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OTHER FORMS OF ASSISTANCE HAVE FALLEN TO FRACTION OF WHAT THEY WERE IN FORMER YEARS. ACCORDINGLY, WE INTEND CONTINUE PATIENT EDUCATIONAL PROCESS SEEKING REINFORCE GROWING DISTILLUSION WITH FATAH. AT SAME TIME WE SHARE COLLEAGUES' VIEWS ON INDISPENSURILITY GETTING AT ROOT CAUSE: CONTINUANCE OF ARAB-ISRAEL DISPUTE. PUBLICLY SAUDIS HAVE ABJURED USE OF OIL AS POLITICAL WEAPON, BUT THERE ARE INSISTENT PRESSURES ON THEM TO DO OTHERWISE. WE SUGGEST CONSIDERATION OF STEPS WHICH CAN OFFSET PRESENT OVERWHELMING PRO-ISRAEL APPEARANCE OF US POLICY IN ARAB EYES.

WE AGREE US NEEDS STRENGTHEN POSITION OF MODERATE PALESTINIANS PERHAPS WITH GREATER ATTENTION TO PLIGHT OF REFUGEES AND BY EXAMINING MEANS PROVIDING PALESTINIANS WITH RESPECTABLE POLITICAL ENTITY AND POLITICAL PERSONALITY OF THEIR OWN. END SUMMARY.

- 1. AN ASSESSMENT OF HOW WE CAN MANIPULATE OUR RELATIONS: WWOH SAUDI ARABIA TO BRING ABOUT SOME ABATEMENT OF TERRORIST THREAT DIVIDES ITSELF FAIRLY OBVIOUSLY INTO TWO BROAD TOPICS: (A) COOPERATION APPREHENSION OF DANGEROUS PERSONAGES; (B) DIALOGUE ON POLITICAL LEVEL INTENDED BRING WEIGHT OF SAUDI INFLUENCE AND THAT OF KING FAISAL PERSONALLY TO DISCOURAGE TERRORIST ACTIVITIES.

2. WITH REGARD TO FIRST CATEGORY, SAUDI ATTITUDES REVEAL FERTILE SPHERE FOR COOPERATION. ASIDE FROM RECENT TAPLINE SABOTAGE ON SAUDI TERRITORY AND RUPTURE OF ARAMCO PIPING SOME DISTANCE INLAND FEW WEEKS AGO, SAUDIS HAVE BEEN FOR PAST THREE YEARS BLISSFULLY IMMUNE FROM DISRUPTIVE IMPACT OF BOMBINGS, ASSASSINATIONS AND OTHER TURMOIL WHICH HAS GRIPPED JORDAN, LEBANON, AND EVEN OCCASIONALLY KUWAIT. SAUDIS ARE DESPERATELY ANXIOUS PRESERVE THIS HAPPY STATE OF AFFAIRS. URGENT HOPE THAT WOLF WILL STAY AWAY FROM THEIR DOOR HAS EVEN MADE SAUDIS BLIND TO FACT THAT THEY TOO WERE ONE OF BSO'S TARGETS IN KHARTOUM. COMMENTS HERE HAVE REVEALED ALMOST NO SPONTANEOUS RECOGNITION OF THIS FACT.

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DECLASSIFIED E.O. 12958, as amended, Sect 3.5

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By [Signature] NARA, Date 8/6/07 [21/1/07] [2]

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██████████ SAUDI SECURITY SERVICES ARE HARDLY PARAGONS OF MODERNITY, BUT THEY HAVE SOME FACTORS GOING FOR THEM. WE IN PROCESS OF PREPARING ASSESSMENT ROLE AND FUTURE POTENTIAL OF PALESTINIANS IN SAUDI ARABIA (ESTIMATED AROUND 30,000). OUR PRELIMINARY ESTIMATE IS THIS COMMUNITY COWED AND UNEASY, AWARE THAT SIGNIFICANT TERRORIST DISTURBANCE COULD EASILY RESULT IN COUPLE OF THOUSAND OF THEM FINDING THEMSELVES IN JAIL WITHIN TWO OR THREE DAYS. FATAH HAS NO OVERT OPERATING OFFICES IN SAUDI ARABIA. SUSPICION DIRECTED TOWARD THEM, AND RELATIVE ISOLATION OF PALESTINIANS HERE TENDS REDUCE NUMBERS WHO WOULD BE INCLINED HARBOR OR ASSIST BSO TEAMS. ONE SENIOR SAUDI HAS REMARKED TO US, WITH PERHAPS A BIT TOO MUCH CONFIDENCE, THAT KHARTOUM INCIDENT MOST UNLIKELY OCCUR HERE SINCE WITHOUT DOUBT ASSASSINS' HEADS WOULD ROLL (LITERALLY) WITHIN FEW DAYS AFTER EVENT. DRACONIAN, SAUDI-STYLE JUSTICE HAS IT STRENGTHS.

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4. OUR AID/OPS MISSION (INTERNAL SECURITY ADVISERS) IN RIYADH IS REMARKABLY WELL PLACED ENCOURAGE AND ASSIST SAUDI UNDERTAKE PERHAPS MOST USEFUL TASK THEY CAN PURSUE IN COMBATTING TERRORISM: DENIAL OF SAUDI TERRITORY TO BSO ACTIVISTS. WE WILL HAVE ONGOING OPPORTUNITIES BUILD UP SAUDI SURVEILLANCE CAPABILITIES (INCLUDING, HOPEFULLY, IMPROVING ITS TARGETING). FOR EXAMPLE, DEPUTY MINISTER INTERIOR MOHAMMED BIN ZARA WILL BE IN US FOR SEVERAL WEEKS ORIENTATION TOUR BEGINNING ABOUT APRIL 1 UNDER AID/OPS SPONSORSHIP AND LATTER WILL SOON ALSO BE HOSTING SIX TOP QUALITY, YOUNG, ENGLISH-SPEAKING SAUDI SECURITY OFFICERS FOR COURSES IN BOMB DISPOSAL AND OTHER ANTI-TERRORIST TECHNIQUES. WE INFORMED BIN ZARA LOOKING FOR IMMIGRATION CONTROL ADVISER. HIS VISIT SHOULD PROVIDE OPPORTUNITY REVIEW SAUDI TERRORIST CONTROL TECHNIQUES, AND, WITHOUT DRIVING POINTS HOME TOO HARD, SUGGEST MEANS FOR IMPROVEMENT WITH WHICH WE MIGHT PERHAPS ASSIST. WE ALSO IN PROCESS IMPROVING QUALITY OF ADVISERS FOR COAST GUARD/FRONTIER FORCE. ORVIOUSLY WE CANNOT BE TOO SANGUINE

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ABOUT PROSPECTS SEALING LONG SAUDI FRONTIERS OR ESTABLISHING FULLY EFFECTIVE CONTROLS AT POINTS OF ENTRY, BUT WE HAVE AT LEAST CONSIDERABLE SAUDI DESIRE FOR USG ASSISTANCE AND FOR ADVICE ON WIDE RANGE THESE PREVENTIVE ENDEAVORS.

5. BEFORE REVIEWING PROBLEM OF FEDAYEEN TERROR IN SAUDI-US BILATERAL TERMS, WE WOULD LIKE REINFORCE FEELINGS EXPRESSED BY NEIGHBORING COLLEAGUES THAT THERE IS PROBABLY NO REAL CURE FOR TERRORIST DISEASE OTHER THAN GETTING AT UNDERLYING CAUSE: ARAB-ISRAELI DISPUTE. WE MAY BE TEMPTED REGARD PRESENT SITUATION AS KIND OF PAX JUDACA WHICH, LIKE PAX ROMANA OF CENTURIES PAST, SEEMS REPRESENT TRIUMPH OF HIGHLY ORGANIZED, MOTIVATED AND INTELLIGENT MINORITY OVER SURROUNDING MAJORITY IN EASTERN MEDITERRANEAN. IN THAT SENSE IT IS NOT PERHAPS AN UNUSUAL HISTORICAL PHENOMENON. JUDGING FROM STAND-PAT STATEMENTS EMANATING NOW FROM ISREALI LEADERS, THIS STATE OF AFFAIRS IS VIEWED BY SOME OF THEM WITH CONSIDERABLE SATISFACTION.

6. PUT TO US AND ARABS SUCH "PAX" SEEMS HARDLY AS ENDURING AND SATISFACTORY AS IT MAY TO OUR ISREALI FRIENDS. DRAGON'S TEETH, SUCH AS TERRORISM, KEEP SPROUTING UP ALL ROUND THE EDGES. WE KNOW THAT "NO PEACE, NO WAR" IS STILL FRAUGHT WITH RISKS FOR US, IF NOT FOR ISRAELI, INTERESTS. WE HAVE FELT REASSURED BY VARIOUS SAUDI PUBLIC STATEMENTS ABJURING USE OF PETROLEUM AS POLITICAL WEAPON AND BY AFFIRMATIONS OF SAUDI SENSE OF RESPONSIBILITY FOR MAKING ITS OIL AVAILABLE TO WESTERN USERS. BUT IT MIGHT BE A MISTAKE TO REGARD THESE AFFIRMATIONS AS HAVING INDEFINITE DURABILITY. WE KNOW THERE ARE INSISTENT PRESSURES ON SAUDI ARABIA FROM OTHER ARAB STATES TO EXAMINE MORE INTENSIVELY HOW OIL COULD BE BROUGHT TO BEAR TO INFLUENCE WESTERN, AND PARTICULARLY US, ATTITUDES ON ARAB-ISRAEL ISSUE, AND THERE IS EVIDENCE OF SIMILAR PRESSURE FROM FEDAYEEN QUARTERS AS WELL.

7. IMPORTANT CONVICTION AFFECTING ARAB OUTLOOK ON EVERY PHASE OF PROBLEM IS MOUNTING ARAB FEELING, QUITE UNINTENDED PERHAPS ON OUR PART, THAT SINGLE OVERRIDING USG INTEREST IN MIDDLE EAST IS SUPPORT OF ISRAEL. AS WE HAVE SEEN IN RE-13R 2331J, ARABS HAVE REACHED STAGE WHERE THEY GIVE INSTANT CREDENCE TO "ANNOUNCEMENTS" FROM WHATEVER SOURCE DESCRIBING

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INCREASED US ASSISTANCE FOR ISRAEL.

8. AS USUAL, STATEMENT OF PROBLEM IS EASIER THAN FORMULATION OF SOLUTION. YET WE WONDER IF THERE IS NOT SOMETHING WE CAN DO TO BALANCE THE SEEMING PRO-ISRAELI CAST OF OUR PRESENT POLICY BY EFFORTS TO CONVINCING ARABS WE ARE WELL DISPOSED TOWARD THEM ALSO. SAUDIS, AT LEAST, ARE ALMOST PATHETICALLY EAGER FOR SIGNS THAT USG SUPPORTS SOME ASPECTS OF ARAB SIDE OF CASE. FRIENDLY RECEPTION GIVEN HERE TO OUR RECENT PUBLIC STATEMENT ON STATUS OF JERUSALEM IS SIGNIFICANT CASE IN POINT UJDDA 03121.

9. WE SHARE FULLY KUWAIT'S VIEW (KUWAIT 0929) SUGGESTING USG SHOULD TAKE CLOSER LOOK AT ITS RELATIONS WITH MODERATE PALESTINIANS. WE NOT FULLY UP TO DATE HERE ON USG POLICY TOWARD UNRWA, BUT IT IS OUR IMPRESSION WE HAVE IN RECENT YEARS DEVOTED MUCH EFFORT TO IMPRESSING CLEARLY ON OTHER STATES NOTION THAT THEY MUST NOW ASSUME INCREASING PERCENTAGE OF UNRWA'S FINANCIAL BURDEN. EVEN WITH PRESENT TIGHTNESS OF AID FUNDS, WE WONDER IF IT WOULD NOT BE POSSIBLE SOMEHOW DEMONSTRATE MORE POSITIVE CONCERN FOR PALESTINIAN REFUGEE PLIGHT. CONGRESS SEEMS RESPOND WELL TO HUMANITARIAN PLEAS FOR ASSISTING DESTITUTE MILLIONS IN BANGLADESH OR OPPRESSED JEWS IN SOVIET UNION. IS THERE ANY WAY PLIGHT OF PALESTINIANS MIGHT AGAIN BE MADE MORE VIVID TO OUR LEGISLATORS EVEN THOUGH IT INVOLVES DIFFICULT TASK SEPARATING TERRORIST IMAGE FROM THAT OF PALESTINIANS AS WHOLE?

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10. CAN MOUNT HUSTINGS TO CONDEMN US. BUT IN GENERAL, THEY DO NOT MOUNT HUSTINGS AT ALL. I.E., POLICY STATEMENTS MADE IN PUBLIC ARE ABJURED EXCEPT WHERE CIRCUMSTANCES SUCH AS PRESENCE OF DISTINGUISHED VISITORS REQUIRE STANDARD VOICING OF GENERALLY MEANINGLESS ARAB RHETORIC. THIS STANDARD SAUDI LOW-PROFILE TECHNIQUE DICTATES, FOR EXAMPLE, POLICY OF NO RESPONSE TO BAGHDAD RADIO'S RECURRENT ANTI-SAUDI INVECTIVE OR TO GLANCING BLOWS FROM LIBYAN SPOKESMEN WHEN LATTER IDENTIFY REACTIONARY ROYAL REGIMES AS ARAB ENEMIES. FOR A TERRITORIALY VAST, MILITARILY VERY WEAK AND VERY RICH COUNTRY, THIS POLICY HAS PAID OFF REMARKABLY WELL OVER LAST THREE YEARS, A PERIOD IN WHICH SAUDIS HAVE SEEN MARKED IMPROVEMENT IN THEIR RELATIONS WITH YEMEN, SYRIA, EGYPT, SUDAN AND ETHIOPIA.

12. YET IN MANY RESPECTS AND ASIDE FROM ISLAMIC AFFAIRS, SAUDIS ARE STILL FUNDAMENTALLY TIMOROUS, AWARE THAT THEIR FRIENDSHIP FOR US, ON WHICH THEY DEPEND HEAVILY TO STRENGTHEN THEM AGAINST RADICAL THREATS FROM SOUTH YEMEN AND IRAQ, LEAVES THEM IN HIGHLY VULNERABLE POSITION VIS-A-VIS MANY OF THEIR ARAB BRETHERN TO EXTENT THAT THEY MIGHT WITH FEW MISSTEPS BECOME PRIME TARGET OF SUCH ARAB RADICALS AS ALGERIA, LIBYA, IRAQ AND SYRIA.

13. FOLLOWING THESE PRINCIPLES SAUDIS HAVE TENDED MANAGE THEIR RELATIONS WITH FATAH AND OTHER MILITANT PALESTINIAN GROUPS IN GINGERLY FASHION. IN IMMEDIATE POST-'67 YEARS SAUDI GOVT'S PUBLIC ENDORSEMENT OF PALESTINIAN COMMANDOS MATCHED ENTHUSIASM OF OTHER ARAB STATES. SIMILARLY DECLINE IN SAUDI SUPPORT HAS TENDED FOLLOW THAT OF OTHER ARAB GOVTS AS MOVEMENT BECAME STEADILY MORE FRAGMENTED, LESS EFFECTIVE, AND MORE DISCREDITED.

[REDACTED] PAYROLL LEVIES FOR "PALESTINIAN MARTYRS FUND" HAVE ALMOST CEASED, AND PRESENT POSTURE IS FAR CRY FROM DAYS WHEN POSTERS LINED CITY WALLS URGING CONTRIBUTIONS AND FULL SUPPORT FOR LIBERATION GROUPS. DISENCHANTMENT IS REAL. KING HAS LOST PATIENCE WITH PALESTINIAN FACTIONALISM AND IS DEEPLY DISTURBED BY KHARTOUM TYPE TERRORISM.

14. HOWEVER, SAUDI ATTITUDES TOWARDS FATAH WILL, WE THINK,

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CONTINUE TO BE INFLUENCED FUNDAMENTALLY BY TYPICAL CAST OF SAUDI THINKING DESCRIBED ABOVE. PAYMENTS TO FATAH WILL PROBABLY CONTINUE AT LEVELS CAREFULLY AIMED AT KEEPING IN FORCE PRESENT "INSURANCE POLICY" AGAINST INSTIGATION OF TERRORISM AND SABOTAGE WITHIN SAUDI BORDERS. PERHAPS WE SHOULD KEEP IN MIND THAT THE MORE WE WARN AGAINST GROWING IDENTITY OF FATAH AND BRD, THE MORE WE RISK STRENGTHENING SAUDI CONVICTION THAT SOME MINIMAL LEVEL OF INSURANCE PREMIUMS MUST BE MAINTAINED. INSURANCE POLICY HAS HAD INCIDENTAL BENEFITS FOR US TOO, I.E., VITAL OIL INSTALLATIONS HAVE BEEN IMMUNE FROM SERIOUS DISRUPTIONS, OFFICIAL US PERSONNEL AND PREMISES (SUCH AS OUR FAR-FLUNG MILITARY MISSION LOCATED AT FOUR MAJOR SITES) HAVE BEEN FREE EVEN OF ANY SIGNS OF INTIMIDATION.

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15. ON BALANCE, HOWEVER, WE STRONGLY FAVOR CONTINUED STEADY DIALOGUE KEEPING SAUDIS FULLY REMINDED CLOSE BSO-FATAH LINKS, LONG-RANGE DANGERS OF EXPANSION IN TERRORIST SCOPE AND IN GENERAL DOING WHAT WE CAN ASSURE FATAH ASSUMES DISREPUTABLE IMAGE IN SAUDI MINDS. IN THIS WAY WE CAN HOPE MINIMIZE IMPACT SUCH SWEET-TALKING OPERATORS AS ARU HISHAM (JIDDA 1214), WHO WAS QUITE APPARENTLY FIRST EMISSARY INTENDED BEGIN REHABILITATION FATAH REPUTATION AND CONVINCE KING WHAT HE WOULD APPARENTLY LIKE BELIEVE, I.E., THAT THERE ARE STILL WITHIN ORGANIZATION GOOD AND BAD ELEMENTS AND THAT SAG CAN REASONABLY HOPE MAKE INFLUENCE OF FORMER PREDOMINANT. ONGOING EDUCATIONAL PROCESS WE HAVE IN MIND IS BEST SERVED THROUGH REITERATED LOW-PITCH DISCUSSIONS WITH KEY OFFICIALS, RATHER THAN REPEATED FORMAL DEMARCHES. PROPOSED TACTIC REQUIRES STEADY SUPPLY OF INCRIMINATING INTELLIGENCE TENDING PROVE FATAH'S CLOSE INVOLVEMENT IN TERRORIST ACTIVITIES.

16. BY SUCH TACTICS WE CAN HOPE AT LEAST ASSURE THERE IS GROWING DISENCHANTMENT WITH FATAH AND NO INCREASE IN

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SAUDI SUPPORT FOR IT. IT IS UNREALISTIC, HOWEVER, HOPE SAUDIS, WHO IN CRUCIAL MIDDLE EAST AFFAIRS ARE CHRONIC FOLLOWERS AND NOT LEADERS, WILL SUDDENLY ASSUME DRAMATIC NEW POSTURE CUT FATAH OFF FOREVER WITHOUT CEFT AND FOLLOW JORDAN IN MAKING EMPHATIC PUBLIC CONDEMNATIONS. WE MAY BE CONVINCED OURSELVES THAT RADICALISM-TERRORISM CAN INCREASE ITS SWAY AMONG ARABS TO POINT WHERE CONSERVATIVE REGIMES LIKE SAG COULD, AS JORDAN DID, FACE SERIOUS THREAT. WE FEAR, HOWEVER, THAT INGRAINED HABITS OF MIND DESCRIBED ABOVE MAKE IT MOST UNLIKELY SAG WILL, UNLESS AND UNTIL ITS SURVIVAL IS CLEARLY AT STAKE, ENTER LISTS TO ADMINISTER ALL OUT DEFEAT TO TERRORISM AND FATAH. THACHER

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