Abu Mohammad al-Jolani

Abu Mohammad al-Jolani, born Ahmed Hussein al-Sharaa in 1982, has emerged as a pivotal figure in the Syrian civil war. His life, marked by ideological shifts and strategic maneuvering, offers a glimpse into the evolution of global jihadist movements and the complex dynamics of the Syrian conflict.

Al-Jolani has conflicting accounts regarding his birthplace. Some sources claim he was born in Riyadh, Saudi Arabia, where his father worked as a petroleum engineer until the family returned to Syria in 1989. Other reports suggest he was born in Syria, with his family originally from the Golan Heights. Al-Jolani claims in a 2021 PBS interview that he was born in Saudi Arabia, where his family had relocated due to his father’s work. Despite these differing reports, it is generally agreed that al-Jolani’s family moved back to Syria in the late 1980s. While details of his early life remain scarce, sources suggest that he was a media student in Damascus. The Al-Aqsa Intifada in 2000 and the September 11th attacks in 2001 deeply impacted him, leading to his radicalization. By 2003, when the US invaded Iraq, al-Jolani had abandoned his studies and embraced a devout Salafi identity, ultimately traveling to Iraq to fight against the US occupation.

His time in Iraq proved formative. Arriving in Baghdad weeks before its fall, he eventually found himself in the Sunni stronghold of Ramadi, where he was exposed to the realities of war and the burgeoning networks of jihadist fighters. After a brief return to Syria, where he narrowly evaded arrest during a crackdown on jihadist cells, al-Jolani returned to Iraq in 2005. This time, he joined a group aligned with al-Qaeda in Iraq (AQI) and was captured in 2006 while planting a roadside bomb. He spent the next five years in US military prisons, including Abu Ghraib and Camp Bucca, further solidifying his commitment to jihadist ideology and allowing him to build relationships with future Islamic State leaders, including Abu Bakr al-Baghdadi.

In 2011, with the outbreak of the Syrian uprising, al-Baghdadi tasked al-Jolani with establishing the al-Nusra Front, a covert branch of the Islamic State of Iraq (ISI), in Syria. By 2012, Nusra had become a prominent fighting force, concealing its ties to ISI. Initially, al-Jolani prioritized gaining Syrian support, distancing himself from ISI’s brutality. He expressed support for al-Qaeda’s extremist goals in Syria, rejecting political talks aimed at ending the conflict. His focus at the time was on establishing an Islamic state ruled by Sharia law, with no accommodation for Syria’s minority groups.

Tensions arose in 2013 when al-Baghdadi unilaterally declared the merger of Nusra and ISI to form the Islamic State of Iraq and the Levant (ISIS). Al-Jolani resisted, seeking to maintain local support and distance his group from ISIS’s increasingly violent tactics. He pledged allegiance to al-Qaeda, making Nusra its Syrian branch, and engaged in battles against ISIS for supremacy in the fight against Bashar al-Assad. This move further complicated al-Jolani’s relationship with al-Baghdadi, as he argued that his ultimate allegiance was to al-Qaeda’s leader, Ayman al-Zawahiri, and not to Baghdadi.

In 2016, al-Jolani took steps to rebrand his group, first changing its name to Jabhat Fateh al-Sham and then severing ties with al-Qaeda. This decision, seen by some as a pragmatic move to avoid being targeted by international forces, marked a shift towards a more Syrian-focused agenda. In 2017, he consolidated his power by merging several rebel groups into Hayat Tahrir al-Sham (HTS).

Under his leadership, HTS established a civilian front, the “Syrian Salvation Government” (SG), in 2017 to administer the Idlib province, the largest rebel stronghold in northwest Syria. The SG functioned like a state, providing services and infrastructure while maintaining a religious council guided by Sharia law. This move signaled al-Jolani’s desire to showcase HTS’s governance capacity and ability to provide stability and services.

However, al-Jolani’s rule in Idlib has been criticized for its authoritarian tactics and crackdown on dissent. Protests erupted against HTS, accusing the group of suppressing dissent and mirroring Assad’s authoritarianism. In response, HTS initiated reforms, including disbanding a controversial security force and establishing a “Department of Grievances,” although critics dismissed these as superficial attempts to appease concerns.

In recent years, al-Jolani has sought to cultivate a more moderate image, dropping his nom de guerre and using his real name, Ahmed al-Sharaa, in official communications. He has replaced his military attire with Western-style clothing and was interviewed by international media, emphasizing his group’s commitment to building state institutions and decentralizing power. He has even offered assurances to Syria’s minority communities, pledging to protect their rights in post-Assad Syria.

Despite these efforts, al-Jolani remains a controversial figure. The United States continues to designate HTS as a terrorist organization and offers a $10 million bounty for information leading to his capture. Critics question the genuineness of his transformation, viewing it as a strategic maneuver to gain legitimacy and escape international sanctions.

The recent rebel offensive that resulted in the fall of the Assad regime has propelled al-Jolani into the spotlight. HTS played a pivotal role in the offensive, demonstrating its military capabilities and strategic planning. Al-Jolani now faces the complex challenge of transitioning from a rebel leader to a potential statesman. While he has presented himself as pragmatic and focused on internal stability in Syria, the task ahead is monumental, and his true intentions still need to be determined.

Al-Jolani’s views on the West and Israel are complex and have evolved. While he once expressed support for al-Qaeda’s extremist goals, he now claims that HTS poses no threat to the West. He has criticized Western policies but denies any intention to wage war against Western nations. His stance on Israel is less clear. His family’s origins in the Golan Heights suggest a personal attachment to the Israeli-Palestinian conflict. However, he has not explicitly articulated his views on Israel in recent years.

On December 14, 2024, Jolani declared that his forces have no intention of engaging in conflict with Israel, emphasizing that Israeli intervention excuses are invalid now that the Iranian troops have left Syria. Two days later, he stated that Syria under his control would not be used as a launchpad for attacks on Israel or any other state. He urged Israel to end its airstrikes and withdraw from territories taken after the fall of Bashar al-Assad. He also expressed willingness to honor the 1974 disengagement agreement and allow the return of United Nations monitors.

On December 20, 2024, the U.S. announced it intends to remove the $10 million bounty on al-Jolani. This decision followed a meeting between al-Jolani and Barbara Leaf, U.S. Assistant Secretary of State for Near Eastern Affairs, in which al-Jolani pledged not to allow terrorist organizations to operate in Syria or pose threats to the U.S. or neighboring countries. Previously designated a terrorist by the U.S. due to his connections with al-Qaeda, al-Jolani had a bounty placed on him for information leading to his capture. However, Israel’s security officials have expressed skepticism about al-Jolani’s pledge. They stated that they are “not impressed by the supposedly moderate messages” coming from the jihadist leader. These statements are seen as an attempt to “deceive” Israel. Intelligence reports indicate that al-Jolani’s group remains a radical faction, and the rebels, who are increasingly seen as an extension of Turkish President Recep Tayyip Erdoğan’s influence, pose a continuing threat.

Sources: “Who is Abu Mohammed al-Julani, leader of HTS in Syria?” Al-Jazeera, (December 4, 2024). 
Mostafa Salem, “How Syria’s rebel leader went from radical jihadist to a blazer-wearing ‘revolutionary,’” CNN, (December 6, 2024).
Kareem Chehayeb, “Who is Abu Mohammed al-Golani, the leader of the insurgency that toppled Syria’s Assad?” AP, (December 8, 2024).
Mina Al-Lami, “From Syrian jihadist leader to rebel politician: How Abu Mohammed al-Jolani reinvented himself,” BBC, (December 8, 2024).
Hassan Hassan, “‘I went to university with rebel leader Jolani – I wonder if he has really turned his back on jihad,’” Telegraph, (December 8, 2024).
Adam Rasgon, Raja Abdulrahim, “Who Is the Leader of Syria’s Rebel Offensive?” New York Times, (December 8, 2024).
Freddie Clayton, Ammar Cheikh Omar, “Syrian rebel leader's extremist past raises questions about his future,” NBC, (December 9, 2024).
Lior Ben Ari, “Syrian Rebel Leader in First Statement on Israel: “It No Longer Has Excuses to Intervene,”” Ynet, (December 14, 2024). [Hebrew]
Samer Al-Atrush, “Jolani: Syria won’t be used as launchpad for attacks on Israel,” Times, (December 16, 2024).
“US decides to lift $10 million bounty on Syrian HTS leader al-Julani,” Jerusalem Post, (December 20, 2024).
““Pragmatic”? In Israel, They Are Not Impressed by al-Jolani: “Intelligence Reveals His True Intentions,” Ynet, (December 20, 2024). [Hebrew]

Photo: “Muhammad al-Jawlani,” Rewards for Justice.