

# **PART TWO: DOCUMENTATION**

**PROOF OF THE LOCATION OF THE HEZBOLLAH'S MILITARY  
INFRASTRUCTURE AND OPERATIONAL ACTIVITIES CARRIED OUT  
FROM WITHIN THE CIVILIAN POPULATION**



**A residential building in the village of Al-Qsaibe (north of the Litani River). Found clearly launcher, rocket 302mm long-range a was away) 20m tuoba) vicinity the in visible on the aerial photograph. The launcher was apparently hidden in the garage of a nearby building.**

**LOCATIONS OF THE MILITARY  
INFRASTRUCTURE IN THE SHI'ITE SUBURBS OF  
SOUTH BEIRUT**



## A. GENERAL DESCRIPTION

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1. Since the mid-1980s, Hezbollah has entrenched itself in the Shi'ite slums of southern Beirut (called **Dahiya**). Hezbollah headquarters, bases, and main offices attacked by the Israeli Air Force during the war were situated in the district of **Harat Hreik** and, to a lesser extent, in nearby Shi'ite districts (**Bir al-Abd, Al-Ruwis**), in residential buildings, the vast majority of which were inhabited by civilians.<sup>1</sup> Most Shi'ites residing in these districts are sympathetic to Hezbollah. They cooperate with the organization and are aware that it establishes its headquarters, bases, offices, and operatives' residences in civilian houses.

### The Hezbollah stronghold in southern Beirut



**Right: Masses attending Hezbollah's "victory rally" held in the eastern part of the Dahiya (Beirut's southern suburb). Left: Hassan Nasrallah, surrounded by bodyguards, speaking at the rally (Al-Jazeera Television, September 22).**

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<sup>1</sup> Hezbollah also had bases and offices in the Shi'ite districts of Al-Shiyakh, Burj al-Barajneh, Hay al-Sulum, and Sufayr. These bases and offices were not attacked by the Israeli Air Force during the war.

2. These districts—notably **Harat Hreik**, where the so called “**security square**” is located—can be defined as Hezbollah’s **nerve center**. It contains the organization’s headquarters, alongside its military, administrative, and civilian infrastructures. Those include the main operations room, general staff functions (logistics, manpower, intelligence, and security), propaganda apparatuses (Al-Manar Television), logistics sites, workshops, and apartments of the organization’s leaders and operatives. **Also situated in these districts are the offices of the Iranian Revolutionary Guards, which support Hezbollah. The entire complex is surrounded by civilian institutions and densely-populated civilian residential buildings.**
  
3. **Harat Hreik** and its nearby districts are **heavily secured by Hezbollah**. Security includes roadblocks, car and foot patrols, surveillance cameras, and alert units. **Unauthorized access for strangers** and even for Lebanese military and police **is forbidden**. Hezbollah operates a **security unit** responsible for the security of the organization’s important figures and the sensitive sites located in these districts.

## **Security procedures in the district of Harat Hreik (the security square)**

4. During the second Lebanon war, the IDF detained Hussein Ali Mahmoud Suleiman, a Hezbollah operative from the Beirut district of Bir Hassan. In his interrogation, he detailed Hezbollah's security procedures in the security square:
  - a. It has four guarded and secured entrances.
  - b. The guards dress in black, are armed with Kalashnikov assault rifles, and equipped with bulletproof vests and communications devices.
  - c. Vehicles entering must have a permit or undergo an examination C. Examples of Hezbollah's bases, offices, operatives' houses, arms and ammunition, and hotspots of ground warfare inside population car. the of underside the Lebanon south in centers
  - d. Pedestrians are checked only if they appear suspicious.
  - e. Numerous rotating surveillance cameras are positioned in the security square.

5. **Territorial deployment in the Beirut region:** Hezbollah made preparations for a possible incursion of Israeli forces landing on the shore near Beirut and attempting to infiltrate into the southern suburb. For that purpose, the organization has established a **“perimeter defense” system in Beirut**, which includes anti-tank and anti-aircraft squads deployed on the streets of the Shi'ite districts and on the roofs of buildings. The Shi'ite districts of Beirut are mostly composed of high-rise buildings, enabling


Hezbollah to operate from apartments on the upper floors and roofs and giving a substantial advantage to a force defending the districts against an incursion. Furthermore, the organization has a **naval unit** deployed along the shoreline, notably in the Shi'ite district of Ouzai, which is integrated into the organization's defensive and offensive plans.<sup>2</sup>

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<sup>2</sup> On July 14, an Iranian ground-to-sea C-802 missile was fired from the shore of Beirut at the Israeli Navy Ship Hanit, killing four sailors.

## B. Examples of aerial photographs of Hezbollah targets attacked by the Israeli Air Force in south Beirut

6. The following are aerial photographs of Hezbollah targets in Harat Hreik, attacked and destroyed by the Israeli Air Force during the war. IDF attacks targeted **specific** Hezbollah sites in the district, where Hezbollah placed extensive military infrastructure in many civilian houses.



**An aerial photograph with 10 Hezbollah targets attacked by the Air Force in Harat Hreik (enlarged views of the sites before and after the attack appear below)**

**Target 1**



**The house of Hezbollah leader Hassan Nasrallah  
argets 2 and 3**



**Two Hezbollah bases**

## Target 4



**Fadlallah Center, Hezbollah's office building**

## Target 5

Before the Air Force attack...



...and After



A Hezbollah base



**The building complex housing Hezbollah's headquarters**

## Target 7

**Before the Air  
Force attack...**




**And After...**



**Hezbollah base serving for terrorist activity**

## Target 8

**Before the Air Force attack...**



**And after...**



**Buildings housing Hezbollah offices**

## Target 9



**Hezbollah's security center**


## Target 10



**Hezbollah's Al-Manar television station**

## C. Examples of Hezbollah's bases, offices, operatives' houses, arms and ammunition, and hotspots of ground warfare inside population centers in south Lebanon<sup>3</sup>

**centers population the showing Lebanon south of map A referred to in this section's examples**



**The population centers referred to in the examples**

<sup>3</sup> The examples cited in this section and the one dealing with the Beqa'a Valley refer to the period before the second Lebanon war (except for the examples of hot spots of ground warfare).

# LOCATIONS OF THE MILITARY INFRASTRUCTURE IN THE VILLAGES OF SOUTH LEBANON AND A DESCRIPTION OF THE GROUND WARFARE WAGED THERE BY HEZBOLLAH

## A. Overview

7. Documents detailing Hezbollah's defense plans to counter a possible IDF assault in south Lebanon were seized in the second Lebanon war. The plans were based on **the concept of waging persistent ground warfare inside the villages of south Lebanon and using them as bases for firing on Israeli population centers**. A clear testimony to that effect can be found in **Al-Muntazar-2**, a plan detailing the **defense plan of Deir Miness, a town in the eastern sector** (see Appendix 1(ii)), based on warfare inside and from the town.<sup>4</sup>
  
8. What follows are examples of **four population centers in south Lebanon**, in which an extensive military infrastructure was established in the years before the war. These population centers were used by Hezbollah to wage persistent fighting against the IDF; a short description of that fighting (based on a preliminary debriefing) will be given in this section. Examples of Hezbollah's headquarters, bases, offices, and storehouses in **other south Lebanese towns and villages** will be presented later.

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
<sup>4</sup> As already mentioned, such activity conducted by Hezbollah, based on deliberate blending with the civilian population, constitutes a war crime.

# HEZBOLLAH BY WAGED WARFARE GROUND THE OF DESCRIPTION IN SOUTH LEBANESE TOWNS AND VILLAGES AND THE GENERAL INFRASTRUCTURE MILITARY THE

## A. Bint Jbeil

**Hezbollah's military infrastructure in the Bint Jbeil-Ainata region inside civilian houses**

**1.-20 Base**  
(Five bases do not appear on the aerial photograph)  
**22-26. Weapons storehouses**  
(Fifteen storehouses do not appear on the aerial photograph)



## Hezbollah's military infrastructure in the midst of the residential area of the town of Bint Jbeil

**Number of operatives:** About 60 regular operatives are routinely found in the village, including about 15 logistics operatives responsible for the town's storehouses. The actual number of operatives who fought in the Bint Jbeil-Einata region during the second Lebanon war is between 100-150, including about 40 Special Force operatives.

**Arms and ammunition:** Stored in Bint Jbeil before the war were arms, ammunition and equipment that were supposed to be sufficient for combat lasting more than a week. Some of the equipment was stored in storehouses placed inside civilian residential buildings.

**Fighting:** The Bint Jbeil-Maroun al-Ras region was the site of sustained, persistent fighting against the IDF.



**An enlarged view of the Al-Dawra district in the town of Bint Jbeil. The storehouse is marked in red, with a nearby residential building marked in yellow.**



**An enlarged view of an arms storehouse situated on the main street of the Al-Dawra district. The storehouse is situated in a civilian house and is surrounded by other civilian house**

### **The fighting waged by Hezbollah in the town of Bint Jbeil<sup>5</sup>**

9. Following Hezbollah's encounter with IDF forces in the region of Maroun al-Ras (July 19-20), the organization realized that the IDF was preparing to launch an offensive against the town of Bint Jbeil. Accordingly, it brought forces to this region and **reinforced** them with dozens of skilled operatives as well as unit Nasr the from operatives Force Special in sabotage, anti-tank, and anti-aircraft warfare.
10. On July 23, the IDF forces launched a ground offensive that focused on the town of Bint Jbeil. **Hezbollah terrorists used the military**

**infrastructure they had prepared in advance and hidden amidst the town's civilian buildings to conduct persistent fighting against the IDF. The Bint Jbeil region also served as a key rocket launching site for attacks against Israel** (see below).

11. As IDF activity continued, and as it became clear that the region of Bint Jbeil was the IDF's main target in south Lebanon, Hezbollah reinforced the region with manpower and arms from the Nasr unit. Dozens of operatives skilled in various fields (artillery, sabotage, anti-tank and anti-aircraft warfare, and intelligence), were infiltrated into the region under the cover of darkness. Thus, during the last week of July, **about 100-150 Hezbollah operatives** were active in the Bint Jbeil region. They maintained a **low profile and blended in with the local population; at times, they dressed in civilian clothes and did not bear any clearly identifiable military markings.**
  
12. In the combat waged in and around Bint Jbeil (July 25-26), Hezbollah extensively employed **anti-tank weapons** of various kinds (including recoilless guns and anti-tank rockets). The use of anti-tank weapons contributed greatly to the high number of IDF casualties. Besides fighting against the IDF, Hezbollah also conducted **extensive logistics activities** to supply its forces near the village.

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<sup>5</sup> This section is based on preliminary reports by the Israeli Northern Command and on information

13. It should be noted that Hezbollah waged fierce fighting **from inside civilian houses, where the organization's operative units were placed.** The organization's operatives used gunfire and anti-tank fire against IDF soldiers **from inside civilian houses.** On more than one occasion they gained an operative advantage against IDF forces that found themselves inside a "killing zone" (while moving between Hezbollah-controlled houses or while remaining in buildings identified and charges explosive placed had Hezbollah organization). the by **booby traps in civilian houses** where it assumed the IDF would operate. Dozens of Hezbollah operatives were killed during the fighting—a relatively high number considering the limited space.

14. **The pattern of warfare waged by Hezbollah in Bint Jbeil (and other towns and villages in south Lebanon) is forbidden by the international laws governing armed conflict, which require making distinction between civilians and combatants.** That required the IDF to return fire and act against the Hezbollah operatives, who attacked from civilian houses. **IDF activity is permissible under military law, since by operating from the buildings Hezbollah turned them into legitimate military targets.**

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received during the war. It is not a comprehensive summary of the fighting in Bint Jbeil.

## Examples of arms and ammunition seized by the IDF in civilian houses in Bint Jbeil



**A camera for intelligence collection and an RPG-7 launcher**



**Russian-made Konkurs anti-tank missiles, found in the storehouse of one of the town's houses**



**A camera for intelligence collection and an RPG-7 launcher**



**An RPG-7 launcher**




**US-made TOW missiles in original container**



**Communications devices, including a radio frequency scanner (left)**

## B. Aita al-Shaab

### The military infrastructure in the village of Aita al-Shaab located inside civilian houses



**An aerial photograph of Hezbollah bases, arms storehouses, and a local headquarters in the village of Aita al-Shaab. As can be seen, Hezbollah's arms storehouses and bases are found throughout the village, in the midst of residential areas.**

## **Hezbollah's military infrastructure in the village of Aita al-Shaab**

**Number of operatives:** 60-70

**Arms and ammunition:** small arms, anti-tank, mortars, explosive charges

**Reinforcements during the war:** mostly arms and ammunition transferred to the village.

### **The Hezbollah headquarters in Aita al-Shaab**



**The location of the house (circled). It is situated between civilian buildings.**

**An enlarged view of the house that served as the Hezbollah headquarters**



**Description of the building: a one-storey building with entrances from east and west. The western entrance leads to a stairway connected to a room in the attic. The parking is to the east and can be accessed from the south.**

### **The warfare waged by Hezbollah in Aita al-Shaab<sup>6</sup>**

- 15.** Starting August 1, 2006, IDF forces began surrounding and attacking the village of Aita al-Shaab in order to destroy Hezbollah's military infrastructure there. According to a testimony by **Muhammad Abd al-Hamid Srour**, one of the Hezbollah detainees and a native of the village, **most residents had fled from the village.** They left the village houses and stores open so that they could be used by Hezbollah fighters.
  
- 16.** **About 30 squads of Hezbollah fighters operated** in the village region. IDF forces identified three anti-tank squads, ten flat-trajectory fire squads, and three reconnaissance squads. **A front command post was situated** in the village. It coordinated the activities of Hezbollah fighters and operated through the territorial subdivision headquarters near the

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<sup>6</sup> According to a preliminary report prepared by the Israeli Northern Command.

village of **Aitit** (southeast of Tyre). According to a testimony given by one of the Hezbollah detainees, about 25 regular anti-tank operatives resided in the village (see below).

17. As the IDF forces approached the urban territory, they were subjected to anti-tank fire from inside the village houses and from squads deployed in the from firing deliberate again, Once village. the around positions key village houses forced the IDF to return fire at civilian buildings used by Hezbollah. The resulting damage stemmed from Hezbollah's unethical activity, violating the principle of distinction and operating from inside civilian houses.

### **A Hezbollah operative uncovers a bunker underneath a house to an Al-Jazeera reporter**

18. On August 19, Al-Jazeera broadcasted an interview with one of the Hezbollah operatives who had fought in Aita al-Shaab. The operative, dressed in uniform and wearing a helmet, appeared relatively old, and testified that he had spent two years in the Israeli prison before his release in 2000 (see **Appendix 2(i)** for the recorded interview).
19. The operative told the Al-Jazeera reporter about hand-to-hand battles that took place in the village between entrenched Hezbollah operatives and IDF forces. He also mentioned that Hezbollah had laid explosive charges in the combat zone. During the interview, he took the reporter **inside a bunker dug under a civilian house, which could only be reached by entering the house itself**. He told the reporter that Hezbollah operatives used to hide there during the Israeli Air Force attacks and that the operatives in hiding had gotten used to the bombings. He also noted that supplies of food and ammunition were brought into the bunker during the Air Force attacks.



**The entrances to the bunker through a room in a residential building**




**An inside view of the bunker**

## Testimonies of Hezbollah detainees

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### The testimony of Muhammad Abd al-Hamid Srour



20. According to **Muhammad Abd al-Hamid Srour**, an operative in Hezbollah's anti-tank unit from the village of Aita al-Shaab, Hezbollah's arms and ammunition were stored in the villagers' houses. **He said that the house owners were not always aware of the precise contents of Hezbollah's storehouses** (that is, Hezbollah turned the residents into a living shield without their knowledge or consent, which constitutes a war crime).
21. He related that **Hezbollah's official centers in the village such as the "culture center" or the "administrative center" held no arms and ammunition since, in Hezbollah's assessment, such places could become targets for the IDF's attacks.**
22. According to Muhammad Srour, most of the village residents left as the fighting began. **During the fighting, anti-tank missiles were smuggled into the village inside backpacks carried by operatives, dressed in civilian clothes and riding a motorcycle with a white flag.** It should be noted that the use of a white flag to grant immunity to combat activity or to pose for a civilian or humanitarian element **constitutes a war crime.**

## The testimony of Hussein Ali Mahmoud Suleiman



**Hussein Ali Mahmoud Suleiman**

- 23.** Hussein Ali Mahmoud Suleiman is a Hezbollah **anti-tank operative who took part in the abduction of two IDF soldiers (July 12)**. During interrogation, he said that he had been instructed **to arrive at the anti-tank base in the village of Aita al-Shaab following the abduction**. He then settled in one of the houses on the outskirts of the village, where he was caught. In also related that **25 regular anti-tank operatives** were in the village of Aita al-Shaab. He also reported on **the use of anti-tank weapons in the village and pinpointed buildings in the aerial photograph—including residential buildings, where the anti-tank operatives had stayed. Thus, for example:**



**A building where about 20 anti-tank operatives gathered and waited for instructions from a commander**

### C. Ghandouriyeh-Froun

#### **The military infrastructure in the village of Ghandouriyeh located inside civilian houses**



**Arms storehouses, a bunker, and operatives' quarters in the village of Ghandouriyeh**

## Hezbollah's military infrastructure

**Number of operatives:** At least 50 Hezbollah operatives.

**it where houses, village the within bunker a built Hezbollah arms: and Bases** stored arms and ammunition.

**Reinforcements during the war:** In addition to the organization's operatives ordinarily residing in the village, reinforcements were brought in during the war.

## The warfare waged by Hezbollah in the village of Ghandouriyeh<sup>7</sup>

24. On August 9, an IDF force prepared to move west from the village of Al-Taybe toward Qantara to cross Wadi al-Saluqi and take over the villages of **Froun and Ghandouriyeh**. After a two-day delay, infantry and armored forces began moving to Ghandouriyeh. An IDF brigade (some landed by helicopter in the Froun-Ghandouriyeh region and some crossing Wadi al-Saluqi) met with stubborn Hezbollah resistance.

25. Hezbollah deployed in the Ghandouriyeh-Froun region to hinder the IDF's maneuvers there, inflict casualties, and prevent the forces from Hezbollah-into penetration a was Saluki the crossing Since west. Litani the of south deyolped) unit Nasr the territory, movingcontrolled River) concentrated most of its efforts there. That was reflected in the **massive deployment of anti-tank squads armed with advanced Kornet missiles and the**

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<sup>7</sup> According to a report prepared by the Israeli Northern Command.

**extensive reinforcement of Hezbollah operatives in the Froun-Ghandouriyeh region, far beyond what is customary in routine times.**



**The Kornet launcher seized at a post in Ghandouriyeh**



**Right: a Russian-made Kornet missile in its original container, seized in the village of Ghandouriyeh. Left: the remains of a Kornet missile found in the village**

26. **The village of Ghandouriyeh was Hezbollah's main combat area, with about 50 operatives** and large quantities of various kinds of arms. These included small arms, machineguns, and advanced anti-tank missiles, mostly located in houses overlooking the path to the village from Wadi al-

Saluqi. There were also lookouts who provided the Hezbollah fighters with information on the movement and position of the IDF forces.

27. It should be noted that the arms were deployed in **a large number of civilian houses, which served as firing positions and allowed Hezbollah operatives to quickly move from one position to the next.** Hezbollah operatives attempted to initiate close contact with the IDF forces. **Over 20 Hezbollah operatives were killed** during the fighting, a relatively large number considering the small combat area.
  
28. Various arms and ammunition were seized in the village of Ghandouriyeh:
  - a. Eight complete kits of advanced Kornet anti-tank missiles (including heat-seeking devices, the missiles themselves, and shipping certificates<sup>8</sup>)
  
  - b. 30 Kalashnikov assault rifles
  
  - c. 10 PK machineguns
  
  - d. 6 communications devices
  
  - e. Uniforms and helmets
  
  - f. PK machineguns

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
<sup>8</sup> These are advanced Russian-made anti-tank systems, which were delivered to Hezbollah by Syria.



**Right: arms and ammunition seized in Ghandouriyeh. Left: Russian-made Kornet missiles in their original container**

## An aerial photograph of a missile storehouse in the village of Froun (about 2 km north of Ghandouriyeh)

### Overview



A rocket storehouse in a two-storey building in the Froun district of Al-Sultan. The building with the storehouse formerly served as a bakery. It is situated on the village road near two Husseiniyas and adjacent to one of them.<sup>9</sup>

### An enlarged view of the rocket storehouse



An enlarged view of the building where the storehouse is located. It is clearly visible that the storehouse is adjacent to one of the Husseiniyas.

<sup>9</sup> **Husseiniya**, named after Hussein Bin Ali, is a Shi'ite religious community center conducting culture, education, and welfare activities. Many Husseiniyas are found in the towns and villages of south Lebanon.

29. Fifteen rockets, 40 mortar shells, 10 Sagger missiles, a box of hand grenades, and several crates of ammunition were found in the village of **Froun**.

## D. Maroun al-Ras

### Hezbollah's military infrastructure in Maroun al-Ras located inside civilian houses

