

Linking National/Local Elections - PLSC 485C 01

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Class Meeting: TR 4:25 pm - 5:50 pm

Class Location: Fine Arts 246

Office Hours: M 16:00-18:00

Course Description: This course studies the issue of the linkage between local and national politics as it comes into being in the elections on all layers of government. As a research seminar the course will include:

1. Dealing with empirical findings from a variety of democratic countries and continents.
2. Discussing these findings theoretically using tools stemming from strategic choice theory.
3. Applying empirics and theory to the analysis of elections and policies.
4. Developing your own perception of the interaction between local and national politics and their relative influence on national policy and social welfare.

Theoretically, the link between national and local elections has been mostly dealt with from two very different points of view. One point of view claims that 'all politics are local': all events at the national arena are almost determined by the local realities of integration (or its lack) between classes, races and ethnic groups). That is, voters – on national and local elections alike- vote on the basis of their local concerns rather than national level issues. Hence, national politicians should engage in local issues so as to sustain their polity that will support them in national elections. This perception implies for example that in the average European parliamentary election, even if the issues set on the table would be the country's accession to the EU or whether Greece should be at the EU or national immigration policy; the real concerns for the voters are those of their area: welfare, education and immigration all as being considered on the basis of a local perception. Yet, the national (and supra-national) arena has its own

market of ideas and competition for power and policy positions not directly linked to events at the local arena. Croatians supported their country's accession to the EU even in areas where it meant paying more taxes so as to compensate Serbian refugees for displacement as a part of that process. Put differently, not all politics is local.

The other perspective- developed by Reif and Schmidt- also links local and national politics, asserts that local elections are of second-order and henceforth are of lesser importance for voters and politicians alike. That is, local elections relate to local minor policy issues: sewage systems, parts of the education, specific welfare needs, regulation to local restaurants etc. Moreover, local administrations are strongly regulated by national administrations. Hence, even if local issues matter the real 'action' is in national elections: there all issues national and local alike are being determined. Therefore, the national elections are of first-order: there the stakes are high, consequently turnout is high and voters vote strategically. That is, they are willing to make compromises in their choices so as to attain their goals. The local elections are of second order: they matter less since the stakes involved with them are low. Hence, there will be lower turnout to these elections and voters would tend to be more sincere. Furthermore, they might use these elections so as to punish the parties that rule the national polity for low performance. Thus, for this perception all politics is national. Yet, if that is the case then why do we see specific places with higher turnout on local elections than national elections? How is it that these places are excluded from national politics and are the constant political losers of the national system? In other words how can that model explain the not so rare case of 'inverted order elections'? Well it cannot. It does not mean that the Reif and Schmidt model is irrelevant. It means that it describes some aspects of political realities associated with the local-national elections interaction and is oblivious to the other possibilities in that interaction. The challenge is to connect all these dots and present an analytical explanation that covers that variety of interactions between the local and national electoral levels.

Following an ongoing research project that thus far has focused on the Israeli case this course presents a theoretical perspective (summed in Figure 1) which relates to local elections as indeed second order for voters who have their needs supplied by the ruling institutions and coalitions. They can receive their needs that way because the median voter is willing to respect them and their representatives. Hence, they (and their policy desires) are included in the ruling coalition. Yet, for social groups that have no solidarity with the median voter there are no such chances. Hence, turnout and support for a party in national elections is redundant and cannot be rationally justified. In such cases national elections become second order and the 'left-behind' groups' votes demonstrate low turnout to such elections as well as more sincere voting. For such groups- if they are geographically located at the same settings- local

elections provide an opportunity for taking over resources and control even if these are of small importance still they are better than nothing at all.

A strengthening factor in that sense is the behavior of political parties, which serve as the driving force in modern politics. Political parties can provide vehicles to power for groups which can supply what parties need: votes that do not deter other votes. Indeed 'left behind' social groups that tend to turnout strongly in national elections receive the national parties' attention. Such parties will see in their interest to maintain a local party branch and facilitate it through the parties' participation in local elections. This way such groups keep channels to the national government and secure the transference of payoffs to their area. This can continue as long as these local votes' support does not deter the support of other of this party's voters. Yet, if the 'left behind' groups do not turnout strongly in national elections the national parties will not see competing in these localities in local elections a beneficial act that coincides with their interests. Therefore, these populations are left without any communication to an interface to power and bureaucracies that are- at least to some extent- affected by political parties and their needs. Hence, this also strengthens the effect of exclusion of these groups from the national power circles.

As figure 1 shows we will consider a several intervening factors in this process. Parties' decision making processes might differentiate between areas on the basis of their electoral magnitude and ethnic composition which might give them all sorts of surprising opportunities to recruit votes and voters. The tendencies of federalism or devolution of authorities from the national government to the local government (or 'evolution' of authorities towards the EU's council of ministers and its presidency), might change the stakes associated with the institutions and hence create a variance in the incentives to compete (for parties) and vote (for citizens and groups). As time will allow we will try to deal with these contingencies and estimate their effects on the interaction we discuss.




Figure 1: The Course's Theoretical Perspective

Grading

The grade will be based on the following three components:

Participation and discussion: 25%

Two papers: 35%

Take home exam: 40%

1. Participation and discussion:

- a. Attendance: Attendance will be checked every meeting. After four unapproved absences you will not be eligible for the participation and discussion grade. Students who did not attend at all will receive the grade 'No Show F'.
- b. Class based presentation (10%): For each meeting (from the 3rd meeting onwards) a team of 2-3 students will be asked to lead a discussion on the basis of the reading items and with reference to the meeting's topic. At least 24 hours before the meeting the discussants will need to prepare a set of discussion points and send it to everyone (to me also offcourse) by email. The discussion should be focused on dealing with the main topics stemming from the text and reflecting on the ability of politicians to monitor the behavior of bureaucracies. People failing to attend at their designated time of discussion without pre-approval from me (at least a week before the meeting they are supposed to discuss) will receive a zero grade for that task.
- c. Active discussion (15%): At the end of each meeting those of you who have participated actively in the discussion should approach me and sign me on a note approving your participation. The scale for computing this grade is simple: 2 signatures equals one point with 30 notes equal 15 points and 0 notes equal 0 points.

2. Papers (75%):

During the semester you will have to submit two papers which will be a preparation for the final take home exam. The **General Instructions for Submission:**

- a. Needless to mention, academic writing and citing rules apply for the position papers you need to submit as well as the take home exam. Each paper should be 2-3 pages long (including bibliography), font Times New Roman size 12 with 1.5 line spacing and the Microsoft Word default margin size.
- b. Any data when used should appear in clear tables in the paper itself while citing the sources and websites you based your analysis on.
- c. The papers should be submitted on time via Blackboard. The TURNITIN entries will be in the content part of the website.
- d. Any delay needs to be coordinated and approved by me at least a week before the preset date of submission. Any uncoordinated delay in submission would yield a zero grade.

The first paper (15%):

- a. Present and explain the Reif and Schmidt second-order elections model.
- b. Present and explain two cases which support the model.
- c. Present and explain two cases that reject the model.
- d. Following these cases present and explain your perception of the model's validity.

The Second Paper (15%):

- a. Present and explain the Austen-Smith & Banks Legislative Game.
- b. On the basis of Schofield and Sened's papers explain how does the party valence affect the legislative game?
- c. On the basis of Roemer's papers explain how social identities can affect the way this game takes place.
- d. Use these papers to re-discuss the second-order elections' model validity.

Take home exam (40%):

- a. Take one local campaign (i.e. mayoral/state legislature/gubernatorial) and one national campaign (presidential/US Senate/US house of representatives) from your area (town/county).
- b. Describe and explain the events in these campaigns on the basis of the stages of the legislative game, with reference to the social identities and the valence of the parties and candidates involved in these electoral campaigns.
- c. Is the second-order elections model valid for your area? Explain your answer using at least three theoretical papers from the course syllabus.
- d. The take home exam will be 6 pages long including bibliography (font, size and margins as with the position papers). It needs to be submitted by the end of the exam week. Any uncoordinated submission after that date would receive the grade zero for that task.

Basic guidelines:

1. *Appeals* for grades will be submitted in hardcopy to my mailbox by the end of the week in which you received back your papers.
2. *Plagiarism* as discovered will be passed on to the university's disciplinary authorities please avoid these issues.
3. *Course website*- Please check the website frequently for class announcements, presentations and discussions.
4. *Class Behavior*- I do not mind drink (coffee, water and soda) in class but food is out of the question (as in NO FOOD IN CLASS PLEASE). As a Mediterranean I am willing to absorb a reasonable and justifiable level of being late. After 15 minutes doors are closed.
5. *Students with disabilities*- academic training can be rough and is rougher (yet not impossible) for students with disabilities. Please do not hesitate to contact: Students with Disabilities, Binghamton University, P.O. Box 6000, Binghamton, NY 13902-6000. Office: UU-119, Phone: 607-777-2686 (voice/TTY), Fax 607-777-6893. E-mail: ssd@binghamton.edu.

Main Topics and Reading Items (all available through JSTOR with most uploaded to the course's website)

1. What is local politics and how is it related to national politics?

Trounstine, J. (2009). 'All Politics is Local: The Re-emergence of the Study of City Politics'. *PS: Perspectives on Politics* 7(3): 611-618

Morgenstern, S. & S.M. Swindle (2005). 'Are Politics Local? An Analysis of Voting Patterns in 23 Democracies'. *Comparative Political Studies* 38(2): 143-170.

Tavits, M. (2010). 'Effect of Local Ties on Electoral Success'. *Party Politics* 16(2): 215-235.

Bardahn, P. & Mookherjee, D. (2000) 'Capture and Governance at Local and National Levels.' *American Economic Review* 90(2): 135-9

2. Local Elections: Representation, Political Parties and Public policy Implications

Marschall, M. J., P. Shah & A. Ruhil (2011). 'The Study of Local Elections.' *PS: Perspectives on Politics* 44(1): 97-100.

Marschall, M. J. & A. Ruhil (2005). 'Fiscal Effects of Voter Initiative Reconsidered: Addressing Endogeneity.' *State Politics and Policy Quarterly* 5(4): 327-355.

Baodoung H. & Vanderleeuw, J.W. (2001). 'Racial Transition and White Voter Support for Black Candidates in Local Elections.' *Journal of Urban Affairs* 23(3-4): 309-322.

Jerome, B. & Jerome-Speziari, V. (2005). 'The 2004 French Regional Elections: Politico-Economic Factors of a Nationalized Local Ballot.' *French Politics* 3:142-63.

Brender, A. (2003) 'The Effect of Fiscal Performance on Local Government Election Results in Israel: 1989-1998'. *Journal of Public Economics* 87: 2187-205.

3. Local Elections: Second Order Elections?

The Second Order Elections Model

Reif, K. and H. Schmitt. (1980). 'Nine second-order national elections: A conceptual framework for the analysis of European election results'. *European Journal of Political Research* 8 (1): 3 – 44.

Reif, K. (1997). 'Reflections: European Elections as Member State Second Order Election Revisited'. *European Journal of Political Research* 31(1-2): 115 – 124.

Norris, P. (1997). 'Nomination: Second-Order Elections Revisited.' *European Journal of Political Research* 31(1): 109 – 115.

Empirical Analysis of the Model: EU and its Near Neighbors

Heath, A., I. McLean, B. Taylor & J. Curtice. (1999). 'Between First and Second Order: A Comparison of Voting Behavior in European and Local Elections in Britain'.

European Journal of Political Research 35(3): 414-389

Rallings, C. & M. Thrasher. (2005). 'Not All 'Second-Order' Contests are the Same: Turnout and Party Choice at the Concurrent 2004 Local and European Parliament Elections in England'. *British Journal of Politics and International Relations* 7: 584-597.

Jeffery, C. & D. Hough. (2003). Regional Elections in Multi-Level Systems. *European Urban and Regional Studies* 10(3): 199 – 212. (Includes also Canada)

Koepke, J. R., and N. Ringe. (2006). The second order election Model in an Enlarged Europe. *European Union Politics* 7(3): 321-346.

Marsh, M. (1998). Testing the Second-Order Election Model after Four European Elections. *British Journal of Political Science* 28(4): 591 – 607.

van der E., C., M. N. Franklin and M. Marsh. (1996). 'What Voters Teach Us about Europe-Wide Elections: What Europe-Wide Elections Teach Us about Voters'. *Electoral Studies* 15(2): 149-166.

Hix, S. & M. Marsh (2007). 'Punishment or Protest? Understanding European Parliament Elections'. *The Journal of Politics* 69(2): 495-510.

Hobolt, S.B. & M.N. Franklin (2011). 'The legacy of lethargy: How elections to the European Parliament depress turnout'. *Electoral Studies* 30(1):67-76.

Hobolt, S.B. & J. Wittrock (2011). 'The second-order election model revisited: An experimental test of vote choices in European Parliament elections'. *Electoral Studies* (30): 29-40.

Russia

Golosov, G. V. (2006). 'The Structure of Party Alternatives and Voter Choice in Russia.' *Party Politics* 12(6): 707-725.

Ross, C. (2011). 'The Rise and Fall of Political Parties in Russia's Regional Assemblies'. *Europe-Asia Studies* 63(3): 429-448

United States and Canada

Barreto, M.A., M. Villarreal and N.D. Woods (2005). 'Metropolitan Latino Political Behavior: Voter Turnout and Candidate Preference in Los Angeles.' *Journal of Urban Affairs* 27(1): 71-91.

Tam Cho, W. K., J. G. Gimpel. (2006). Residential Concentration, Political Socialization and Voter Turnout. *The Journal of Politics* 68(1): 156-167.

Cluter, F. (2008). 'One Voter, Two First-Order Elections?' *Electoral Studies* 27:492-504.

Israel

Ben-Bassat, A. & M. Dahan. (2008). *Social Identity and Voter Turnout*. CESIFO Working Paper No. 2331.

Nachmias, D., M. Rosenthal and H. Zubida (2010). "Inverted First- and Second-Order Elections: The Effects of Political Alienation on Electoral Turnout in Israel". *Midwest Political Science Association Annual Meeting*.

4. Some Claims Regarding Electoral Politics, Coalitional Choices and Public Policy

Collective Action and Turnout

Riker, W. H. and P. C. Ordeshook (1968). "A Theory of the Calculus of Voting". *American Political Science Review* 62: 25-42.

Verba, S., K. L. Scholzman & H. E. Brady. (2000). 'Rational Action and Political Activity'. *Journal of Theoretical Politics* 12(3):243-268.

Green D.P. & Gerber A.S. (2003). 'Getting Out the Vote in Local Elections: Results from Six Door-to-Door Canvassing Experiments'. *The Journal of Politics* 65:1083-1096

The Influence of Partisan Electoral Valence

Schofield, N. J. and I. Sened (2005). "Modeling the Interaction of Parties, Activists and Voters: Why is the Political Center so Empty?" *European Journal of Political Research* 44(3), 355-90.

Schofield, N. J. and I. Sened (2005). "Multiparty Competition in Israel, 1988–96". *British Journal of Political Science*, 35(4): 635-663

Here Enter Class and Race

Roemer, J.E. (1997). "Political-economic equilibrium when parties represent constituents: The unidimensional case," *Social Choice and Welfare*, 14(4): 479-502.

Roemer, J. E. (1998). "Why the poor do not expropriate the rich: An old argument in new garb". *Journal of Public Economics* 70 (3), pp 399-424.

Selway, J.S. (2011). "The Measurement of Cross-cutting Cleavages and Other Multidimensional Cleavage Structures." *Political Analysis*, vol. 19, no. 1, pp. 48 – 65.

Lee, W. and J.E. Roemer (2006). "Race and redistribution in the United States: A solution to the problem of American exceptionalism". *Journal of Public Economics* 90: 1027-1052

Policy as an Electoral Outcome

Austen-Smith, D. and J. Banks (1988). "Elections, Coalitions and Legislative Outcomes." *American Political Science Review*. 82(2): 405-422.

Sened, I. (1996). 'A Model of Coalition Formation: a Theory and Application'. *The Journal of Politics* 58: 350-372.

Wessels, B. and H. Schmitt (2008). 'Meaningful choices, political supply, and institutional Effectiveness'. *Electoral Studies* 27: 19-30

5. Legislative Game A: Turnout in Local and national Elections

Institutions, Political Parties and Turnout

Fisher, S.D., L. Lessard-Philips, S.B. Hobolt & J. Curtice (2008). 'Disengaging voters: Do plurality systems discourage the less knowledgeable from voting?' *Electoral Studies* 27: 89-104

Tse-hsin C. (2011). 'Uncovering the micro-foundations of turnout and electoral systems'. *Electoral Studies* 30:295-308.

Gronland, K. (2004). 'Voter turnout in politically homogeneous and dichotomous contexts: A comparison of two electoral systems'. *Electoral Studies* 23: 501-524.

Johnston, R.J., S. Mathews & A. Bittner (2007). 'Turnout and the party system in Canada, 1988-2004'. *Electoral Studies* 26: 735-745

Thoralkson, L. (2005). 'Federalism and the European party System'. *Journal of European Public Policy* 12(3): 468–487

Cleavages, Competition and Turnout

Shamir, M. and Arian, A. 1999.' Collective Identities and Electoral Competition in Israel'. *American Political Science Review*. 93(2): 265-277.

Herron, M.C. & J.S. Sekhon (2005). 'Black Candidates and Black Voters: Assessing the Impact of Candidate Race on Uncounted Vote Rates'. *The Journal of Politics* 67(1); 154-177

Griffin, J. D. and M. Keane (2006). 'Descriptive Representation and the Composition of African American Turnout'. *American Journal of Political Science* 50(4): 998-1012

Can it all Combine?

Kalleher C.A. and D. Lowery (2009). 'Central City Size, Metropolitan Institutions and Political Participation.' *British Journal of Political Science* 39: 59-92.

Nachmias, D., M. Rosenthal and H. Zubida (2012). 'Local and National Electoral Turnout: A Theory and Evidence from the Israeli Case'. *Paper to be Presented at the Midwest Political Science Association Annual Meeting*.

6. Legislative Game B: National Political Parties' Strategic Decisions Regarding Local Issues

Ames, B. (1994) 'The Reverse Coattails Effect: Local Party Organization in the 1989 Brazilian Presidential Election', *American Political Science Review* 88(1):95-111.

Gaines, B. & C. Crombez (2004). 'Another look at Connections Across German Elections'. *Journal of Theoretical Politics* 16(3): 289-319.

Stokes, S.C. (2005). "Perverse Accountability: A Formal Model of Machine Politics with Evidence from Argentina." *American Political Science Review* 99(3):315-325

Nachmias, D., M. Rosenthal and H. Zubida (2011). "National Party Strategies in Local Elections: A Theory and Some Evidence from the Israeli Case". *American Political Science Association Annual Meeting*. Seattle: Washington.

7. Legislative Game C: Legislation and Rule-Making as an Outcome of Representation

Hix, S. & M. Marsh (2011). 'Second-order effects plus pan-European political swings: An analysis of European Parliament elections across time'. *Electoral Studies* 30: 4-15

Besley, T. & S. Coate (2003). 'Centralized versus decentralized provision of local public goods: a political economy approach.' *Journal of Public Economics* 87(12): 2611-2637.

Marschall, M.J. and P.R. Shah (2007). 'The Attitudinal Effects of Minority Incorporation: Examining the Racial Dimensions of Trust in Urban America.' *Urban Affairs Review* 42(5): 629-658.

Devas, N. & S. Delay (2006). Local Democracy and the Challenges of Decentralizing the State: An International Perspective. *Local Government Studies* 32(5): 677 – 695

8. Intervening Variables: District Magnitude, Electoral Method, Federalism/Devolution
- Ordeshook, P. C. & O. V. Shvetsova (1994). Ethnic Heterogeneity, District Magnitude, and the Number of Parties. *American Journal of Political Science*. 38(1): 100-123.
- Marschall, M. J., A.V.S. Ruhill & P.R. Shah (2010). 'The New Racial Calculus: Electoral Institutions and Black Representation in Local Legislatures'. *American Journal of Political Science* 54(1): 107-124.
- Lewis, P. G. (2011). 'Size and Local Democracy: Scale Effects in City Politics.' *PS: Perspectives on Politics* 44(1):107-109
- Shvetsova, O. (2005). 'Mass-Elite Equilibrium of Federal Constitutional Legitimacy'. *Constitutional Political Economy* 16(2):125-141.

Week	Meeting	Date	Topic	Readings	Assignments and presentations
1	1	1/31	What is local politics and how is it related to national politics?	Trounstone, J. (2009) Morgenstern, S. & S.M. Swindle (2005)	
	2	2/2	What is local politics and how is it related to national politics?	Tavits, M. (2010). Bardahn, P. & Mookherjee, D. (2000)	
2	3	2/7	Local Elections: Representation, Political Parties and Public policy Implications	Marschall, M. J., P. Shah & A. Ruhil (2011). Marschall, M. J. & A. Ruhil (2005). Baodoung H. & Vanderleeuw, J.W	
	4	2/9	Local Elections: Representation,	Jerome, B. & Jerome-Speziari, V.	

			Political Parties and Public policy Implications	(2005). Brender, A. (2003)
3	5	2/14	Local Elections: Second Order Elections?	Reif, K. and H. Schmitt. (1980). Reif, K. (1997). Norris, P. 1997
	6	2/16	Local Elections: Second Order Elections? EU and Near Neighbors	Heath, A., I. McLean, B. Taylor & J. Curtice. (1999). Rallings, C. & M. Thrasher. (2005).
4	7	2/21	Local Elections: Second Order Elections? EU and Near Neighbors	J. C. & D. Hough (2003). Koepke, J. R., and N. Ringe (2006) Marsh, M. (1998).
	8	2/23	Local Elections: Second Order Elections? EU and Near Neighbors	van der E., C., M. N. Franklin and M. Marsh. (1996). Hix, S. & M. Marsh (2007).

5	9	2/28	Local Elections: Second Order Elections? EU and Near Neighbors	Hobolt, S.B. & M.N. Franklin (2011) Hobolt, S.B. & J. Wittrock (2011)
	10	3/1	Local Elections: Second Order Elections? EU and Near Neighbors	Golosov, G. V. (2006) Ross, C. (2011) Submission of Paper #1
6	11	3/6	Local Elections: Second Order Elections? The US and Canada	Barreto, M.A., M. Villarreal and N.D. Woods (2005) Tam Cho, W. K., J. G. Gimpel. (2006). Cutler (2008)
	12	3/8	Local Elections: Second Order Elections? Israel	Ben-Bassat, A. & M. Dahan. (2008). Nachmias, Rosenthal and Zubida, (2010)
7	13	3/13	Some Claims Regarding	Austen-Smith, D. and J.

			Electoral Politics, Strategic Choices and Public Policy	Banks (1988). Wessels, B. and H. Schmitt (2008)
	14	3/15	Some Claims Regarding Electoral Politics, Strategic Choices and Public Policy	Schofield and Sened (2005)*2
8	15	3/20	Some Claims Regarding Electoral Politics, Strategic Choices and Public Policy	Roemer, (1997; 1998)
	16	3/22	<u>Legislative Game A:</u> <i>Collective Action and Turnout</i>	Riker, W.H. and P. Ordeshook (1968) Verba, S., K. L. Scholzman & H. E. Brady. (2000). Green D.P. &

Gerber A.S.
(2003).

9	17	3/27	<u>Legislative</u> <u>Game A:</u> <i>Institutions,</i> <i>Political</i> <i>Parties and</i> <i>Turnout</i>	Fisher, S.D., L. Lessard- Philips, S.B. Hobolt & J. Curtice (2008) Tse-hsin C. (2011).
	18	3/29	<u>Legislative</u> <u>Game A:</u> <i>Institutions,</i> <i>Political</i> <i>Parties and</i> <i>Turnout</i>	Gronland, K. (2004) Johnston, R.J., S. Mathews & A. Bittner (2007) Thoralkson, L. (2005)
10	19	4/3		SPRING RECESS
	20	4/5		SPRING RECESS
11	21	4/10	<u>Legislative</u> <u>Game A:</u> <i>Cleavages,</i> <i>Competition</i> <i>and Turnout</i>	Selway, J.S. (2011). Lee, W. and J.E. Roemer (2006).
	22	4/12	<i>No Meeting</i> <i>MPSA</i>	Shamir, M. and Arian, A.

				1999.
				Herron, M.C. & J.S. Sekhon (2005).
				Griffin, J. D. and M. Keane (2006).
12	23	4/17	<u>Legislative Game A: <i>Can it Combine?</i></u>	Kalleher C.A. and D. Lowery (2009). Nachmias, D., M. Rosenthal and H. Zubida (2012).
	24	4/19	<u>Legislative Game B</u>	Ames, B. Submission (1994) of paper #2 Gaines, B. & C. Crombez (2004)
13	25	4/24	<u>Legislative Game B</u>	Stokes, S.C. (2005) Nachmias, D., M. Rosenthal and H. Zubida (2011).
	26	4/26	<u>Legislative Game C</u>	Besley, T. & S. Coate (2003) Marschall, M.J. and P.R. Shah (2007)

14	27	5/1	<u>Legislative Game C</u>	Hix, S. & M. Marsh (2011) Devas, N. & S. Delay (2006)
	28	5/3	<u>Intervening Variables</u>	Ordeshook, P. C. & O. V. Shvetsova (1994). Marschall, M. J., A.V.S. Ruhill & P.R. Shah (2010)
15	29	5/8	<u>Intervening Variables</u>	Lewis, P. G. (2011) Shvetsova, O. (2005)
	30	5/10	General Overview	Last day of classes
