ENTRAL INTELLIGENCE AG CY ROUTINE Intelligence Information Cable IN 49185 PAGE 1 OF 5 PAGES DUA concrue CIA/NHCC NAVY AIR1 NIC QEA. 10 <u>ক্ষেত্রনার</u> ins The second of information affecting the National Defence of the United States within the meaning of the Employage Laws, Title 18, U.S.C. we are with the present of the Employage Laws, Title 18, U.S.C. THIS IS AN INFORMATICATELLORE, NOT FINALLY EVALUATED INTELLIGENCE. 1.5(c) Fer 18 CO 3,4(0)(1) DIST 14 FEBRUARY 1968 COUNTRY ARAB STATES/ISRAEL/USSR 001 5 FEBRUARY 1968 COMMENTS BY SOVIET OFFICIAL ON THE POSSIBLE RENEWAL SUBJECT OF ARAB-ISRAELI HOSTILITIES AND SOVIET INTENTIONS ACQ SOURCE 1.5(c)3.4(0)(1) COMMENT: THE FOLLOWING REPORT IS THE FIRST INFORMATION RECEIVED REGARDING SOVIET PLANS TO PARTICIPATE IN A LIMITED ARAB OFFENSIVE AGAINST ISRAEL. 1.5(c)3.010)(1) 5 3

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1.5(c) 3.4(c)(1)

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1.5(c) 3.4(c)(1)

s	(elassification) (alignat controls)	
	THE	
	SOVIETS NOW BELIEVE A RENEWAL OF ARAB-ISRAELI HOSTILITIES WILL	1.5(c)
	OCCUR IN LATE SPRING. HOSTILITIES	3.4ib)(1)
	ARE INEVITABLE SINCE IT IS IMPOSSIBLE TO ARRANGE A VEHICLE FOR	
	NEGOTIATIONS BETWEEN THE ISRAELIS AND THE ARABS.	
	COMMENT: A SIMILAR REPORT FROM THE AMERICAN EMBASSY IN BEIRU	Г
	WAS RECEIVED IN LATE JANUARY	
	ACCOR	D-
	ING TO THIS REPORT,).5(b) 3.aio\(1)
	EGYPT WAS PREPARING A LIMITED ATTACK AGAINST	
	ISRAELI FORCES IN LATE FEBRUARY TO DRIVE THE ISRAELI FORCES	
	BACK "THREE OR FOUR MILES" FROM THE SUEZ CANAL.	
		•
	SEE BEIRUT EMBASSY	
	AIRGRAM A-639 DATED 31 JANUARY 1968. ANOTHER REPORT ON THE	1.5(c) 2 -(a)(f)
	POSSIBLE RENEWAL OF HOSTILITIES RECEIVED IN LATE JANUARY	
5		5 4
3 2		3 2
i		1

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i.5(c) a anni(i)

distant controls)

1.5(c)S.s(b)(1).

STATED THAT THE UAR IS PLANNING TO RESUME HOSTILITIES BECAUSE OF THE EXTREME PESSIMISM OVER THE SUCCESS OF THE MISSION OF UN SPECIAL ENVOY GUNNAR JARRING. MINISTER OF WAR FAWZI REPORTEDLY FAVORS AN ATTACK ON 5 JUNE 1968 WHILE PRESIDENT NASIR PREFERS AN EARLIER DATE, LATE MARCH OR EARLY APRIL, IF POSSIBLE. IN VIEW OF THE LACK OF IDENTIFICATION OF THE

1.5(c)3 4/b)(1);

THE REMARKS ATTRIBUTED TO THE UAR LEADERS SHOULD BE TREATED WITH CIRCUMSPECTION.)

WHEREAS PREVIOUSLY SOVIET ADVISORS STAYED IN THE BACKGROUND AND PLAYED A LIMITED ROLE IN SHAPING AND ORGANIZING ARAB ARMIES, THEY ARE NOW ACTIVELY ENGAGED IN REORGANIZING ARAB FORCES AND ENGAGING IN SOME COMMAND FUNCTIONS. WHEN THE FIGHTING IS RENEWED, THE SOVIETS WILL ACTIVELY AID THE ARABS IN GAINING BACK THE TERRITORY LOST IN THE JUNE 1967 WAR.

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(dissem controls)

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1.5(c) 3.460(1)

(diasem controls) SOVIET ASSISTANCE, HOWEVER, WILL BE LIMITED TO REGAINING ONLY THAT TERRITORY LOST IN THE JUNE WAR. .5(c) 3.4(0)(1) COMMENT: THE SAME EMBASSY AIRGRAM CITED IN PARAGRAPH 2 ALSO STATED SOVIET ADVISORS WOULD DIRECT A LIMITED ATTACK AGAINST ISRAEL FOR THE SOLE PURPOSE OF IMPROVING EGYPT'S BARGAINING POSITION WITH ISRAEL. THE SAME ALSO CLAIMED THAT THE SOVIETS WERE ASSISTING THE UAR IN PLANNING AND TRAINING FOR A RESUMPTION OF HOSTILITIES. THE SOVIETS : .5(c) 3 4(0)(1) HAVE ADVISED THE UAR THEY WILL SUPPORT AN ATTACK AGAINST ISRAEL TO RECOVER THE TERRITORY LOST DURING THE JUNE WAR IF DIPLOMATIC EFFORTS FAIL; BUT THE SOVIETS MADE IT VERY CLEAR THAT ISRAEL IS HERE TO STAY AND THAT THEY WILL NOT ACQUIESCE IN OR FACILITATE ISRAEL'S DESTRUCTION. 1.5(0)2.40)(1)

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1.5(c) 3.4(c)(1)

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	1.
THE "PUEB	LO"
INCIDENT DRAMATICALLY DEMONSTRATED THAT THE U	NITED
STATES HAS MADE IT CLEAR IT WILL AVOID A COMMITMENT OF	F ITS
FORCES ELSEWHERE.	E THAT
THE UNITED STATES WILL NOT INTERVENE ON ISRAEL'S BEHAL	LF UNLESS
THE PRE-JUNE 1967 BORDERS ARE CROSSED. IN VIEW OF THIS,	
THE ARABS SHOULD TAKE ADVANTAGE OF THE SITUAT	ION TO
REGAIN THEIR LOST LANDS.	
	
A REASSESSMENT OF SOVIET AND AME	RICAN
POWER POSITIONS MAY RESULT IN A MAJOR ARAB MILIT	rar y
OFFENSIVE AGAINST ISRAEL BY JUNE 1968.)	
5. DISSEM: STATE ARMY NAVY AIR CINCSOUTH (PER	
CINCMEAFSA	i.5(c) 3.4(b)