkins Medicine International signed a three-year contract with Clemenceau Medicine International to provide oversight, development, and training services for Clemenceau Medical Center Riyadh.^{^[86]}

Dhahran, Saudi Arabia

Johns Hopkins Aramco Healthcare is a joint venture between Saudi Aramco and Johns Hopkins Medicine, established in 2014 with a 10-year term. Johns Hopkins owns 20% of the joint venture.^{^[87]} No funding identified with the program was reported.

It is possible that some of the funding for these programs in foreign countries was reported to the DoE without being attributed to these campuses (a significant flaw in the reporting requirement), but this seems unlikely given the amounts reported during their years of operation. Since the budgets of overseas campuses are in the millions of dollars, and ISGAP identified more than $3 billion in unreported funds for campuses in Qatar alone, tens of millions have likely gone undisclosed by universities with satellites in other countries.

Qatar’s Billion-Dollar Bet on American Universities

Qatar has leveraged its vast oil and gas wealth to shape public opinion and elite American institutions in ways that serve its political interests—often at the expense of transparency, academic freedom, and U.S. national values. The small Gulf state has drawn particular scrutiny because it is an autocracy that bans political opposition, criminalizes dissent, silences women and LGBTQ citizens, disregards human trafficking, funds and hosts terrorist groups, including the Muslim Brotherhood, Hamas, Al-Qaeda, the Taliban, and ISIS. It also created Al Jazeera, a state-backed network notorious for its anti-Israel and anti-American bias. Qatar became a focus of news coverage after the October 7, 2023, Hamas massacre because of its ties to the terrorist organization, its involvement in hostage negotiations, and growing concerns that its financial influence has fueled the demonization of Israel and the rise of antisemitism on U.S. campuses.

The principal source of funds for campuses is the QF, which opened an academic center named after Muslim Brotherhood ideologue Sheikh Yusuf al-Qaradawi, who has advocated the destruction of America and the Jews, invited a cleric who called for Jews and their helpers to be destroyed, and hosts other Muslim extremist preachers at its mosque in Education City, where foreign campuses are located.^{^[88]}

According to Arnold, “Through the QF, the country hopes to 1) increase the workforce participation rate among Qataris; 2) equip Qataris to replace the foreigners who dominate many sectors of their current workforce; 3) prevent the “brain drain” that results when Qataris study abroad and fail to return home; and 4) maintain the strength of Qatar’s Islamic religious customs and traditions.”^{^[89]}

In 2012, the QF collaborated with the Institute for Global Law and Policy at Harvard Law School to establish a graduate law school at Hamad Bin Khalifa University in Doha.^{^[90]} The DoE report shows Qatar’s $1 million donation that year, but with no further details.

Graphic courtesy of Zachor Legal Institute

Six American universities have campuses in Education City. According to Qatar, “These universities operate with complete independence. The contract payments to these universities fund the operating costs of the campuses in Qatar, including construction, maintenance, and faculty salaries. They are not donations, and this distinction is clearly reflected in the DoE data.”^{^[91]} In reality, the universities are required to operate under the laws and norms of the host government, while the DoE report offers little to no detail about how the funds are actually spent..

Virginia Commonwealth

In 1997, the Virginia Commonwealth University School of the Arts in Qatar (VCUarts Qatar) became the first American university to establish a presence in Doha’s Education City. It offers bachelor’s degrees in art history and fine arts (including fashion, graphic, and interior design, as well as painting/printmaking) and a master’s degree in fine arts (design). The QF funds the campus.

Of VCU’s $380 million in reported Arab donations, $334 million came from Qatar. While none are explicitly attributed to the Qatar campus, the largest donations—contracts ranging from $38 to $45 million each between 2002 and 2033, totaling about $330 million—were almost certainly tied to its operation. The Washington Post estimated VCUarts Qatar’s annual budget at $42 million for fiscal 2014 and reported that VCU receives a management fee on top of operating expenses, which amounted to $3.4 million in 2012–2013 and was expected to grow annually.^{^[92]}

VCU’s 2024 Financial Report noted the university held more than $20 million on behalf of VCU Qatar in Qatar. It also stated that QF advances nearly $600,000 annually to cover 12 residential leases in Doha for faculty and staff housing. More concerning, the QF retains a 50% share of any intellectual property developed at the campus and a say in curriculum changes if they pose “a significant budgetary or academic impact” without infringing on “the academic freedom of faculty regarding curricular decisions.”^{^[93]}

Table 6
American Campuses in Qatar^{^[94]}

Name	Year Established	Specialization
Virginia Commonwealth University	1997	Fine Arts
Cornell University	2001	Medicine
Texas A&M University	2003	Engineering
Carnegie Mellon University	2004	Computer Science and Technology
Georgetown University	2005	Politics
Northwestern University	2008	Journalism

Cornell

By far, Qatar’s most significant contributions are to Cornell University. In 2001, Cornell agreed to establish the Weill Medical College in Doha, launching a new era of Arab influence over U.S. institutions. The Qatari government committed $750 million over 11 years to support the project, including undisclosed payments.^{^[95]} Tax records showed Cornell was reimbursed nearly $122 million in 2014.^{^[96]}

According to ISGAP, Cornell disclosed to the DoE that it received only $64 million in donations from QF through 2018, less than 5% of the roughly $1.4 billion it is estimated to have received, by far the largest share of unreported funds tied to Qatari campuses. Much of the discrepancy appears to come from reporting donations without specifying their purpose. From 2012 to 2019, Cornell received $99,999,999 annually, almost certainly earmarked for the Weill Cornell Medicine–Qatar program. Together with eight other contributions exceeding $50 million each, the total approaches $1.3 billion—funds that ISGAP believed went unreported.

Cornell did disclose in 2021 that the annual budget for Weill College was $151 million. An additional five restricted contracts worth $764 million were committed from 2020 through 2025 to establish and support the college. Notably, the DoE found that these contracts granted “admission preference” to Qatari citizens “in some circumstances”—effectively formalizing national favoritism at an American university’s foreign outpost.

Cornell’s 2024 tax return lists expenses for the Middle East and North Africa of more than $157 million, which roughly corresponds with the budget for Weill. The university’s financial report says, “A significant portion of private revenue is received for the benefit of Weill Cornell Medicine - Qatar, which operates under an agreement between Cornell University and the Qatar Foundation.” The amount is not disclosed.^{^[97]}

Georgetown

Georgetown University has also faced criticism for its campus in Qatar. Founded in 2005 as the Georgetown University School of Foreign Service in Qatar (now known as Georgetown University in Qatar), the institution offers a four-year liberal arts program that provides students with a multidisciplinary education in international affairs, preparing them for a diverse range of careers.^{^[98]} In 2018, the editorial board of the Georgetown Voice called for its closure, citing the Qatari government’s human rights abuses, particularly against women, LGBTQ individuals, and migrant workers, as “antithetical to Georgetown’s mission as a Jesuit institution.” The board insisted that the financial cost should not deter shutting the school. “The integrity of our school is at stake,” it concluded.^{^[99]}

Well, integrity can easily be bought for more than $1 billion.

This was evident in 2025, when Georgetown held a gala celebrating 20 years of partnership with the QF and renewed its contract for an additional decade. As if to underscore its abdication of moral responsibility, the University awarded Her Highness Sheikha Moza bint Nasser—mother of the Emir and Chair of QF—its President’s Medal, one of the highest honors it bestows. This was in addition to the honorary doctorate awarded in 2008.^{^[100]} Her Highness said, “Qatar Foundation is committed to forging a path that leads to cross-cultural understanding, respect and collaboration, a commitment that is shared by Georgetown University. Together we will inspire and nurture those who will have the courage to build bridges between nations and lead our world into a better future.”^{^[101]}

Interim President Robert Groves gushed that Moza’s work reflects the University’s “deepest commitments” to knowledge, peace, and justice. Meanwhile, she leads an organization from a country that enforces speech restrictions, partners with U.S.-designated terrorist entities, and systematically abuses migrant workers who labor under what human rights groups call “modern slavery.”

Lenny Ben-David highlighted the Sheikha’s hostility toward Israel, characterizing it as anti-Semitic. As an example, he cited her 2023 speech in Türkiye, where she declared:

For decades, we have witnessed Israel spreading fabricated historical narratives, which were refuted by many historians, including Israeli ones. These narratives have taken over the world’s collective mind, and if someone dares to debate any Israeli narrative, he is cast aside, having been accused of anti-Semitism, which in itself is another problematic narrative. By ‘Semitism,’ they mean Jews, having taken a monopoly on the Semitic race, which they attribute to themselves, while denying [its application] to other nations, which speak Semitic languages, like the Arabs, the Assyrians, and the Chaldeans….^{^[102]}

In his book, The Doha Experiment: Arab Kingdom, Catholic College, Jewish Teacher, Gary Wasserman quoted professors saying “there were implicit boundaries on what was discussed in classes about the history, culture and politics of the region” and it would be “impolite to criticize the emir and insane to insult Islam.”^{^[103]} In 2017, a graduate student researching human rights and migrant labor in the Middle East was denied a visa to attend the school.^{^[104]} As an undergraduate, she criticized the treatment of workers who were constructing the Georgetown campus in Doha. The following year, the Qatar campus canceled a debate about the portrayal of God as a woman after a furor erupted when it was publicized.^{^[105]} The university stated that it was a process issue but acknowledged that it must comply with Qatari law, which may have considered the subject blasphemous. Such restrictions on free speech at the Washington, D.C., campus have earned the university the “Lifetime Censorship Award” from the Foundation for Individual Rights and Expression (FIRE).^{^[106]}

In 2014, the QF provided $59.5 million in support.^{^[107]} According to Georgetown’s 2023 tax return, the university spent more than $98 million in the Middle East and North Africa, which likely includes the Qatar campus, where the interim dean received more than $834,000 in compensation.^{^[108]} A former employee stated that QF pays a lump sum yearly to the Georgetown campus, with some of the funding allocated to the D.C. campus as a “branding fee.”

Notably, its financial report does not disclose any financial information, saying only that the University signed ten-year agreements for the Doha campus in 2005 and 2015, and that the QF “funds the University’s allowable costs and expenses to operate the program in accordance with agreed-upon annual budgets.”^{^[109]} No funding for the campus was disclosed in the DoE report.

Texas A&M

The first indication that Qatar’s influence might be turning toxic came in February 2024, when Texas A&M announced it would close its Qatar campus after 21 years—just three years into a renewed 10-year contract. The move was expensive: the DoE recorded seven Qatari contributions totaling nearly $105 million, and the Washington Post reported that the prior contract called for the university to receive more than $76.2 million annually to operate the campus. It was unclear whether that included management fees, which totaled $8.2 million in 2014.^{^[110]} According to an investigation by the Daily Northwestern, A&M receives $7 million annually and another $3 million if it “meets certain thresholds for hiring long-term faculty members, enrolling Qatari students and collaborating with universities and institutions in Qatar.”

Officially, the university cited regional instability and shifting priorities for its decision. Unofficially, some pointed to an ISGAP report warning that Qatar had full ownership of all intellectual property from Texas A&M’s Qatar operations—including innovative nuclear research with potential weapons applications, as well as advanced work in biotechnology, cybersecurity, robotics, and AI. The report questioned whether this access could enable Qatar to pass sensitive technologies to Iran or “other dangerous regional actors.” Texas A&M rejected the allegations, calling them a “misinformation campaign” and insisting the decision had been under discussion before the report was released.^{^[111]}

The QF, which contributed at least $386 million to the project, accused the board of succumbing to a “disinformation campaign.”^{^[112]} The Middle East Studies Association also weighed in, charging that the university acted out of “political fears of U.S. campus politics” and denouncing the ISGAP report as containing “false, scurrilous and harmful accusations” against faculty—though no faculty members were specifically named.^{^[113]} Notably, the Middle East Studies Association (MESA), which fancies itself a champion of academic freedom, has not expressed concern over the QF requirement that A&M, like VCU, give it a role in curriculum changes.^{^[114]}

Inside Higher Education reported that the campus faced controversy and scrutiny before. In 2021, Joseph Ura, the former chair of the Qatar campus’s liberal arts program, stated that he was removed from his position for defending a professor whose contract was not renewed after she tweeted pro-Israel sentiments. The following year, faculty expressed concerns about the impact a reorganization plan would have on academic freedom.^{^[115]}

According to Texas A&M’s most recent financial report, the university still had over $430,000 deposited in a Qatari bank.^{^[116]}

Northwestern

Northwestern University has received more than $221 million in ten contributions to support its Doha campus since its creation in 2008, according to the DoE report; however, the Daily Northwestern reported a figure of more than $500 million since 2007.^{^[117]} Officially, the QF aimed to train journalists and media professionals on campus, offering undergraduate degrees in journalism and communication. However, NU-Q’s role has extended far beyond education.

In 2013, NU-Q signed a formal agreement with Al Jazeera, the Qatari state-controlled broadcaster, to train journalists for the outlet. The partnership included scholarships, exchange programs, and training workshops for NU-Q students. NU-Q also committed to supporting Al Jazeera’s expansion into the U.S. market through its short-lived cable channel, Al Jazeera America (AJA), and later through the digital platform AJ+—both of which have been criticized for biased, anti-Western content.

NU-Q faculty have also conducted research projects promoting Qatar’s domestic and international narratives. These include one $800,521 grant for “National Museums and the Public Imagination: A Longitudinal Study of the National Museum of Qatar,” $482,986 for “Assessing Qatari Emerging Media Engagement,” $150,000 for “Qatari Women: Engagement and Empowerment,” and $99,836 for a study on Qatar’s participation in the World Values Survey. A $30,000 project titled “Hashtag Blockade” examined the online discourse during the Gulf Crisis. Additional research grants did not disclose the amount of funding.^{^[118]}

In 2015, Professor Stephen Eisenman, then president of Northwestern’s Faculty Senate, visited the Doha campus and issued a blunt internal report. He was told NU-Q operated at no cost to Northwestern and even generated revenue—though President Morton Schapiro minimized its impact on the university’s finances, calling it little more than “a rounding error.” Eisenman noted that the QF had funded five new endowed professorships at the home campus, none of which appeared in the DoE’s foreign gift disclosures.^{^[119]}

More troubling were Eisenman’s findings on academic freedom. He wrote that NU-Q faculty enjoyed only “limited” academic freedom, not just due to Qatar’s strict censorship laws but also because many were untenured. He observed that students “appear to have internalized many speech restrictions and willingly operate within them.”

Eisenman proposed several reforms: instituting shared governance for NU-Q faculty and conditioning continued partnership on Qatar’s progress toward greater intellectual and press freedom. “Lack of free speech protection cannot be legitimated as a matter of cultural difference,” he wrote. “It is the exercise of power by a repressive government over its people.” As of 2021, Eisenman reported that none of his recommendations had been implemented. His report no longer appears on the university website.

In 2021, students at the NU-Q campus protested discrimination against the University’s South Asian, East Asian, and Black students and low student wages.^{^[120]}

The most recent NU-Q annual report (2022–2023) offers no financial transparency. It discloses only a $350,000 grant from the Carnegie Corporation of New York, while touting additional grants from the Qatar National Research Fund and the QF’s Education City Innovation in Teaching program—with no amounts listed.^{^[121]} The university’s 2023 tax return lists expenses of $63 million for maintaining NU-Q. It also receives approximately $6 million annually as a management fee.^{^[122]}

Northwestern President Michael Schill was asked about the university’s ties to Qatar during a 2024 hearing of the House Education and Workforce Committee and was unable to answer the question of how much money the university had received for the Doha campus. ^{^[123]} Later, Francisco Marmolejo, president of higher education at QF, issued a statement that said, “Qatar Foundation is not in the business of buying, or attempting to buy, influence in U.S. higher education institutions.”^{^[124]}

In a subsequent interview a year later, Schill was whether Northwestern complies with the stipulation in the contract with the QF that “NU, NU-Q, and their respective employees, students, faculty, families, contractors and agents, shall be subject to the applicable laws and regulations of the State of Qatar, and shall respect the cultural, religious and social customs of the State of Qatar.” Schill responded, “I believe it has to.” When pressed as to whether that included Qatar's censorship laws, Schill was evasive, saying it was a “legal matter” but that he believed NU-Q had the same academic freedom and free speech as its U.S. campus. A few weeks later, Schill resigned.^{^[124a]}

It is difficult to understand why a university celebrated for its journalism program would align itself with a regime that suppresses free expression and bankrolls a media network notorious for tendentious reporting and entrenched anti-Israel and anti-American bias.

Despite the red flags, Northwestern has given no indication of reconsidering its Qatar partnership. The university remains under contract to operate NU-Q through at least 2028.

Carnegie Mellon

Carnegie Mellon University, celebrating the 20th anniversary of its Qatar campus in 2025, announced the third ten-year extension of its partnership with the QF. No funds for the campus are identified in the DoE report. However, CMU has received an unusual amount of $74,130,684 every year from 2016 through 2024, totaling more than $667 million over nine years, which could be allocated to the campus. CMU’s 2023 tax return listed nearly $15 million in expenditures in the Middle East and North Africa. The dean of CMU-Q, Michael Trick, received more than $1 million in compensation.^{^[125]}

According to Trick, “The partnership between Carnegie Mellon and Qatar Foundation is based on the shared vision of the transformative impact of education. For more than 20 years, this campus has provided an exceptional education for students from Qatar and around the world who may not otherwise have had access.”^{^[126]}

CMU-Q received three grants, each for an unspecified amount, from the Qatar National Research Fund (QNRF) for AI research in 2022.^{^[127]} CMU-Q has also had a six-year collaborative relationship with the Jassim and Hamad Bin Jassim Charitable Foundation to inspire Qatar’s youth to explore computing. No funding is disclosed.^{^[128]} In January 2025, three research projects led by faculty members at CMU-Q were awarded grants by the Qatar Research, Development, and Innovation (QRDI) Council for unspecified amounts, supporting undergraduate writing, Qatar quantum materials, and indoor geo-locating using cellular infrastructure.^{^[129]}

Arnold notes that “Unlike Saudi Arabia, Qatar exercises extensive bureaucratic oversight into university operations. The Qatari government also owns all the national partner organizations, including the Doha Film Institute, the Qatar National Research Fund, and Al Jazeera.” Universities like Northwestern, she adds, demand “nothing of Qatar beyond its money: the nation can preserve its illiberal quasi-absolute monarchy and traditional Islamic mores and still escape criticism.”

She further observed, “the Qatari government went from paying for the operation of a branch campus to funding American fellowships, research, and even hospitals. By cultivating its relationship with the host country, the university gains the potential to rake in cash through initiatives that extend well beyond the walls of the original branch campus.”^{^[130]}

Prestige Centers

Three of the most prestigious university centers have also been beneficiaries of foreign funding:

The James A Baker III Institute for Public Policy at Rice University.
The Belfer Center for Science and International Affairs at the Harvard Kennedy School.
The Watson Institute for International & Public Affairs at Brown University.

The DoE report provides no information on whether donations were made to any of them; however, other sources raise questions about how Arab funds are utilized and whether they influence research or curriculum.

The Baker Institute

The Center for International Policy reported that the Baker Institute received funding from Kuwait, Qatar, and Saudi Arabia.^{^[131]} The Institute’s website does not disclose donors, yet one of its “Life Members” is Sheikh Abdulla bin Ali Al Thani of Qatar. Its 2024 annual report lists $17.4 million in revenue without specifying amounts per donor. Among those named: the Diana Tamari Sabbagh Foundation (one of the largest Arab charitable foundations, founded by Palestinian businessman and activist Hasib Sabbagh); the Kuwait Foundation for the Advancement of Science; the Qatar Fund for Development; the State of Qatar Endowment for International Stem Cell Policy; and Aramco Americas.

The Qatar Fund for Development was among the donors of programmatic gifts, which “allows fellows, scholars, and researchers to investigate current and new research areas and creates opportunities to engage undergraduate and graduate students in the research and policy recommendation processes,” (Al Jazeera Media Network of Qatar was listed as a supporter in the 2022 report).^{^[132]}

Among the publications from the Institute were “Israel’s Mass Displacement of Gazans Fits Strategy of Using Migration as a Tool of War.” The report asserts that Israel has deliberately displaced the Gaza population in violation of international law when, in fact, the population was encouraged to move to avoid being in a battle zone after being used as shields by Hamas, which had embedded itself within the civilian population.^{^[133]}

The institute is led by David Satterfield, a veteran diplomat who most recently served as President Joe Biden’s Special Envoy for Middle East Humanitarian Issues, overseeing the response to the Gaza humanitarian crisis. His distinguished career also includes service as U.S. Ambassador to Türkiye and Lebanon, as well as Assistant Secretary of State for Near Eastern Affairs.

The Belfer Center

The Belfer Center is part of the Kennedy School, which has a webpage titled “Transparent Engagement and Funding” that lists none of its funders. It says only financial support “comes from a broad spectrum of funders.” These include grants from unspecified “foreign government agencies” and other supporters. It says that it “reports all grants and gifts publicly,” but does not say where, and has no reporting on its website.^{^[134]}

The Center does not include budget or donor information in its annual report. The Center for International Policy report listed Kuwait, Saudi Arabia, and the UAE as donors.^{^[135]} Saudi Prince Turki bin Abdullah bin Abdulaziz Al Saud provided an undisclosed amount in 2017 for its Project on Saudi and Gulf Cooperation Council Security. “With Prince Turki’s generous support, the Belfer Center is pleased to begin this project on the national security challenges that confront the Gulf and Arabian Peninsula. We hope to illuminate this complex set of topics and help to develop ideas and recommendations for the United States and allies and partners in the region to address these critical issues,” said Center Director Graham Allison.^{^[136]}

The Center announced a $6 million gift from the Kuwait Foundation in 2018 “to develop the next generation of leaders and scholars from Kuwait, the Gulf region, and the broader Middle East, and fund research on issues of vital importance in the region.”^{^[137]} The gift does not appear in the DoE report.

The Center’s 2023 annual report describes its Middle East Initiative as a project aimed at strengthening intellectual exchange between Harvard and the Middle East. That year, 13 Harvard students traveled to the UAE to gain deeper insight into “the UAE’s economy, social transformations, and governance.” The report also highlighted the 20th anniversary of its Kuwait Program, which brought 50 Kuwaiti participants to an executive education program.^{^[138]} In 2024, 18 Harvard students visited the UAE and Saudi Arabia as part of a course on leadership and transformation in the Arab world. These programs illustrate how Arab funders seek not only to educate their citizens and enhance their countries’ global image, but also to influence U.S. students by shaping their narratives on Middle East affairs.

The faculty chair of the initiative is Tarek Masoud. In 2023-2024, Masoud organized a series of events related to the Middle East conflict. His decision to invite Dalal Saeb Iriqat, a professor at Arab American University Palestine, sparked controversy after her social media posts described the Hamas massacre of October 7, 2023, as “a normal struggle 4 #Freedom.” While defending that statement, she made additional incendiary remarks, framing Hamas’s abduction of 251 people as “coercive diplomacy” and characterizing the conflict as “a reflection of 76 years of apartheid, of Israeli military occupation, of settler colonialism.” Harvard Kennedy School Dean Douglas W. Elmendorf publicly distanced the institution from the event, calling Iriqat’s views “abhorrent.”^{^[139]}

Responding to the storm over Iriqat’s remarks, Masoud appeared to draw a moral equivalence between the two sides, saying he was “very saddened by the inability of many people on each side to empathize with suffering on the other side.”

Not all the sessions Masoud organized were one-sided attacks on Israel like the Iriqat event. He also hosted speakers such as former Israeli parliamentarian Einat Wilf and pro-Israel New York Times columnist Bret Stephens. In 2023, the pendulum swung back when the initiative welcomed former Palestinian Authority Prime Minister Salam Fayyad and the former Editor-in-Chief of the Saudi-owned Al Arabiya English television station as fellows.

A board member and Center affiliate is Stephen Walt, who is listed as a Middle East expert, but is not. Walt became a favorite among Israel’s detractors after co-authoring The Israel Lobby, a polemic that displays a fundamental misunderstanding of Middle East history, politics, and the workings of the pro-Israel lobby.

The Watson Institute

Brown University’s Watson Institute offers no donor transparency. Within it, the New Directions in Palestinian Studies Program frames the Israeli-Palestinian conflict through “settler colonialism.” Numerous faculty members signed letters that acknowledged Hamas’s October 7 attacks in a single sentence before pivoting to lengthy condemnations of Israel, falsely claiming critics of Israel are being silenced.^{^[140]}

Events sponsored by Watson have linked the Palestinian cause to unrelated U.S. protest movements, such as those in Ferguson and Standing Rock, under the banner of “intersectionality.” Its Director of Middle East Studies, Nadje Al-Ali, who describes herself as a “feminist activist academic,”^{^[141]} has accused Israel of genocide and the media of anti-Palestinian bias.^{^[142]} Senior fellow Stephen Kinzer, a former New York Times correspondent with no Middle East expertise, has called Gaza “the world’s harshest occupation,” oblivious to the fact that Israel completely withdrew from Gaza in 2005 and that Hamas has since exercised complete control over nearly every aspect of Palestinian life there.^{^[143]}

Some 18 members of the Middle East Studies department within the Watson Center signed a letter that condemned the killing of Israelis and the taking of hostages, but primarily attacked Israel, falsely claimed critics of Israel were being silenced, and asked the administration to call for a ceasefire.^{^[144]}

The Institute published several papers critical of Israel’s conduct of the war. William Hartung, a senior research fellow at the Quincy Institute for Responsible Statecraft, which has a record of hostility toward Israel, wrote a paper criticizing U.S. military aid. The paper said total assistance from October 2023 to September 2025 was $21.7 billion, but the breakdown in the published table totaled less. Another paper by a political anthropologist accused Israel of “genocide.” A third paper, by an Oxford professor, accepts the fraudulent casualty figures of the Health Ministry without acknowledging that Hamas runs it or that any of the dead were terrorists.^{^[144a]}

The Watson advisory board includes Kenneth Roth, former head of Human Rights Watch, whose record of hostility toward Israel is well documented.

Taken together, the pattern is unmistakable: Arab money flows to prominent U.S. academic centers; those centers lack financial transparency; and their programming and personnel frequently promote narratives hostile to Israel while partnering with—and at times serving the public-relations interests of—the very governments providing the funding.

Who Is Educating Future Diplomats?

The most prestigious training ground for future diplomats is Georgetown University’s Walsh School of Foreign Service. Its founder, Jesuit priest Edmund Walsh, envisioned a school preparing students for “all major forms of foreign representation—whether commercial, financial, consular or diplomatic.”

In its investigation of institutional compliance with reporting requirements, the DoE noted, “Prince Alwaleed’s agreement with Georgetown exemplifies how foreign money can advance a particular country’s worldview within U.S. academic institutions.”^{^[145]} Yet for the more than $1 billion Georgetown has received from Arab sources, no purpose is listed in public disclosures, making it impossible to assess the full extent of influence.

Among the more than 150 faculty listed on the Walsh website is John Esposito, a longtime apologist for radical Islam and an example of how Arab funding can have a malign impact on campus and beyond. He was the founding director of the Alwaleed Center for Muslim-Christian Understanding (ACMCU). Frequently cited for his expertise on Islam, Esposito said before 9/11, “Bin Laden is the best thing to come along, if you are an intelligence officer, if you are an authoritarian regime, or if you want to paint Islamist activism as a threat.”^{^[146]}

Esposito is a BDS advocate (as are several other Walsh professors), a promoter of the canard comparing Israel to Afrikaner South Africa, and a vocal critic of Israel’s war with Hamas. Continuing his pattern of defending Islamists, he reposted on X, “Hamas is not ISIS.”^{^[147]} On October 6, he reposted a critical tweet about Israeli settlers but said nothing the next day after the Hamas massacre.

Eight days after the Hamas massacre, Esposito signed a warning, along with four other Walsh professors, that Israel may engage in genocide.^{^[148]} Eleven days after 10/7, he joined 20 Walsh professors from Georgetown Faculty and Staff for Justice in Palestine (FSJP) who signed a statement calling on the university to demand a ceasefire, mentioning sympathy for all victims, Palestinian and Israeli, but nothing about Hamas, the massacre, or the hostages. It repeats the South Africa comparison, said Israeli politicians bragged about “the atrocities they plan to commit” and deceitfully claimed students and faculty expressing opposition to “Israeli war crimes and mourning the dead are being silenced.”^{^[149]} Esposito was also one of at least 22 Walsh professors from FSJP who wrote to Georgetown’s president, calling for a ceasefire in Gaza and demanding “a halt to the grave violations of international humanitarian law and human rights law in the Gaza Strip.”^{^[150]}

Nine years before the Hamas slaughter, a half dozen Walsh faculty (and one emeritus) signed a statement accusing Israel of, among other things, “rationing Palestinian calorie intake at just above subsistence levels,” and “massacres” in Gaza. It also called for the return of Palestinian refugees to their homes, the end of Israel’s “colonization” of “Arab lands” occupied in June 1967, and recognition of the rights of Israeli Arabs.^{^[151]}

Also, long before October 7, Nader Hashemi, the current Director of the ACMCU, called for a boycott of Israel and compared it to South Africa’s former regime. He is also a Hamas apologist. In 2018, he posted: “Please no more lectures about Hamas when Israeli fascists are in power”^{^[152]} and “Hamas changes its strategy and looks to Mandela/Gandhi and MLK for inspiration.”^{^[153]} In 2021, he tweeted: “Don’t talk to me about Hamas unless u r willing to talk about the moral equivalent of Hamas on the Israeli side who form a core part of Bibi’s coalition. Key difference: we ban Hamas while we arm/support their Israeli counterparts.”^{^[154]} Hashemi referred to Israel’s war on Hamas as “genocide,”^{^[155]} and complained that feminists weren’t speaking up for Gaza’s women,^{^[156]} while failing to condemn Hamas’s sexual abuse of Israeli women. In 2022, he said Israel’s Mossad might have orchestrated the stabbing of author Salman Rushdie.^{^[157]}

Another professor, sociologist Gözde Güran, signed the Sociologists in Solidarity with Gaza and the Palestinian People statement, which denounces “the Israeli regime,” falsely alleges Israel’s use of white phosphorus, and accuses Israel of committing “genocide.” The statement’s only mention of the October 7 massacre was to mock Israel for “claiming its actions are a justifiable response.”^{^[158]}

In defending the boycott of Israel, the Director of the Center for Contemporary Arab Studies, Fida Adely (who holds a chair named after an ambassador for the virulently anti-Israel Arab League), referred to the need to “end decades of occupation and repression of Palestinian human rights” and criticized dialogue between Israelis and Palestinians as marginalizing Palestinians.^{^[159]} She participated in a teaching session on “The Unending War on the Children of Gaza.”^{^[160]}

Jonathan Brown, the Prince Alwaleed bin Talal Chair of Islamic Civilization, is married to a producer for the Qatari Al Jazeera network. He is another BDS supporter who says, “All the Arabs were ‘cleansed’ from what used to be Yafa.”^{^[161]} The post was met with derision by people living in this thriving area adjacent to Tel Aviv, where 16,000 Arab Israelis live.^{^[162]} Referring to the death of a Palestinian killed by Israeli troops, he tweeted, “What never gave them a chance is the Israeli apartheid occupation.”^{^[163]} At a symposium, he said, “The problem is that the Israeli political creature, the Israeli political establishment, has not told Jews in Israel that they are not allowed to take stuff that doesn’t belong to them, and that is, I think, a fundamental problem… If you can tell people that your religious belief does not give you the right to take the possessions of someone else.”^{^[164]} On March 21, 2024, he tweeted, “Israeli security forces are lunatics. Israel is insanely racist.”^{^[165]}

The university suspended Brown in July 2025 after posting on social media that Iran should conduct a “symbolic strike” on a U.S. military base. “Within minutes of our learning of that tweet, the dean contacted Professor Brown, the tweet was removed [and] we issued a statement condemning the tweet. Professor Brown is no longer chair of his department [Arabic and Islamic Studies] and he’s on leave, and we’re beginning a process of reviewing the case,” Georgetown University interim President Robert Groves told a congressional hearing.^{^[166]}

Two other members of the Walsh faculty are Osama Abi-Mershed, Director of the Center for Contemporary Arab Studies (CCAS), and Marwa Daoudy, Associate Professor and Chair of Arab Studies. Abi-Mershed is another BDS supporter who has pledged “not to collaborate on projects and events involving Israeli academic institutions.”^{^[167]} He also signed a 2014 statement accusing Israel, during its counterterror operation against Hamas, of causing “disproportionate harm” and committing “war crimes,” while calling for the suspension of U.S. aid to Israel.^{^[168]}

Daoudy launched a novel attack on Israel, accusing it of “ecocide”^{^[169]} and “cultural genocide.”^{^[170]} She derided “Biden’s complete and unconditional surrender to Israel” and repeated the false claim that Israel steals water from Palestinians for the benefit of “illegal settlers.”^{^[171]} She praised as “beautiful” a speech by South Africa’s Foreign Minister accusing Israel of behaving like Afrikaner South Africa, and echoed his assertion that “‘Palestinians are denied the right to exist as human beings.’”^{^[172]} She said she signed a letter (signatories are missing) to Georgetown’s president protesting his statement condemning the Hamas massacre because it did not mention the Palestinians.^{^[173]}

Diplomats can also get an education from Georgetown University in Qatar. Among the faculty is Palestinian American historian Abdullah Al-Arian, who said there’s a growing consensus that Israel is committing “genocide” in Gaza and wants to pursue an “ethnic cleansing campaign on the order of the Nakba” but is being forced to settle for reducing Gaza’s territory “through unprecedented destruction and a long-term military occupation.” He uses standard anti-Semitic jargon like “settler-colonial” state to describe Israel, but couches much of his opinion by referring to what others say.^{^[174]}

Law professor Noha Aboueldaha refers to “Israel’s brutal military assaults,” “atrocities,” and the need “to dismantle the system of dehumanization of Palestinians.”^{^[175]} She reposts tweets attacking Israel as well as her own, accusing Israel of “collective punishment.”^{^[176]} She misquotes Israeli Defense Minister Yoav Gallant in an effort to prove Israel’s “genocidal intent, crimes against humanity, and war crimes.”^{^[177]}

Ian Almond, a professor of World Literature, said on LinkedIn, “I’m sorry, but I don’t blame Hamas for this. If you let power do whatever it wants without ever checking or rebuking it, this is where you end up.”^{^[178]} He claimed that before October 7, Palestinians made “non-violent” approaches to the border, where they were “met with violence – Israeli snipers killed over 200 of these peaceful protesters.”^{^[179]} He found it “disturbing to see pictures of any women, Israeli or Palestinian, being dragged off by a crowd of jeering men,” ignoring that no Palestinian women were treated that way.^{^[180]}

Yehia A Mohamed, Associate Professor of Arabic at GU-Q, wrote numerous Facebook posts such as “Half a year has passed since the extermination war in Gaza and the resistance has not given up or been defeated,”^{^[181]} “I have always been with the Palestinian resistance, regardless of the ideologies of each team, whether this team is Fatah, the Front, Hamas, or Jihad,”^{^[182]} and “The Biden and Blinken administration bears more responsibility for the genocide and war crimes in Gaza than the leaders of the terrorist occupying state.”^{^[183]}

Historian Trish Kahle is a member of FSJP and a signatory to their ceasefire letter along with Al-Arian and Aboueldaha. While still a graduate student at the University of Chicago, she wrote columns for SocialistWorker.org. In one, Kahle said Israel “mercilessly slaughtered” 1,000 Palestinians “in the open-air prison that is the Gaza Strip” and denounced the university’s investment in Israel.^{^[184]} After the October 7 massacre, she signed a statement (along with 1,200 “scholars”) by “Feminists For a Free Palestine” accusing Israel of, among other things, ethnic cleansing, “pinkwashing to justify genocide,” and colonialism.^{^[185]}

Across its Washington and Doha campuses, Georgetown has accepted massive Arab funding, concealed donor purposes, and staffed influential positions with faculty who openly support BDS, legitimize Hamas, and promote narratives hostile to Israel. The Qatar connection adds a further layer of concern: restrictions on speech and compliance with local censorship laws contradict the values of open inquiry that the university claims to uphold.

Qatar’s Backdoor to University Influence

While Qatar’s university funding often draws headlines, far less attention has been paid to its backdoor channel—the Arab Center Washington DC (ACW), a U.S. affiliate of the Arab Center for Research and Policy Studies in Doha.^{^[186]}

The ACW describes itself as “a nonprofit, independent and nonpartisan research organization dedicated to furthering the political, economic and social understanding of the Arab world in the United States and to providing insight on U.S. policies and interests in the Middle East.”

It relies on tax-deductible contributions from “individual supporters, organizations, foundations and corporations.” However, Its IRS filings tell a different story: of the $2.5million in reported contributions, all but $2,810 came from the Qatari parent center.^{^[187]}

ACW’s programming makes its leanings clear, with events like “Gaza and the Crime of Genocide: Legal and Political Dimensions of Accountability” and “Repression of Palestine Activism amid the War on Gaza.”

Executive Director Khalil E. Jahshan, a veteran of several Arab lobby groups, has called the “clearest political message” of Hamas’s October 7 attack a warning to the “Camp of Normalizers” that their plans for a “New Middle East” without Palestine “shall not pass unopposed.”^{^[188]}

He has also accused Brett McGurk, a top Biden adviser, of “rewarding Israel for its genocidal war in Gaza” by advancing Saudi–Israel normalization “at the expense of Palestinian national rights.”^{^[189]}

The center has 14 academic advisers, 13 of whom are professors from universities such as Georgetown, George Washington, the University of Maryland, and Princeton. It does not indicate whether any members are paid. Two members of the Walsh Faculty at Georgetown were previously mentioned: Osama Abi-Mershed and Marwa Daoudy. Among the other professors on the list is Columbia University professor Hamid Dabashi. He refers to ISIS as “murderous thugs” and says, “Their Israeli counterparts meanwhile conquered parts of Syria and declared it part of their Zionist settler colony.” Dabashi does see one difference, which suggests that he doesn’t read The New York Times, “ISIS does not have a platoon of clean shaven and well coiffured [sic] columnists at the New York Times propagating the cause of the terrorist outfit as the Zionists columnists do on a regular basis.”^{^[190]}

While Dabashi wears his disdain for Israel on his sleeve, a more slippery example is the University of Maryland’s Shibley Telhami. A critic of Israel, he is best known for producing widely quoted surveys related to Israel with questions consistently written to elicit negative responses towards the Jewish state.^{^[191]} Following the October 7 massacre, Telhami posted tweets such as “the Israeli army has weaponized humanitarian measures such as ‘evacuation orders’, ‘safe routes’ & ‘safe zones’ to support their military operations & facilitate the mass displacement of Palestinians.”^{^[192]}

Another adviser is retired USC professor Laurie Brand, a former president of MESA and now chair of its Committee on Academic Freedom, which devotes much of its attention to criticism of Israel and defense of anti-Semitic rhetoric. In its post-October 7 letter to universities, MESA denied that anti-Zionism is a form of anti-Semitism. While expressing heartbreak over the loss of Israeli and Palestinian lives, the letter said nothing about the Hamas massacre that created the toxic campus environment in which many Jewish students feel under siege.^{^[193]} She is indignant that Israel’s detractors are silenced while freely expressing criticism and supporting the boycott of Israel, which undermines academic freedom.

George Washington University history professor Dina Khoury is another former MESA president who supports BDS and has condemned Israel in a prior Gaza conflict for its actions to defend its citizens.^{^[194]}

Sheila Carapico, a professor of political science and international studies at the University of Richmond, is another BDS supporter and a consultant to Human Rights Watch.^{^[195]} She authored an article complaining about Saudi Arabia bullying Qatar.^{^[196]}

Another BDS supporter is Amaney Jamal, the Edwards S. Sanford Professor of Politics at Princeton.^{^[197]}

ACW also has 18 research fellows, including Dana El Kurd, an assistant professor at the University of Richmond who wrote an op-ed in the Washington Post assailing the normalization of relations between Israel and the Gulf states, claiming that rather than advancing peace, Israel is giving the Arab regimes tools to solidify their authoritarian rule. She claims the Palestinian issue is the “root cause of the Arab-Israeli conflict” and suggested that the Abraham Accords emboldened Israel to annex Palestinian territory, ignoring that Israel gave up a plan to exercise sovereignty to achieve the agreement with the Gulf states.^{^[198]}

One member of the ACW board is Mohammed Abu Nimer, director of the Peacebuilding and Development Institute at American University. Hamas, he says, has “engaged in the fight against the Israeli occupation since 1987,” meaning even after Israel withdrew in 2005.^{^[199]} He also repeats the canard that Hamas changed its charter and does not consider Jews its enemy, and no longer seeks Israel’s destruction.^{^[200]} The man who received the 2023 Distinguished Scholar Award for his “groundbreaking work in interreligious dialogue and faith-based peacebuilding” compares Israel to Afrikaner South Africa and accused Israel of “ethnic cleansing” and preparing for a “genocide” in Gaza.^{^[201]}

Another board member is Laurie King, an anthropology professor at Georgetown who was a co-founder of the virulently anti-Israel website Electronic Intifada. She has compared Israel to Afrikaner South Africa and called for it to be boycotted. She falsely accuses Israel of “ethnic cleansing.” She justifies the Hamas massacre as a response to Israel controlling “virtually all aspects of life” for Palestinians, even though Israel withdrew from Gaza and Hamas controlled the lives of those living there. Unsurprisingly, she objects to individuals who have expressed anti-Semitic sentiments being called out for anti-Semitism.^{^[202]}

Given the absence of transparency, it remains unclear whether these academics promote anti-Israel narratives because they are paid, or whether Qatar recruits them precisely because they already hold these positions. If there is no financial or professional benefit, why lend one’s name—and credibility—to a Qatari-funded advocacy platform?

Foreign Students
Students from the Arab world have sought an American education for decades. The first students sponsored by Saudi Arabia attended the University of California, Berkeley, in 1947. Seven of King Faisal’s eight sons studied in the United States. These students come to broaden their horizons and receive specialized training in areas such as business and engineering, for which there is a demand in their home countries. Many assume positions in the government when they return.^{^[203]}

Roughly 80% of Arab donations with a stated purpose are earmarked for financial aid. This suggests that many unreported or “purpose unknown” donations may serve the same function—but the lack of disclosure also leaves open the possibility that some serve more political ends. The DoE’s database shows glaring gaps. For example, in a past report, George Mason University acknowledged receiving $58.9 million since 2012 from the Saudi Embassy for scholarships. In its most recent filing, no purpose was recorded for any contributions.^{^[204]}

Foreign students pay full tuition, which allows schools—especially public research institutions—to offset declining state appropriations, expand programs, and bolster local economies.^{^[205]} Arab governments’ scholarship largesse both enables access to world-class institutions and addresses shortages of skilled labor at home. Some Arab students are from royal families or are legacies, while others are sent to study specific areas such as petroleum engineering. In 2023–24, more than 30,000 students from 11 Arab countries and the Palestinian Authority studied in the U.S., a mere 3% of over one million international students.

Table 7
Arab Students in the United States^{^[206]}

Bahrain	335
Iraq	476
Jordan	2,643
Kuwait	5,102
Lebanon	1,987
Oman	1,748
Palestinian Territories	466
Qatar	388
Saudi Arabia	14,828
Syria	385
UAE	1,571
Yemen	256
Total Arab	30,185

Saudi Arabia alone accounts for nearly 15,000 students—the 12th-largest national group—although numbers have fallen sharply from a peak of 61,000 in the 2015–16 academic year.^{^[207]} Even with that decline, Saudi Arabia provides 45% of all Arab-attributed tuition aid to U.S. universities, spending $846 million compared to Qatar’s $4.5 million. Based on DoE records, Arab donors have covered 3,720 tuition payments across 122 institutions. Some universities receive multiple large gifts, such as Columbia, Stanford, and Penn State. Still, the University of Alabama stands out, having received 1,488 donations (40% of the total), three-quarters of which came from Saudi Arabia, totaling over $24 million.

Contrary to alarmist theories, these donations are not concentrated in elite political incubators. The largest single gift went to the University of Missouri–Kansas City, while the Saudis’ went to the University of Idaho. Based on the cost of attending Missouri, all 5,000 Kuwaiti students could have enrolled for the year, though the grant information said it covered only a semester.^{^[208]}

Most Arab students are not sent to engage in campus politics. They typically major in STEM fields, health, or other professions needed in their home countries, and Saudi Arabia explicitly forbids its students from participating in political or religious activism abroad.^{^[209]} This undercuts assumptions that they are behind incidents like the February 2024 resolution passed by the University of Alabama–Birmingham Student Government Association that accused Israel of “apartheid” and “plausible genocide of Gaza.”^{^[210]}

Historically, Arab-funded student groups like the Organization of Arab Students (OAS) and the General Union of Palestinian Students (GUPS) played visible roles in anti-Israel activism in the 1970s and ’80s. GUPS functioned as a campus arm of the PLO. Both organizations are now defunct.

Students from Arab countries who are hostile toward Israel could potentially affect the atmosphere if they became active in the BDS movement and other anti-Semitic, anti-Israel campaigns. Kenneth Marcus, who leads the Brandeis Center for Human Rights Under Law, is concerned that cross-cultural exchanges can often bring students “indoctrinated with anti-Jewish propaganda” to campus.^{^[211]} He added, “They may come in peace, but also in many cases, bring with them cultural attitudes toward Israel and Jewish communities in a way that is harmful in the United States.” Still, on most campuses, foreign nationals make up a small proportion of the student body.

After Hamas invaded Israel on October 7, 2023, some foreign students joined campus protests, yet most faced little or no disciplinary action from universities or law enforcement. At MIT, where foreign students make up 30% of the student body, the administration “explicitly declined to discipline rule-breaking foreign students for fear that suspension might jeopardize their student visas.”^{^[212]}

While critics warn of negative influence, some argue that immersion in American democratic life can have the opposite effect. As former Saudi Planning Minister Hisham Muhyi al-Nazer, a UCLA graduate, once said, “I don’t know any Saudi Arab who has studied in the United States who has come back with a feeling against it.”^{^[213]}

Members of Congress have called on the Trump administration to investigate whether international students are violating U.S. law by endorsing or promoting terrorist activity—a deportable offense.^{^[214]} While some Arab students—including U.S. citizens—are outspoken BDS supporters, the scale and nature of their activism remain unclear. More transparency in foreign donations, coupled with closer monitoring of campus political involvement, is necessary to ensure that academic exchange does not become a tool for political subversion.

Overstating the Problem of Unreported Funds

The DoE’s failure to disclose the purposes of foreign donations—combined with the large sums that go unreported altogether—understandably raises suspicion. Critics of Arab governments, especially Qatar, often leap to the conclusion that this money must be funding subversive or dangerous agendas. Yet, much of the documented evidence points in quite a different direction.

ISGAP has done significant work uncovering unreported foreign funding. But its assertion that countries like Qatar are exerting a “detrimental influence on U.S. higher education and national security” collapses under closer scrutiny. In its own report on Yale’s financial ties to Qatar, ISGAP lists eleven allegedly unreported grants—yet not one is shown to threaten national security or to bias attitudes toward Israel or Jews.^{^[215]}

Six of those grants funded medical research, including a psychiatry project at Weill Cornell Medical College in Qatar that studied risk factors for perinatal depression. Three more were tied to oil-related studies. The only politically themed grants were equally benign: one supported a lecture series on “The Rule of Law in Arab Politics,” offering insight into legal and political transitions during a volatile period in the Arab world; another explored Christian support for regime change in Syria and Egypt.

Even the two education initiatives ISGAP flags—the Yale–The QF partnership on the World Innovation Summit for Education (WISE) and the Wise Learner’s Voice Program—are platforms for global leadership training, not vehicles for extremist indoctrination.

Table 8
Unreported Funds by University and Country of Donor 1981-2020

American University^B	1984	$5,000,000	Saudi Arabia
Berkeley	11/26/1998	$5,000,000	Saudi Arabia
Berkeley	1998	$2,000,000	Saudi Arabia
Berkeley	2008	$28,000,000	Saudi Arabia
Carnegie Mellon^A	1986-2018	$122,410,305	Qatar
Carnegie Mellon^F	2010-2022	700,000,000	Qatar
Cornell^A	1986-2018	$1,398,144,660	Qatar
Cornell	2008	$25,000,000	Saudi Arabia
George Washington^D	2/18/2011	$4,500,000	Kuwait
Georgetown^A	1986-2018	$138,597,917	Qatar
Georgetown	12/12/2005	$20,000,000	Saudi Arabia
Georgetown	1993	$6,500,000	Palestinian Authority
Harvard	1982	$600,000	Saudi Arabia
Harvard	1982	$1,000,000	Saudi Arabia
Harvard	12/12/2005	$20,000,000	Saudi Arabia
Harvard	2001	$500,000	Saudi Arabia
Harvard	1993	$5,000,000	Saudi Arabia
Harvard	1994	$1,000,000	Saudi Arabia
Harvard	1982	$1,500,000	Saudi Arabia
Harvard	6/20/2005	$5,000,000	Saudi Arabia
Johns Hopkins	2/1/2018	$50,000,000	United Arab Emirates
MIT	2018	$23,000,000	Saudi Arabia
New York University	2008	$50,000,000	United Arab Emirates
Northwestern	1986-2018	$12,342,876	Qatar
Rice	1996	$1,000,000	Saudi Arabia
Rochester Institute of Technology	2008	$136,000,000	United Arab Emirates
Stanford	2008	$25,000,000	Saudi Arabia
Texas A&M^A	1986-2018	$739,424,927	Qatar
University of Arkansas	1994	$20,000,000	Saudi Arabia
University of Texas Austin^E	2008	$25,000,000	Saudi Arabia
Virginia Commonwealth^A	1986-2018	$587,467,226	Qatar
Yale	2015	$10,000,000	Saudi Arabia
Total		$3,444,302,159

^ASource: ISGAP.
^BAU later said the pledge was not paid.
^CEstimated.
^DThe chair was created, but no report was issued indicating where the remainder of the funds originated.
^EThis amount is mentioned for the program, but UT’s share is not specified|.
^FUnreported to the Pennsylvania DoE.

These cases hardly justify the rising hysteria over foreign funding in general—or Qatar’s in particular. Still, examples in our report raise valid concerns, and the DoE’s lax enforcement of reporting rules, coupled with obscuring the purposes of Arab funding, inevitably fuels suspicion. But when reports fail to establish harmful intent or concrete consequences, they weaken the case for imposing stricter limits on foreign funding.

Compromising Values

For decades, universities have largely evaded serious government scrutiny for fundraising in Arab countries—at least until recently. Revered as bastions of liberalism and academic freedom, they have paradoxically entangled themselves in ethical compromises by courting financial relationships with authoritarian regimes. This pattern reflects a troubling prioritization of fundraising over principle, seen not only in dealings with Arab states but also with other serial human rights violators such as China, Türkiye, and Venezuela.

Critics have long warned of the consequences of establishing campuses in the Gulf, where universities may be compelled to conform to discriminatory laws and restrictive cultural norms. NYU’s collaboration with the UAE is a prime example. The UAE is notorious for human rights abuses and anti-Semitic sentiment; yet, then-President John Sexton appeared unconcerned about the risks posed to gay students (homosexuality is illegal), Jews (Abu Dhabi was home to a Holocaust-denying think tank), or Israeli scholars (barred from the country before the Abraham Accords). His only concession was that anyone on the NYU Abu Dhabi campus would have to accept the norms of that society. The program’s UAE government coordinator, Mubarak Al Shamesi, was even blunter: “NYU was aware of our local culture and rules and guidelines… and our policies on Israelis or homosexuality were clearly not a concern for them.”^{^[216]}

Instances of censorship and reprisal against dissenting voices further illustrate the ethical compromises made by universities for financial gain. The QF’s suppression of a Lebanese band with an openly gay singer at Northwestern’s Doha campus and the dismissal of a professor at the campus for expressing pro-Israel views highlight the chilling of academic freedom in environments beholden to oppressive regimes.^{^[217]}

Few institutions have the courage to reject the hundreds of thousands—or millions—offered by Arab donors. In 1977, Georgetown University accepted a $750,000 endowed chair from Libya. Columnist Art Buchwald blasted the decision, calling it “blood money from one of the most notorious regimes in the world today,” and sarcastically suggesting the creation of a “Brezhnev Studies Program in Human Rights or an Idi Amin Chair in Genocide.”^{^[218]} After five years of defending the gift, President Rev. Timothy Healy returned it with interest because Libya supported terrorism.

Healy also returned a $50,000 gift from the Iraqi government of Saddam Hussein, expressing the hope that the university could request a gift in the future, and asking that the Iraqis “understand the delicacy of the university’s position.”^{^[219]} Healy didn’t explain, and some faculty attributed the decision to his support for Israel and pressure from pro-Israel members of the community. History professor Hisham Sharabi branded him a “Jesuit Zionist.”^{^[220]}

In the late 1970s, Saudi arms merchant Adnan Khashoggi offered $600,000 to establish a Middle East Studies program at Swarthmore, Haverford, and Bryn Mawr, but the deal fell through after revelations about his alleged involvement in passing bribes on behalf of Northrop.^{^[221]} After that scandal blew over, he offered $5 million to American University in Washington, D.C., where he served on AU’s board of trustees from 1983 to 1989 (when he was kicked off for failing to attend board meetings).^{^[222]}

His 1984 contribution to constructing the Adnan Khashoggi Sports and Convocation Center provoked much criticism, with one professor suggesting they rename the center the Khashoggi Sports and Guerrilla Warfare Center.” The decision was defended by university president Richard Berendzen, who, in a book on his life as a university president, had written about being invited to parties at Khashoggi’s New York apartment, where he met movie stars.^{^[223]} After criminal charges surfaced, the issue of keeping the building’s name was debated. Khashoggi was eventually acquitted of all charges, but in 1986, he admitted to advancing $5 million toward the shipment of arms in the Iran-Contra scandal, and the university came under pressure to remove Khashoggi’s name from the center. One evening, in the middle of the night, his name was surreptitiously removed, which was later attributed to his failure to pay his financial pledge.^{^[224]}

In 2000, Harvard Divinity School accepted a $2.5 million donation from Sheikh Zayed bin Sultan al-Nahayan to endow a professorship in Islamic religious studies. This gift sparked a one-person crusade by Rachel Fish, a student at the school. Outraged by Sheikh Zayed’s abysmal human rights record and his funding of the Zayed Center for Coordination and Follow-Up—a hub for Holocaust denial and virulent anti-Semitic and anti-American propaganda—Fish fought to have the university return the tainted money. After 18 months of controversy, Harvard agreed to return the money, shifting the onus to “representatives of the UAE” who “informed Harvard of the donor’s desire to withdraw the gift.”^{^[225]}

In 1975, Saudi Arabia was asked to finance a $5.5 million teacher-training program, but several schools, including Harvard, would not participate after the Saudis banned Jewish faculty from participating. MIT gave up a $2 million contract to train Saudi teachers for the same reason.^{^[226]}

The Midwest Universities Consortium for International Activities (comprising Illinois, Indiana, Wisconsin, Michigan State, and Minnesota) won a contract to provide curricular advice to the University of Riyadh but withdrew after four Jewish professors were denied visas to enter the country. David Johnson, the dean of international studies at Wisconsin, said, “We are not really dependent on an infusion of Arabian funds. Even if we were, this organization is not going to prostitute itself for oil money.”^{^[227]} The University of Wisconsin has accepted $76 million from Gulf nations (more than half from Saudi Arabia to pay for their students’ tuition).

The University of Nevada, Las Vegas, turned down Dubai’s offer to open a campus due to concerns about human rights.^{^[228]} Boston University, Harvard, Michigan State (now closed), and the Rochester Institute of Technology had no such qualms.

Saudis and other Arab donors need not worry; most universities are more than happy to accept their money.

The murder of Jamal Khashoggi in 2018 served as a stark reminder of the ethical dilemmas facing universities with ties to Saudi Arabia. Typically, universities have escaped scrutiny for accepting funds from heinous regimes. The national attention devoted by the media to Khashoggi’s brutal slaying forced recipients of funds from the Saudis to reconsider the merits of keeping the money. However, ethics seems to have played a less significant role in universities’ decision-making than the potential downside of negative publicity.

Several institutions said they were reviewing their relationship with Saudi Arabia in the wake of the killing, but none deemed the incident critical enough to cut their ties. For example, Northwestern accepted nearly $22 million from the kingdom. The administration responded to questions by expressing its condolences and insisting most funds went to faculty grants for “basic science research” that would have global benefits. “Going forward, the university is asking faculty to assess their relationships with Saudi Arabia.”^{^[229]} That was 2018. Since then, Northwestern has taken another $13 million from Saudi Arabia.

Graduate students wrote an open letter to the president of MIT urging him to sever ties with the Saudi government and condemn its human rights violations:

We know that you and MIT’s leadership initially approached the Institute’s partnership with Saudi Arabia with the noblest of intentions. However, at this point, MIT’s continued collaboration with the Saudi government sends the message that human rights violations can be overlooked in favor of financial considerations. It assures Mohammad bin Salman (MBS), the crown prince of Saudi Arabia, that MIT will tolerate his present and future transgressions. And it enables the regime to profit from MIT’s reputation. This both grants the kingdom impunity and damages MIT’s reputation.^{^[230]}

MIT reviewed its ties with Saudi Arabia and decided only to end the Media Lab relationship with MiSK. One rationale for accepting Saudi money was that some funders “served as moderating social influences—for example, by employing female engineers and managers.” Jonathan King, the editorial board chair of MIT’s faculty newsletter, said the small amount of money involved did not justify getting “in bed with murderers and a government that imprisons its women activists.” He asked why MIT would risk its reputation for “chump change.”^{^[231]}

Since the controversy arose, MIT has reported additional gifts of more than $32 million from Saudi Arabia.

Johns Hopkins is another institution that has been challenged to address the human rights issues in Saudi Arabia. The university has reported $111 million in contributions from Saudi sources. President of Johns Hopkins Medicine International Pamela Paulk told the Baltimore Sun, “It is not important for us to be involved in politics. Our mission is to provide health care, education, and research.”^{^[232]}

Peter Danchin, a human rights lawyer and director of the International and Comparative Law Program at the University of Maryland Carey School of Law, suggested universities can express their views privately or publicly. “The risk is the regime retaliates and threatens to cancel the joint venture,” Danchin said. “As a human rights lawyer, I would think that is a risk worth taking. There is a question about complicity. If you are doing business in a country with human rights violations, at some point, there is a moral and ethical question that arises about what you should do.”^{^[233]}

No doubt speaking for many universities, Liz Reisberg, an independent consultant and research fellow at Boston College’s Center for International Higher Education who has worked as a consultant for Saudi Arabia’s Ministry of Education, said responding to the Khashoggi murder could be symbolic, but it would be hypocritical unless universities are prepared to cancel academic relationships with other countries that violate human rights. “If universities withdraw from their international initiatives each time there is a violation of human rights or an act of violence committed by [an] academic partner’s government,” Reisberg wrote, “soon all international academic engagement would probably come to a screeching halt.”^{^[234]}

This is absurd, of course, as universities have opportunities to collaborate with dozens of countries that do not have the egregious human rights records of countries like Saudi Arabia and Qatar. Universities see little downside to accepting tainted money due to the lack of transparency. Hence, it is not surprising that 150 universities have taken $2.7 billion in Saudi money (68% of all their contributions) since the killing of Khashoggi.

If no one knows, who will object?

Universities do not need to sever all foreign ties, but they should reject funds from the worst human rights offenders. As MIT’s students noted, with an endowment of over $16 billion, “MIT cannot be threatened into silence.”^{^[235]} At least that’s the theory.

Not all institutions have MIT’s financial cushion. Still, all share the same responsibility: to lead by example, prioritize integrity over expediency, and refuse to launder the reputations of abusive regimes in exchange for cash. The funders know, however, that they can always find a university that can’t resist temptation.

What About Israel?

The Israeli government, individuals, and companies made 1,323 donations to 103 institutions, totaling $419 million, between 2000 and the present. As with Arab donations, few from Israel – 12% worth only $53 million (13% of the total) – describe their purpose. Only 131 contributions were from the Israeli government. Fifteen grants come from the Binational Science Foundation (BSF) and three from the Binational Agricultural Research and Development Fund (BARD), which the United States and Israel jointly fund to support basic science and agricultural research. The descriptions of several others suggest they may also be binationally financed projects. Israel’s Ministry of Defense made twelve donations worth $4 million for unspecified projects. Only one contribution from Israel is for tuition payments for students. Other projects are described primarily as research projects or clinical trials.

Five of the six largest contributions ($4-$7 million) from Israel went to Brigham Young University, a Mormon institution that has a campus in Jerusalem, and the other, $4.5 million, went to Carnegie Mellon. None listed their purpose or were from the government.

American citizens and private foundations fund endowments for Israel Studies programs, chairs, and centers—not the Israeli government—and therefore fall outside DoE reporting requirements. These investments are designed to enhance the depth and quality of Israel-related scholarship, not to vilify Palestinians, Arabs, or any other group. Also, unlike Arab state donations, any Israeli government contribution for an academic post related to Israel Studies would spark a fierce backlash. Paradoxically, such an investment might also backfire if the recipient of the funds chose an anti-Israel professor to fill the position. That is precisely what happened in some instances where pro-Israel Americans donated money to universities.^{^[236]}

What Is the Impact?

The Arab lobby’s strategy for shaping U.S. policy and influencing the next generation of leaders begins on college campuses. As Aramco’s magazine acknowledged, courses “once tailored for diplomats and missionaries now draw students who plan careers in banking, business, law, public health, education, and urban studies,” and “university ‘outreach’ programs are developing and providing courses on the Middle East for both high school [K-12] and adult-education programs.”^{^[237]} This is not accidental—it’s long-term influence at work.

Arab governments also leverage donations to American universities to launder their image and bury inconvenient truths. After 9/11, Saudi Arabia wanted Americans to forget that 15 of the 19 hijackers were Saudis. Today, Crown Prince Mohammed bin Salman uses prestigious U.S. universities to present himself as a modernizer, despite global outrage over the murder of journalist Jamal Khashoggi. As Harvard’s Grif Peterson observed, a financial relationship with institutions like Harvard and MIT “allows Mohammed bin Salman to project an image of being a Western-leaning progressive leader” and gives “legitimacy to this growing power base that he’s creating.”^{^[238]}

NYU professor Zachary Lockman put it bluntly: “I don’t think there’s any doubt that the Saudis have seen such donations as a way to acquire goodwill, legitimacy, and support in U.S. academia… And, of course, donors want to ensure that the people filling these chairs and running these programs will be sympathetic to the policies of these countries’ regimes, though they cannot always make that happen” (emphasis added).^{^[239]} The donors don’t have to worry, as the universities have no interest in offending their cash cows.

F. Gregory Gause III, an expert on the Gulf and the head of the International Affairs Department at Texas A&M University, questioned whether donations by countries like Saudi Arabia have helped improve their image. “In general,” he said, “if what they’re trying to do with gifts to universities is buy goodwill, they’ve failed.”^{^[240]}

If you look at Gallup’s polls on American attitudes toward foreign countries, there is evidence of his view. In 2001, before 9/11, for example, 47% of Americans had a favorable opinion of Saudi Arabia and 46% an unfavorable one. In the February 2025 survey, the figures were 38% and 55%, respectively. Its “very favorable” rating has never exceeded 7% in that time.^{^[241]}

Saudi Arabia’s image may not have improved, but that doesn’t mean its money—and that of other Arab donors—lacks influence. Professors who benefit from this funding can shape classrooms, publish textbooks, train teachers, design curricula, and even position themselves as “experts” sought by media and policymakers.

Gallup did not ask Americans’ views of Qatar; perhaps because it is less well known than Saudi Arabia. The emirate faces mounting scrutiny, and for good reason, given its autocratic government and ties to Islamic extremism and terror groups. Its influence is often indirect but no less corrosive. “Qatar’s goal is not to promote anti-Semitic or pro-Palestinian messages,” Gulf expert Ariel Admoni explained, “but anti-Semitism and pro-Palestinian sentiments are byproducts of policies convenient for them.” Why? Because, as he notes, “In Western countries, particularly within educated circles, the pro-Palestinian struggle is perceived as a ‘convenient’ cause. Consequently, from the Qatari perspective, this portrayal positions them favorably on what they consider to be the right side of public opinion, especially among the youth.”^{^[242]}

Predictably, Qatar denies any malicious intent. In response to questions raised during a June 13, 2024, House Ways and Means Committee hearing, for example, its embassy insisted it was not “funding American universities for malign purposes, including influencing recent incidents of campus unrest,” adding on X: “Qatar has no desire or ability to influence anything that happens on U.S. university campuses.”^{^[243]}

Not surprisingly, universities deny that foreign gifts influence their policies. Douglas W. Elmendorf, the dean of Harvard’s Kennedy School, for example, acknowledged that his school receives Saudi financial support but insisted, “Our principal standards for such work are whether it maintains our tradition of scholarly excellence, whether it can be conducted without donors’ attempting to influence the conclusions of our scholarship, and whether it has positive effects on people in the societies where we are engaged.” He added, “We believe that our work in Saudi Arabia meets those standards and have made no changes in that work at this point.”^{^[244]}

History shows that the influence is real.

In 1982, Khalid al-Turki made a $2 million contribution to establish a professorship in contemporary Arab Studies at Harvard.^{^[245]} While universities, especially elite ones that can afford to ignore donors’ wishes, maintain they do not allow strings to be attached to gifts, there was reportedly an unwritten understanding that the position would go to Walid Khalidi, a PLO-affiliated professor who rewrote history to fit the Palestinian narrative and was a proponent of the specious idea that “the crux and the kernel of the Arab-Israeli conflict is the Palestinian problem.”^{^[246]} The university denied that the funder would determine the choice for the position. Still, it went to Khalidi.^{^[247]} Edward Keenan, dean of the Graduate School of Arts and Sciences (GSAS) and outgoing director of the Center for Middle Eastern Studies, said the donation drew attention primarily due to concerns about Saudi influence in America.^{^[248]}

Today, that chair is held by Steven Caton, a BDS advocate who compares Israel to Afrikaner South Africa and signed a statement castigating Israel and calling for “Palestinian liberation” and an end to U.S. support for Israel.^{^[249]}

Princeton’s Bernard Lewis warned decades ago that Middle East studies had succumbed to “a degree of thought control and limitations of freedom of expression without parallel in the Western world since the 18th century.” He added, “It seems to me it’s a very dangerous situation because it makes any kind of scholarly discussion of Islam, to say the least, dangerous. Islam and Islamic values now have a level of immunity from comment and criticism in the Western world that Christianity has lost, and Judaism never had.”^{^[250]}

Consider the Center for Middle East Studies program at Harvard. It listed 81 courses for Spring 2024. Of those, three were Hebrew classes, and five titles related to Israel, only two of which did not include the term “Palestine.”^{^[251]}

Some Harvard faculty members have been vocal in their criticism of Israel. For example, Salma Waheedi, who teaches a course titled “Law, Human Rights, and Social Justice in Israel and Palestine,” signed a statement supporting Palestinian liberation. This statement implicitly accused Israel of “racism and colonial violence” and explicitly of “state violence” while also calling for the United States to end its support for Israel.^{^[252]} Waheedi also signed a letter to President Biden nine days after the October 7 massacre. The letter recognized the Hamas atrocities but condemned Israel’s “escalating response” as a form of “collective punishment.”^{^[253]}

Waheedi’s course subject was also the focus of a submission by the International Human Rights Clinic at Harvard Law School to the United Nations Independent International Commission of Inquiry on the Occupied Territory, including East Jerusalem, and Israel. The submission, which was made jointly with Addameer Prisoner Support and Human Rights Association, accused Israel of “the crime of apartheid.” Addameer is an NGO that Israel has identified as a front for terrorists, with several employees who are also members of the PFLP, a U.S.-designated terrorist group.^{^[254]}

Another Harvard course, “Learning in Context: Narratives of Displacement and Belonging in Israel/Palestine,” is taught by Atalia Omer from the Divinity School. She reposts tweets demonizing Israel from anti-Israel groups like IfNotNow and Jewish Voice for Peace, and participated with them on a panel on “Jewish Solidarity with Palestine.”^{^[255]} She has accused Israel and its supporters of “weaponizing” the Holocaust. She objected to President Biden saying, “Hamas’s sole purpose is to kill Jews” following the October 7 massacre. Omer also rejected the “war on Hamas” argument for relying on “cultural and religious reductionism devoid of historical and geopolitical analysis,” which is her rationalization for the massacre. She ahistorically says the “root causes” are “turning Gaza into prison, a prolonged occupation, and the original event of the Nakba.” She accuses the Israeli government of using the Holocaust “as a justification for another Nakba.”^{^[256]} Along with four other professors at the Divinity School, Omer signed a statement just a week after October 7 that blamed Israel for the massacre because of its “decades of oppression.”^{^[257]}

Is the course selection at Harvard and elsewhere a function of Arab funding of Middle East Studies? It is plausible.

Georgetown’s $20 million gift from Saudi Prince Alwaleed bin Talal for its Center for Muslim-Christian Understanding sparked Rep. Frank Wolf to ask whether the Center had produced any critique of Saudi Arabia’s record on “human rights, religious freedom, freedom of expression, women’s rights, minority rights, protection for foreign workers, due process and the rule of law,” its links to “extremism and terrorism,” or produced any critical study of the “controversial religious textbooks produced by the government of Saudi Arabia that have been cited by the State Department, the U.S. Commission on International Religious Freedom and non-governmental groups for propagating extreme intolerance.”

Georgetown President John DeGioia brushed aside the concern, hailing the Saudi prince as “a global business leader and philanthropist.” But then, in an attempt to burnish the Center’s prestige, he inadvertently revealed the real reason for Riyadh’s interest—and the real danger it poses:

Our scholars have been called upon not only by the State Department, as you note, but also by Defense, Homeland Security, and FBI officials, as well as governments and their agencies in Europe and Asia. In fact, several high-ranking U.S. military officials, prior to assuming roles with the Multi-National Force in Iraq, have sought out faculty with the Center for their expertise on the region.^{^[258]}

Consider the implications: faculty whose positions were created—or sustained—by Arab funding, from regimes whose values fundamentally clash with American principles, are shaping the minds of U.S. generals, diplomats, and national security officials. This is not merely troubling; it is a national security risk.

This is why Wolf’s questions remain urgent and why they should now be asked of every university taking Arab money. Georgetown remains Exhibit A. How much academic freedom can scholars at the Center for Contemporary Arab Studies truly claim when their Advisory Board reads like a Who’s Who of Arab powerbrokers? It includes Saudi Prince Turki Al-Faisal Al-Saud, the Ambassador of Oman, a Qatari Minister of State, Egypt’s former Minister of Transport, the Washington Director of Aramco Americas, and the Executive Director of the U.S.-Qatar Business Council.^{^[259]}

When the guardians of scholarship answer to foreign interests, who is really writing the syllabus—and influencing U.S. policy?

The allure of Arab money can influence universities in other ways as well. The Arab Lobby cited the example of Texas A&M effectively censoring the PBS station it managed by canceling the broadcast of Death of a Princess in 1980, a film Saudi Arabia was desperate to keep off the airwaves because of its unsympathetic portrayal of the kingdom. University president Jarvis Miller explained that his university didn’t want to “risk damaging international relations by showing a movie that reportedly relies on sensationalism and shock value to attack a culture and religion that is foreign to us. As a university, we are attempting at this very time to establish significant new ties with the people who are most offended by this movie.”

The University of Houston also prevented the film from being shown on its station. A press release explained that the university understood the “strong and understandable objections by the government of Saudi Arabia at a time when the mounting crisis in the Middle East, our long friendship with the Saudi government, and U.S. national interests all point to the need to avoid exacerbating the situation.” Several years earlier, the university had signed a lucrative contract to provide instruction for a Saudi princess in Riyadh, and the university received a significant percentage of its donations from oil companies.^{^[260]}

Many Arab gifts support benign or even laudable purposes, such as healthcare and scientific research. For example, MD Anderson, one of the nation’s premier research hospitals, was one of the largest funding recipients, reporting two $75 million gifts from the UAE. Another significant gift, $15 million from Qatar, went to Tulane after Hurricane Katrina (Louisiana State University received $3.3 million).^{^[261]}

The concern arises in political fields. Even a handful of strategically placed professors can shape campus discourse, promoting anti-Israel narratives and normalizing hostility toward Jews under the guise of scholarship. While most faculty who agitate against Israel do so without Arab funding, endowed positions—such as the chair in Palestine Studies at Brown—create powerful platforms. Still, the evidence of a direct link between funding and faculty behavior remains largely anecdotal rather than empirical.

Table 9
Sources of Funding for Title-VI Programs

Qatar	$667,745,466
Saudi Arabia	$304,553,451
UAE	$219,446,705
Total	$1,191,745,622

Ironically, some of the most problematic faculty receive money from the U.S. government through the Title VI program to support Middle East Studies Centers. These Centers are often highly politicized and have used non-academic materials from sources such as Aramco and the Saudi Arabian Cultural Mission.^{^[262]} These Centers train high school teachers, extending their influence into K-12 education. Unsurprisingly, these Centers are prime targets for Arab investment. According to ISGAP, they have received nearly $1.2 billion from Gulf nations. Meanwhile, universities with Middle East Studies departments outside the Title VI system have collected an additional $1.2 billion from the same sources.^{^[263]}

In a report for the National Association of Scholars, Neetu Arnold argues that “foreign donations do not guarantee the promotion of a foreign country’s interests. Harvard academics only advocate for the issues Middle Eastern donors support when those positions align with the scholars’ own views.” For example, Harvard’s Middle East Studies department criticized the Turkish government despite receiving substantial funding from Türkiye.

Arnold, however, adds a crucial caveat: “Ideologies and foreign interests coincide quite often—especially in recent years” (emphasis added). She recalls that in 2003 it was shocking to find the department distributing Saudi propaganda blaming Islamic radicalism on Western colonialism. “Today,” she observes, “this is par for the course in American universities,” which are now dominated by “social justice and critical theory” (emphasis added). Underscoring the entrenchment of these ideas, she says: “a donor would probably have to pay Harvard academics not to promote this type of message” (emphasis in original).

Contrary to widespread fears about foreign influence, Arnold concludes: “As an institution, Harvard shapes Middle East Studies far more than any individual donor—and very much for the worse.”

Her bottom line: “Removing foreign funding would not stop Harvard academics from spreading their harmful ideologies.”^{^[264]} The same is true across other universities.

While donors rarely dictate decisions outright, administrators know the boundaries. They know what not to say, what not to teach, and whom not to hire. Faculty appointments reflect this unspoken understanding. Chairs funded by Arab states are unlikely to be offered to scholars critical of radical Islam or sympathetic to Israel. Instead, these positions go to academics who align with the donor’s worldview—or, at the very least, will never challenge it.

As a result, experts on modern Israel—who would normally qualify on merit—are effectively barred from most Middle East Studies departments. They must scramble for one of the few slots in Israel Studies or unrelated disciplines. Meanwhile, junior faculty who privately support Israel often muzzle themselves, fearing tenure committees stacked with ideological opponents. The outcome is predictable: a suffocating echo chamber where anti-Israel orthodoxy reigns, diversity of thought is crushed, and academic freedom becomes a hollow slogan.

Influencing Presidents

One of the Arab lobby’s most effective strategies for shaping U.S. Middle East policy is investing in American presidents—both directly and indirectly. A key tactic is donating to presidential libraries. Although these contributions are made after a president leaves office, they send a clear message to future leaders: supportive policies toward Arab states come with rich rewards. The influence extends beyond libraries to academic institutions tied to presidents.

Consider former President Jimmy Carter. In 1982, he established The Carter Center at Emory University. Carter was critical of Israel during his presidency and became an even more outspoken detractor afterward. His Center attracted millions in Arab funding. Saudi King Fahd donated $7.6 million, and his nephew, Prince Alwaleed Bin Talal, contributed at least $5 million. The Abu Dhabi-based Zayed Center—whose gift to Harvard was rejected due to its anti-Semitic record—awarded Carter $500,000 for the Zayed International Prize for the Environment in 2001.^{^[265]} The Center’s donors include the Alwaleed Philanthropies, Arab Fund for Economic and Social Development, the Sultanate of Oman, the OPEC Fund for International Development, the Government of the UAE, the Kuwait Fund for Arab Economic Development, the Kingdom of Saudi Arabia, and the Qatar Fund for Development. Instead of a direct impact, the Arab funding may be indirect through experts at the Center teaching at Emory, as well as through faculty and students engaging in its programs and activities.

Another example illustrates how this strategy plays out at the university level. In the 1980s, an obscure southern governor approached Saudi Arabia for support for his state university. They refused. That governor was Bill Clinton. When Clinton became the Democratic nominee for president, the Saudis changed their tune: in 1992, they donated $3.5 million to the University of Arkansas. One week after Clinton was elected, he discussed the gift with King Fahd. A few weeks after his inauguration, the university received another $20 million to establish the King Fahd Middle East Studies Center.^{^[266]} Neither contribution was disclosed at the time. “I don’t believe that, technically, we have to report it,” admitted Fred Harrison, the university’s general counsel—though he promised they would. The only reported gifts from King Fahd appeared three years later: $18 million and $312,524 in 1995.^{^[267]}

The Center claims to be “dedicated to the study of the modern Middle East,” Still, before 2024, it offered no Hebrew instruction, and only one core course related to Israel: “History of 19th-20th Century Palestine, Zionism and the founding of modern Israel, and the Palestine-Israel conflict in local and regional perspective.” A survey course inaccurately refers to the “Arab-Zionist conflict.”

The Center drew renewed scrutiny after the Hamas massacre of October 7, when the university canceled a scheduled panel discussion featuring Professors Joel Gordon and Ted Swedenburg. Law professor Robert Steinbuch publicly criticized Gordon, Swedenburg, and another faculty member, Mohja Kahf, for their positions.

Steinbuch quotes Swedenburg as saying, “Jews lived and often thrived throughout the Middle East for centuries, a history that was tragically disrupted with the creation of the state of Israel.”^{^[268]}

Gordon signed a public statement that mentioned the incursion by “Palestinian armed groups” on October 7, but the rest of the 10-paragraph document attacks Israel and warns of the possibility of it committing genocide.^{^[269]} Gordon and Swedenburg signed an open letter to the media, incredulously accusing journalists of “uncritical reporting of Israeli violence against the Palestinian people.”^{^[270]}

Kahf’s conduct has been even more revealing. After the massacre, she displayed a comic strip on her office door that said, “[why is it that] [e]very time you hear this: If we include a Palestinian speaker, then we have to include the Israeli point of view for balance; and yet you rarely hear this ... If we invite an African American speaker, then we have to include the KKK point of view for balance[?]” She also had on her door, “Palestine, from the river to the sea,” the expression calling for the replacement of Israel with a Palestinian state and the genocide of Israelis.

In Steinbuch’s correspondence with Kahf, she makes several risible remarks, such as that European Jews returned to Israel “through violent takeover in 1948” and “colonized” the land of “marginalized Indigenous [Middle Eastern] Jews.”^{^[271]}

These professors also helped cancel a scheduled lecture by noted feminist scholar Phyllis Chesler, who had criticized Islamic honor killings of women. Kahf argued Chesler’s views “promote[d] bigotry.”^{^[272]}

MESA defended the faculty and called on the university to denounce the “defamation” of the Center and the professors.^{^[273]} Unsurprisingly, the association did not object to Chesler’s cancellation.

In 2024, the Center appeared to undergo a dramatic shift when it announced a new collaboration with the Jewish Studies Program. Director Shirin Saeidi stated, “With the increased focus on Israeli politics, it became my main priority as director of the Middle East Studies Program to help students understand the news in real time with the insights of a leading scholar, Dr. Shai Gortler.” Gortler, the announcement said, is “an expert in Israeli history, society, and politics.”^{^[274]} He is also a critic whose research has focused on attacking Israeli policies of incarceration and surveillance of Palestinians. His views can be gleaned from the titles of his sample courses: “Israeli Politics and Society: Settler Colonialism, Occupation, Struggles” and “Israeli Incarceration, Torture, and Subject Formation.”^{^[275]} Still, Hebrew is not a core course and only one relates specifically to Israel, “Palestine and Israel in Modern Times.”^{^[276]}

In 2025, the university removed Saeidi as the director of its King Fahd Center for Middle East Studies and was considering firing her from her tenured faculty role because of several actions and social media posts that Dean Brian Raines said were “damaging for the director of the university’s Middle East studies program to post.” One post he cited said, “Israel is a terrorist and genocidal state that must be dismantled by international forces.” Other posts included, “Israel is a terrorist state. Free Free Palestine.” She also likened the struggle of the Iranian people to that of the Palestinians, saying, “Iranians have now realized that Israel is a genocidal and terrorist state, and that the struggle of the Iranian people is inseparable from the struggle of the Palestinian people.” She also taunted the State Legislature, “You were unable to punish me because of the Zionist proxies who give you money and know your secrets, and now you are attacking the Middle East Studies Center and my colleagues. Let me tell you something: This matter has now become an international dispute."

It was not just her speech that got Saeidi in trouble. She also signed letters that listed her affiliation with the university, without specifying that she was speaking only for herself. She also provided testimony on university letterhead in the appeal of a case involving an Iranian war criminal.^{^[276a]}

Does Arab Money Stimulate Anti-Semitism?

ISGAP claimed in its report that Arab funding has “a significant impact on campus attitudes, including the emergence of an anti-Semitic culture and BDS activities at some of the most important universities in the United States.” More specifically, ISGAP asserted there is a “direct correlation” between Arab funding and “active presence at those universities of groups that have been proven to foster an aggressive and hostile anti-Semitic atmosphere on campus, such as the Muslim Students Association (MSA) and Students for Justice in Palestine (SJP).”^{^[277]}

Yet, the report provided no evidence to support these assertions and even acknowledged that no causal link could be established. That is hardly surprising given the lack of transparency about how donations are used. In fact, until the October 7 massacre, MSAs were a marginal factor in shaping campus climates. SJPs certainly disrupted campuses, but their activities are difficult to connect to Arab donations, which fund faculty positions and academic programs, and not student organizations. Some international students may influence campus dynamics, but the most intense hostility toward Jews and Israel typically comes from American students, including Jews involved with groups such as Jewish Voice for Peace and IfNotNow. Nevertheless, the surge in anti-Israel protests and incidents of antisemitism on campuses nationwide after October 7 has heightened concerns that Arab funding could be contributing to this environment.

Seeking to prove such a link, ISGAP and The Network Contagion Research Group (NCRI) published “The Corruption of the American Mind: How Concealed Foreign Funding of U.S. Higher Education Predicts Erosion of Democratic Values and Antisemitic Incidents on Campus.”^{^[278]} The study focused on unreported funds—raising the obvious question: how can you assess impact when you don’t know how the money was used?

The report attempts to validate its hypothesis using quantitative methods, but its disregard for qualitative evidence yields illogical and inconsistent deductions. It begins with its conclusion—reflected in the title—and twists the data to fit. Even then, it hedges with equivocations: contributions “may be dedicated to purposes that are controversial at best and malevolent at worst,” “secret money may be used to create a generally intolerant intellectual environment on campus,” “money might be used to support …faculty who are…antisemitic,” and “might be used to support extremist groups on campus” [emphasis added]. Such hedging betrays the failure to substantiate these suppositions.

NCRI estimates $13 billion in undocumented contributions (from all foreign sources) between 2014 and 2019, but the DoE report it cites lists $6.5 billion. Regardless, the issue is not the dollar amount but the purpose, and the authors admit they have no idea because the funds were undocumented.

Moreover, what we do know undermines their thesis. Qatar’s largest gifts funded Weill Cornell Medicine in Doha. Does anyone seriously believe that sending hundreds of millions to a medical school in Qatar sparked anti-Semitism in Ithaca? Columbia—arguably the most hostile campus since October 7—received nothing from Qatar. The UAE’s top gifts went to MD Anderson Cancer Center in Texas. Would that foment anti-Semitism in Austin? The Saudis’ most significant contribution covered tuition for students at the University of Idaho, where Hillel reports that there are zero Jewish students. If Riyadh’s goal were to incite anti-Semitism, why send money to Idaho?

The pattern continues: some of the most volatile campuses—like Berkeley—are not among the top recipients. Berkeley, a decades-long epicenter of anti-Israel activism, received a total of $66 million—less than some universities get in a single year. And the faculty most responsible for campus hostility—those in anthropology, sociology, and gender studies—are least likely to be funded by Arab states.

NCRI’s attempt to prove its case relies on a data mashup from the FBI, ADL, and AMCHA, but these sources are incompatible. The FBI does not isolate campus hate crimes, and AMCHA’s methodology has flaws. According to ADL data, the most consistent, the average number of incidents per year during the studied period was 139. Serious, yes, but not the tidal wave we see today. More importantly, the term “incidents” obscures severity. A swastika on a wall is different from a physical assault—yet there were only four assaults in ADL’s data. If the sole incident in a school year is graffiti, does that define campus climate? And logically, why would vandalism correlate with Arab funding?

NCRI offers zero examples of undocumented money being used to fuel anti-Semitism. A mathematical correlation detached from real-world evidence is hollow.

Another problem with the NCRI study is that it didn’t stick to examining anti-Semitism but drifted into concerns regarding China and Russia. The authors also claim to prove that Arab money has a broader impact on “democratic norms of pluralism, tolerance, and freedom.” They conclude that “there clearly has been an erosion of democratic norms on campus, self-censorship, censorship by scientists, disinvitations rising, abandonment of free speech/academic freedom by academics.”

The study presents no example linking this erosion to Arab contributions. Furthermore, this claim contradicts the supposition that anti-Semitism is being fomented. It is the anti-Semites who have freedom of speech and are typically shielded by academic freedom. Perhaps some anti-Semitic faculty censor themselves, but professors who use “Zionists” as a euphemism for “Jews” are ubiquitous.

Yes, foreign funding can corrode campus values—but not in the way NCRI suggests. The danger lies in the terms universities accept to secure Gulf money, leading to self-imposed restrictions on criticizing Islam or donor regimes. After all the quantitative sleight of hand, the authors conclude that the impact on campus is “complex and multiply determined” —a scholarly way of saying they can’t prove their case.

And that’s no surprise. Today’s anti-Semitism is less about foreign dollars and more about decades of ideological capture: faculty indoctrinating students with warped social justice dogma, intersectionality that demonizes Israel, Middle East Studies programs erasing Israel from curricula, Jewish professors echoing anti-Israel narratives, and a generation of Jewish students arriving ignorant of their heritage. Layer onto that administrators who tolerate academic malpractice and enforce double standards against Jews—and you have the real drivers of campus hostility, none of which require a Qatari checkbook.

Compliance Crackdown

College leaders were indignant over the first Trump administration’s enforcement of a law they had long treated as a dead letter, conceding they had ignored it. As reporter Elizabeth Redden noted, they complained that the DoE has “taken an unnecessarily combative, rather than collegial approach to enforcing a law that no one much paid attention to in the past” (emphasis added).^{^[279]} In other words, the problem wasn’t the law, but the fact that someone finally enforced it.

The Council for Advancement and Support of Education (CASE) fought the requirement to disclose the donor’s name and address, claiming this would “violate institutions’ commitment to donor confidentiality and would preclude institutions from accepting anonymous gifts from foreign sources.”^{^[280]} Their position? Protect secret money rather than embrace transparency.

Betsy DeVos, then Secretary of Education, cut through the noise: “This is about transparency.” She said that too many institutions were “underreporting or not reporting at all.” She emphasized that if they “are accepting foreign money or gifts, their students, donors, and taxpayers deserve to know how much and from whom.”^{^[281]}

However, the Department undercut her stance in its “Response to Public Comments.”The department stated that it would require the name and address of foreign sources, but agreed to withhold this information from the public disclosure report.^{^[282]}

MESA revealed a telling double standard in its reaction to DeVos. For decades, MESA expressed concern about restrictions on academic freedom that can be imposed – explicitly or implicitly – by funders, whether American or foreign. MESA has opposed funding from the CIA and Department of Defense because such connections create “‘dangers for students and scholars by fostering the perception [abroad] of [their] involvement in military or intelligence activities.’” But when it comes to Arab funding, MESA’s tone changes. Suddenly, transparency is less critical than shielding programs from “blanket accusations that funding by Middle East governments necessarily means that those governments control the academic content of the programs and the hiring of faculty.”^{^[283]} Notably, this is the same organization that voted to boycott Israel in 2023—an irony hard to miss.^{^[284]}

The second Trump administration, backed by the Republican Congress, has taken an even more serious approach to monitoring the campuses. University presidents have been called to testify about foreign funding of their institutions, and legislation was introduced to lower the dollar amount they need to report to the DoE. For academia, the era of willful ignorance may finally be ending.

In addition, the Zachor Legal Institute, in conjunction with Judicial Watch, filed a Freedom of Information Act (FOIA) lawsuit against DoE in 2025, seeking records related to Doha’s funding and operations at Georgetown, Northwestern, Cornell, Harvard, and the University of Michigan. Marc Greendorfer, president of the Zachor Legal Institute, said, “We were disappointed with the opacity and obstruction of the prior administration, which seems to have had a policy of preventing the American people from knowing what terror-supporting foreign actors have been doing in our schools.”^{^[285]}

President Trump took a step toward greater enforcement when he issued the Executive Order “Transparency Regarding Foreign Influence at American Universities” on April 23, 2025. The Order says, “It is the policy of my Administration to end the secrecy surrounding foreign funds in American educational institutions, protect the marketplace of ideas from propaganda sponsored by foreign governments, and safeguard America’s students and research from foreign exploitation.” To do this, the president empowered the Secretary of Education to take appropriate steps to: “reverse or rescind any actions by the prior administration that permit higher education institutions to maintain improper secrecy regarding their foreign funding,” and “require universities to more specifically disclose details about foreign funding, including the true source and purpose of the funds.” DoE and the Attorney General were empowered to “conduct audits and investigations…where necessary to ensure compliance.”^{^[286]}

The problem lies not only in government bureaucracy but in universities’ stubborn refusal to follow the law and disclose their foreign donors. This was exemplified in the exchange between Congresswoman Elise Stefanik (R-NY) and then-president of Harvard Claudine Gay during a congressional hearing. Rep. Elise Stefanik repeatedly pressed Gay to confirm whether Harvard’s Middle East Studies Department receives funding from foreign governments and entities. Gay avoided giving a direct “yes” or “no,” instead repetitively stating that Harvard receives support from alumni and various sources worldwide. When asked about the amount reported to the federal government, Gay admitted she did not know the figure.^{^[287]}

Conclusion

Given the increasingly hostile climate toward Jews on college campuses, it is reasonable to ask whether Arab funding plays a role in fueling this environment. Beyond campus culture, foreign donations raise broader concerns for national security, research integrity, and academic independence.

As Arnold concluded: “This soft-focus publicity campaign complements rather than replaces direct lobbying of politicians and close relationships with Western leaders, which is the main means Middle Eastern countries use to secure specific national interests.”^{^[288]}

Still, this report has documented billions of dollars in contributions from Arab states and the powerful incentives these gifts create for universities to avoid offending their benefactors. The DoE’s failure to maintain adequate records severely hampers any systematic investigation into the effects of these donations. Yet, thanks to media disclosures and case studies, we have uncovered troubling examples of how such funding can distort priorities, compromise transparency, and threaten academic freedom and American interests.

A central—and perhaps unanswerable—question remains: Does Arab money shape faculty attitudes, or does it simply follow scholars whose views already align with donor interests? Likewise, drawing a direct link between Arab funding and the current surge of anti-Israel hostility and anti-Semitism is complicated, given that much of the money supports fields with little connection to Israel.

To be clear, anti-Semitism and anti-Israel sentiment on the left long predate the surge in Arab funding. The rise of intersectionality, which divides the world into “oppressors” and “oppressed,” and the framing of Jews as beneficiaries of “white privilege” and Israelis as “colonizers” have done far more to radicalize campus culture. Progressives’ hostility toward Israel—and their double standard of castigating the Jewish state while overlooking the abuses of Arab regimes—reflects ideological bias rather than donor influence. Furthermore, Arab donors have no reason to bankroll progressives who view them as human rights abusers.

While some Arab states—such as Qatar and Saudi Arabia—have deeply rooted traditions of anti-Semitism and hostility toward Israel, their current leaders are not seeking to provoke Americans or Jews. On the contrary, they often pursue engagement, driven in part by the anti-Semitic belief of an omnipotent Jewish lobby in Washington that can shape U.S. policy. The Abraham Accords illustrate this pragmatic shift, where normalization with Israel brought Arab states closer to American interests and earned goodwill from pro-Israel communities.

Expanding partnerships with Arab nations, including establishing overseas campuses, offers opportunities for international collaboration—but only if universities safeguard academic freedom. Transparency and faculty oversight must be non-negotiable to prevent the erosion of core educational values.

Meanwhile, the lack of transparency surrounding foreign gifts, enabled by the DoE, fuels public mistrust. The first Trump administration sounded the alarm, but the Biden administration abandoned its investigations. Worse, the DoE’s inadequate reporting leaves the public in the dark.

Today, most foreign gifts are disclosed without any indication of their intended purpose, making it nearly impossible to assess their impact on national security, campus culture, or academic integrity. Moving beyond anecdotal evidence will require a systematic review of curricula, syllabi, faculty publications, and program agendas to identify bias and potential academic malpractice.

Even when donors do not explicitly demand political concessions, universities often assume they expect silence on sensitive issues—especially criticism of Arab regimes. This creates an implicit quid pro quo: even funds for seemingly apolitical purposes, such as medical research, can carry the unspoken expectation of deference.

To restore trust and protect both national security and intellectual integrity, several steps are required:

Establish clear guidelines for foreign funding to ensure it does not compromise academic freedom or national security.
Lower the reporting threshold from $250,000 to $50,000.
Mandate full disclosure of donor identities and the purpose of all foreign gifts—including previously unreported contributions—and make this information public on university websites and financial reports.
Require similar reporting to state authorities.
Disclose by country of origin, the number of foreign students, and the amount of tuition received.
Reveal all revenue generated from campuses in foreign countries and fees received from individuals or entities in those countries to manage and maintain them.
Empower the DoE to enforce compliance with reporting requirements and mandate that its reports include complete information on donor identities, whether governmental or individual, and the use of funds received.
Task congressional committees to investigate the impact of foreign funding on national security.
Create a blue-ribbon committee of scholars to assess the impact of foreign funding on academic freedom, campus culture, and attitudes toward Jews and Israel.
Consider banning or capping funding from non-democratic countries that abuse human rights or pose a security threat to the United States.
Require the closing of campuses in foreign countries that compromise national security or conflict with U.S. foreign policy objectives.
Investigate the impact of Arab funding on teaching, curricula, faculty hiring, outreach programs, and research priorities.

Only with transparency and accountability can we ensure that America’s universities serve students—not foreign interests.

^{^[1]} “Undue Foreign Influence,” Office of the Vice President for Research, MIT, (November 25, 2024), accessed August 19, 2025.

^{^[2]} “Institutional Compliance with Section 117 of the Higher Education Act of 1965,” U.S. Department of Education Office of the General Counsel, (October 2020).

^{^[3]} Compiled by the author from Foreign Schools Gift and Contracts Reports, Department of Education.

^{^[4]} Mitchell Bard, The Arab Lobby: The Invisible Alliance That Undermines America’s Interests in the Middle East, NY: HarperCollins: 2010, pp. 300-313.

^{^[5]} Laurent Murawiec, Princes of Darkness: The Saudi Assault on the West, (Lanham, Md.: Rowman and Littlefield, 2003), p. 51.

^{^[6]} Bard, p. 300.

^{^[7]} Katrina Thomas, “America as Alma Mater,” Saudi Aramco World, (May/June 1979).

^{^[8]} Steven Emerson, The American House of Saud, (NY: Franklin Watts, 1985), pp. 294-295.

^{^[9]} Katrina Thomas, “America as Alma Mater,” Saudi Aramco World, (May/June 1979).

^{^[10]} Paul Findley,” They Dare to Speak Out: People and Institutions Confront Israel's Lobby, (IL: Chicago Review Press, 2003), p. 196.

^{^[11]} Findley, p. 198.

^{^[12]} Lawrence Feinberg, “United Arab Emirates Gives GU $750,000 for A Chair in Arab Studies,” Washington Post, (May 12, 1980).

^{^[13]} Bard, p. 134.

^{^[14]} Walid Khalidi, “Remembering Hasib Sabbagh (1920–2010),” Journal of Palestine Studies, Vol. 39, No. 3 (Spring 2010), p. 60; Neetu Arnold, “Hijacked: The Capture of American’s Middle East Studies Centers,” National Association of Scholars, (2022), pp. 71-72.

^{^[15]} John L. Esposito, “The Prince Alwaleed Center for Muslim-Christian Understanding,” Islamic Studies, Vol. 45, No. 1 (Spring 2006), pp. 121-122; Scott Jaschik, “Professor John L. Esposito: A Profile,” The Muslim Weekly, (March 21, 2005). Arnold’s study indicates that Sabbagh’s foundation contributed $2.9 million, and he personally donated an additional $1 million.

^{^[16]} Neetu Arnold, “Hijacked: The Capture of American’s Middle East Studies Centers,” National Association of Scholars, (2022), pp. 74-75.

^{^[17]} John L. Esposito, Facebook, (July 1, 2015); Kamal Abu-Shamsieh, Laila El-Haddad, Zareena Grewal, Hatem Bazian, and Omid Safi, “Call for immediate halt to Muslim Leadership Initiative (MLI), Sponsored by Shalom Hartman Institute,” Care2 Petitions accessed August 28, 2025.

^{^[18]} Sam Westrop, Anna Stanley, and Asra Nomani, “Beachhead: Georgetown U.: How Foreign and Domestic Radical Actors Captured a U.S. University,” A joint report by the Middle East Forum, the Pearl Project, and the Clarity Coalition, (July 7, 2025).

^{^[19]} Allen S. Weiner, “Money From Black Gold,” Harvard Crimson, (June 9, 1983).

^{^[20]} Murawiec, p. 51.

^{^[21]} “Foreign Funding Disclosure Reports,” Department of Education, (February 18, 2025).

^{^[22]} “About Qatar Foundation,” Qatar Foundation, accessed July 30, 2025.

^{^[23]} “Statement from the Embassy of the State of Qatar,” @QatarEmbassy_US, (June 13, 2024).

^{^[24]} “International Student Totals by Place of Origin, 2000/01-2023/24,” Open Doors Report on International Educational Exchange, Institute of International Education, (2024).

^{^[25]} Munib and Angela Masri Foundation.

^{^[26]} “Alumni, Parents, and Friends Establish the Mahmoud Darwish Professorship in Palestinian Studies,” Brown University, (July 14, 2020).

^{^[27]} Tamara Walid, “The long road to peace,” Philanthropy Age, (January 25, 2015).

^{^[28]} A.J. Caschetta, “Brown University Goes All In for Palestine,” American Spectator, (July 22, 2020).

^{^[29]} Ali Abunimah, “How a Tel Aviv Univ. event is being sold as boycott compliant at Brown,” Electronic Intifada, (April 10, 2015); A.J. Caschetta, “Brown University Professor Can’t Control Birzeit’s Terrorists,” The American Spectator, (December 26, 2021).

^{^[30]} “The Corruption Of The American Mind: Presented By How Concealed Foreign Funding Of U.S. Higher Education Predicts Erosion Of Democratic Values And Antisemitic Incidents On Campus,” NCRI, (November 6, 2023).

^{^[31]} Charles Asher Small and Michael Bass, “Higher Education And Contemporary Antisemitism: Soft Power And Foreign Influence,” ISGAP, (July 2019) and Volume Two, (September 2020).

^{^[32]} “Palestine and Praxis: Open Letter and Call to Action,” Undated, accessed August 15, 2025.

^{^[33]} “King Fahd Professorship in Molecular Medicine,” Johns Hopkins University.

^{^[34]} Jonathan Dube, “King Fahd of Saudi Arabia Gives Harvard $5-Million,” Chronicle of Higher Education, (July 7, 1993).

^{^[35]} Katrina Thomas, “America as Alma Mater,” Saudi Aramco World, (May/June, 1979).

^{^[36]} “Sultan Program in Arab Studies,” University of California, Berkeley, accessed September 2, 2025.

^{^[37]} “The Corruption Of The American Mind: Presented By How Concealed Foreign Funding Of U.S. Higher Education Predicts Erosion Of Democratic Values And Antisemitic Incidents On Campus,” Network Contagion Research Group, (November 6, 2023).

^{^[38]} “Harvard University History of Named Chairs,” (Cambridge: President and Fellows of Harvard College, 1994), p. 570; “Hasib Sabbagh Remembered,” Baker Institute for Public Policy, Rice University, accessed September 2, 2025.

^{^[39]} Samih Al-Abid, “The Israeli-Palestinian Case: Current Prospects and Continued Importance of the Two-State Solution,” Baker Institute, (July 1, 2022).

^{^[40]} Jim Krane, “Israel and Hamas Go to War. The Region’s Gas Boom Will Take a Hit,” Barron’s, (October 10, 2023).

^{^[41]} Harvard University History of Named Chairs,” (Cambridge: President and Fellows of Harvard College, 1994), p. 384.

^{^[42]} Tarek Masoud, “On Gaza and Israel,” Belfer Center For Science And International Affairs, (October 12, 2023).

^{^[43]} Jonathan Dube, “King Fahd of Saudi Arabia Gives Harvard $5-Million,” Chronicle of Higher Education, (July 7, 1993); Giuliana Vetrano, “No Strings Attached?” Harvard Crimson, (March 8, 2006); Arthur Clark, “The New Push for Middle East Studies,” Saudi Aramco World, (Jan/Feb, 2003); Stanley Kurtz, “Saudi in the Classroom,” National Review, (July 25, 2007); Ben Shapiro, “When Harvard Met Saudi,” Human Events, (December 28, 2005).

^{^[44]} Neetu Arnold, “Hijacked: The Capture of American’s Middle East Studies Centers,” National Association of Scholars, (2022), p. 61.

^{^[45]} Elizabeth Redden, “Ties That Bind,” Inside Higher Ed, (November 8, 2018).

^{^[46]} “Looking Back on Islamic Studies at Harvard | Roy Mottahedeh, William Graham, and Ali Asani,” Prince Alwaleed bin Talal Islamic Studies Program at Harvard University, (January 27, 2021). Alwaleed also funded a center of American Studies and Research at the American University in Cairo to “deepen the AUC community’s understanding of the United States and its relationship with the Middle East and North Africa (MENA)” and “present a nuanced view of American involvement in the region.”

^{^[47]} “Al-Waleed donates USD 5 million 18 to Harvard Medical School Dubai Center,” Kuwait News Agency, (June 20, 2005).

^{^[48]} Scott Jaschik, “Professor John L Esposito: A Profile,” The Muslim Weekly, (March 21, 2005); “Jewish Groups Keep Watchful Eye As Schools Receive Saudi Donations,” JTA, (December 16, 2005); Karen W. Arenson, “Saudi Prince Gives Millions to Harvard and Georgetown,” New York Times, (December 13, 2005).

^{^[49]} See Martin Kramer, “Concealment Continues at Columbia,” Martin Kramer on the Middle East, (September 8, 2003) and Jacob Gershman, “Columbia Failed to Report Saudi Gift,” New York Sun, (January 30, 2004). Donors to the Said chair at Columbia: Yusef Abu Khadra, Abdel Muhsen Al-Qattan, Ramzi A. Dalloul, Richard and Barbara Debs, Richard B. Fisher, Gordon Gray, Jr., Daoud Hanania, Rita E. Hauser, Walid H. Kattan, Said T. Khory, Munib R. Masri, Morgan Capital & Energy, Olayan Charitable Trust, Hasib Sabbagh, Kamal A. Shair, Abdul Shakashir, Abdul Majeed Shoman, Jean Stein, and the United Arab Emirates.

^{^[50]} Joy Resmovits, “Without Protest or Funding, Columbia Opens Center for Palestine Studies,” Forward, (October 18, 2010).

^{^[51]} “Center for Palestine Studies 2018-2019 Annual Report,” Columbia University.

^{^[52]} CPS Reports.

^{^[53]} Neetu Arnold, “Neetu Arnold: Carnegie Mellon isn't being open about its relationship with Qatar,” Pittsburgh Post-Gazette, April 18, 2024).

^{^[54]} “His Majesty Sultan Qaboos Academic Chairs,” Ministry of Higher Education, Research & Innovation, Oman, accessed August 15, 2025.

^{^[55]} “Grants Add to Northwestern-Qatar Partnership,” Engineering News, Northwestern University, (Undated).

^{^[56]} Saul Pink and Samantha Powers, “In Focus: As Northwestern considers another decade in Qatar, some NU-Q students say campus falls short of promises,” The Daily Northwestern, (May 20, 2024).

^{^[57]} “MIT and Saudi Aramco augment existing collaboration,” MIT News, (June 23, 2012).

^{^[58]} Andrea K. McDaniels, “Johns Hopkins gets $50 million from UAE for global stroke center,” Baltimore Sun, (February 1, 2018).

^{^[59]} Anne Ju, “$25 million CU-Saudi link will boost nanoscience research, with focus on sustainability,” Cornell Chronicle, (April 30, 2008); Elizabeth Redden, “From Bay Area to Red Sea,” Inside Higher Ed, (March 5, 2008); Tamar Lewin, “U.S. Universities Join Saudis in Partnerships,” New York Times, (March 6, 2008).

^{^[60]} Neetu Arnold, “Hijacked: The Capture of American’s Middle East Studies Centers,” National Association of Scholars, (2022), p. 102.

^{^[61]} “Yale University Receives $10 Million to Create Center for Islamic Law,” Philanthropy News Digest, (September 13, 2015); Paul Sutliff, “Yale University Omits $10 Million “Gift” for Islamic Center Came from Saudi with Terror Ties,” People’s Pundit Daily, (December 4, 2015).

^{^[62]} “Awards and Grants,” NYU Abu Dhabi, accessed August 25, 2025.

^{^[63]} Al Jalila Foundation.

^{^[64]} Elizabeth Redden, “Ties That Bind,” Inside Higher Ed, (November 8, 2018).

^{^[65]} Michael Levenson, “Babson, which helped launch college named for Saudi crown prince, reexamining its ties,” Boston Globe, (October 26, 2018); Elizabeth Redden, “Ties That Bind,” Inside Higher Ed, (November 8, 2018).

^{^[66]} “Center Establishes Project on Saudi and Gulf Security,” Belfer Center, (Spring 2017); Michael Levenson, “Khashoggi killing spotlights Saudi money flowing to Harvard, MIT,” Boston Globe, (October 25, 2018); Shera S. Avi-Yonah, “‘Secretive, Dubious Partnerships’: Harvard Quietly Keeps Strong Saudi Connections,” Harvard Crimson, (October 25, 2018); “100 Saudis Among The Top 800 Students In The World Attend Harvard University,” MiSK, (August 16, 2016).

^{^[67]} Michael Sokolove, “Why Is There So Much Saudi Money in American Universities?” New York Times Magazine, (July 3, 2019).

^{^[68]} “Crown Prince Mohammed bin Salman’s Visit to Boston Extends Saudi-U.S. Collaboration,” Royal Embassy of Saudi Arabia Information Office, (March 24, 2018).

^{^[69]} Michael Sokolove, “Why Is There So Much Saudi Money in American Universities?” New York Times Magazine, (July 3, 2019).

^{^[70]} Michael Sokolove, “Why Is There So Much Saudi Money in American Universities?” New York Times Magazine, (July 3, 2019).

^{^[71]} “Munib and Angela Masri Foundation Create Fellowship at University of Texas at Austin,” edgo, (January 21, 2020); “Graduate Fellowship Endowment at the Jackson School of Geosciences,” Munib and Angela Masri Foundation, accessed August 25, 2025.

^{^[72]} Hariri Foundation.

^{^[73]} Zvika Krieger, “The Emir of NYU,” New York, (April 13, 2008).

^{^[74]} Zvika Krieger, “The Emir of NYU: John Sexton’s Abu Dhabi Debacle,” The Atlantic, (March 13, 2013).

^{^[75]} Johns Hopkins Medicine International, accessed September 2, 2025.

^{^[76]} MIT & MI.

^{^[77]} API.

^{^[78]} Johns Hopkins Medicine International, accessed September 2, 2025.

^{^[79]} Dubai Harvard Foundation for Medical Research, accessed September 2, 2025.

^{^[80]} “RIT to build new campus in Dubai,” WHAM ABC TV, (January 30, 2018).

^{^[81]} “American Hospital Dubai and Baylor College of Medicine to set up medical college,” Gulf News, (January 31, 2024).

^{^[82]} Tamar Lewin, “George Mason University, Among First With an Emirates Branch, Is Pulling Out,” New York Times, (February 28, 2009).

^{^[83]} Jack Stripling, “Gulf Withdrawal,” Inside Higher Ed, (February 27, 2009).

^{^[84]} Johns Hopkins Medicine International.

^{^[85]} Johns Hopkins Medicine International, accessed September 2, 2025.

^{^[86]} Johns Hopkins Medicine International.

^{^[87]} Johns Hopkins Medicine International, accessed September 2, 2025.

^{^[88]} “Qatari Backing for Extremist Preachers and Anti-Semitic Incitement,” ADL, (April 10, 2018) accessed August 25, 2025.

^{^[89]} Neetu Arnold, “Outsourced to Qatar,” National Association of Scholars, (September 12, 2022).

^{^[90]} Camille G. Caldera, “Harvard Maintains Public Ties to Foreign Foundations Under Scrutiny in Education Department Probe,” Harvard Crimson, (February 20, 2020).

^{^[91]} “Statement from the Embassy of the State of Qatar,” @QatarEmbassy_US, (June 13, 2024).

^{^[92]} Nick Anderson, “Doha’s Education City by the numbers: Enrollment, diplomas, faculty, finances,” Washington Post, (December 6, 2015); Anderson, “The Education City contracts: A case study from VCU in Qatar,” Washington Post, (December 6, 2015)

^{^[93]} “Financial Statements for the Year Ended June 30, 2024,” VCU accessed August 8, 2025; Saul Pink and Samantha Powers, “In Focus: As Northwestern considers another decade in Qatar, some NU-Q students say campus falls short of promises,” The Daily Northwestern, (May 20, 2024).

^{^[94]} Neetu Arnold, “Outsourced to Qatar,” National Association of Scholars, (September 12, 2022).

^{^[95]} Karen W. Arenson, “Cornell Will Open A Medical School In the Persian Gulf,” New York Times, (April 9, 2001).

^{^[96]} Nick Anderson, “Doha’s Education City by the numbers: Enrollment, diplomas, faculty, finances,” Washington Post, (December 6, 2015).

^{^[97]} “Cornell University Consolidated Financial Statements June 30, 2024 and 2023,” accessed on August 8, 2025.

^{^[98]} “Georgetown University in Qatar,” Qatar Foundation, accessed August 7, 2025.

^{^[99]} Editorial Board, “Time to Quit Qatar,” Georgetown Voice, (February 9, 2018).

^{^[100]} “Honorary Degree Recipients,” Georgetown University.

^{^[101]} “Her Highness Attends Georgetown University in Qatar’s 20 Year Anniversary Celebration,” Georgetown University Qatar, (April 17, 2025).

^{^[102]} Lenny Ben-David, “Qatari PR Show in Washington to Focus on ‘Israel’s Destruction of Gaza’ and ‘Genocide in Gaza,’” Jerusalem Center for Security and Foreign Affairs, (June 5, 2025).

^{^[103]} Elizabeth Redden, “‘The Doha Experiment,’” Inside Higher Ed, (November 1, 2017).

^{^[104]} Elizabeth Redden, “Visa Denied,” Inside Higher Ed, (January 8, 2017).

^{^[105]} Sarah McLaughlin, “Georgetown University doubles down on censorship of religious debate at Qatar campus,” FIRE, (February 20, 2019); Menatalla Ibrahim and Saad Ejaz, “Georgetown Cancels Religious Debate After Backlash,” The Daily, [Undated].

^{^[106]} Catriona Kendall, “Georgetown in Qatar Ranks Poorly on Free Speech,” The Hoya, (February 15, 2019); “10 Worst Colleges for Free Speech: 2023,” FIRE, (February 2, 2023).

^{^[107]} Nick Anderson, “Doha’s Education City by the numbers: Enrollment, diplomas, faculty, finances,” Washington Post, (December 6, 2015).

^{^[108]} “Georgetown University Form 990 for year beginning 07-01-2022, and ending 06-30-2023,” accessed August 8, 2025.

^{^[109]} “Georgetown University Consolidated Financial Statements June 30, 2024 and 2023,” accessed August 8, 2025.

^{^[110]} Nick Anderson, “Texas university gets $76 million each year to operate in Qatar, contract says,” Washington Post, (March 8, 2016).

^{^[111]} “Hijacking Higher Education: Qatar, the Muslim Brotherhood, and Texas A&M,” ISGAP, (2023); Liam Knox, “Cutting Off Qatar,” Insider Higher Ed, (February 16, 2024).

^{^[112]} “‘Disinformation campaign’ behind Texas A&M closure of Doha campus: Qatar Foundation,” Arab News, (February 9, 2024).

^{^[113]} Ash Ü. Bâli and Laurie Brand, “Letter to Texas A&M University Leadership Concerning the Closure of Texas A&M Campus in Qatar,” MESA, (March 7, 2024).

^{^[114]} Saul Pink and Samantha Powers, “In Focus: As Northwestern considers another decade in Qatar, some NU-Q students say campus falls short of promises,” The Daily Northwestern, (May 20, 2024).

^{^[115]} Liam Knox, “Cutting Off Qatar,” Insider Higher Ed, (February 16, 2024).

^{^[116]} “Annual Financial Report of The Texas A&M University System For the Year Ended August 31, 2024 With Comparative Totals for the Year Ended August 31, 2023,” accessed August 8, 2025.

^{^[117]} Saul Pink and Samantha Powers, “In Focus: As Northwestern considers another decade in Qatar, some NU-Q students say campus falls short of promises,” The Daily Northwestern, (May 20, 2024).

^{^[118]} Neetu Arnold, “Outsourced to Qatar,” National Association of Scholars, (September 12, 2022)

^{^[119]} Stephen F. Eisenman, “A Report on Northwestern University Qatar: Nine Proposals,” Northwestern University, (March 2015), accessed August 7, 2025.

^{^[120]} Maia Pandey, “NU-Q students protest racism on campus, advocate for higher wages and support services,” The Daily Northwestern, (November 22, 2021).

^{^[121]} “Northwestern Qatar Annual Report 2022-2023.”

^{^[122]} Saul Pink and Samantha Powers, “In Focus: As Northwestern considers another decade in Qatar, some NU-Q students say campus falls short of promises,” The Daily Northwestern, (May 20, 2024).

^{^[123]} “Calling For Accountability: Stopping Antisemitic College Chaos,” House of Representatives, Committee on Education and the Workforce, (May 23, 2024).

^{^[124]} Katherine Knott, “Qatar Foundation Pushes Back on House Republicans’ Accusations,” Inside Higher Education, (May 28, 2024).

^{^[124a]}Interview of Michael Harry Schill, Committee on Education and Workforce, U.S. House of Representatives, Washington, D.C., (August 5, 2025); Anemona Hartocollis, Michael S. Schmidt, and Tyler Pager, “President of Northwestern, a School Attacked by the G.O.P., Will Resign,” New York Times, (September 4, 2025).

^{^[125]} Carnegie Mellon University Form 990 for year beginning 07-01-2022, and ending 06-30-2023.

^{^[126]} “Carnegie Mellon University and Qatar Foundation extend partnership for another decade,” Carnegie Mellon University in Qatar News, (May 15, 2025).

^{^[127]} “Carnegie Mellon receives grants for AI research into key areas for Qatar,” Press release, Carnegie Mellon University in Qatar, (August 4, 2022).

^{^[128]} “Shaping Qatar’s Digital Future: The Hamad Bin Jassim Center’s 6-Year Impact,” Press release, Carnegie Mellon University in Qatar, (October 17, 2024).

^{^[129]} “Carnegie Mellon Qatar awarded three QRDI Academic Research Grants,” Press release, Zawya, (January 18, 2025).

^{^[130]} Neetu Arnold, “Outsourced to Qatar,” National Association of Scholars, (September 12, 2022).

^{^[131]} Ben Freeman, “Foreign Funding of Think Tanks in America,” Center for International Policy, (January 2020).

^{^[132]} “2024 Annual Report,” Rice University’s Baker Institute for Public Policy, Rice University.

^{^[133]} Nicholas R. Micinski, Adam G. Lichtenheld, Kelsey Norman, “Israel’s Mass Displacement of Gazans Fits Strategy of Using Migration as a Tool of War,” Rice University’s Baker Institute for Public Policy, (December 11, 2023).

^{^[134]} “Transparent Engagement and Funding,” Harvard Kennedy School accessed August 25, 2025.

^{^[135]} “Foreign Influence Transparency Initiative,” Center for International Policy, (January 2020).

^{^[136]} “Harvard’s Belfer Center Establishes Project on Saudi and GCC Security,” Belfer Center Press Release, (March 27, 2017).

^{^[137]} “Harvard Kennedy School Receives $6 Million Gift to Extend Opportunities for Next Generation of Kuwaiti and Middle East Leaders and Scholars,” Belfer Center For Science And International Affairs, (March 1, 2018).

^{^[138]} “Belfer Center Annual Report 2022,” Belfer Center For Science And International Affairs, (March 13, 2023).

^{^[139]} William C. Mao and Dhruv T. Patel, “Palestinian Prof. Defends Controversial Posts at Harvard Kennedy School Talk on War in Gaza,” Harvard Crimson, (March 8, 2024).

^{^[140]} Brown University Faculty Members, “Brown faculty call for a ceasefire in Israel-Palestine and the protection of academic freedom and student activism,” Brown Daily Herald, (November 7, 2023).

^{^[141]} @NadjeAlAli [Profile deleted]; Anya Sen, “Interview with Professor Nadje Al-Ali: A Transnational Look at Gender, Human Rights, and Race,” Medium, (September 8, 2024).

^{^[142]} “Public Statement: Scholars Warn of Potential Genocide in Gaza,” OpinioJuris, (October 15, 2023); “Palestine/Israel Scholars Open Letter to US Media, (October 16, 2023).

^{^[143]} Simon Plosker, “Boston Globe: Gaza ‘The World’s Harshest Occupation,’” Honest Reporting, (July 29, 2019).

^{^[144]} Brown University Faculty Members, “Brown faculty call for a ceasefire in Israel-Palestine and the protection of academic freedom and student activism,” The Brown Daily Herald, (November 7, 2023).

^{^[144a]}William D. Hartung, “U.S. Military Aid and Arms Transfers to Israel, October 2023 – September 2025,” The Watson School of International and Public Affairs, Brown University, (October 7, 2025); David Vine, “Mass Displacement since October 7, 2023: Flight from War, Genocide, and Expulsion in Gaza, Iran, Israel, Lebanon, and the West Bank,” Brown University, (October 7, 2025); Neta Crawford, “The Human Toll of the Gaza War: Direct and Indirect Death from 7 October 2023 to 3 October 2025,” Brown University, (October 7, 2025).

^{^[145]} “Institutional Compliance with Section 117 of the Higher Education Act of 1965,” U.S. Department of Education, Office of the General Counsel, (October 2020).

^{^[146]} John. L. Esposito, “The Future of Islam,” Fletcher Forum, (Summer 2001), p. 32.

^{^[147]} @ACMCU, (October 30, 2023).

^{^[148]} “Public Statement: Scholars Warn of Potential Genocide in Gaza,” OpinioJuris, (October 15, 2023).

^{^[149]} “Faculty & Staff Statement on the Situation in Gaza,” Georgetown Faculty & Staff for Justice in Palestine, (October 18, 2023).

^{^[150]} “Georgetown Faculty & Staff Call for a Ceasefire,” Georgetown Faculty & Staff for Justice in Palestine, (February 23, 2024).

^{^[151]} “Middle East Studies Scholars and Librarians Call for the Boycott of Israeli Academic Institutions,” Mona Baker, (August 6, 2014).

^{^[152]} @naderalihashemi, (April 8, 2018).

^{^[153]} @naderalihashemi, (April 15, 2018).

^{^[154]} @naderalihashemi, (May 24, 2021).

^{^[155]} @naderalihashemi, (August 29, 2025).

^{^[156]} @naderalihashemi, (March 20, 2024).

^{^[157]} Kieran Nicholson, “Colorado Jewish leaders call out DU professor’s remarks on Salman Rushdie stabbing,” Denver Post, (August 29, 2022).https://www.denverpost.com/2022/08/29/nader-hashemi-salman-rushdie-stabbing-israel-mossad/

^{^[158]} “Sociologists in Solidarity with Gaza and the Palestinian People,” (May 22, 2024) [Removed].

^{^[159]} Fida Adely & Amahl Bishara, “Dialogue as Diversion,” Savage Minds, (November 12, 2015).

^{^[160]} @jadaliyya, (November 20, 2023).

^{^[161]} @JonathanACBrown, (March 12, 2024).

^{^[162]} Patrick Drennan, “The Israeli towns where Jews and Arabs live side by side,” The Hill, (October 23, 2023).

^{^[163]} @JonathanACBrown, (December 7, 2023).

^{^[164]} “Middle East Dialogue 2015- The Religious Dimension of the Israeli-Palestinian Conflict,” YouTube, (April 30, 2015).

^{^[165]} @JonathanACBrown, (March 21, 2024).

^{^[166]} Gabby Deutch, “Anti-Israel Georgetown professor Jonathan Brown removed as Islamic studies department chair,” Jewish Insider, (July 15, 2025).

^{^[167]} “Middle East Studies Scholars and Librarians Call for the Boycott of Israeli Academic Institutions,” Jadaliyya Reports, (August 6, 2014).

^{^[168]} “Historians’ Letter to President Obama and Members of Congress,” Historians Against the War, (July 31, 2014).

^{^[169]} @MarwaDaoudy, (March 12, 2024). Tweet deleted.

^{^[170]} @MarwaDaoudy, (January 14, 2024). Tweet deleted.

^{^[171]} @MarwaDaoudy, (February 23, 2024). Tweet deleted.

^{^[172]} @MarwaDaoudy, (January 15, 2024). Tweet deleted.

^{^[173]} @MarwaDaoudy, (October 11, 2023). Tweet deleted.

^{^[174]} Rayyan Al-Shawaf, “Making Gaza Unlivable,” Diwan, (December 14, 2023).

^{^[175]} Frederick Deknatel, “The Global Impact of the ICJ Ruling on Israel: A Democracy in Exile Roundtable,” Dawn, (February 9, 2024).

^{^[176]} @NohaAboueldahab, (November 24, 2023).

^{^[177]} Noha Aboueldahab, “Israeli Leaders Trumpet Genocidal Intent,” Afkar, (October 16, 2023); Yair Rosenberg, “What Did Top Israeli War Officials Really Say About Gaza?” The Atlantic, (January 21, 2024).

^{^[178]} Ian Almond, LinkedIn, [Undated]

^{^[179]} Ian Almond, LinkedIn, [Undated

^{^[180]} Ian Almond, LinkedIn, [Undated]

^{^[181]} Yehia A Mohamed, Facebook, (April 7, 2024).

^{^[182]} Yehia A Mohamed, Facebook, (December 8, 2023).

^{^[183]} Yehia A Mohamed, Facebook, (December 10, 2023).

^{^[184]} Trish Kahle, “UC Sells Out To Apartheid,” SocialistWorker.org, (August 4, 2014).

^{^[185]} “Feminists For a Free Palestine. Stop the Genocide. End the Occupation,” Jadaliyya Reports, (November 8, 2023).

^{^[186]} Arab Center Washington DC website.

^{^[187]} “Form 990 Arab Center Washington D.C. Inc. for fiscal year ending Dec. 2023,” accessed August 8, 2025.

^{^[188]} Yara M. Asi, Imad K. Harb, Khalil E. Jahshan, Tamara Kharroub, Laurie King, Jonathan Kuttab, and Yousef Munayyer, “The Hamas Attack on Israel: Context, Analysis, and Potential Repercussions,” Arab Center Washington DC, (October 10, 2023).

^{^[189]} @KhalilEJahshan, (January 12, 2024).

^{^[190]} Cnaan Liphshiz, “Columbia University professor says Israel almost identical to Islamic State,” Times of Israel, (April 5, 2019).

^{^[191]} Alexandra Fishman and Max Samarov, “Why Is a Leading Think Tank Promoting Misleading Opinion Polls About Israel?” Fathom, (September 2023).

^{^[192]} @ShibleyTelhami, (March 18, 2024).

^{^[193]} Ash Ü. Bâli and Laurie Brand, “Open Letter to U.S. and Canadian College and University Presidents,” MESA, (December 18, 2023).

^{^[194]} “Middle East Studies Scholars and Librarians Call for the Boycott of Israeli Academic Institutions,” Jadaliyya Reports, (August 6, 2014).

^{^[195]} “Middle East Studies Scholars and Librarians Call for the Boycott of Israeli Academic Institutions,” Jadaliyya Reports, (August 6, 2014).

^{^[196]} Sheila Carapico, “Saudi Bullying of Qatar,” Middle East Report Online, (March 13, 2014).

^{^[197]} Usaama al-Azami, “Princeton’s Faculty Petition to Divest from Israeli Occupation,” HuffPost, (November 13, 2015).

^{^[198]} Dana El Kurd, “Will Israel further normalize relations with its Arab neighbors?” Washington Post, (July 11, 2022).

^{^[199]} “Human rights expert says Hamas and Israel both committed possible war crimes,” NPR, (October 11, 2023).

^{^[200]} Mohamed Nimer, “Charting the Hamas Charter Changes,” Insight Turkey, Vol. 11, No. 4, (Fall 2009).

^{^[201]} Madison Minges, “A Conflict Resolution Expert on Peace and the Israel-Hamas War,” School of International Service News, American University, (October 24, 2023).

^{^[202]} Rochelle Davis, Sam Halabi and Laurie King, “The University Mission and the Freedom to Define and Decry Atrocity,” Georgetown Voice, (November 19, 2023).

^{^[203]} Katrina Thomas, “America as Alma Mater,” Saudi Aramco World, (May/June 1979), pp. 2-11.

^{^[204]} Elizabeth Redden, “Ties That Bind,” Inside Higher Ed, (November 8, 2018).

^{^[205]} John Bound, Breno Braga, Gaurav Khanna, and Sarah Turner, “A Passage To America: University Funding And International Students. American Economic Journal: Economic Policy, (February 2020), pp. 97-126.

^{^[206]} “Host Regions and Destinations of U.S. Study Abroad Students, 1999/00-2022/23,” Open Doors Report on International Educational Exchange, Institute of International Education, 2024.

^{^[207]} “International Student Totals by Place of Origin, 2000/01-2023/24,” Open Doors Report on International Educational Exchange, Institute of International Education, (2024).

^{^[208]} “2025-2026 Academic Year F-1/J-1 Cost Estimates,” International Student Affairs Office, UMKC, accessed August 1, 2025.

^{^[209]} Layla Quran, “Saudi students in U.S. say their government watches their every move,” PBS News Hour, (March 19, 2019).

^{^[210]} Erica Thomas, “UAB SGA resolution condemns Israel for apartheid, ethnic cleansing, ‘plausible genocide,’” 1819 News, (April 25, 2024).

^{^[211]} Andrew Bernard, “Experts urge House committee to go after university pocketbooks over Jew-hatred,” JNS, (June 14, 2024).

^{^[212]} Jay Greene, Adam Kissel, and Lindsey Burke, “Protecting American Universities from Undue Foreign Influence,” The Heritage Foundation, (February 13, 2024).

^{^[213]} Katrina Thomas, “America as Alma Mater,” Saudi Aramco World, (May/June 1979).

^{^[214]} Tony Badran, “Why America’s Richest Universities Are Protecting Hate-Filled Foreign Students,” Tablet, (January 30, 2024).

^{^[215]} “The Ongoing Failure to Report: Yale University, Qatar and Undisclosed Foreign Funding,” ISGAP, (2023).

^{^[216]} Zvika Krieger, “The Emir of NYU,” New York, (April 13, 2008).

^{^[217]} Alexander Cornwell, “Qatar Foundation rejects U.S. university’s reason for scrapping event after anti-gay backlash,” Reuters, (February 5, 2020); Rasha Younes, “Northwestern University’s Precarious Role Under Qatar’s Repressive Laws,” Human Rights Watch, (February 6, 2020); Liam Knox, “Cutting Off Qatar,” Insider Higher Ed, (February 16, 2024).

^{^[218]} Seth Cropsey, “Arab Money and the Universities,” Commentary, (April 1979).

^{^[219]} Paul Findley, They Dare to Speak Out, (CT: Lawrence Hill & Co., 1985), pp. 196-197.

^{^[220]} Lawrence Feinberg, “GU’s Agile Leader,” Washington Post, (December 30, 1980).

^{^[221]} Paul Findley, They Dare to Speak Out, (CT: Lawrence Hill & Co., 1985), pp. 189-195.

^{^[222]} Deborah Christensen, “In Arresting Move, School’s Board Drops Khashoggi,” Los Angeles Times, (May 5, 1989).

^{^[223]} Michael Isikoff, “American U. Donation Stirs Debate,” Washington Post, (January 11, 1987).

^{^[224]} Joan Mower, “Kashoggi Gift Stirs Controversy At American University,” AP, (January 15, 1987); Chris Cottrell, “Indiana University Considers Removing Segregationist’s Name from Building,” Eagle, April 30, 2007; Robert Baer, Sleeping with the Devil, (NY: Random House, 2004), p. 42.

^{^[225]} Rachel Lea Fish, “A Troubling Gift,” Wall Street Journal, (June 6, 2003); Alan Cooperman, “Harvard Will Refund Sheik's $2.5 Million Gift,” Washington Post, (July 27, 2004); Jonathan Jaffit, “Fighting Sheikh Zayed’s Funding of Islamic Studies at Harvard Divinity School: A Case Study,” Jerusalem Center for Public Affairs, (November 17, 2005).

^{^[226]} Terence Prittie and Walter Henry Nelson, The Economic War Against the Jews, (NY: Random House, 1977), pp. 186-187.

^{^[227]} Prittie and Nelson, p. 187.

^{^[228]} Zvika Krieger, “Desert Bloom,” Chronicle of Higher Education, (March 28, 2008).

^{^[229]} Elizabeth Redden, “Ties That Bind,” Inside Higher Ed, (November 8, 2018).

^{^[230]} Lukas Wolters and Nicolas Dumas, “President Reif, cut MIT’s ties to Saudi Arabia now!” The Tech, (October 25, 2018).

^{^[231]} Michael Sokolove, “Why Is There So Much Saudi Money in American Universities?” New York Times Magazine, (July 3, 2019).

^{^[232]} Andrea K. McDaniels, Johns Hopkins footprint in Saudi Arabia raises human rights concerns after Khashoggi killing,” Baltimore Sun, (November 5, 2018).

^{^[233]} Andrea K. McDaniels, Johns Hopkins footprint in Saudi Arabia raises human rights concerns after Khashoggi killing,” Baltimore Sun, (November 5, 2018).

^{^[234]} Liz Reisberg, “Ethical Quandaries for Higher Education,” Inside Higher Ed, (November 1, 2018).

^{^[235]} Lukas Wolters and Nicolas Dumas, “President Reif, cut MIT’s ties to Saudi Arabia now!” The Tech, (October 25, 2018).

^{^[236]} See, for example, Daniel Pipes, “Smart university giving,” Philanthropy Daily, (February 12, 2013), and Andrew Lapin, “Donor yanks Israel Studies endowment at U of Washington over professor’s Israel criticism,” JTA, (March 1, 2022).

^{^[237]} “Arabic, Arabists and Academia,” Saudi Aramco World, (May/June 1979).

^{^[238]} See also Elizabeth Redden, “Ties That Bind,” Inside Higher Ed, (November 8, 2018); Grif Peterson and Yarden Katz, “Elite universities are selling themselves – and look who’s buying,” The Guardian, (March 30, 2018).

^{^[239]} Elizabeth Redden, “Ties That Bind,” Inside Higher Ed, (November 8, 2018).

^{^[240]} Elizabeth Redden, “Ties That Bind,” Inside Higher Ed, (November 8, 2018).

^{^[241]} “Country Ratings,” Gallup.

^{^[242]} Tal Schneider, “Awash in Qatari money, have US campuses become incubators for Doha’s interests?” Times of Israel, (March 14, 2024).

^{^[243]} “Statement from the Embassy of the State of Qatar,” @QatarEmbassy_US, (June 13, 2024).

^{^[244]} Shera S. Avi-Yonah, “‘Secretive, Dubious Partnerships’: Harvard Quietly Keeps Strong Saudi Connections,” Harvard Crimson, (October 25, 2018).

^{^[245]} “Jewish Groups Keep Watchful Eye As Schools Receive Saudi Donations,” JTA, (December 16, 2015).

^{^[246]} Walid Khalidi, “The Palestine Problem: An Overview,” Journal of Palestine Studies, XXI, no. 1 (Autumn 1991), p. 5.

^{^[247]} Giuliana Vetrano, “No Strings Attached?” Harvard Crimson, (March 8, 2006); Elizabeth Redden, “Ties That Bind,” Inside Higher Ed, (November 8, 2018).

^{^[248]} Allen S. Weiner, “Money From Black Gold,” Harvard Crimson, (June 9, 1983).

^{^[249]} “Statement by Harvard Faculty in Support of Palestinian Liberation,” Palestine Forum, (May 22, 2021).

^{^[250]} Matt Corrade, “Lack of Openness Makes Scholarly Discussion of Islam Dangerous, Says Bernard Lewis,” Congressional Quarterly’s Homeland Security News and Analysis, (April 27, 2008).

^{^[251]} These are the courses:

JEWISHST 152. Renaissance and Revolution: Judaism, Zionism, and Israel.
GOV 1106. The Political Economy of Israel.
HDS 1834. Archaeology and History of Israel/Palestine from the Second Temple to the Early Islamic Period.
HLSS 3122. Law, Human Rights, and Social Justice in Israel and Palestine.
HDS 3335. Learning in Context: Narratives of Displacement and Belonging in Israel/Palestine.

“Middle East-related Courses,” CMES, accessed March 20, 2024.

^{^[252]} “Statement by Harvard Faculty in Support of Palestinian Liberation,” Palestine Forum, (May 22, 2021).

^{^[253]} Legal Scholars Demand Withdrawal of US Support for Attacks on Gaza, (October 16, 2023).

^{^[254]} “Apartheid in the Occupied West Bank: A Legal Analysis of Israel’s Actions,” International Human Rights Clinic at Harvard Law School and Addameer Prisoner Support and Human Rights Association, (February 28, 2022); Rachel O’Donoghue, “Harvard Law School Teams Up With Palestinian NGO Whose Board Members Include Convicted Terrorists,” Honest Reporting, (March 28, 2022).

^{^[255]} “Panel Discussion: Jewish Solidarity with Palestine,” Jewish Currents, (November 6, 2023).

^{^[256]} Atalia Omer, “Stop weaponizing the Holocaust,” The Hill, (November 4, 2023).

^{^[257]} Diane L. Moore, Hilary Rantisi, Atalia Omer, Hussein Rashid, Susie Hayward, “Statement from the Leadership of Religion and Public Life on the Current Spate of Violence in Palestine/Israel,” New Politics, (October 13, 2023).

^{^[258]} Details of Wolf’s letter in Steven Emerson, “Wolf to Georgetown: Detail Use of Saudi Millions,” IPT News, (February 15, 2008), and DeGoia’s February 22, 2008, response can be found on the Investigative Project website.

^{^[259]} “Board of Advisors,” Center for Contemporary Arab Studies, accessed August 15, 2025.

^{^[260]} Emerson, American House of Saud, 166-167; Barnstone V. Univ. of Houston, KUHT-TV, LEAGLE, (May 12, 1980).

^{^[261]} Parker Wishik, “Qatar donates $3.3 million to University,” Reveille, (May 3, 2006).

^{^[262]} Mitchell Bard, “Taxpayer-Funded Bias on Middle East Invades K-12 Classrooms,” Algemeiner, (November 8, 2017).

^{^[263]} Charles Asher Small and Michael Bass, “Higher Education And Contemporary Antisemitism: Soft Power And Foreign Influence,” ISGAP, (July 2019) and Volume Two, (September 2020).

^{^[264]} Neetu Arnold, “Hijacked: The Capture of American’s Middle East Studies Centers,” National Association of Scholars, (2022).

^{^[265]} Bard, The Arab Lobby.

^{^[266]} Tim Weiner, “Clinton and His Ties to the Influential Saudis,” New York Times, (August 23, 1993); King Fahd Center for Middle East Studies, University of Arkansas.

^{^[267]} Goldie Blumenstyk, “Unlisted Foreign Donations,” Chronicle of Higher Education, (March 16, 1994).

^{^[268]} Robert Steinbuch, “Where is the other side in these ‘forums’?” Arkansas Democrat Gazette, (January 19, 2024).

^{^[269]} “Public Statement: Scholars Warn of Potential Genocide in Gaza,” OpinioJuris, (October 15, 2023).

^{^[270]} “Palestine/Israel Scholars Open Letter to US Media, (October 16, 2023).

^{^[271]} Robert Steinbuch, “Arkansans deserve better,” Arkansas Democrat Gazette, (January 12, 2024).

^{^[272]} Robert Steinbuch, “But wait, there’s more,” Arkansas Democrat Gazette, (February 23, 2024).

^{^[273]} Ash Ü. Bâli and Laurie Brand, “Letter to the University of Arkansas protesting its failure to defend its faculty,” MESA, (March 12, 2024).

^{^[274]} “Middle East Studies and Jewish Studies to Offer Fall Seminar on Israeli Politics and Society,” University of Arkansas News, (July 12, 2024).

^{^[275]} Shai Gortler website accessed August 14, 2025.

^{^[276]} “MEST Core Course,” University of Arkansas, accessed August 14, 2025.

^{^[276a]}Robert Steinbuch, “Time for action,” Arkansas Democrat Gazette, (December 5, 2025); Nell Gluckman, “Free Speech – The U. of Arkansas Is Trying to Fire a Tenured Professor for Statements on Iran and Israel,” Chronicle of Higher Education, (December 18, 2025).

^{^[277]} Small and Bass, Volume Two, p. 5.

^{^[278]} “The Corruption Of The American Mind: Presented By How Concealed Foreign Funding Of U.S. Higher Education Predicts Erosion Of Democratic Values And Antisemitic Incidents On Campus,” Network Contagion Research Group, (November 6, 2023).

^{^[279]} Elizabeth Redden, “Foreign Gift Investigations Expand and Intensify,” Inside Higher Ed, (February 19, 2020).

^{^[280]} Letter from Sue Cunningham, President, and CEO of CASE to Stephanie Valentine, Director of the Information Collective Clearance, Division of DoE and Paul Ray, Administrator, Office of Information and Regulatory Affairs, Office of Management and Budget, (March 11, 2020).

^{^[281]} “U.S. Department of Education Launches Investigation into Foreign Gifts Reporting at Ivy League Universities,” U.S. Department of Education, (February 12, 2020).

^{^[282]} Response to Public Comments (60-day notice), Department of Education, [Undated].

^{^[283]} Ann Mosely Lesch, “Promoting Academic Freedom: Risks and Responsibilities,” 1995 MESA presidential address, MESA Bulletin, (July 1996).

^{^[284]} “Middle East Scholars Vote to Endorse BDS,” MESA, (March 23, 2022).

^{^[285]} Ohad Merlin, “Watchdogs sue US government over Qatar’s billions in university funding,” Jerusalem Post, (February 2, 2025).

^{^[286]} “Transparency Regarding Foreign Influence At American Universities,” Executive Orders, The White House, (April 23, 2025).

^{^[287]} “Stefanik Questions College Presidents On the Rise Of Antisemitism On Their Campuses, Receiving Funds From Foreign Entities, And Their Lack Of Support For The Jewish Communities On Campuses,” Press Release, Office of Rep. Elise Stefanik, (December 5, 2023).

^{^[288]} Neetu Arnold, “Hijacked: The Capture of American’s Middle East Studies Centers,” National Association of Scholars, (2022), p. 125.

Arab Funding of American Universities:Donors, Recipients, and Impact

Arab Funding of American Universities:
Donors, Recipients, and Impact