Regulations concerning the time for eating leavened bread on the eve of Passover -- material used for making unleavened bread and bitter herbs.
MISHNA: As long as it is lawful to eat leavened bread, one may also give it to his domestic or wild animals or to fowls; he may also sell it to strangers or derive benefit therefrom in any other way; when that time is passed, however, it is unlawful to derive any benefit from it whatever, not even use it for fuel or to light therewith an oven or a stove. R. Jehudah said: "The removal of leaven cannot be effected except by burning"; but the sages maintain, "It can also be effected by crumbling it into small particles, casting it to the wind or throwing it into the sea."
GEMARA: According to the Mishna, at the time when one is no longer allowed to eat leaven himself, he must not give it to others either? With which Tana does the Mishna accord?
Said Rabba bar Ula: The Mishna above is according to the opinion of Rabbon Gamaliel, who says, that ordinary eatables may be eaten only during the first four hours, but heave-offerings may be eaten even during the fifth hour and should be explained thus: As long as the priest may still eat heave-offering an ordinary Israelite may give ordinary leaven to others, etc.
Why does the Mishna enumerate domestic and wild animals and fowls? Would it not suffice to simply mention animals? Were domestic animals only mentioned, it might be assumed that they may be given that leaven, because should they leave any it will be seen and can be guarded against, whereas wild beasts generally hide what they leave uneaten and may thus cause the man to be guilty of having leaven in his house on the Passover. On the other hand, were wild animals only mentioned, it might be presumed that wild animals only are mentioned, because whatever they leave uneaten they hide and a man will not be able to see it, while if domestic animals should leave any of it, it will be within sight of all and will not be heeded by him, when he will become guilty of having leaven in his house within the view of all. Hence the enumeration is made. Why are fowls specially mentioned? Because animals are specified, fowls are also added.
"He may also sell it to strangers." Is this not self-evident? (If it may be eaten, why should it not be allowed to sell it to a Gentile?) We are told this in order not to presume that the halakhah prevails according to the Tana of the following Boraitha: "Beth Shammai say: Leaven should not be sold to a Gentile unless it is positively known that he will consume it before the Passover. Beth Hillel, however, hold, that if it may be eaten, it may also be sold. R. Jehudah ben Bathyra said: 'Kuthach (a dish made with leavened bread) and any other dishes made with Kuthach must not be sold thirty days before Passover.'"
"Or derive benefit therefrom," etc. Is this not self-evident? This refers to corn which had been parched during the first four hours and which may under those circumstances he used even after the appointed time, and the Mishna is in accordance with the opinion of Rabha, who decreed that.
"When that time is passed, however," etc. Is this not self-evident? The Mishna means to state that even from the sixth hour up to the time when the Passover sets in, no, benefit may be derived from any remaining leaven notwithstanding the fact that eating during the time mentioned is rendered unlawful by rabbinical enactments only; for R. Giddel said in the name of R. Hyya bar Joseph, quoting R. Johanan: "If a man betroth a woman on the eve of Passover after the sixth hour even with hard wheat, 1 it is not considered a valid betrothal."
"Nor even use it for fuel." Is this not self-evident? The Mishna means to state, that even according to R. Jehudah, who holds that removal of leaven cannot be effected except by burning, we might assume, that while it is being burned it may also be used as fuel, hence we are told that this must not be done.
Hezkyah said: Whence do we know that no benefit may be derived from leaven on Passover? Because it is written [Exod. xiii. 3]: "And no leavened bread shall be eaten," and "it shall not be eaten," signifies, that no benefit may be derived from it in the same manner as it must not be eaten. How would it be, however, if the verse read "ye shall not eat"? Then leaven could be used for everything else except eating? Hence we must say, that Hezkyah differs with R. Abbahu, who said: Wherever it is written "one shall not eat," or "it shall not be eaten," or "ye must not eat," it implies, that no use whatever must be made of such thing unless it be explicitly stated that while it should not be eaten, one may otherwise derive benefit therefrom, as it is written [Deut. xiv. 21]: "Ye shall not eat anything that dieth of itself, unto the stranger, etc., canst thou give it or thou mayest sell it," etc.
Concerning reptiles it is written [Levit. xi. 41]: "And every creeping thing that creepeth upon the earth is an abomination, it shall not be eaten," and still we have learned in a Mishna, that those who catch beasts, fowls or fish and among them there should be any unclean species, they may nevertheless sell them to Gentiles? In that case it is different, for previously it is written [ibid. 23]: "Shall be an abomination unto you," which signifies, that it is theirs and they ma y derive what benefit they can thereof. Then why does the Mishna state, "if there should be among them any unclean species, he may sell them," why should it not be allowed to sell such to commence with? Be cause it is written "shall be unto you an abomination" and that implies, that they should always be an abomination, but if incidentally they should come within the possession of a man, he may use them at will.
According to Hezkyah, who says, that wherever it is written "it shall not be eaten" it is unlawful to derive any benefit from the object mentioned, why should it not be written instead "ye shall not eat," in which event the additional passage "shall be an abomination unto you" will become unnecessary? Hezkyah could reply: That is just the ground upon which I base my assertion (for, because it is written "ye shall not eat," the additional passage quoted legalizes the use of such objects; hence wherever it is written "it shall not be eaten" without such additional passage, it is obvious that no benefit may be derived from the object mentioned).
As for leavened bread again, concerning which it is written "it shall not be eaten," and we have learned in a Boraitha that R. Jose the Galilean nevertheless states, that it is surprising why it is ordained that no benefit may be derived from it for all the seven days of Passover? R. Jose may explain his statement by citing the other passage, which reads "shall not be seen with thee," and the words "with thee" signify, that the leaven belongs to the man and he may make use of it. What explanation will the sages bring forth? The sages hold that the words "with thee" merely suggest, that thy leaven must not be seen, which belongs to thee, but that of others and consecrated leaven may be seen. Whence does R. Jose infer this suggestion? The words "with thee" are written twice. What do the sages infer from the fact that "with thee" is written twice? They hold, that one refers to a Gentile under the control of the man, and the other to one, that is not under his control. Whence does R. Jose adduce this? Because "with thee" is written a third time in another passage [Deut. xvi. 4]. How will the sages explain the third citation of "with thee"? They claim that separate passages were necessary in order to make a distinction between leaven and leavened bread. Were leaven alone mentioned it might be presumed that leavened bread was allowed or vice versa, hence both passages were necessary.
Shall we assume that the difference of opinion between Hezkyah and R. Abbahu is similar to the difference of opinion between the following Tanaim: It is written [Levit. vii. 24]: "And the fat of a beast that dieth of itself, and the fat of that which is torn by beasts may be used for any manner of work, but ye shall in no wise eat of it." Why is it written "for any manner of work"? Because it might be presumed that the fat should be used for work pertaining to divine service, but not to ordinary work, hence we are told that it may be used "for any manner of work." So said R. Jose the Galilean. R. Aqiba, however, said: "On the contrary! it might be presumed that the fat could be used for ordinary work but for that pertaining to divine service it should not, hence we are told that this may also be done."
Shall we assume that R. Jose the Galilean and R. Aqiba differ concerning the intent of the passage "Ye shall not eat," R. Jose holding, that wherever the passage occurs, it signifies also, that no use may be made of the object in question and the verse quoted above [Lev. vii. 24] is required in order to permit of the use of such an object as must not be eaten, while R. Aqiba holds, that such things as are forbidden to be eaten may nevertheless be made use of and the verse quoted merely signifies the relation to cleanness or uncleanness?
Nay; it may be that both R. Jose and R. Aqiba agree, that wherever it is written "Ye shall not eat" the object in question must not even be used, and their point of variance concerns another matter. One holds, that the permission to make use of carrion does not include the fat of the carrion; hence an additional passage is necessary in order to make the use of the fat lawful; while the latter holds, that fat is included in the permission to use the carrion; hence the additional passage concerns only the relative cleanness or uncleanness.
Let us see! Notwithstanding the citation of so many Passages, and the allegation of diverse opinions existing between Hezkyah and R. Abbahu, we do not find a single instance of where the two sages actually differ concerning the main issue involved, viz.: the permissibility or non-permissibility of using such objects as are forbidden to be eaten. Upon what point then do they disagree? They differ concerning leaven on Passover, according to the sages, who prohibit its use, and concerning the ox, which must be stoned for goring a man, 1 and the flesh of which all agree must not be used. According to Hezkyah, it must not be used on account of the passage which states "his flesh shall not be eaten," while R. Abbahu declares, that no passage to that effect is necessary, as by being stoned the ox becomes carrion and must for that very reason not be used.
Even in this case there is no palpable difference of opinion between the two sages? According to both the flesh of the ox must not be used? They differ concerning an ordinary (non-consecrated) animal which had been slaughtered in the court of the Temple, where only consecrated animals could be slaughtered; if an ordinary animal, however, had been slaughtered at that place (it is considered as if it were torn by beasts in the field and its flesh must not be used), Hezkyah says, that it must not be used, because the passage [Exod. xxii. 30] reads: "Flesh that is torn of beasts in the field shall ye not eat; to the dogs shall ye cast it." The word "it," in his opinion, refers only to the flesh that is torn of beasts, which, though it must not be eaten, may be used as food for dogs, etc., but not to flesh of an animal slaughtered in the court of the Temple. According to R. Abbahu, however, such flesh may, from a biblical point of view, be used.
One of the scholars sate before Samuel bar Na'hmeni and said in the name of R. Jehoshua ben Levi: Whence do we know that all things, which are according to biblical law forbidden to be eaten are also forbidden to be made use of; f.i., leaven on Passover and the ox which is stoned? Because it is written [Levit. Vi. 23]: "And every sin-offering whereof any of the blood is brought into the tabernacle, etc., shall not be eaten; it shall be burned in fire." Why is the additional injunction to burn it with fire made? The words "it shall be burned in fire" are superfluous in the passage [Lev. vi. 23] quoted, because further on [ibid. x. 16] it is written "Behold it was burnt," hence they should be applied to all other prohibitions of the Law; and if they cannot be applied in connection with such prohibitions as distinctly forbid the eating of the objects mentioned, they should be applied to the use of such objects (i.e., whatever is prohibited to be eaten should also not be used).
Accordingly it might be said, that all such things which must not be used should be burnt? Therefore it is written [ibid. vi. 21]: "And every sin-offering whereof any of the blood is brought into the tabernacle of the congregation to make atonement therewith in the holy place, shall not be eaten; it shall be burnt in fire." Whence we infer, that only such things as are brought into the holy place must be burnt but not other things the use of which is prohibited by the Scriptures should be burned.
Replied Samuel bar Na'hmeni: "From the verse just quoted R. Simeon decrees in another Boraitha that all things of sanctity which become desecrated, f.i., flesh of sacrifices which had been left over, must be burned."
The scholar rejoined: Thy teacher R. Jonathan inferred the above from the following passage [Exod. xxix. 34]: "And if aught of the flesh of the consecration sacrifice, or of the bread, remain unto the morning, then shalt thou burn the remainder with fire; it shall not be eaten." Is not the sentence it shall not be eaten "superfluous? It is already written, thou shalt burn the remainder with fire." Hence it should be applied to the other prohibitions of the Law; and wherever it is already written "it shall not be eaten," apply it in the sense that it shall not be used. And lest it might be assumed, that whatever must not be used should be burned, therefore the verse distinctly states "then shalt thou burn the remainder with fire." Thus the remainder only should be burned but not other things which are not to be used.
R. Abbahu said in the name of R. Johanan: "All the prohibitions of the Law 'it shall not be eaten' or 'it shall not be used' cannot, if disregarded, make one amenable to the punishment of stripes unless the acts were committed in the manner incidental to their customary execution." What would he intend to exclude thereby? Said R. Schimi bar Ashi: He means to exclude the act of putting fat from the stoned ox On a wound; notwithstanding the fact that, contrary to the law, benefit was derived from the fat, the act does not make a man amenable to the punishment of stripes, and so much the more would he exclude the act of eating raw fat (tallow).
It was also taught by R. A'ha bar Ivia in the name of R. Assi quoting R. Johanan: "If a man put fat from the stoned ox on his wounds, he is not culpable; because all the prohibited acts of the Law cannot if committed make a man amenable to the punishment of stripes unless they were executed in the customary manner." Said R. Zera: "We have learned a similar ordinance in another Boraitha (in Tract Cholin)."
Abayi said: All agree, that concerning Kilaim in a vineyard, there is an exception and even if not carried out in the customary manner, the man becomes amenable to the punishment of stripes, because in that instance eating is not mentioned at all (as it is written [Deut. xxii. 9]: "Thou shalt not sow thy vineyard with divers seeds: that the ripe fruit of thy seed which thou hast sown and the fruit of thy vineyard shall not be defiled"), but the injunction is against defilement in any manner whatever.
R. Jacob said in the name of R. Johanan: "It is permitted for a man to cure himself by means of any of the prohibited things mentioned in the Scriptures with the exception of wood taken from the groves used for idolatry." How is this to be understood? If there is danger attending the illness, then even the wood from that grove may be used, and if the illness be not serious then no prohibited things whatever must be used? A dangerous illness is referred to, and nevertheless the wood from a grove used for idolatry must not be used as we have learned in a Boraitha: "R. Eliezer said: 'It is written [Deut. vi. 5], "Thou shalt love the Lord, etc., with all thy soul," therefore, even if thou shouldst be forced to give up thy soul thou shalt not do any things pertaining to idolatry.'"
When Rabhin came from Palestine, he said in the name of R. Johanan: "With all things it is permitted to cure one's self except by means of idolatry, adultery, and shedding of blood." Not by means of idolatry as we have learned above, and "not by means of adultery and shedding of blood" as we have learned in the following Boraitha: Rabha said: "It is written [Deut. xxii. 26]: For as when a man riseth against his neighbor, and striketh him dead, even so is this matter," hence the ravishment of a betrothed damsel is considered equal to murder, and as concerning murder it is said, that if a man be told to slay another or else he would be slain, he must rather permit himself to be slain than slay another, so it is also concerning a betrothed damsel, who should rather permit herself to be slain, than to be ravished by a man."
Whence do we know, that a man must rather permit himself to be slain than to slay another? This is a matter of common sense, as it happened with Rabha: A man came to Rabha and told him, that the governor of the city had ordered that he (the man) slay a certain man or himself suffer death, and Rabha said to him: "Rather than slay another, thou must permit thyself to be slain; for how dost thou know that thy blood is better than his, perchance his blood is better than thine?"
It was taught: The benefit of a thing which is forced upon a man against his will, may, according to Abayi, be enjoyed (f.i., if a man was carried into a house where fragrant incense was offered up to idols he may enjoy the odor of such incense). Rabha, however, maintains, that he must struggle against it. If he can avoid enjoying it and has no intention to derive any benefit therefrom, it is a case similar to the point of variance between R. Simeon and R. Jehudah concerning an act committed unintentionally. R. Simeon holds, that an act committed unintentionally does not make one culpable, while R. Jehudah holds, that it does. If one cannot avoid enjoying it, but had no original intention to derive any benefit therefrom, all agree, that he must not struggle against it. They differ, however, concerning a case where a man cannot avoid enjoying it, but also had the intention to derive pleasure therefrom. According to R. Simeon he is culpable, and according to R. Jehudah as long as the enjoyment cannot be avoided, the man is not culpable. Hence Abayi holds in accordance with the opinion of R. Jehudah. Rabha can also declare, that he is in accord with R. Jehudah; for R. Jehudah holds an intentional act and an unintentional act to be on a par only when a more vigorous ordinance is concerned (f. i., in the case of an unintentional act committed on the Sabbath), but was it ever known, that R. Jehudah should be of the same opinion where a more lenient ordinance is concerned?
Said Abayi: When do I adduce my statement? From the following Boraitha: "It was told of R. Johanan ben Zakai, that he sate in the shade of the Temple and lectured all day. (The Temple being sanctified must not be put to (profane) use, and R. Johanan, on account of the heat of the sun, sought the shade caused by the height of the Temple)." In this case it was a matter of necessity for R. Johanan to use an open space because he could not find a room sufficiently large to accommodate his audience, and when seeking the shade of the Temple he did so with the intention to avail himself of the benefit of the shade, whence I may infer, that such an act, even though it be intentional, is permissible.
Rejoined Rabha: "With the Temple it is different. It was constructed for use on the inside and not on account of its shade."
"Or to light therewith an oven or a stove," etc. The rabbis taught: An oven which was fed with the peel of fruit from newly planted trees 1 or with the straw of Kilaim (divers seeds) of a vineyard (if the oven was new and by such burning had become fit), must be demolished. If the oven, however, was an old one, it must only be allowed to cool off and may subsequently be used. If bread was baked with the heat caused by such fuel, Rabbi said, "the bread must not be used," while the sages permit its use. If food was cooked over the coals of such fuel, all agree, that such food may be consumed.
Have we not learned in another Boraitha, that be the oven old or new it need only be cooled off and subsequently it may be used? This presents no difficulty. The latter Boraitha is in accord with the sages, who hold, that bread baked in an oven fed with such fuel may be used, thus discountenancing the assumption that the heat of such fuel invalidates the bread; consequently they hold that the oven must simply be allowed to cool off but need not be demolished.
Said R. Joseph in the name of R. Jehudah quoting Samuel: "An oven fed with the peel of fruit from newly planted trees or with straw of Kilaim of a vineyard (if the oven was new) must be demolished. If it was an old one, however, it must only be allowed to cool off and may subsequently be used. If bread was baked with the heat produced by such fuel, Rabbi said 'the bread maybe used,' while the sages prohibit it." Did we not learn to the contrary, however, viz.: that Rabbi prohibited the use of such bread while the sages permitted it?
Samuel generally adheres to the rule, that wherever Rabbi differs with an individual, the halakhah prevails according to Rabbi, but when differing with the sages, the halakhah prevails according to the sages. In this instance, however, Samuel holds, that the halakhah prevails according to Rabbi in the former Boraitha; but knowing that the people hold to the rule that wherever Rabbi and the sages differ, the halakhah prevails according to the sages, he purposely inverts the Boraitha and makes it appear as if the sages originally prohibited the use of the bread in question.
The Boraitha also stated: "If food was cooked over the coals of such fuel, all agree, that such food may be consumed." R. Jehudah in the name of Samuel and R. Hyya bar Ashi in the name of R. Johanan differed concerning this ordinance. One holds, that the ordinance is effective only if the coals were already extinguished; but if still live, the food must not be used. The other, however, holds, that even if the coals were still live, it is also permitted to use the food.
According to the former opinion, Rabbi correctly states, that bread baked in the heat caused by such fuel is not to be used, because he holds, that the use of the fuel is indirectly transmitted to the bread or, in the case of the live coals, to the food; but according to the one who permits the use of food cooked over the live coals of such fuel, how can Rabbi prohibit the use of the bread baked in the heat produced by such fuel? Said R. Papa: Rabbi may refer to bread which is baked directly by the flame of such fuel. In that case, do the sages also permit the use of such bread? Under what circumstances then does the fuel render the use of things unlawful? When a man sits opposite the flame, said R. Ami bar Hama, caused by such fuel in order to warm himself and thus derives direct benefit from such fuel it is not permitted (but bread, being baked only when the flame is about to die out and heat remains, may be used).
"R. Jehudah said: 'The removal of leaven cannot be effected except by burning.'" We have learned in a Boraitha: R. Jehudah said: "Leaven must be removed only by burning and so should the law be; for if the remainder of the flesh of the sacrifices, concerning which there are no commandments directing that it must neither be seen nor found, must be burnt, so much the more should leaven be burned"; but the sages replied: "Every regulation which is intended to be made more rigorous but by force of circumstances eventually becomes even more lenient, cannot be considered a proper regulation; for in this case thou sayest 'leaven must be removed only by burning,' but how would it be if a man could not find any wood at the time? Should he do nothing towards removing it? But the law distinctly orders the leaven to be removed, as it is written [Exod xii. 15]: 'But on the first day ye shall have put away leaven out of your houses,' which signifies, that it must be removed by any means whatever."
R. Jehudah, however, advanced another argument: "The remainder of the flesh of the sacrifices must not be eaten and leaven must not be eaten; hence as the former must be burnt so must the latter"; but the sages again replied: "Take the instance of carrion. Carrion must not be eaten, yet it need not be burned," and R. Jehudah replied: "There is a difference between the two. The remainder of the flesh must not be eaten nor may any benefit be derived therefrom, which same law applies also to leaven." "Then take the instance of the stoned ox," said the sages again, "that must not be eaten nor even used and still it need not be burnt." "There is still a difference," rejoined R. Jehudah, "the remainder of the flesh must neither be eaten nor used, and if it is the culprit becomes amenable to the punishment of Kareth (being 'cut off'); the same law applies to leaven; hence the latter should also be burned." "Then what about the fat of the stoned ox," queried the sages, "that must not be eaten, and if this be done, it constitutes a transgression punishable with Kareth; still it need not be burned?" R Jehudah then advanced another argument: "Concerning the remainder the law prescribes, that it shall not be left until morning, and concerning leaven it is also prescribed, that none should remain, then why should not burning apply to both?" and the sages replied: "Take the instance, then, of a trespass-offering brought for a doubtful transgression or a sin-offering fowl brought for a doubtful case, which we ourselves declare should be burned, still thou maintainest, that it must not be put on the altar but should be buried." This rejoinder silenced R. Jehudah. Commenting upon this R. Joseph said: "This can be compared to the general saying, that a wood-carver carved a spoon and with that spoon he carried mustard to his mouth and burned his tongue. Abayi, however, said: "It can be compared to a man making stocks, which are subsequently shackled to his own feet," and Rabha said: "It can be compared to a man making arrows, one of which finally reaches his own heart."
"But the sages maintain, it can also be effected by crumbling," etc. The schoolmen propounded a question: "What does the Mishna mean, that it should be crumbled in order to be thrown forth to the wind but that it may be thrown into the sea whole or that it must also be crumbled before being thrown into the sea? We have learned in a Boraitha: If the man is in a desert, he should crumble the leaven and throw it forth to the wind; but if he is at sea, he may throw it into the water whole."
MISHNA: Leaven belonging to a Gentile, which during the Passover was in possession of that Gentile, may be used after that festival, but not when it belonged to an Israelite, for it is written [Exod. xiii. 7]: "Neither shall there be seen with thee any leaven in all thy boundaries."
GEMARA: According to whose opinion is this Mishna? Not according to R. Jehudah, nor R. Simeon nor R. Jose the Galilean? What is their opinion? We have learned in the following Boraitha: One who ate Chometz (leavened bread) before or after the appointed time (which is the time between noon and sunset on the eve of Passover) transgressed a negative commandment. If he ate it during the appointed time he transgressed a negative commandment and is amenable to Kareth (being cut off). From the time when it is prohibited to eat Chometz and further, no benefit whatever maybe derived therefrom. Such is the dictum of R. Jehudah. R. Simeon, however, said: "Before and after the appointed time, eating Chometz does not constitute a transgression," but at the appointed time he agrees with R. Jehudah, and R. Jose the Galilean said: "It is surprising to know, that no benefit maybe derived from Chometz during all of the seven days." Whence do we know that a man who eats Chometz during the six hours preceding the time when Passover sets in, transgresses a negative commandment? Because it is written [Deut. xv. 31: "Thou shalt not eat therewith any leavened bread." Such is the dictum of R. Jehudah. Said R. Simeon to him: "How canst thou say such a thing? It is also written [ibid.]: 'Seven days shalt thou eat therewith unleavened bread' (if thou shouldst say that 'therewith' refers to the Passover-sacrifice, did then the Passover-sacrifice continue for seven days?). Thus 'therewith' refers to the moment when the eating of unleavened bread be comes compulsory; but before such time the negative commandment, 'Thou shalt not eat leaven,' is not effective."
Upon what grounds, then, does R. Jehudah base his dictum, that even during the six hours preceding the arrival of Passover, Chometz must not be eaten? Because there are three passages referring to leaven [Exod. xii. 20, ibid. xiii. 3, and Deut. xvi. 3], one of which has reference to the six hours preceding the appointed time, the second to the appointed time, and the third for the Chometz which was not removed before the Passover, and was left over until after Passover.
How does R. Simeon account for the three passages? He applies one to the appointed time, another [Exod. xii. 20] to such things as had become leavened by contact with leaven, and the third refers to the time when the Israelites went out of Egypt, when the eating of Chometz was prohibited for one day only, as stated by R. Jose the Galilean, who bases his assertion to that effect on the passages [Exod. xiii. 3 and 4]: "No leavened bread shall be eaten. This day go ye out, in the month of Abib." Thus only on this day no leavened bread should be eaten.
Now, then, according to whose opinion is the Mishna? Shall we assume that it is according to R. Jehudah? Does he not hold all Chometz to be unlawful after Passover, if in existence during the Passover, regardless of whether it belong to a Gentile or an Israelite? According to R. Simeon, even that belonging to an Israelite may be used after the Passover? And according to R. Jose the Galilean, even during Passover benefit may be derived from Chometz belonging to an Israelite also?
R. A'ha bar Jacob replied: "The Mishna is according to the opinion of R. Jehudah, and the question how, according to R. Jehudah, leaven belonging to a Gentile may be used after the Passover can be answered by stating, that R. Jehudah infers a comparison by analogy from the fact that leaven, being mentioned in connection with eating and also with seeing, in the same manner as only leaven belonging to the person concerned must not be seen, but that belonging to others may be seen, so it is also with respect to eating. A man must not eat his own leaven, but that of another he may eat. Accordingly our Mishna should have taught that eating is also permissible; but in consequence of the necessity of mentioning that no benefit may be derived from bread belonging to an Israelite, the same term is used in connection with bread belonging to a Gentile. In the same manner, our Mishna should have taught, that bread belonging to a Gentile maybe eaten even during the appointed time; but from the necessity of mentioning that bread belonging to an Israelite must not be used after the appointed time, the same is also taught concerning a Gentile."
Rabha, however, said: "The Mishna may also be in accordance with R. Simeon, and the question, Why should no benefit be derived from bread belonging to an Israelite after the Passover? may be answered by stating, that it was merely a punishment for the transgression of the two commandments, 'it shall not be seen' and 'it shall not be found,' which the Israelite committed by leaving the leaven over from before the Passover."
The Mishna concludes by quoting the passage: "Neither shall there be seen," etc. Thus Rabha's statement is borne out; but according to R. A'ha bar Jacob, it should conclude with the passage: "No leaven shall be eaten." Thou assumest that the conclusion of the Mishna refers to the prohibition of using bread belonging to the Israelite! This is not so! It refers to the first clause of the Mishna; namely, the bread belonging to a Gentile may be used, because it is written, "Neither shall there be seen with thee," but that belonging to a Gentile may not only be seen but also used, as stated above.
Both of these sages (Rabha and R. A'ha bar Jacob) hold to their individual theories, as it was taught: "If a man had eaten leaven belonging to Gentiles on the Passover, according to R. Jehudah, said Rabha, he should be punished with stripes; but according to R. A'ha bar Jacob, he need not be punished in that manner." Why does Rabha decree thus? Because he holds, that R. Jehudah does not put the eating of leaven on a level with the sight thereof; but R. A'ha bar Jacob holds, that R. Jehudah does put eating on a level with the sight of leaven, hence the punishment of stripes is not to be inflicted.
Rabh said: "Chometz, whether it became mixed with its own kind (which was unleavened) or with another kind during the appointed time (the seven days) is prohibited to be used. If it became mixed at any other but the appointed time, it is prohibited to be used only if it became mixed with its own kind; but if with a different kind it may be used."
[How is the case? Does Rabh mean to state, that the Chometz which had become mixed with the unleavened can be tasted? Why then does he permit its use at any other but the appointed time and if mixed with a different? The Chometz can be detected by means of the taste? It might be said, however, that the Chometz was of so trifling a quantity that it could not be detected; then why, if it became mixed during the appointed time and not with its own kind, should it be prohibited?
Rabh intended that his decree serve as a precautionary measure, and prohibits even a trifling quantity of Chometz during the appointed time, which had become mixed with a kind not its own, lest it be used if it became mixed with its own kind.]
Samuel, however, said: "During the appointed time only Chometz which had become mixed with its own kind is prohibited but not such as had become mixed with another kind, while at any other but the appointed time it may be used even if mixed with its own kind." (Thus Samuel does not hold the precautionary measure of Rabh to be necessary.)
R. Johanan, however, said: "Chometz even during the appointed time and when mixed with its own kind is only then prohibited if it can be tasted (with the unleavened). In all other cases it may be used." (Because he holds with R. Simeon, who permits the use of Chometz after the appointed time in any manner.)
Said Rabha: The halakhah prevails, that Chometz during the appointed time is prohibited to be used, if mixed with its own kind or with another kind even in trifling quantities, as Rabh decreed; and at any other but the appointed time it may be used in any manner, as R. Simeon decreed. Rabha holds to his individual theory and says: When we were at the school of R. Na'hman, he told us after the Passover to go and buy leavened bread from the soldiers of the government.
Rabh said: "Earthenware pots which had been used during the year must be destroyed before Passover." For what reason? Let them be left over until after the Passover and then used for other kinds of food than formerly? This is a precautionary measure, in order to prevent the possibility of their being used for the same kinds of food as formerly.
Samuel, however, said: "They need not be destroyed, but kept until after Passover, and then they may be again used for any purpose whatever." Samuel holds to his individual theory, for he said to the vendors of earthenware pots for the Passover: Lessen the prices of your pots for the Passover, otherwise I shall decree that the, law prevails according to R. Simeon (and the old pots will be valid after the Passover)." Why did he not proclaim this in reality? He is of the opinion of R. Simeon? The place where he was at the time was within the jurisdiction of Rabh; hence he could only threaten them.
An oven was greased with fat immediately after it had been heated. Rabha bar Ahilayi prohibited the eating of the bread baked therein even with salt, lest it be eaten with Kutach (a dish made with milk), and prohibited the use of the oven for all time to come. An objection was made: We have learned: "Dough must not be kneaded with milk, and if this was done the bread therefrom must not be eaten, in order to avoid the possibility of committing a transgression (i.e., eating such bread with meat). Likewise, an oven must not be greased with the fat of a ram's tail, and if this was done, the bread must not be eaten and the oven must again be heated and other bread baked."
Thus we see, that the oven may be reheated and other bread baked therein; why does Rabha bar Ahilayi prohibit the use of the oven permanently? Rabha bar Ahilayi can make no answer to this question.
Said Rabhina to R. Ashi: "Now, if Rabha bar Ahilayi's statement was effectually refuted by the Boraitha, why should Rabh decree, that the pots which were used during the year must be destroyed before the Passover, 1 why could they not be burnt out and then used again?" and R. Ashi answered: "With an oven it is different. That is heated on the inside; hence as soon as it is heated again no traces of the fat will be left and it becomes the same as it was before; while pots are always exposed to the fire from the outside, and for that reason their condition will remain unchanged; and if thou shouldst ask why the inside of the pots should not be exposed to the fire also, the answer is, that there is fear of their bursting should this be done. Hence I say, that a pot which could withstand a fire must not be used on Passover, unless it was filled with live coals and burnt out."
Rabhina asked of R. Ashi: "What should be done on Passover with knives?" and he answered: "I buy new knives for the Passover." And Rabhina rejoined: "In Master's case it is proper; for thou art rich and canst afford it; but what should a poor man do?" "I do not mean exactly new knives," replied,, R. Ashi, "but renovated knives," i.e., knives the blades of which are covered with clay and placed in the fire, and after being thoroughly burnt are taken out, and together with the hilts are soaked in boiling water, when they become equal to new ones. The halakhah prevails, however, that the whole knife need only be soaked in boiling water which had not been removed from the fire.
Said R. Huna the son of R. Jehoshua: "A wooden ladle should be placed in boiling water which had not been removed from the fire," for he holds, that in the same manner that the ladle absorbs the leaven contained in the pots, in the same manner can it be purified.
Ameimar was asked: What is the law concerning glazed pottery? If the color of the coating was green, there is no question but that they must not be used; but we refer to such as were glazed in black or in white. If the coating was cracked, there is also no question but that they must not be used; but we refer to such as were perfectly smooth. Ameimar replied: I noticed that the fat cooked in such pots oozes out on the other side, and hence it is obvious that they absorb it; and the Scriptures attested that an earthen pot never yields forth what it has once absorbed." 1
Said Rabba bar Abba in the name of R. Hyya bar Ashi, quoting Samuel: "All vessels in which leavened food had been kept while cold may be used for unleavened food, with the exception of such vessels as contained actual leaven, for that is very pungent. Said R. Ashi: "Such vessels in which leavened bread and vinegar were generally mixed must also not be used, because that is equal to leaven." And Rabha said: "The large basins which are frequently used in the city of Mehuzza for kneading dough must also not be used, because they are considered the same as kneading-troughs." Is this not self-evident? Because basins are open on all sides we might assume that the air surrounding it destroys the effects of the leaven, hence we are told that such is not the case.
MISHNA: If a Gentile lent money to an Israelite, taking as security leavened articles, such articles may be used after the Passover; but if an Israelite had lent money to a Gentile on leavened articles they must not be made use of after the Passover.
GEMARA: It was taught: If one man owed another money and pledged his property as security for the debt, and the debt becoming due had not been paid, Abayi said the articles pledged must be considered the property of the creditor from the time the loan was made, while Rabha said, "Only from the moment the debt became due." If the debtor sold or consecrated his property before the debt fell due, all agree that the creditor can recover such property, or (if consecrated) redeem it (for a trifle), in order that it may not be said that consecrated articles can be recovered gratuitously. Wherein they do differ is, if the creditor had, prior to the time the debt fell due, transferred his eventual right to the property to another or consecrated it. Abayi holds, that such transfer is valid in the event of consecration; it holds good because, as we see that the debt was not paid when it became due, the pledged articles are considered the property of the lender from the time the money was loaned. Rabha, however, maintains, that on account of his having no right to the property until it was forfeited, the transfer or consecration, whichever the case may be, is of no account, because if the debtor would have had the money he would have redeemed his pledge, consequently the pledge belongs to him until the time has expired.
An objection was made based upon our Mishna: "If a Gentile lent money to an Israelite upon leavened articles, they may be used after the Passover." Thus, according to Abayi, who holds that the right of possession is vested in the creditor from the moment the loan is made, it would be correct, because during the Passover the leavened articles were the property of the Gentile; but according to Rabha, who holds that the right of possession is not the creditor's until the property is forfeited, the leavened articles were the property of the Israelite during the Passover, how can they then be lawfully used? In this case the Mishna refers to an instance where the pledged articles were deposited with the creditor, as we have learned in a Boraitha: "If a Gentile pledged a large loaf (used as a wedding-cake) with an Israelite on Passover, the Israelite does not transgress the law prohibiting leaven to be seen or found with him. If the Gentile, however, told him that thenceforth that loaf should be his, the Israelite by accepting it would commit such a transgression"; hence Rabha's opinion is borne out.
The rabbis taught: If there was a store of wine and bread belonging to an Israelite, and Gentile and Israelitish laborers worked there, the Chometz found therein after the Passover must not be used, much less eaten. If it was a store belonging to a Gentile and Israelitish laborers worked there, the Chometz found there after the Passover may be eaten, and so much the more be used.
MISHNA: Leaven that had been covered by fallen ruins must be considered as annihilated and removed. Rabbon Simeon ben Gamaliel says: "Only then, if it is covered to such an extent that a dog cannot drag it out."
GEMARA: Said R. Hisda: Nevertheless, the man should in mind renounce the leaven.
The Mishna states: "If it be buried to such an extent that a dog cannot drag it out." We have learned in a Boraitha: How much is that? Three spans."
R. A'ha the son of R. Joseph asked R. Ashi: "Samuel said: There is no better way of hiding money than by burying it in the ground. Should it be buried to a depth of three spans also?" and he answered: "In the case of the leaven it is essential that the dog should not scent it, hence three spans are necessary; but when burying money it is only required to hide it from view and a lesser depth is sufficient." What should the depth be, however? Said Raphram bar Papa of Sikhra: "One span."
MISHNA: If any person should eat leavened heave-offering during the Passover by mistake, he must pay the principal and a fifth part 1 in addition; but if he ate it wilfully, he is exempt from the obligation of making restitution and also from payment of its value as wood (fuel) in case of the heave-offering being unclean.
GEMARA: The schoolmen propounded a question: "In what manner must the person make restitution, according to the quantity consumed or according to the value thereof? We do not ask concerning a case where the value of the article consumed had been greater and had subsequently depreciated; f.i., if it had originally been worth four zuz and later only one. In that case he must certainly refund its original value, for there is no difference between his case and that of a robber, concerning whom we have learned in a Mishna, that when a robber makes restitution for a pillaged article he must do so in accordance with the value of such article at the time it was purloined. We ask, however, concerning an instance of where the article consumed had enhanced in value; f.i., it had been worth one zuz and subsequently rose to the value of four zuz. Should he restore the article according to the quantity or according to the value, i.e., if he had only eaten the worth of one zuz, should he restore the equivalent of that amount?"
Said R. Joseph: "Come and hear: 'If he ate dried figs and repaid with dates, may he be blessed'; thus we have learned in a Boraitha. If he paid in accordance with the quantity, i.e., he ate a measure of dried figs which is only of the value of one zuz and made restitution with a like measure of dates which was worth four zuz, it is obvious why he should be blessed; but if he restored only the value of the dried figs with dates of equal value, why the blessing? "
Rejoined Abayi: "He may have only refunded the value of the figs by an equal value in dates, but nevertheless he may be blessed on account of making restitution for a less salable article with one that is more easily marketable."
An objection was made based upon our Mishna: "Our Mishna states, that 'he must pay,' etc. If he must restore the leavened heave-offering in equal measure it would be correct, but if be must refund the pecuniary equivalent therefor, how can this be done? Leavened articles have no pecuniary value on Passover?" Our Mishna is in accordance with R. Jose the Galilean, who holds that benefit may be derived from leavened articles on the Passover. How then will the latter clause of the Mishna correspond? Why should he be exempt from repayment if he had eaten the leavened heave-offering wilfully? According to R. Jose, benefit may be derived therefrom on Passover? He holds with R. Nehunia ben Hakana of the following Boraitha: R. Nehunia ben Hakana says that the Day of Atonement is put on a par with the Sabbath in the event of a violation of the law concerning either of the two days. (I.e., if a man violate the Sabbath and by such violation cause damage to another, he need make no restitution for the damage inflicted from the fact that he has committed an offence punishable with death by stoning; should he have done likewise on the Day of Atonement, the fact that he incurs the punishment of Kareth (being cut off) also exempts him from making restitution. 1 Thus in this case, where by eating leavened heave-offering the man incurs the punishment of Kareth, he need not make restitution for the article consumed.)
This case presents a difference of opinion between Tanaim, as we have learned: If a person had eaten leavened heave-offering on Passover, he is exempt from the obligation of making restitution and also from payment of its value as wood (fuel). Such is the decree of R. Aqiba. R. Johanan ben Nouri, however, holds him liable. Said R. Aqiba to the latter: "What benefit does a man derive from eating leaven on Passover?" and he answered: "What benefit can a man derive from eating unclean heave-offering at any time of the year, and still he is obliged to refund its value?" and R. Aqiba rejoined: "While a man must not eat unclean heave-offering he may otherwise make use thereof, as fuel; how canst thou compare this to leaven on Passover, which must not be used in any manner? The only comparison which can be made between the two can be made by comparing grapes or berries which had become unclean heave-offering and cannot even be used as fuel and leaven on Passover. If such grapes or berries had been eaten, I say, no restitution need be made." This difference of opinion refers only to such heave-offering as had been set aside and become leavened before the Passover; but if a person had set aside leavened articles as heave-offering on Passover it cannot be accounted heave-offering at all, for it does not accept of the sanctification of heave-offering.
We have learned in another Boraitha: It is written [Leviticus xxii. 14]. "And he shall make good unto the priest the holy thing." This signifies that he must make good the thing eaten with another that can become holy, but if a man eat leavened heave-offering on Passover, he need not make restitution even for its value as wood (fuel). Such is the dictum of R. Eliezer ben Jacob. R. Eliezer Hasma, however, holds him liable for restitution. Said R. Eliezer ben Jacob to the latter: "What benefit does a man derive from eating leaven on Passover?" (and he answered in the same manner as R. Johanan answered R. Aqiba. Whereupon R. Eliezer ben Jacob made the same rejoinder as R. Aqiba to R. Johanan ben Nouri, and the conclusion was, that) R. Eliezer Hasma said: "The priest can make use of such leavened heave-offering as food for his dog or as fuel for his stove."
Abayi said: "R. Eliezer ben Jacob, R. Aqiba, and R. Johanan ben Nouri all agree, that no benefit may be derived from leaven on Passover, and R. Aqiba differs with R. Johanan ben Nouri only as follows: R. Aqiba holds, that restitution for holy things must be made in accordance with the value of the article consumed, while R. Johanan ben Nouri maintains, that restitution must be made in accordance with the quantity thereof." Is this not self-evident? We might assume, that their point of variance does not concern the value or the quantity of the article consumed, but whether any benefit may be derived from leaven on the Passover or not; hence we are told by Abayi that such is not the case. Whence does Abayi adduce that such is not the case? Because otherwise R. Johanan ben Nouri would have answered R. Aqiba as R. Eliezer Hasma answered R. Eliezer ben Jacob.
The master said: "If leaven was set aside as heave-offering on Passover, all agree that it cannot be accounted heave-offering." Whence do we adduce this? Said R. Na'hman bar Itz'hak. "From the passage [Deut. xviii. 4]: 'And the first shearing of thy sheep shalt thou give him.'" Thus we see that it is written "give him," but not for fuel.
R. Huna the son of R. Jehoshua objected: "We have learned, that heave-offering must not be set aside from unclean (grain) to serve for clean (grain), but if this was done unintentionally, the heave-offering is valid." Thus the heave-offering is nevertheless unclean and must not be eaten; still the priest may use it for fuel (and it is nevertheless valid?). This presents no difficulty: In this latter instance the heave-offering at some time could have been eaten by the priest (when it was still clean), while in the case of leaven on Passover the priest never had an opportunity to use it for himself, but it could at any time only have been used as fuel. How should this be understood? For instance, if the article whereof the heave-offering was to be set aside had become leavened while still growing.
How is it, however, if the article had become leavened after it had been reaped? Can it be accounted heave-offering? R. Na'hman bar Itz'hak answered: "Yea; 'This is the interpretation of the angels and this is the resolve of the Most High [Daniel iv. 21], and it is also decided in the colleges as I have said."
Subsequently, when R. Huna the son of R. Jehoshua came from Palestine, he gave as a reason why leaven set aside as heave-offering on Passover is not accounted heave-offering the following: "It is written [Deut. xviii. 4]: 'The first fruit of thy corn,' etc., which means that the first of fruit should be given to the priest and the remainder should be used by the donor; but when the remainder cannot be used, as was the case with leaven on Passover, the first cannot be given as heave-offering to the priest."
MISHNA: A person acquits himself of the duty (of eating unleavened bread) on Passover with the following articles: With cakes made of wheat, barley, spelt, rye, and oats; also with Demai (grain of which it is doubtful whether the legal dues had been separated), with first tithes of which the heave-offering had been taken, with the second tithes, and with consecrated things which have been redeemed. Priests (acquit themselves of the duty) with the first of the dough, with heave-offering, but not with (grain) which is still mixed (untithed), nor with the first tithes of which heave-offering has not yet been taken, nor with unredeemed second tithe and consecrated things not redeemed Neither with cakes of thanksgiving-offering nor the thin cakes of the Nazarite's offering, if they had prepared them for their own use; but if prepared for public sale, they may acquit themselves of the duty (of eating unleavened bread on Passover) therewith.
GEMARA: We have leaned in a Boraitha: Spelt is considered grain, and rye and oats are considered cereals.
With the articles enumerated in the Mishna a person acquits himself of the duty, but not with rice or millet? Whence do we know this? R. Simeon ben Lakish and also the disciples of R. Ishmael said; and likewise the disciples of R. Eliezer ben Jacob taught: "It is written [Deut. xvi. 3]: 'Thou shalt not eat therewith any leavened bread. Seven days shalt thou eat therewith unleavened bread,' which signifies, that only such things should be used for unleavened bread which can become leavened; but rice and millet can never become leavened, only putrid." Our Mishna is not in accordance with the opinion of R. Johanan ben Nouri, who said, that rice and millet are also grain, that they may become leavened, and that one may acquit himself of his duty therewith.
Rabba bar bar Hana said in the name of Resh Lakish: "Dough which was kneaded with wine, oil, or honey, and becomes leavened, does not make the owner amenable to Kareth, if he had eaten it."
R. Papa and R. Huna the son of R. Jehoshua sate before R. Idi bar Abhin, and the latter was slumbering. Said R. Huna the son of R. Jehoshua to R. Papa: "What reason did Resh Lakish have for his dictum?" and he answered: "Because the above passage [Deut. xvi. 3] implies, that only such things as can become leavened may be used for unleavened bread on Passover he holds that the dough in question being rich, and poor dough only being permissible for unleavened bread, it is not an offence punishable by Kareth to eat such (rich) dough." In the meantime R. Idi awoke and said to them: "Youngsters! Thus was the reason of Resh Lakish: 'The dough was made with juice of fruit and not with water, and juice of fruit cannot make dough leavened.'"
"Also with Demai." (The discussions concerning this citation of the Mishna occur many times in the Talmud and have been left in the Tract Berachoth (Benedictions), where they will appear once for all. See Tract Erubin, page 71.)
"Priests--with the first of the dough." Is this not self-evident? We might assume that the unleavened bread for Passover must be valid for all alike, and as the first of the dough, etc., cannot be eaten except by priests only, they should not be used to discharge the obligation (mentioned); hence we are told by the Mishna that they may, because the verse reads Matzoth (the plural of Matzoh), implying that all kinds of Matzoth may be used.
The rabbis taught: "We might assume that a man may acquit himself of the duty of eating unleavened bread with grain of which all the legal dues had not yet been separated, f.i., grain of which heave-offering had been separated but not the heave-offering of the first tithes or of which first tithes only had been taken, but not second tithes or even such of which only the tithes for the poor had not been taken; therefore the passage quoted states, that 'thou shalt not eat therewith any leavened bread: seven days shalt thou eat therewith unleavened bread'; and this implies, that only such things should be eaten as would make one culpable if eaten in a leavened state only; but not such as would make a man culpable for other reasons."
What has become of the prohibition regarding the eating of leaven in that event? The rabbis are in accord with R. Simeon, who holds that a twofold prohibition cannot apply to one and the same thing, as we have learned in a Boraitha: "R. Simeon said: One who eats carrion on the Day of Atonement is free of the sin of violating that day."
The rabbis taught: Shall we assume that a man may acquit himself of the duty of eating unleavened bread with the second tithes, which he had brought to Jerusalem? Therefore it is written [Deut. xvi. 31, "The bread of affliction," which signifies, that only bread which can be eaten during affliction may be used; but second tithes, which must be eaten with joy (according to the passage [Deut. xxvi. 14], "I have not eaten thereof in mourning"), cannot be used. So said R. Jose the Galilean. R. Aqiba, however, said: "Because it is written Matzoth (the plural of Matzoh) and it is repeated several times, even second tithes are included." Why, then, is it called bread of affliction? This implies, that the dough should not be kneaded with wine, oil, or honey. [What could R. Aqiba, however, say to the claim of R. Jose, that second tithes cannot be eaten as "bread of affliction"? R. Aqiba can say: Is it then written "bread of affliction"? it is written "poor bread." 1]
Does R. Aqiba, then, hold that one cannot acquit himself of the duty with dough kneaded with wine, oil, or honey? Have we not learned in a Boraitha: It is not lawful to knead dough in Passover with wine, oil, or honey, and if this was done, Rabbon Gamaliel decrees that it should be immediately burned; the sages, however, say, that it may be eaten. R. Aqiba, commenting thereon, said: "At one time I took my Sabbath-rest in the house of R. Eliezer, and R. Jehoshua and I kneaded them dough with wine, oil, and honey, and they did not object?" [Although (according to Rabbon Gamaliel) this must not be done, if it was done, cold water may be poured on on the festival, in order to keep it from becoming leavened, and the sages said: "Such dough as may be kneaded may also be kept from becoming leavened by pouring water thereon on a festival; but such as must not be kneaded must also not be kept from becoming leavened in the manner described. All agree, however, that on Passover dough must not be kneaded with tepid water?"] This presents no difficulty. On the first day of the Passover one cannot acquit himself of the duty of eating unleavened bread with dough kneaded with wine, oil, or honey; but on the remaining days such dough may be used, as was told by R Jehoshua to his children: "On the first day (of Passover) ye shall not knead the dough for the unleavened bread with milk; but on the remaining days ye may do so." (It is allowed to knead dough with milk, according to the opinion of Rabhina, providing it is made so that it can be distinguished from the other.)
The rabbis taught: Shall we assume that a man may acquit himself of the duty of eating unleavened bread with firstfruits 1 (brought as a meat-offering on Pentecost)? To that end it is written [Exod. xii. 20]: "In all your habitations shall ye eat unleavened bread," which signifies, that only such things as may be eaten in all your habitations may be used for the acquittal of the duty of eating unleavened bread, but such things as can be eaten only in Jerusalem, as is the case with the firstfruits, cannot serve for that purpose. Such is the dictum of R. Jose the Galilean. R. Aqiba, however, says, that the reason firstfruits cannot serve the purpose is because as the unleavened bread is put on a par with the bitter herbs which cannot be taken from the firstfruits (as no firstfruits were taken from herbs); hence the unleavened bread also cannot be taken from the firstfruits. Lest it might be said, on the other hand, that as the bitter herbs are prepared from articles of which kind no firstfruits can be brought, leavened bread which would serve for the acquittal of the obligation should be made only from material of a kind of which no firstfruits can be brought; but wheat and barley, of which firstfruits are brought, should be deemed unfit for such purpose; hence the passage repeats Matzoth (plural for Matzoh), which includes all kinds. If that term includes all kinds, why not also firstfruits? R. Aqiba retracted his statement concerning the comparison between bitter herbs and unleavened bread, as we have learned in the following Boraitha: Shall we assume that a man may acquit himself of the duty of eating unleavened bread with firstfruits? To that end it is written [Exod. xii. 20]: "In all your habitations shall ye eat unleavened bread," which signifies, that only such things as may be eaten in all your habitations may be used for the acquittal of the duty of eating unleavened bread, but such things as are eaten only in Jerusalem, as is the case with firstfruits, cannot serve the purpose. Accordingly, it might also be presumed that unleavened bread should not be made with second tithes, which should also be eaten in Jerusalem: therefore Matzoth is repeated several times in the passage and made to include even second tithes. If this be so, why are firstfruits excluded, while second tithes are included? We include second tithes because they may be eaten under certain circumstances in any place, as R. Elazar stated: "When second tithe becomes unclean even in Jerusalem, it may be redeemed, and with the ransom-money things may be bought which can be eaten in any place whatever, and firstfruits which cannot be eaten outside of Jerusalem under any circumstances are excluded." Who holds, then, that unleavened bread may be made with second tithes? R. Aqiba, and he excludes firstfruits by reason of the passage quoted [Exod. xii. 20], and not through comparison with bitter herbs. Thus we see that he retracts his former statement, as mentioned above.
The rabbis taught: "It is written 'bread of affliction'; hence pancakes (made of flour, boiling water, and oil) and large loaves cannot serve for the acquittal of the duty of eating unleavened bread." Shall we assume, then, that only coarse (barley) bread can serve that purpose? Therefore Matzoth is repeated in order to add that any kind may be used, even such as were as fine as those used in the time of King Solomon. For what purpose, then, is it written "bread of affliction"? In order to exclude the two kinds mentioned; and whence do we know that large loaves (called in Hebrew "Ashishah") are considered articles of value which cannot be called "bread of affliction"? From the passage [II Samuel vi. 19]: "And he dealt out to all the people, to the whole multitude of Israel, to both men and women, to every person one cake of bread, and an Ashpar (good piece of flesh), and one Ashishah." Said R. Hanan bar Abba, by an Ashpar is meant the sixth part of a young bullock and by an Ashishah is meant a loaf which was made of flour to the quantity of a sixth of an Ephah (a half-saah), and this is at variance with the opinion of Samuel, who maintains that an Ashishah is a flagon of wine; as it is written [Hosea iii. i]: "Who turn themselves after other gods, and love Ashishai (flagons of wine)."
The rabbis taught: "Thick loaves must not be baked on the Passover. Such is the decree of the school of Shammai, but the school of Hillel permit this to be done." How thick should they be? Said R. Huna: "One span, because the thickness of the showbreads was one span." R. Joseph opposed this: How can Beth Hillel permit the loaves on Passover to be one span thick, for what have the showbreads in common with Passover loaves? In the case of showbreads there were priests who were thoroughly competent for their work; but the Passover loaves are prepared by ordinary people. The showbreads were prepared with the utmost skill, and how can they be compared to ordinary loaves? For the former dry wood only was used, while for the latter even damp wood is used? The former were baked in a hot oven, while the latter are often baked in a cooler oven; for the baking of showbreads an iron stove was used, while for the Passover loaves an earthen oven was considered sufficient. Said R. Jeremiah bar Abba: I especially asked our Rabbi (meaning Rabh), and according to another version R. Jeremiah bar Abba said in the name of Rabh, who asked his (Rabh's) master (who was R. Jehudah the Holy) concerning this question, and he answered: By "thick loaves" is meant in reality a large quantity of dough, and the reason that this should not be baked on Passover is in order to prevent the preparation of bread on the festival for the coming week-days. Why does the Tana teach this with especial reference to Passover? It applies to every other festival? Because he was at the time teaching concerning the Passover. In another Boraitha we were distinctly taught, instead of "on the Passover," on a festival.
The rabbis taught: "One may acquit himself of the duty of eating unleavened bread on the Passover with coarse or fine bread, and even with cakes adorned with figures, although the sages said that it is not allowed to bake cakes adorned with figures on Passover."
Said R. Jehudah: "This question was propounded by Baithus ben Zunin to the sages: 'Why is it not allowed to prepare figured cakes on Passover?' and they answered: 'Because the woman in preparing them tarries over her work, and in the meantime the dough becomes leavened.' Rejoined Baithus: 'Could she not impress the figures on the cakes with a press and thus facilitate the work?' and the sages replied: 'In that event it would be said, that all figured cakes are prohibited, with the exception of those made by Baithus.'"
Said R. Elazar bar Zadock: "I once went with my father to the house of Rabbon Gamaliel, and he was served with figured cakes on Passover. Afterwards I asked my father whether it was not a fact that the sages had prohibited the use of figured cakes on Passover, and he replied: 'My son, only such as are made by ordinary people are prohibited, but not such as are prepared by bakers.'"
R. Jose said: "If such cakes are made, they should be made as thin as wafers, but not as thick as loaves, because in the latter event they might become leavened."
R. Assi said: "Dough of second tithe, according to R. Meir (who holds second tithe to be consecrated) is exempt from the obligation of first dough (due the priests); but according to the sages it is not. Unleavened bread baked from such dough cannot, according to R. Meir, serve for the acquittal of the obligation of eating unleavened bread on the Passover, while according to the sages it may. According to R. Meir the citron, which must be used on the first day of the Feast of Tabernacles, 1 must not be bought with the proceeds of second tithes, while according to the sages it may."
"Neither with cakes of thanksgiving-offering nor the thin cakes of the Nazarite's offering," etc. Whence do we adduce this? Said Rabba: "From the passage [Exod. xii. 17]: 'And ye shall observe the unleavened bread,' which signifies, that only dough which is observed for unleavened bread may be used, but not such as is observed for any other purpose, as is the case with that of the thanksgiving-offering and the Nazarite's offering.
R. Joseph, however, said: "This may be inferred from this passage: 'Seven days shall ye eat unleavened bread,' which signifies, that only such bread should be eaten as can be used for the entire seven days, but the thanksgiving and Nazarite offering can only be eaten on one day and night."
There are two Boraithas, one of which bears out the dictum of Rabba, while the other bears out that of R. Joseph.
Why are passages needed upon which to base the decree of the Mishna? Is it not sufficient that the cakes of both offerings mentioned are made of rich dough (i.e., with oil)? Said Samuel bar Itz'hak: The quantity of oil mixed with the dough is so insignificant that it is not counted; for a quarter of a lug of oil is used for a great many cakes. Then let it be said that the reason why those cakes cannot be used is because they cannot be eaten anywhere except in Jerusalem? Said Resh Lakish: "From the Mishna itself, we can infer that these two offerings were eaten not alone in Jerusalem, but also in Nob and in Gib'an."
We have learned in a Boraitha: R. Ilayi said: I asked R. Elazar whether the two kinds of cakes mentioned could serve for the acquittal of the duty on Passover, and he answered that he had not heard whether they could or not. So I went out and asked R. Jehoshua, and he answered: "It was decided, long ago, that such as were made for personal use could not, but those prepared for public sale could be used." When I came back to R. Elazar and told him what R. Jehoshua had said, he replied: "Is this (the result of) a covenant? Was it so decreed to Moses on Sinai, that no reason should be given for the enactment?"
What is truly the reason for this ordinance? Said Rabba: "An article prepared for public sale is of a necessity made conditional; for the intention is, if the article is not sold, the maker will use it for himself."
MISHNA: The duty of eating bitter herbs on the Passover may be acquitted with the following herbs: with lettuce, wild endive and garden endive, 1 with Harhabinah, 2 with bitter coriander, 3 and bitter herbs (horseradish), either fresh or in a dried state, but not if pickled, boiled, or cooked in any way; they may also be combined to the size of an olive, and the obligation is discharged if the stalks of them only had been used; also with Demai (when it is doubtful if they had been tithed), or such as are of the first tithe of which the heave-offering had been taken, or of the second tithe, or of redeemed consecrated things.
GEMARA: The disciples of R. Samuel taught: "The duty of eating bitter herbs may be acquitted with the following herbs: with lettuce, wild endive and garden endive, with Harhabinah and bitter coriander, with oleander 4 and Harginin and Hardafni 5 (kinds of herbs having a bitter taste)." R. Jehudah said: "Also with lettuce of Julin and of Galin."likewise said R. Ilayi: "I heard from R. Eliezer that (Akarbanin) hart's tongue (scolopendrium) may be used, and I inquired among all his disciples, seeking one to corroborate his statement, but could not find one; and when I came to R. Eliezer ben Jacob, be admitted that R. Eliezer had made that statement."
R. Jehudah said: "All herbs which when cut emit white juice may serve for the acquittal of the duty of eating bitter herbs on Passover," and R. Johanan ben Berokah, that such as when cut should become a shade paler. Anonymous teachers, however, say that all bitter herbs emit white juice, and become a shade paler when cut. Said R. Johanan: "From these teachings we can infer, that all the bitter herbs enumerated so far are juicy and when cut become a shade paler." Said R. Huna: "The halakhah prevails according to the decree of the anonymous teachers."
Rabhina noticed that R. Aha the son of Rabha always endeavored to have a certain kind of bitter herbs (horseradish) on Passover. Said he to R. Aha: "It is thy opinion that this kind of herbs is to be desired because it is more bitter; but have we not learned in the Mishna, and also from the disciples of R. Samuel, that lettuce stands first, and R. Oshiya also said that lettuce was more preferable. Even Rabha said that lettuce is called Hassa (in Arabic), which signifies, 'God has mercy on us,' and R. Samuel ben Nahmeni said in the name of R. Jonathan: 'Why are the Egyptians compared to bitter herbs? Because, as the bitter herbs are first soft and then hard, so were also the Egyptians: at first they treated the Israelites with kindness and afterwards with harshness?'" Answered R. Aha the son of Rabha: "I shall not do so any more."
R. Rehumi said to Abayi: "Whence do we know that bitter herbs must be used? The passage says 'Maror' (bitterness)? Can this not refer to the gall of a Khuphia (a certain kind of fish)?" and he replied: "We adduce this from the Matzoth. As Matzoth should be made of the fruit of the earth, so should also the bitterness be derived from the fruit of the earth." "Cannot this also refer to oleander (which is poisonous)?" queried R. Rehumi, and Abayi replied: "Fruit of the earth is required, and not fruit of trees." "Cannot this also refer to Harzapha? 1" Answered Abayi: "It must be equal to Matzoth in that it may be bought with the proceeds of second tithes, and Harzapha cannot be bought therewith, as it is not an edible article."
Said Rabba bar R. Hanin to Abayi: "As it is written 'Maror' (bitterness), (one kind), why should the bitterest of all kind of herbs be used? and Abayi replied: "In one place it is also written 'Merarim' [Numb. ix. ii], which signifies more than one." "Perhaps it means but two kinds?" Said Abayi: "As Matzoth maybe of several different kinds, so the bitter herbs should be of several different kinds."
"Either fresh or in a dried state," etc. Said R. Hisda: "This refers only to stalks of the herbs, but if leaves of the herbs are used they may only be fresh but not dried." If the latter clause of the Mishna, however, refers to stalks, then should it not be assumed that the first clause refers to the leaves? Nay; the Mishna merely explains that the stalks only may be used, fresh or dried.
The rabbis taught: If the leaves are withered the duty of eating cannot be discharged therewith; but upon the authority of R. Eliezer ben Zadock it was said, that even herbs with withered leaves may be used.
MISHNA: It is prohibited to soak bran on the Passover to feed fowls therewith; but it is permitted to pour boiling water on bran. A woman must not soak the bran which she takes with her to the bath, but must use it in a dry state for the purpose of rubbing her body therewith. A person must not masticate grains of wheat to put it (as a poultice) on his wound, because they will become leavened.
GEMARA: The rabbis taught: The following things can never become leavened: "Baked, cooked, and scalded articles." Cooked articles do not become leavened; but can they not become leavened while being cooked? Said R. Papa: "By cooked articles is meant, articles which had previously been baked and then cooked."
We have learned in a Boraitha: "If water drip on flour even all day long, the flour cannot become leavened." Said R. Papa: "This is the case only if the water drip drop by drop."
The disciples of R. Shila said: "Vathka (a dish made of salt, meal, and oil) may be used on Passover." Have we not learned that Vathka must not be used? This presents no difficulty. Such as was made with water and salt must not be used, but Vathka made with oil and salt is permitted.
Mar Zutra said: "The bottom of a cooking-pot must not be strewn with dry flour, lest it be not thoroughly cooked and become leavened." R. Joseph said: "A man should not pour boiling water on two grains of wheat together, lest one become attached to the other and the water will not reach every particle of the grain, in which case it may become leavened."
The rabbis taught: "It is not allowed to soak barley on Passover, but if it was soaked it is not to be used, only if the barley fall asunder, whereas if it remained whole it may be used." Said R. Jose: "Even if it be observed that they are about to fall asunder, it is permitted to pour vinegar on them, which will prevent their becoming leavened." Said Samuel: The halakhah does not prevail according to R. Jose."
R. Hisda said in the name of Mar Uqba: "The Boraitha which states that if the barley fell asunder it must not be used means to say, that even if they had not yet fallen asunder, but would when taken out, they must also not be used," and Samuel said: "Nay; it distinctly means to say, only if they had already fallen asunder," and so Samuel acted on one occasion in the village of Bar Hashu.
Rabba said: "A man who wishes to guard his soul (i.e., a very pious man) should not soak grain on Passover." Why only a man who wishes to guard his soul? Does not the Boraitha prohibit this to all alike? Rabba means to say, that one who wishes to be pious should not even soak wheat, which is less liable to become leavened than barley. Said R. Na'hman: "One who would obey the dictates of Abba (Rabba) will be compelled to eat mouldy bread; for at R. Huna's house wheat was soaked, and also at the house of Rabha bar Abin," and Rabha said: It is a duty to soak wheat, for it is written, "Ye should observe the unleavened bread," and if it be not soaked, what would there be observed? Shall we say, the kneading should be observed; did not R. Huna say, that even with unleavened dough of a Gentile the obligation of eating Matzoth may be discharged, providing a piece of unleavened bread of the size of an olive is eaten afterwards? Thus we see that the piece of unleavened bread must be eaten afterwards and not first, because the Gentile's dough was not originally intended to serve for Matzoth. If, therefore, the baking alone should be observed, the dough could be baked for the express purpose of using it as Matzoth; the same applies to kneading the dough; hence the observing of the unleavened bread must take place before the dough is kneaded, i.e., from the time the wheat is soaked.
Whence do we know that the unleavened bread must be observed before being kneaded? Did not R. Huna say that the dough of a Gentile may be used, and a piece of unleavened bread must be eaten afterwards only because the dough was not originally intended to serve as Matzoth, but if the dough was made by the Gentile especially for that purpose, would it not be sufficient to discharge the obligation of eating Matzoth therewith?
Notwithstanding the fact that Rabha's assertion was thus refuted, he did not retract; for he said to the sheave-binders in the field: "When ye bind the sheaves, bear in mind that they are intended for the preparation of Matzoth"; whence we see that he holds that the unleavened bread must be observed from beginning to end.
The mother of Mar, the son of Rabhina, would buy her wheat for the Passover directly from the field.
It happened that a ship with a cargo of wheat was sunk in the river of Hishta. So Rabha advised that the (recovered) wheat should be sold in small lots to Israelites, in order that they could consume it before the Passover set in.
The rabbis taught: A cooking-pot must not be strewn with flour on Passover, and one who would do this should first strew the flour and then pour vinegar thereon, while according to others, the vinegar may be poured on first. Who is meant by the others? Said R. Hisda: "R. Jehudah, who holds (in Tract Sabbath), that on Sabbath spices may be put in all vessels or cooking utensils, except in such as contain vinegar, because vinegar facilitates cooking." Ula, however, said that this must not be done under any circumstances, for concerning a Nazarite it is said: "Go away! go away! Do not draw nigh unto the boundaries of the vineyard (meaning: One should avoid even such things as might appear as prohibited, lest the prohibition itself be disregarded)."
R. Papa permitted the bakers in the house of the Exilarch to strew a pot with dry flour, and Rabha would even strew his own Pot', with dry flour.
MISHNA: It is unlawful to put flour in Harosoth (sauce) 1 or in mustard, but if this be done, it should be immediately eaten. R. Meir, however, prohibits it. The Passover sacrifice must not be boiled in any liquid or in juice of fruit; but it is permitted to moisten it (after it has been roasted), or to dip it (in a liquid when eaten). Water used by a baker (to cool his hands while kneading the dough for Matzoth) must immediately be thrown away, because it becomes leaven.
GEMARA: R. Kahana said: They differ only concerning mustard; but as for Harosoth (sauce), all agree that (if flour had been put into it) it must be burned. We have also learned to this effect in a Boraitha, viz.: "Flour must not be put into Harosoth, and if this be done the same must be immediately burned; and if it be put in mustard, R. Meir holds that it must be immediately burned, while the sages bold that it should be immediately eaten." Said R. Huna the son of R. Jehudah in the name of R. Na'hman, quoting Samuel: "The halakhah prevails according to the opinion of the sages."
Said R. Na'hman bar Itz'hak to him: "Concerning what does master hold, that the halakhah prevails according to the opinion of the sages, Harosoth or only mustard?" and he answered: "What is the difference?" Said R. Na'hman bar Itz'hak: "What about the statement of R. Kahana (just quoted)?" and he answered: "I have not heard his statement nor does it concern me."
"The Passover sacrifice must not be boiled." The rabbis taught: It is written [Exod. xii. 9]: "Ye shall not eat of it raw (rare), nor in any wise sodden with water." Hence we see that it must not be boiled in water; but whence do we know that it must not be boiled in any other liquid? Say, that it is an a fortiori conclusion, for, whereas it must not be boiled in water, which does not interfere with its taste, it should not so much the more be boiled in any other liquid which might affect its taste.
Rabbi, however, said: "We infer this from the fact that it is written, 'nor in any wise sodden with water,' which signifies, that it must not be boiled in any liquid." Wherein do Rabbi and the rabbis differ? In a case of where the sacrifice is cooked in a pot without water. According to the rabbis it may be cooked in that manner, because no water is used nor is its taste affected, while Rabbi holds that it must not be cooked in any wise."
What definition do the rabbis attribute to the passage "in any wise"? They explain according to the following Boraitha: "If a person boiled (the Passover sacrifice) and then roasted it, or first roasted and then boiled it, he is culpable." In the former case it is correct to hold the man culpable; but in the latter, if he had already roasted, what difference does it make if it was subsequently boiled? This is not allowed, because it is written, "nor in any wise sodden with water."
The rabbis taught: Shall we assume, that a man would be culpable if he had boiled the sacrifice even after it had been thoroughly roasted? Therefore it is written: "Ye shall not eat of it raw (rare), nor in any wise sodden with water." If it was rare and then sodden in water it makes a man culpable; but if it was thoroughly roasted, it does not. What is meant by thoroughly roasted? Said R. Ashi: "If it was roasted brown."
The rabbis taught: We might assume, that if a man ate a raw piece of the Passover sacrifice of the size of an olive, he is culpable; therefore it is written: "raw, nor in any wise sodden with water;" but if not sodden with water, it does not make a man culpable. Shall we assume, then, that it may be eaten raw to commence with? To that end it is written [ibid., ibid.]: "but roasted by the fire." What is meant by raw (rare) P Said Rabh: "That is what the Persians call 'Abarnim' (rare)."
R. Hisda said: "If a thing is cooked on the Sabbath in the hot waters of Tiberias it does not constitute a culpable act; but it is a culpable act to cook the Passover-sacrifice therein." What is meant by the word "culpable" in this connection? Said R. Hyya bar R. Nathan: R. Hisda plainly said: Not culpable (for stripes) but guilty of transgressing the ordinance concerning "roasted by the fire."
Abayi said: "If a man eats the Passover-sacrifice raw (rare) he is amenable to a double punishment by stripes, the same as if he eats it cooked, and if he eats it cooked and raw he is amenable to a triple punishment by stripes, because he transgresses two distinct commandments, viz.: 'Ye shall not eat it raw' and 'but roasted by the fire.'" Rabha, however, said: "For the violation of a negative commandment, which is derived from a positive regulation, no stripes should be inflicted." 1
The rabbis taught: If a man had eaten part of the sacrifice of the size of an olive, raw, while it was yet day on the eve of Passover, be is not culpable, but if it had already become dark, he is guilty. If he had eaten a part of the sacrifice of the size of an olive, roasted, while it was yet day, he did not exclude himself from the company with whom he had combined for the sacrifice. If he had eaten the same, however, when it had become dark, he did exclude himself from the others.
The rabbis taught: "If he had eaten a roasted piece of the sacrifice while it was yet day on the eve of Passover, and a piece the size of an olive, raw, when it was already become dusk, he is culpable for both acts; because the roasted is held to be equal to the raw (i.e., as he may eat the roasted only at night, he must not eat it during the day)." It is right, the act of eating a raw piece of the sacrifice is a culpable one, for the reason that it is expressly written: "Ye shall not eat it raw"; but as for the roasted sacrifice, it is written: "Ye shall eat it only at night," and from this it may be inferred that it should not be eaten during the day; hence it is a negative commandment derived from a positive, and it is known that the violation of such a commandment is only equal to the violation of a positive commandment? Said R. Hisda: "This is in accordance with the opinion of R. Jehudah, who maintains that even for the violation of such a commandment, punishment may be inflicted. 1
"Water used by a baker must immediately be thrown away," etc. In one Boraitha we have learned, that the water must be thrown where it will run down, but not in a pit, where it will accumulate; while in another Boraitha we have learned, that it may even be poured into a pit. This presents no difficulty. The former Boraitha treats of a case where there is a large quantity of water, while the latter treats of a small quantity which is absorbed by the soil of the pit.
R. Jehudah said: A woman should not knead dough (on Passover) except with water "Shelanu." 2 R. Mathna repeated the same words in Papunia. On the morrow, all of the inhabitants came to him with jugs in their hands and begged him for water (thinking that the word "Shelanu" meant "our" and that he had the necessary water), whereupon he answered them: "I meant with water that had remained over night (debithu)."
Rabh preached: "A woman should not knead her dough in the glare of the sun, nor with water that had been heated by the sun. Also not with water that had been left over in a Muliar (teakettle), and should not remove her hands in general from the oven, until her bread is baked. She also requires two vessels filled with water. One to cool off her hands when kneading and the other to moisten her dough before putting it into the oven."
The schoolmen propounded a question: "What is the law if a woman did knead her dough with such water (as thou hast prohibited)?" Said Mar Zutra: "The bread will be lawful," while R. Ashi maintained that "it will not be fit for use." Said Mar Zutra: "Whence do I adduce my opinion? From the previous Boraitha, which teaches that, while it is not allowed to soak grain in water, if this was done, it does not make a man culpable unless the grain fell asunder," and R. Ashi replied: "Are all threads woven in the same (woof)? Where this was explicitly taught, it remains so, but where it was not taught, it is not so."
45:1 Why was the decree of Rabh confronted with the fact that Rabba bar Ahilayi's statement had been effectually refuted by the Boraitha? Why could not the Boraitha itself have been used in order to counteract Rabh's decree? In our opinion, this was not done because Rabh was a Tana, and in many instances the Talmud allows Rabh, as a Tana, to dispute a Boraitha. In this case, however, as Rabha bar Ahilayi could find no answer for the refutation, and it was not said in his defence that he held according to Rabh, which he could have done provided Rabh had actually differed with the Boraitha, hence we must assume that Rabh is in accordance with the Boraitha. Now, then, if such is the case, the question why Rabh holds that the pots must be destroyed according to Rabh is a logical one.
54:1 The difference between the two is as follows: The Hebrew term for affliction is Oni, written Ayni, Nun, Vav, Iod; and the term for "poor" is also Oni, but is written Ayni, Nun, Iod, and in the verse it is spelled in the latter manner.
65:1 Of the two statements in this paragraph, in the old edition the former is attributed to Rabha, while the latter is credited to Abayi; but the latter statement always appears in other portions of the Talmud as the opinion of Rabha; hence we have exchanged the places of the two names. In this we are borne out also by R. Joseph Karo in his commentary entitled "Keseph Mishna."
66:2 "Shelanu" has a twofold meaning. The more general definition is "our" or "of us," and the other, which is more seldom used, is "which has remained over night." See Appendix at the end of this Tract.
Sources: Sacred Texts