Report on Human Rights Practices for 2005

Israel occupied the West Bank, Gaza Strip, Golan Heights, and East Jerusalem during the 1967 War. In 2005 the population of Gaza was approximately 1.4 million, of the West Bank (excluding East Jerusalem) approximately 2.4 million, and of East Jerusalem about 415 thousand, including approximately 177 thousand Israelis. Approximately 250 thousand Israelis resided in the West Bank. Various Oslo-era agreements transferred civil responsibility to the Palestinian Authority (PA) for Gaza and parts of the West Bank and divided the territories into three types of areas denoting different levels of PA and Israeli control. However, after Palestinian extremist groups resumed violence in 2000, Israeli forces resumed control over a number of these areas, citing the PA's failure to abide by its security responsibilities. On February 8, Israeli Prime Minister Ariel Sharon and newly elected PA President Mahmud Abbas agreed to cease violence and hostilities completely. During the year violence declined, and Israeli-imposed internal and external access restrictions lessened.

Between August 15 and September 12, the Israeli government evacuated all 21 settlements in Gaza and 4 settlements in the northern West Bank. PA security forces assumed overall security responsibility for Gaza. The Rafah crossing was closed beginning September 7, pending an agreement on border crossings. By mid-November the PA and Egypt controlled the Rafah border, and by year's end there was limited Palestinian transit through the crossing.

The PA has a democratically elected president and legislative council, which select and endorse a prime minister and cabinet. On January 9, Palestine Liberation Organization (PLO) Chairman Mahmud Abbas won approximately 62 percent of the popular vote in a presidential election regarded as generally free and fair. The PA held multiple rounds of municipal elections during the year; however, Abbas postponed Palestinian Legislative Council (PLC) elections, scheduled for July 17, until January 25, 2006.

Israel exercised occupation authority through the Ministry of Defense's Office of Coordination and Liaison.

During the year 190 Palestinians were killed during Israeli military operations. A total of 50 Israelis, including 9 Israeli Defense Force (IDF) soldiers and 2 foreigners in both Israel and the occupied territories were killed in terrorist attacks. In October 2003 three US security personnel were killed and one wounded when a bomb detonated under their car in Gaza. At year's end there had been no progress by the PA's investigative team, and the case remained unsolved.

The PA generally did not maintain effective control over its security forces, and there were reports that members of the PA security forces committed numerous, serious abuses, including torture. The Israeli government maintained effective control of its security forces; however, there were reports that Israeli security forces used excessive force and abused and tortured detainees.

In September the Israeli Supreme Court reaffirmed its earlier decision that the separation barrier is permissible under both international law and Israeli law, however, the Israeli Supreme Court questioned whether the segment of the barrier at issue utilized the least intrusive route available, and it asked the government to consider whether there was an alternative route. The court further found that in September there were 43 remaining petitions regarding other portions of the wall that now would be decided by the court. In an advisory opinion, the International Court of Justice concluded in 2004 that the barrier was contrary to international law in a number of respects.

torture
arbitrary and prolonged detention
poor prison conditions
infringement of privacy and freedom of speech
insufficient measures to prevent attacks by terrorist groups either within the occupied territories or within Israel
numerous instances of violence against Israeli civilians, resulting in deaths and injuries in the West Bank, Gaza, and Israel
corruption and lack of transparency
domestic abuse of women
societal discrimination against women and persons with disabilities and child labor

damage to civilians in the conduct of military operations
numerous, serious abuses of civilians and detainees
failure to take disciplinary action in cases of abuse
improper application of security internment procedures
use of temporary detention facilities that were austere and overcrowded
limited cooperation with nongovernmental organizations (NGOs)

Section 1 Respect for the Integrity of the Person, Including Freedom From:
a. Arbitrary or Unlawful Deprivation of Life

Killings by Palestinian and Israeli security forces and by Israeli settlers and Palestinian militant groups remained a serious problem.

According to Human Rights Watch (HRW), as of June the IDF reported 131 criminal investigations into the use of weapons that resulted in injury or death, resulting in 28 indictments and 7 convictions, with the remaining cases still in process. The IDF also reported that as of June, 611 investigations were opened in response to complaints of physical abuse, such as beatings, and complaints of property destruction. These investigations have led to 77 indictments.

On July 8, an Israeli security guard patrolling the separation barrier shot and killed a 15-year-old Palestinian boy. According to Palestinian witnesses, the boy was working in his family's agricultural fields near Bayt Liqya in the West Bank. Israeli authorities placed the guard under house arrest pending police investigation. At year's end there were no results from the investigation.

On August 17, Asher Weisgan, from the Israeli settlement of Shvut Rachel, shot and killed four Palestinian workers and wounded two others. On August 31, Israeli authorities in Jerusalem District Court indicted Weisgan on four counts of murder. At year's end the case had not been tried.

On September 30, IDF soldiers shot and killed an unarmed 13-year-old Palestinian boy during a pre-dawn raid on the Askar refugee camp, near Nablus. Initial IDF inquiry concluded the soldiers violated rules of engagement. At year's end the IDF was studying whether to conduct a military police investigation.

On October 27, Israeli forces launched a missile strike on a car in Gaza's Jabaliya refugee camp reportedly carrying an Islamic Jihad operative. Six other persons were killed and 19 wounded.

On November 1, Israeli missile strikes killed an al-Aqsa Martyrs' Brigades commander and a local Hamas leader in their car at the Jabaliya refugee camp north of the Gaza Strip. Nine bystanders were also injured.

On November 9, an Israeli border policeman shot and killed 35-year-old Samir Ribhi Da'ari, a Palestinian from Issawiyeh village, a neighborhood of East Jerusalem. Israeli authorities initially claimed that Da'ari attemptedto drive his vehicle overthe border policeman during the arrest of Da'ari's brother. A subsequent autopsy revealed Da'ari was shot in the back; at year's end court action against the policeman was pending.

On December 22, an Israeli raid in Nablus killed a reported commander of a local militia as well as two other Palestinians.

On February 10, Palestinian gunmen attacked the Gaza Central Prison and killed three prisoners as they awaited trial for two separate shooting deaths. The gunmen took one individual from the prison to the al-Burayj refugee camp and killed him publicly. The attackers were reportedly members of the families of the two shooting victims. At year's end there had been no arrests.

On July 23, Palestinian militants attacked vehicles traveling in the vicinity of the Abu Holi checkpoint in Gaza. Three IDF soldiers were injured, and two Israeli civilians were killed. Three militant groups claimed responsibility.

On August 24, a Palestinian stabbed two Jewish yeshiva students from a Western country in the Old City of Jerusalem and killed one. On October 8, Israeli security forces arrested a Palestinian from Hebron, who subsequently confessed to the killing. At year's end there was no further legal action.

On September 7, approximately100 armed men attacked the Gaza City home of Musa Arafat, former PA Gaza National Security Forces chief, and killed Arafat and two bodyguards. The Popular Resistance Committees claimed responsibility for the attack. At year's end the PA had issued but not served an arrest warrant for onePopular Resistance Committeemember.

On September 26, assailants, reportedly from the al-Aqsa Martyrs' Brigades, killed a Palestinian man suspected of collaborating with Israeli authorities. The killers kidnapped him days earlier from the Askar refugee camp near Nablus.

On October 2, a Palestinian civil police commander and two civilians were killed during a fight with Hamas members in Gaza. At least 51 others were injured, and 2 Gaza City police stations were heavily damaged.

On December 8, a knife-wielding Palestinian killed an Israeli soldier at the Qalandiya checkpoint north of Jerusalem; at year's end the Palestinian was awaiting trial.

On December 29, a Palestinian suicide bomber killed an Israeli guard and two Palestinians at a checkpoint near Tulkarm in the West Bank. The Palestinian Islamic Jihad claimed responsibility.

In December 2002 'Imran Abu Hamdiyah, a 17-year-old Palestinian, was found dead in Hebron. In April 2003 Israeli officials arrested four border police officers on charges that they beat and then dumped Hamdiyah from their moving vehicle. On September 22, the Jerusalem District Court sentenced one of the four officers to four and one-half years in prison for assisting in Hamdiyah's death. At year's end the trial of the remaining three officers continued.

In October 2004 an Israeli settler, Boaz Albert, shot and killed 18-year-old Salman Yussuf Safadi near the settlement of Yizhar. On February 27, the Israeli police informed B'tselem that Albert claimed self defense. The investigation was completed and forwarded to the Israeli state attorney for review; however, at year's end the State Attorney's Office had yet to respond or charge Albert.

In September 2004 an Israeli settler, Yehoshua Elitzur, shot and killed Palestinian taxi-driver Sa'al Jabara near Nablus. Witnesses said Elitzur shot Jabara at close range after he slowed his car to ask whether Elitzur needed assistance. On June 9, an Israeli court convicted Elitzur of manslaughter. At year's end Elitzur awaited sentencing.

In August 2004 unidentified assailants threw grenades into a room holding suspected Palestinian collaborators in the Gaza Central Prison. The attack killed two and injured six prisoners. Palestinian security officials arrested two policemen, who allegedly carried out the attack on behalf of Hamas. At year's end no further legal action had been taken against the officers.

Three US security personnel in a diplomatic convoy were killed in an attack in Gaza in October 2003. At year's end there was no progress by the PA's investigative team, and the case remained unsolved. During the year foreign governments continued to press the PA to resolve the case.

There were no reports of politically motivated disappearances during the year. However, the PA neither prevented nor adequately investigated kidnappings of Palestinians or foreign nationals that occurred in conjunction with rising lawlessness in the West Bank and Gaza. For example on December 21, in northern Gaza, armed Palestinians kidnapped two foreign citizen school administrators. After PA official intervention, the kidnappers released their victims, but they have not been apprehended.

PA Basic Law prohibits torture or force against detainees; however, international human rights groups stated that torture was a significant problem, and its use was not restricted to persons detained on security charges.

Torture by PA security forces reportedly was widespread. Documentation of abuses by PA security forces was very limited, due partly to hesitancy by alleged victims to make public claims of torture or abuse against PA authorities. Palestinian security officers have no formal guidelines regarding legal interrogation conduct; most convictions were based largely on confessions.

Israeli law, as interpreted by an Israeli high court decision, prohibits torture and several interrogation techniques but allows "moderate physical pressure" against detainees considered to possess information about an imminent terrorist attack.

The Association for Civil Rights in Israel 2004 report stated that the Public Committee Against Torture submitted over 100 complaints of torture in 2003.The Physicians for Human Rights in Israel reported that during the year, Israeli security forces used psychological abuse more frequently, including threats of house demolition or of questioning elderly parents, and kept prisoners in harsh conditions, including solitary confinement for long periods, rather than subjecting them to physical abuse. Israeli law prohibits forced confessions, but most security case convictions were based on confessions made before defendants had legal representation.

A detainee may not have legal representation until after interrogation, a process that may last weeks. The International Committee of the Red Cross (ICRC) is notified of arrests 12 days after they occur, and the ICRC is allowed to visit detainees 14 days after arrest. Detainees sometimes stated in court that their confessions were coerced, but there were no instances in which judges excluded such confessions.

On September 28, IDF soldiers entered a home in Tulkarm and ordered the residents out of the house, after which the soldiers ordered the men to undress in the street. B'tselem sought clarification from the IDF regarding these procedures. At year's end the IDF had not responded.

On November 21, Israeli soldiers assaulted Palestinian students in Hebron. The students had protested near a checkpoint against searches of their persons and possessions. At year's end no action had been taken against the soldiers.

In January 2004 at the Huwwara checkpoint, an IDF sergeant handcuffed and beat a Palestinian man in front of his family. The sergeant was convicted by a military judicial panel in September 2004, sentenced to 6 months in jail, and demoted to the rank of private; he also admitted beating at least 8 other Palestinians and smashing windshields of 10 taxicabs. At year's end there was no report on further legal action.

In September 2004 the Israeli Justice Ministry indicted five border policemen accused of severely abusing two Palestinians detained for lacking the necessary permits in Abu Dis. According to the indictment, the border policemen forced the Palestinians into a building; beat and abused them with rifles, boots, and fists before forcing them from a second floor window. On February 13, a Jerusalem court convicted 1 of the 5 policemen and sentenced him to 14 months in jail and 1-year probation. At year's end the trial for the other defendants continued.

In 2003 IDF soldiers at the Huwwara checkpoint outside Nablus demanded that two Palestinians clean the checkpoint. When the men refused, the soldiers handcuffed, blindfolded, and detained them for several hours. When B'tselem investigated the incident, the soldiers claimed their superiors had ordered them to do it. B'tselem requested an official investigation of the incident in 2004; however, at year's end there was no official response.

PA prison conditions were poor. Facilities were dilapidated and neglected; most were destroyed during the Intifada, and prisoners were kept informally incarcerated. There were separate facilities to hold juvenile prisoners. Prison facilities were poorly protected and subject to intrusions by outsiders. The PA generally permitted the ICRC access to detainees and allowed regular inspections of prison conditions; however, the PA denied access to some detainees for 14 days following their arrests. The PA permitted monitoring of its prisons, but human rights groups, humanitarian organizations, and lawyers reported difficulties gaining access to specific detainees. Human rights organizations stated their ability to visit PA prisons and detention centers varied depending on which organization ran the facility. Human rights monitors said prison authorities did not consistently permit access to PA detention facilities, and they rarely could see inmates being interrogated.

Conditions of Israeli permanent prison facilities generally met international standards. Provisional detention centers were less likely to meet standards. According to the 2004 Israel Public Defender's Office report on detention facilities of the Prisons Service and Police, detainees in the Jerusalem Russian Compound facility endured overcrowded cells and suffocating conditions. Detention and interrogation facilities for Palestinian detainees, including the four interrogation centers (Shikma, Kishon, Petah Tikva, and the Jerusalem Internment Center) were austere, overcrowded, provisional facilities. Israel held at least 117 Palestinian prisoners in some form of solitary confinement. Israel permitted monitoring of prison conditions by the ICRC and other groups, although human rights groups reported delays and difficulties in gaining access to specific detainees.

The NGO Palestinian Prisoners Club reported that there were approximately 1,153 medical cases in Israeli prisons. Following the August 2004 hunger strike, Israeli authorities increased medical attention and authorized several private doctors to visit prisoners; however, prisoners continued to claim that medical attention was inadequate.

On July 28,Public Committee Against Torture in Israel demanded Israeli authorities investigate the death of 18-year-old Jawab Abu Maghasib, who died while in administrative detention at Ketziot prison in Israel. Abu Maghasib, who had been under administrative detention since 2002, reportedly suffered from a medical condition.
d. Arbitrary Arrest or Detention

Palestinian law prohibits arbitrary arrest and detention; however, it allows police to hold detainees without charges for 24 hours. Courts may approve detention without charges for up to 45 days. A trial must start within six months of arrest or the detainee must be released. In practice the PA detained many Palestinians without charge for months.

Israeli security forces in the West Bank and Gaza consisted of the IDF, the Israel Security Agency (Shin Bet), the Israeli National Police (INP), and the Border Police, an operational arm of the INP that is under IDF command when operating in the occupied territories. Israeli military courts tried Palestinians accused of security offenses.

Palestinian police were normally responsible for security and law enforcement for Palestinians and other non‑Israelis in PA-controlled areas of the West Bank and Gaza. Palestinian security forces included the National Security Forces, the Preventive Security Organization (PSO), the General Intelligence Service, or Mukhabarat, the Presidential Security Force, and the Coastal Police. Other quasi-military security organizations, such as the Military Intelligence Organization, exercised the equivalent of law enforcement powers. The General Intelligence Law, signed into effect in October, placed the Mukhabarat under PA President Abbas's authority.

In April Abbas placed operational control of the security services under the interior minister. While the order was given to consolidate the security forces under the interior minister, this was not done in practice, and there were ongoing problems in the delineation of responsibilities, with no clear chain of command. In practice the Mukhabarat and the PSO maintained independent commands and reported directly to the president. On September 25, Abbas restructured the Palestinian National Security Council, incorporating competing security interests. The PA lacked full control over security forces. On December 20, armed members of Fatah-affiliated Al-Aqsa Brigades briefly seized Bethlehem's municipal building, reportedly demanding employment.

PA security forces detained persons without informing judicial authorities and often ignored laws protecting detainee rights and court decisions calling for release of alleged security criminals. At year's end Palestinian sources estimated the PA imprisoned approximately 239 suspected of collaboration with Israel. Alleged collaborators often were held without evidence and denied access to lawyers, their families, or doctors.

Under applicable occupation orders, Israeli security personnel may arrest without warrant or hold for questioning a person suspected of having committed or being likely to commit a security related offense. Israeli Military Order 1507 permits the Israeli security forces to detain persons for 10 days, during which period they cannot see a lawyer or appear before court. Administrative security detention orders could be issued for up to six-month periods and renewed indefinitely by judges. The law expressly authorizes an appeal of the circumstances of each security detention order to the Israeli Supreme Court. No detainee has ever successfully appealed a detention order under this process. Israeli Military Order 1369 provides for a 7‑year prison term for anyone not responding to a summons in security cases. Suspects are entitled to an attorney, but this right can be deferred during interrogation, which can last up to 90 days. Israeli authorities stated that they attempted to post notification of arrests within 48 hours, but senior officers may delay notification for up to 12 days.

Additionally, a military commander may request a judge to extend this period in security cases indefinitely. The Israeli military orders required notification of family members of specific cases of detention; however, many families reported serious problems in learning of the status and whereabouts of prisoners. Evidence for administrative detentions in security cases was often unavailable to the detainee or his attorneys due to security classification, but it was made available to the court.

Palestinians claimed that security detainees held under Israeli security detention military orders were in fact political prisoners. At year's end Israel held approximately 9,170 Palestinian security prisoners, of whom at least 740 were in administrative detention.

In February and June, the Israeli government released 898 Palestinians in accord with the February Sharm al-Shaykh agreement. Most had served more than two-thirds of their sentences.

During the year Israel conducted some mass arrests in the West Bank; however, most arrests targeted specific persons. Beginning on September 25, in response to rocket attacks from Gaza, the IDF arrested over 300 suspected Hamas and Palestinian Islamic Jihad activists in the West Bank in a period of days, including a number of Hamas municipal election candidates.

Palestinians transferred to prisons in Israel had difficulty obtaining legal representation because only Israeli citizens or Palestinian lawyers with Jerusalem identification cards were permitted to visit them. However, in 2004 the government revised procedures to permit more access by lawyers, and more lawyers exercised access. Israeli authorities in some instances scheduled appointments but then moved the prisoners to other prisons to delay lawyer‑client meetings for as long as 90 days.

The Israeli government frequently failed to notify foreign consular officials in a timely manner after detaining their citizens.

During the year Israel transferred one Palestinian from the West Bank to Gaza. On February 27, the IDF deported an 18-year-old Palestinian from Dheisheh refugee camp in Bethlehem to Gaza following his completion of a 14-month prison sentence. On February 20, Israel allowed 16 deportees to Gaza to return to the West Bank. At year's end approximately 40 others awaited permission to return to the West Bank.

The PA court system is based on Israeli military orders and legal codes, including Jordanian and Ottoman Law that predate the 1967 occupation. A High Judicial Council maintained authority over most court operations. In 2003 the PA justice minister ordered the state security courts terminated. However, Palestinian human rights groups charged the PA did not implement the justice minister's order adequately and called on the PA president to abolish these courts formally. On June 22, PA President Abbas ordered retrials for those sentenced to death by the state security courts. Military courts, established in 1995, have jurisdiction over police and security force personnel as well as crimes by civilians against security forces. In November Abbas issued a decree establishing a court for election issues to be composed of nine judges.

PA courts were inefficient, lacked staff and resources, and often did not ensure fair and expeditious trials. These problems predated PA jurisdiction and were aggravated by subsequent lack of PA attention. PA executive and security services frequently failed to implement court decisions and otherwise inhibited judicial independence.

Ongoing violence adversely affected PA administration of justice. Many police stations and incarceration facilities were damaged or destroyed. Travel restrictions, curfews, and closures significantly impeded administration of justice.

Israeli law provides for an independent judiciary, and the government generally respected this in practice. The IDF usually tried Palestinians accused of security offenses in the occupied territories in military courts. The law comprehensively defined security offenses and may include charges as varied as rock throwing or membership in outlawed terrorist organizations, such as Hamas or the Popular Front for the Liberation of Palestine. Military prosecutors brought charges. Israeli military courts rarely acquitted Palestinians charged with security offenses; sentences occasionally were reduced on appeal.

Israeli military trials followed the same evidentiary rules as in regular criminal cases. The accused is entitled to counsel, and a judge may assign counsel. Charges are made available to the defendant and the public in Hebrew, but the court may order an Arabic translation. The court may hear evidence in security cases denied to the defendant or his attorney; however, a conviction may not be based solely on such evidence. Convictions may not be based solely on confessions, although in practice some security prisoners were convicted on the basis of allegedly coerced confessions by themselves and others. Defendants can appeal through the Military High Court or to the civilian high court in certain instances.

The Israeli government sometimes delayed trials for very extended periods because Israeli security force witnesses did not appear, the defendant was not brought to court, files were lost, or travel restrictions delayed attorneys (see section 2.d.). Palestinian legal advocates alleged that delays were designed to pressure defendants to settle their cases.

Crowded facilities, poor arrangements for scheduling and holding attorney‑client consultations, and confessions prepared in Hebrew hindered defense efforts.

Israeli settlers were tried under Israeli law in the nearest Israeli district court. Civilian judges presided; Israeli law (not military orders) governed the standards of due process and admissibility of evidence. The Israeli government rarely prosecuted settlers for crimes against Palestinians and, in the rare instances when convicted, they regularly received lighter punishment than Palestinians convicted in Israeli courts (see section 1.a.). According to B'tselem, during the year the Israeli police claimed that it had conducted 299 investigations into reported settler attacks on Palestinians; indictments were filed in 65 of these investigations.

In May 2004 a Tel Aviv District Court convicted West Bank Fatah leader and PLC member, Marwan Barghuti, on three charges of murder and a charge of attempted murder involving terror attacks. Barghuti rejected the Israeli court's jurisdiction, did not mount a legal defense, and did not appeal the five consecutive life sentences he received. There was no further legal action during the year.

Pursuant to law the PA can impose the death penalty on a person convicted of any of 42 offenses. Military courts and state security courts have imposed most death sentences attributed to the PA. There is no judicial procedure to appeal these sentences, and only the PA president has the authority to ratify or alter the sentence. If the president does not act, the individual remains in jail.

On June 12, the PA executed four men, the first executions since 2002. The state security courts, established by the presidential decree in 1995 but terminated by the PA justice ministry in 2003, convicted one of the four executed men.

In November 2004 an Israeli military court delayed PLC member Husam Khader's trial until March 6. Khader was arrested in March 2003 for alleged involvement in Intifada-related violence. On November 27, after repeated delays, an Israeli military court sentenced Khader to seven years in jail for Intifada-related violence.

The PA required the attorney general to issue warrants for entry and searches of private property; however, Palestinian security services frequently ignored these requirements. Police searched homes without the consent of their owners. In some cases police forcibly entered premises.

Under occupation orders an IDF officer of the rank of lieutenant colonel or above could authorize entry of private homes and institutions without a warrant, based upon military necessity. On some occasions IDF personnel beat occupants and destroyed or looted property. Authorities stated that these were punishable violations of military regulations with compensation due.

Israeli security forces demolished and sealed the homes of Palestinians suspected of terrorism or the relatives of such suspects, without judicial review (see section 1.g.). According to B'tselem, from October 2001 to January, the Israeli government demolished 666 homes in the occupied territories as punishment. On February 17, Israeli Defense Minister Mofaz announced the cessation of punitive house demolitions.

On February 23, the IDF occupied a Palestinian home in Yatta village south of Hebron for two days. During the period the IDF confined seven family members, including three children and a sick elderly person, to one room.

Israel demolished many homes between the Rafah refugee camp and the border with Egypt on the grounds that some houses concealed tunnels used for weapons smuggling or provided cover for attacks against Israeli soldiers. However, there were no operations comparable to "Operation Rainbow" in May 2004, which destroyed 298 homes according to UN agencies and left approximately 3,800 persons homeless. Between 2000 and the Israeli withdrawal from Gaza, the IDF demolished approximately 1,500 buildings in Rafah making more than 15 thousand Palestinians homeless.

On August 21, IDF Chief of Staff Dan Halutz announced that there would be no legal action against the former IDF commander in the Gaza Strip, Ze'ev Zakai, for unauthorized demolition of 40 buildings in Khan Yunis. An IDF committee earlier determined that had Zakai requested permission to demolish the structures, it was reasonable to conclude he would have received it.

Israeli authorities limited Palestinian home construction, notably in East Jerusalem. Israeli authorities generally restricted Palestinian home building elsewhere in the West Bank and near Israeli settlements. According to the Israeli Committee Against House Demolitions (ICAHD), approximately 10 thousand structures in East Jerusalem were defined by the Israeli government as illegal; consequently, Jerusalem municipal authorities and the interior ministry systematically demolished such structures. In 2004 ICAHD reported over 150 buildings in East Jerusalem were destroyed, and 94 East Jerusalem structures were demolished during the year.

The IDF destroyed numerous citrus, olive, and date groves, and irrigation systems in Gaza, stating that Palestinians had been firing Qassam rockets from those areas. Human rights groups reported that over the past 3 years, 2,400 Palestinian olive trees were destroyed, mainly by Israeli settlers.

The IDF also cleared and took permanent control of privately owned Palestinian land to construct the separation barrier. According to the UN Office for the Coordination of Humanitarian Affairs (OCHA), the separation barrier was approximately 243 miles long, with 166 miles under construction, and was projected to extend 670 miles upon completion. OCHA noted as of October, the Israeli authorities, through military orders, had confiscated approximately 8,785 acres of West Bank land to construct the separation barrier. According to Israel it sought to build the barrier on public lands where possible, and where private land was used, provided opportunities for compensation. Palestinians largely declined to seek compensation out of concern that this would legitimize the Israeli land confiscations. Additionally, numerous cases were filed in Israeli courts challenging the route of the fence.

Human rights monitors reported that the IDF provided greater protection to Palestinian farmers from Israeli settler attacks than they did in the past. Still, Palestinians complained that the IDF measures gave insufficient time to complete the harvest and that they were limited in their ability to protect their property by curfews and travel restrictions. On August 22, Israeli settlers inflicted considerable damage to Palestinian homes and cars near the settlement of Homesh, which was scheduled to be evacuated. No settlers were charged. In October and November, Israeli NGOs documented attacks by settlers on Palestinians and their property in Salem, Hebron, and the Khoruba Valley resulting, among other damage, in destruction of approximately 300 olive trees. Israeli authorities took no action against the settlers.

In February Palestinian residents of Madama village, south of Nablus,claimed to police that settlers from the nearby Yizhar settlement deliberately sabotaged the village's water supply. Israeli police opened an investigation; however, at year's end there were no developments in the case.

g. Use of Excessive Force and Violations of Humanitarian Law in Internal and External Conflicts

Palestinian members of Hamas, Fatah-affiliated militant groups, and Palestinian Islamic Jihad attacked and killed Israeli civilians, foreign nationals, and soldiers, both in Israel and in the occupied territories. They used weapons in such a manner as to inflict casualties on noncombatants, such as suicide bombs, rockets, and mortars. In addition they often fired at Israeli security forces from civilian population areas, increasing the risk that Israeli return fire would harm noncombatants. The PA took some steps to prevent terrorist attacks and banned the display of weapons in public, but these steps did not prevent or deter numerous attacks. Armed members of various groups ignored PA directives; PA security has not consistently prevented them from displaying weapons in public. During the presidential campaign, Fatah presidential candidate Abbas publicly called the armed Intifada counterproductive to Palestinian interests.

In March the PA and Palestinian factions agreed to uphold a tahdiyah, or period of calm, whereby armed Palestinian groups would refrain from attacks on Israeli targets; however, during the year militant factions broke this agreement killing and injuring Israelis.

According to the PA health ministry, the Palestine Red Crescent Society (PRCS), and B'tselem, at least 190 Palestinians were killed during Israeli military and police operations during the year. The IDF stated that the majority of Palestinians killed were armed fighters or persons engaged in planning or carrying out violence against Israeli civilian and military targets. According to the PRCS, IDF operations and clashes with Palestinians resulted in injuries to approximately 900 Palestinians.

According to a June HRW report, Israeli military investigative practices were not "impartial, thorough, or timely." The report charged that the IDF had criminally investigated less than 5 percent of the civilian deaths since the start of the second Intifada in September 2000 until November 2004, and this failure fostered a climate of impunity within the IDF. The IDF stated it conducted 130 investigations involving incidents where soldiers opened fire against regulations, and issued 28 indictments, with 7 convictions, and 1 acquittal; the remaining 20 court cases were ongoing. The other incidents were still under investigation.

The IDF conducted numerous military incursions into Palestinian population centers in response to Palestinian mortar and antitank fire from the centers. These actions often resulted in civilian casualties. Israeli forces fired tank shells, heavy machine-gun rounds, and rockets from aircraft at targets in residential and business neighborhoods where they believed Palestinian gunfire originated. Palestinians often used civilian homes to fire upon Israeli forces and booby-trapped homes and apartment buildings. In response the IDF usually raided, and often destroyed, these buildings.

On January 31, IDF gunfire killed a 10-year-old Palestinian girl and injured a second. Both girls were inside their UN Relief and Works Agency for Palestine Refugees in the Near East (UNRWA) school in Rafah at the time of the incident. The IDF opened an investigation into the shooting;however, at year's end there had been no conclusion from the investigation.

In May 2004 in Rafah, two Palestinian children were shot in the head on the roof-terrace of their home while performing household chores. Amnesty International (AI) concluded that IDF snipers killed both; Israeli army officials suggested an explosive device set by Palestinians killed them. At year's end there was no information on any further official investigation.

In October 2004 IDF soldiers shot and killed Iman al-Hams, a 13-year-old Palestinian schoolgirl, as she approached an IDF outpost in the southern Gaza Strip. The girl approached the outpost carrying a bag of schoolbooks that troops suspected contained explosives. After the girl had been shot from a distance, the IDF company commander allegedly repeatedly fired his automatic weapon into her at close range. In November 2004 an IDF military court indicted the company commander for illegal use of weapons, obstructing justice, unbecoming behavior, and improper use of authority. On February 6, the military court released the company commander after a soldier who witnessed the incident recanted his testimony. Another witness stated that he could not confirm that the company commander had aimed his weapon at the girl. At year's end the family of Iman al-Hams awaited a decision from the Israeli high court on their petition for a broader investigation into the case.

In October 2004 the IDF severely damaged the Gaza City wastewater treatment plant resulting in substantial damage to parts of the plant funded by a Western aid organization. An investigation was begun into the incident; however, the IDF stated that the plant was not intentionally targeted. The Western aid organization has received no further information on the status of the investigation.

IDF soldiers reportedly fired without warning on trespassers in or near restricted areas. On April 9, IDF soldiers shot and killed three Palestinian teenagers near the border fence separating Gaza from Egypt. Palestinians said the youths were playing soccer, but the IDF charged that they were attempting to smuggle weapons. The IDF ordered an investigation; however, at year's end the investigation was not complete.

On August 24, IDF personnel raided the Tulkarm refugee camp and killed five Palestinians. The IDF initially claimed that those killed were connected to terrorist attacks in Israel. A subsequent investigation, however, revealed that three of the five killed were unarmed teenagers while the two adults, shot at close range, were unarmed, low-ranking militants. The IDF chief of staff ordered a special inquiry into the IDF raid; however, at year's end there were no results from the inquiry.

During the year according to Palestinian security and media reports, the IDF targeted for killing at least 30 Palestinians suspected of involvement in terrorism. IDF forces killed at least five bystanders in these operations--some were civilians; others were affiliated with terrorist organizations. Approximately 50 others, mostly bystanders, were injured during these operations. On September 25, the Israeli government announced resumption on a limited basis of targeted killings; it had halted such killings following the February Sharm al-Shaykh summit.

Israeli security personnel operating checkpoints killed a number of Palestinians. On July 18, the IDF opened fire in the direction of Palestinians waiting to cross the Abu Holi checkpoint in the Gaza Strip and killed a 14-year-old Palestinian boy. The IDF opened an investigation into the incident; however, at year's end there were no results.

While protecting the construction of the separation barrier, Israeli security personnel killed a number of Palestinians. On May 4, cousins Jamal Jaber Ibrahim Assi, age 15, and Odai Mufid Mahmud Assi, age 14, were shot and killed near Bayt Liqya, west of Ramallah, during clashes between Palestinian protesters and soldiers. According to Palestinian witnesses, IDF soldiers initially fired rubber bullets and tear gas, but subsequently they fired live ammunition. The IDF ordered a Military Police investigation and suspended the deputy company commander from operational duty until the completion of the investigation. At year's end the there were no conclusions from the investigation.

During the year Israeli forces delayed the movement of, and occasionally fired upon, medical personnel and ambulances.

On January 26, the IDF fired upon a PRCS ambulance that was being driven to evacuate an injured person near Qalqilya.

On February 10, the IDF denied access to a PRCS ambulance transporting a pregnant woman in the Gaza Strip from al-Mawassi enclave to a hospital in Khan Yunis. The security officials delayed access for over two hours before finally denying it.

On April 8, clashes occurred at the Qalandiya checkpoint between the IDF and Palestinian youths who were prohibited from entering Jerusalem for Friday prayers. Two Palestinians were shot.

The IDF abuse of Palestinians or their vehicles at checkpoints continued. In its 2004 report, Machsom Watch (an Israeli women's organization that monitors checkpoints in the West Bank and Jerusalem) alleged a series of abuses. On October 4, IDF soldiers manning the Huwwara checkpoint, south of Nablus, beat and kicked a Palestinian man, according to representatives from Machsom Watch. The Palestinian, who was hospitalized with a concussion and required stitches to his face, said that the beating occurred following an argument with an IDF soldiers on duty at the checkpoint.

Palestinians frequently threw stones and Molotov cocktails, and on occasion fired live ammunition at Israeli security forces. Israeli security forces on various occasions responded with tear gas, rubber bullets, and live fire, including tank fire.

Israeli forces used Palestinians as "human shields" in violation of Israeli law. In 2002 the Israeli high court granted an injunction against the use of Palestinians as "shields" for Israeli forces. The IDF admitted violations of existing procedures and reiterated that IDF forces "are absolutely forbidden to use civilians of any kind as a means of 'living shield' against gunfire or attack by the Palestinian side, or as 'hostages.'" On October 6, the Israeli high court ruled that it was illegal for the IDF to use Palestinian civilians as "human shields" during arrest operations against suspected Palestinian militants. The IDF chief of staff ordered the Israeli army to implement the high court decision immediately.

Prior to the high court decision, on May 23, an Israeli television news report showed footage of an IDF soldier aiming a rifle with a teargas grenade while standing behind a 17-year-old blindfolded Palestinian in Dura village, west of Hebron. The television report claimed that the IDF used the Palestinian as a shield against rock-throwers. The IDF denied the allegation, stating that IDF personnel arrested the Palestinian for throwing rocks at soldiers and kept him under guard until transferring him to police custody.

On August 31, IDF soldiers entered the home of Mahmud Rajabi in Hebron and reportedly detained three members of the family to serve as human shields. The IDF commander of the operation reportedly said that the soldiers used the brothers to prevent rock and bomb throwing at the soldiers in the house. On September 2, the soldiers vacated the premises.

In September 2003 B'tselem and the Association for Civil Rights in Israel petitioned the high court to open military investigations into all cases where IDF soldiers killed Palestinians who had not engaged in hostilities. At year's end the high court had not ruled on the petition.

On July 27, the Knesset approved an amendment to the Civil Wrongs Law that would prohibit Palestinians residing in the occupied territories from seeking compensation for death or injury at the hands of the IDF or property damage. The amendment prohibits "a national of an enemy state or resident of a conflict zone" from bringing claims against Israel in an Israeli court. On September 1, nine Israeli and Palestinian human rights organizations petitioned the high court for a temporary injunction. The high court was scheduled to hold a hearing on March 1, 2006.

Section 2 Respect for Civil Liberties, Including: a. Freedom of Speech and Press

The PA does not have laws providing for freedom of press; however, the law permits every person the right to freedom of thought, conscience, and expression, and the right to express opinions orally, in writing, or through any other form. However, a 1995 presidential decree included injunctions against writing anything critical of the PA or the president. Although the PA did not restrict freedom of speech or press, members of the ruling Fatah faction restricted freedoms of speech and press.

Working conditions for journalists in the West Bank and Gaza improved noticeably during the year. The democratic election of Mahmud Abbas as president of the PA in January improved press freedom and working conditions for journalists. Self-censorship and fear of being harmed or harassed by armed activists and militant groups remained the greatest challenges for journalists working in the West Bank and Gaza.

On May 15, in an apparent act of intimidation, unknown individuals spray-painted the vehicle of a Palestinian journalist in the Gaza Strip. PA police declined to investigate. In the same month, Palestinian journalists in Gaza went on strike for a week to protest PA police beating journalists.

On July 19, the Palestinian Journalists Syndicate, controlled by the Fatah movement, instructed local reporters and photographers not to cover clashes between Hamas and Fatah in the Gaza Strip and warned that any violation of its instructions would bear personal and legal consequences.

There were three Palestinian dailies and several Palestinian weekly newspapers. There also were several monthly magazines and three tabloids. The PA operated two television stations and one radio station. There were approximately 30 independently owned television stations and approximately 9 such radio stations. According to an August study published by the Palestinian Center for Public Opinion, approximately 38 percent of Palestinians in the occupied territories had access to the Internet.

The PA took steps to end incitement in Palestinian media. During the year the Palestinian Broadcasting Corporation (PBC) reduced its inflammatory material, including incitement to violence. PA Minister of Information, Nabil Sh'ath, instructed the PBC in February to eliminate images of dead bodies and other graphic footage and inflammatory videos. The PBC also no longer broadcast nationalistic songs that typically called for fighting the "Zionist enemy."

The Israeli occupation authorities limited speech. In East Jerusalem Israeli authorities prohibited display of Palestinian political symbols; displays were punishable by fines or prison, as were public expressions of anti-Israeli sentiment and of support for Islamic extremist groups. Israeli authorities censored press coverage of the Intifada and reviewed Arabic publications for security related material.

As a general rule, Israeli media covered the occupied territories, except for combat zones where the IDF temporarily restricted access. The government claimed restrictions were necessary for journalists' security.

Closures and curfews limited the ability of Palestinian journalists to do their jobs. Between June and August, the government restricted media access to settlements in Gaza and the northern West Bank that it was evacuating. Journalists complained of area closures, long waits at the Gaza border crossing, and the government's inadequate transportation provisions.

On July 4, the IDF detained an Israeli television reporter and a newspaper photographer covering IDF removal of Israeli activists from a hotel in the Gaza settlement of Gush Katif. The IDF claimed that the journalists violated a closed area order but apologized for handcuffing them.

On August 15, the PA and the Palestinian Journalists Syndicate accused the Israeli government press office of refusing to accredit Palestinian journalists before and during the disengagement from Gaza in an apparent effort to prevent local journalists from reaching settlement areas and covering events.

There were several allegations from foreign media that the IDF fired upon journalists.

On January 2, Majdi al-Arabid, a journalist working in the Gaza Strip, was shot in the stomach near Bayt Lahia while reporting on IDF operations against Palestinians suspected of firing rockets into Israel. Reportedly al-Arabid attempted to identify himself before being shot. An IDF spokesperson said that soldiers were unaware that journalists were in the area. The IDF reportedly opened an investigation; however, at year's end there was no information on the status of that investigation.

During the year Israeli gunfire injured at least one journalist during clashes between the IDF and Palestinians. IDF soldiers beat journalists on several occasions, detained others, and confiscated their press cards in Bil'in village where there were weekly protests over construction of the separation barrier.

In May 2003 James Miller, a British national, was killed by the IDF while filming a documentary in Rafah in the Gaza Strip. On April 14, after an investigation a disciplinary military court hearing acquitted an IDF officer on charges of illegal use of firearms. The IDF decided in March not to prosecute the officer on criminal charges. On April 21, the IDF announced that it had filed an appeal to reopen proceedings against the officer. At year's end there was no information regarding the status of the appeal.

In April 2003 an IDF soldier killed Nazeeh Darwaza while he was filming a wounded child during an IDF incursion in Nablus. In June 2004 Israeli government officials informed B'tselem that the military attorney general was investigating the case. At year's end there was no further information.

Rising levels of lawlessness in the Gaza Strip subjected journalists to harassment and kidnappings. On August 15, unidentified gunmen in the Gaza Strip kidnapped French journalist Muhammad Ouathi, who was covering the Israeli disengagement from Gaza. On August 22, the kidnappers released Ouathi.

On October 12, gunmen kidnapped two Western journalists as they traveled near Khan Yunis in the Gaza Strip. The armed men reportedly had sought employment with the PA security services. The kidnappers released both journalists approximately six hours later.

The PA had authority over all levels of education. During the year the PA did not interfere with education; however, the violence and restrictions on the movement of Palestinians by Israeli security forces adversely affected academic institutions. Israeli closures, curfews, and the separation barrier restricted access to Palestinian academic institutions. The separation barrier also prevented some students from taking examinations. Israeli shelling and gunfire during military operations damaged a number of schools and, in some cases, killed schoolchildren (see section 1.g.). According to the UN Children's Fund (UNICEF), 269 school buildings were damaged between 2000 and the end of the year. The PA education ministry calculated physical damage to schools and universities at more than $10 million (46 million NIS). In some instances Israeli authorities entered campuses to arrest students.

In September Israeli authorities required thousands of Palestinian schoolchildren, who resided on the eastern side of the separation barrier around Jerusalem, to transit gated checkpoints to attend school in East Jerusalem. West Bank teachers who worked in East Jerusalem schools faced difficulties in acquiring permits to reach their classrooms; many did not receive permits until December.

In November 2004 a remote control bomb exploded in the office of Yaser al-Madhoun, a Palestinian professor at al-Azhar University in Gaza City, and killed him; another Palestinian was injured. At year's end PA police continued the investigation. b. Freedom of Peaceful Assembly and Association

PA law permits public meetings, processions, and assemblies, within legal limits; however, the PA imposed some formal limits on freedom of assembly. While it required permits for rallies, demonstrations, and large cultural events, it rarely denied these permits. In Gaza police approval was required for political meetings at specific halls and for buses to transport passengers to attend such meetings. The PA prohibited calls for violence, displays of arms, and racist slogans, although it rarely enforced these provisions.

Israeli military orders banned public gatherings of 10 or more persons without a permit; however, Palestinians could ignore this order without punishment.

Israeli security forces used force against Palestinians involved in demonstrations (see section 1.c.). Israeli and Palestinian authorities disputed whether Palestinians attacked security forces during such demonstrations. In 2001 the IDF authorized gunfire to suppress rock-throwing.

Since February Palestinians and Israelis have demonstrated repeatedly in the village of Bil'in, west of Ramallah, against construction of the separation barrier. Throughout the year confrontations between the IDF and protesters resulted in numerous injuries. Soldiers beat, injured with rubber bullets, or tear gassed at least 160 protesters.

PA law allows for the freedom of association. The PA limited freedom of association somewhat; however, charitable, community, professional, and self-help organizations operated.

In 2001 Israeli officials closed Orient House, the preeminent Palestinian political institution in Jerusalem. In 2002-03, Israel closed other prominent Palestinian centers and offices in East Jerusalem. Israeli authorities claimed that these institutions operated under PA supervision in violation of signed agreements. At year's end all remained closed.

Palestinian law provides for religious freedom, and the PA generally respected this right in practice; however, there was deterioration in the status of the PA's respect for religious freedom.

Islam is the official religion of the PA. Religion must be declared on identification papers, and personal status legal matters must be handled in ecclesiastical courts. The PA's Ministry of Waqf and Religious Affairs constructed and maintained mosques and paid salaries of imams. Christian clergymen and charitable organizations received limited financial support. The PA did not provide financial support to any Jewish institutions or holy sites in the occupied territories; these areas were generally under Israeli control.

The PA judiciary failed to adjudicate numerous cases of seizures of Christian-owned land in the Bethlehem area by criminal gangs. There were credible reports that PA security forces and judicial officials colluded with gang members to extort property illegally from Christians. Several attacks against Christians in Bethlehem went unaddressed by the PA, but authorities investigated attacks against Muslims in the same area.

Following Israeli disengagement from Gaza, Palestinian crowds set fire to 4 of 19 abandoned synagogues but caused little structural damage. The PA announced plans to demolish the remaining synagogues and did so by year's end.

The PA required that religion be taught in PA schools and provided separate instruction for Muslims and Christians.

Israeli authorities generally respected religious freedom and permitted all faiths to operate schools and institutions. There were reports that the Israeli government seized land belonging to several religious institutions to build its separation barrier. However, according to the Israeli government, it sought to build the barrier on public lands where possible, and where private land was used, provided opportunities for compensation.

Throughout the year Israeli authorities granted more visa requests for Christian clergy; however, problems persisted with over 30 requests outstanding. The shortage of foreign clergy impeded the functioning of Christian congregations.

Internal and external closures prevented tens of thousands of Palestinians from reaching places of worship in Jerusalem and the West Bank, particularly during religious holidays. Citing security reasons the Israeli government frequently prevented nearly all West Bank Palestinians and most male Muslim worshippers with Jerusalem blue identification cards under the age of 45 from attending Friday prayers inside the Haram al-Sharif/Temple Mount, the third holiest site in Islam. Israeli authorities restricted most West Bank residents and virtually all Gaza residents from entering Jerusalem during Ramadan, the Muslim holy month of prayer and fasting.

Israeli police continued to escort tourists to the Haram al-Sharif/Temple Mount to assert the right of non-Muslims to visit the shrine. Non-Muslims were not permitted to worship publicly at the shrine; however, Waqf officials accused Israeli police of permitting Jewish groups to worship.

Palestinian media frequently published and broadcast material about the Israeli occupation that included anti-Semitic content. Rhetoric by Palestinian terrorist groups included expressions of anti-Semitism. Some Muslim religious leaders preached sermons on the official PA television station that included expressions of anti-Semitism. On the positive side, on October 28, Israeli media quoted PLO Chief Negotiator Sa'eb Erekat's statement that the Iranian president's declaration that Israel should be wiped off the map was "unacceptable."

On May 13, Ibrahim Mdaires, an imam in Gaza, accused Jews of inflating the dimensions of the Holocaust. On May 19, media quoted PA Minister of Information Nabil Sh'ath as calling for Mdaires' suspension from the PA religious affairs ministry and Muslim Waqf (religious trust), which employed Mdaires, and banned him from delivering Friday sermons. At year's end Mdaires was not delivering Friday sermons.

The PA Ministry of Education and Higher Education (MOEHE) continued to revise its primary and secondary school textbooks. International academics concluded that Palestinian textbooks did not cross the line into incitement; however, critics noted the new textbooks did not recognize Israel on its maps and often ignored historical Jewish connections to Israel and Jerusalem. For more detailed discussion, see the 2005 International Religious Freedom Report.

d. Freedom of Movement Within the Occupied Territories, Foreign Travel, Emigration, and Repatriation

The PA generally did not restrict freedom of movement. The Israeli occupation authorities often restricted the daily movement of Palestinians and frequently heightened these restrictions citing military necessity.

The Israeli government continued construction of a security barrier along parts of the Green Line (the 1949 Armistice line) and in the West Bank. Palestinians filed a number of cases with the Israeli Supreme Court challenging the routing of the barrier. In June 2004 the court ruled that a section of the barrier must be rerouted; determining that the injury caused by the routing of the barrier did not stand in proper proportion to the security benefits; various portions of the barrier route were rerouted. In July 2004 the International Court of Justice issued an advisory opinion, concluding that the construction of the barrier was in a number of aspects contrary to international law.

In September the Israeli Supreme Court reaffirmed its earlier decision that the separation barrier is permissible under both international law and Israeli law; however, it questioned whether the segment of the barrier at issue utilized the least intrusive route available, and it asked the government to consider whether there was an alternative route. The court further found that in September there were 43 remaining petitions regarding other portions of the wall that now would be decided by the court.

At the end of the year, the route of the barrier divided approximately 142,641 acres with a population of 49,400 Palestinians from the rest of the West Bank. According to OCHA the barrier impeded Palestinians from reaching their land to harvest crops and graze animals. Residents' access to schools, medical care, and other services was also impeded. In October 2003 Israeli military orders required the approximately five thousand Palestinians residing in "seam zones" between the separation barrier and the Green Line to obtain residency permits to remain in these areas. Permits are valid for up to a year for residents and only for one gate.

Areas near the barrier or its projected route have been designated as military zones; Palestinians had no expectation they could obtain permits to build near Israeli communities or the barrier.

During periods of unrest (in the aftermath of terrorist attacks or during military exercises), Israeli authorities prohibited travel between some or all towns within the territories. Such "internal closures" were supplemented, during periods of potential unrest and during major Israeli and Muslim holidays, by "comprehensive, external closures," which precluded Palestinians from leaving the territories. During the year there were no extended blanket closures, although several Gaza crossing points were simultaneously closed for extended periods, completely closing off Gaza. During most of the year, Israeli authorities prohibited passage between Gaza and the West Bank. At year's end bus convoys outlined in the November 15 Agreement on Movement and Access had not begun. On September 7, Israeli authorities closed the Rafah terminal. Following the disengagement from Gaza, the PA and Egypt periodically opened the terminal to pedestrian traffic. On November 25, the Rafah terminal reopened, marking the first time the PA independently operated an international border crossing, although under European Union monitoring. At year's end as a general rule, only Palestinian identification holders could transit this crossing.

On December 28, Israeli authorities, in response to Qassam rocket fire, implemented a "buffer zone" in the northern Gaza Strip encompassing former Israeli settlements. Palestinian militants had used the area to fire rockets at Israeli communities.

Since 1993 Palestinians could enter East Jerusalem only with a travel permit issued by Israeli authorities. Israel also imposed curfews in some areas, which confined Palestinians to their homes in areas where the IDF conducted military operations. Following the June 12 suicide bombing in Netanya, the IDF imposed a curfew on Tulkarm lasting over three days. On June 20, the IDF imposed a curfew on Baqa al-Sharqiyah, near Tulkarm, for one and a half days following the killing of an Israeli civilian (see section 1.a.). In December 2004 a terrorist attack extensively damaged the Rafah terminal and killed five Israeli soldiers. The IDF closed the terminal until February 1.

The PA issued passports for Palestinians in the West Bank and Gaza. Because there are no commercial flights from the territories, travelers must depart by land into Jordan or Egypt. Transit passes for travelers using Ben Gurion airport were not available, except for a few humanitarian cases. NGOs claimed that Israeli authorities harassed their representatives who were attempting to enter via Ben Gurion airport.

Palestinians with Jerusalem identification cards issued by the Israeli government needed special documents to travel abroad. Upon request the Jordanian government issued passports to Palestinians in the West Bank and East Jerusalem. Palestinians in East Jerusalem who wish to travel to Jordan must leave their Israeli identification documents with Israeli authorities at the Allenby Bridge. Travelers could obtain applications for bridge-crossing permits to Jordan at East Jerusalem post offices. Screening was conducted at Allenby Bridge.

External and internal closures contributed to increased unemployment and poverty. Approximately 146 thousand West Bank and Gaza workers, representing approximately 25 percent of the Palestinian work force, depended on day jobs in Israel, Israeli settlements, and Jerusalem. Closures impeded Palestinians from reaching jobs or markets in the occupied territories and disrupted internal and external trade. The unemployment rate was estimated at 28 percent at year's end. In addition Israel's strict closure policies frequently restricted the ability of Palestinians to reach places of worship.

In November 2004 the IDF arrested four Birzeit University students from Gaza who lacked permits to stay in the West Bank and returned them to Gaza. Since 2000 many of the 350 Gazans enrolled in Birzeit returned home after West Bank permits expired. During the year there were approximately 35 Gazans studying at the university, many of whom had not seen their families in 4 years.

Apart from closures, delays at checkpoints and roadblocks affected all aspects of life, particularly emergency health care. According to OCHA in the West Bank at year's end, there were 463 obstacles to movement, including 49 fully manned checkpoints, 10 occasionally manned checkpoints, 261 earth mounds blocking roads, 54 cement roadblocks, 53 road gates, 15 earthen walls, 10 trenches, and 11 road protection fences. In addition there were 65 gates along the separation barrier. Of the gates along the separation barrier, 27 were accessible to Palestinians in possession of permits, 27 were for the IDF and closed to Palestinian traffic, and 11 gates were opened only during the olive harvest season. The operating hours of the accessible gates to Palestinians were sometimes limited and irregular.

According to comments quoted in the Israeli press, on September 6, Defense Minister Mofaz instructed IDF soldiers to display "no pity" at checkpoints in the West Bank, adding that security concerns were paramount to any delays or anger of those having to pass through the checkpoints.

According to OCHA the 463 obstacles to movement in the West Bank, compared with 680 in November 2004, 605 in April, and 376 in August. The reduction since November 2004 stemmed from the removal of earth mounds and concrete roadblocks and from the completion of the separation barrier in some areas. Although ambulance response times improved as Israeli authorities issued additional permits, many problems remained, including for ambulances attempting to reach remote West Bank villages.

Villagers from Jayyus, in the West Bank, were unable to exit the village to tend fields or graze sheep. On April 8, the Israeli civil administration (Qalqilya region) notified Jayyus residents that the IDF intended to confiscate eight dunums (approximately three acres) of their farmland along the Palestinian side of the separation barrier to create a security road. The civil administration also reportedly told residents that the IDF would close two barrier gates that provided the only available access to their land on the barrier's western side. Palestinians said the confiscation and closures would bar them from land they own and rely on for income. At year's end only Palestinian farmers with valid permits from the civil administration could access Jayyus lands west of the barrier; during the year Israeli authorities rejected 118 applications for access permits.

On February 15, a Palestinian woman gave birth at the Qalandiya checkpoint with assistance from PRCS medical staff after the IDF prevented her husband from crossing the checkpoint in his vehicle. Israeli officials forbid Palestinian-plated vehicles from crossing at the Qalandiya checkpoint.

On April 12, a Palestinian male died in a PRCS ambulance at the Bayt Iba checkpoint after a 20-minute delay by IDF authorities. PRCS medics failed to revive the man, who was being transported to a hospital in Nablus.

On March 13, Israeli settlers from Ma'on attacked and beat Palestinian shepherds from Jawayah village grazing sheep in an agricultural area near the Ma'on settlement. The following day settlers from Ma'on shot at and attacked the Palestinian shepherds. Israeli authorities have not implemented adequate measures to protect the Palestinians from such abuses.

Palestinians residing in the Israeli-controlled section of Hebron (H2), which includes the Old Arab Market and areas adjacent to four Israeli settlements, faced extensive restrictions on movement. According to OCHA there are 101 significant obstacles to movement in H2. Access for Palestinians to the Old City was limited to six IDF-controlled gates. IDF closures of businesses, prolonged curfews, and settler harassment forced Palestinian shopkeepers to relocate. Of the 1,610 shops officially licensed in H2 before September 2000, more than a thousand closed, one-third by military order. Attendance at 3 Palestinian schools near 4 Israeli settlements in Hebron declined by almost 50 percent. These children were harassed when attempting to walk to the schools.

Israel offered Palestinian residents citizenship following its 1967 occupation of East Jerusalem. Most chose not to accept Israeli citizenship but instead sought a residence permit, known as a Jerusalem identification card. Under the law such residents risk loss of status if their ties with Jerusalem lapse, although human rights groups reported that such revocations were infrequent and selectively enforced. In July 2004 an Israeli ministerial committee reportedly adopted an unpublished resolution calling for the application of the 1950 Absentee Property Law to East Jerusalem. On February 1, the Israeli attorney general ordered the government not to apply the Absentee Property Law to land and buildings in East Jerusalem owned by Palestinians living in the West Bank; in point of fact, the government apparently had not attempted to implement that law in East Jerusalem.

The Israeli government, under the interior ministry, and the Jerusalem municipality continued to demolish Palestinian houses and other structures in East Jerusalem constructed without building permits. It was a slow and expensive process for Palestinians to receive permits to build in East Jerusalem.

Residency restrictions affected family reunification. Israeli authorities did not permit Palestinians who were abroad during the 1967 War, or who subsequently lost residence permits, to reside permanently with their families in the occupied territories. It was difficult for foreign-born spouses and children of Palestinian residents to obtain residency. Palestinian spouses of Jerusalem residents must obtain a residency permit and reported delays of several years before being granted residency. The Israeli government occasionally issued limited-duration permits, but renewing the permits could take up to eight months, which resulted in many Palestinians falling out of status. Palestinians in East Jerusalem also reported extensive delays in registering newborn children with Israeli authorities.

Neither the Israeli government nor the PA used forced exile or forcibly deported anyone from the occupied territories during the year.

Section 3 Respect for Political Rights: The Right of Citizens to Change Their Government Elections and Political Participation

Following the November 2004 death of PA Chairman Yasir Arafat, Palestinians elected Mahmud Abbas as PA president on January 9. Seven candidates competed in a vigorous election campaign. The Israeli government and the PA followed the 1996 parameters for Palestinians residing in East Jerusalem to vote, but inadequate arrangements kept turnout in Jerusalem low.

In December 2004 the PA held municipal elections in 26 West Bank localities for the first time since 1976. The PA held additional municipal elections in Gaza on January 27; a second round of elections on May 5 in Gaza and the West Bank; a third round on September 29 in the West Bank; and a fourth round on December 15 in the West Bank. Domestic and international election observers found these elections met democratic standards, while noting several technical and procedural problems. The PA had yet to schedule additional rounds of municipal elections in the remaining West Bank and Gaza municipalities.

The 88-member PLC and Chairman of the Executive Authority were elected in 1996 in a process that international observers concluded generally met democratic standards, despite some irregularities. The PLC rescheduled legislative council elections from July to January 25, 2006.

On November 28, violence and reported fraud disrupted voting in primary elections to determine Fatah candidates for the January 25, 2006, legislative council elections; primary elections were suspended in Gaza and the West Bank. Efforts to organize the electoral system, candidate and party lists, and campaign rules continued through year's end.

In September 2004 the Palestinian cabinet adopted a one-year reform action plan, approved by the PLC to create a more equal balance of power between the executive and the PLC and to introduce greater accountability and transparency in its governance. The March 1 Quartet-sponsored London meeting provided additional support to the PA's efforts to reform government transparency and improve the economy. During the year the PA made little progress.

While Palestinians with residency permits were eligible to vote in Jerusalem municipal elections, most did not recognize Israeli jurisdiction in Jerusalem and did not participate. There were no Palestinians on the Jerusalem City Council.

During the year there were 5 women on the 88-member PLC, and 2 women served in ministerial-level positions. There were six Palestinian Christians in the PLC.

Israeli authorities restricted Palestinian political activity, especially in East Jerusalem where several candidates in the January PA presidential elections were detained after attempting to campaign without a permit.

There was a widespread public perception of PA corruption, notably within the security forces. Many social and political elements called for reform. The PA security forces made little progress in rationalizing the security forces payroll and rooting out corruption in the services. On September 18, Abbas appointed a new attorney general to focus on corruption. Local NGOs praised the appointment and hoped he would effectively address PA corruption. At year's end the attorney general had announced investigations into several corruption cases. PA members and the general Palestinian public widely criticized the growing lawlessness inside the West Bank and Gaza and the failure by PA security forces to provide security.

The law requires official PA institutions to "facilitate" acquisition of requested documents or information to any Palestinian; however, the law does not require any PA agency to provide such information. Many Palestinians cited the law when seeking to acquire information; however, there were no PA court cases. NGOs sought to make it mandatory to provide information to Palestinians; however, there was no action during the year.

Section 4 Governmental Attitude Regarding International and Nongovernmental Investigation of Alleged Violations of Human Rights

Local Palestinian human rights groups and several international organizations monitored the PA's human rights practices. By the end of the year, approximately 305 NGOs were registered; another 45 remained in processing.

PA officials usually met NGO representatives. Since the beginning of the Intifada, public NGO criticism was somewhat less forthcoming; several NGOs voluntarily decided to defer criticism of the PA's human rights performance. Observers noted documentation of abuses was very limited. NGOs, however, criticized the PA's inadequate security performance.

In March 2004 in Gaza City, unknown assailants shot and killedKhalil al-Zaban, a journalist and advisor to then PA president Arafat on human rights and the media. Al-Zaban headed the PA's government-appointed NGO Council and published its monthly newsletter. He criticized both Islamic militancy and those critical of the PA, particularly on human rights. At year's end the killers and their motives remained unidentified.

Some PA security organizations, including the General Intelligence Service in the West Bank and the police, appointed officials as liaisons with human rights groups. These officers met human rights organizations and diplomats to discuss human rights cases.

Israeli, Palestinian, and international humanitarian and human rights NGOs monitored the Israeli government's practices in the occupied territories. The Israeli government permitted human rights groups to publish and hold press conferences and provided the ICRC and other groups with access to detainees (see section 1.c.). Some organizations criticized Israeli government practices and cooperation. During the year Israel established direct contact with NGOs and human rights groups. Human rights groups, however, continued to report that Israeli closures impeded and, at times, completely prevented their work.

In October 2004 members of the Christian Peacemakers Teams, AI, and an Italian NGO ("Operation Dove") escorted Palestinian children from the village of Tuwani to a nearby school. While walking past the settlement of Ma'on, masked settlers attacked the escorts with baseball bats, seriously injuring a volunteer. At year's end the assailants had not been identified or apprehended.

In January 2004 Thomas Hurndall, a British International Solidarity Movement (ISM) activist, died from injuries sustained in 2003 when an IDF soldier shot him as he attempted to move Palestinian children to safety during clashes in Rafah. On August 11, an IDF court sentenced Sergeant Wahid Taysir, earlier convicted of manslaughter and obstruction of justice in Hurndall's killing, to eight years in prison. At year's end Taysir had begun serving his prison sentence.

On March 16, 2003, an Israeli bulldozer clearing land in Rafah in the Gaza Strip crushed and killed Rachel Corrie, 23, a US citizen peace activist. Corrie was standing in front of the bulldozer and was wearing a reflective vest. Eyewitness demonstrators stated that they believe the driver knew Corrie was in front of the bulldozer as he proceeded forward. IDF investigations concluded that the operator was not negligent. US officials who have seen the IDF report found inconsistencies among the statements of those observing the incident. Some observers continue to raise questions concerning whether the investigation was thorough, credible, and transparent, and the Corrie family continued to pursue the case. In conjunction with the report of the IDF Judge Advocate General, the IDF implemented two remedial procedures for improved safety: the presence of more senior officers to oversee such operations and the designation of closed military zones with orders forbidding the presence of civilians in areas where IDF military operations are conducted.

In April 2003 gunfire from an undetermined source struck ISM activist Brian Avery. The IDF denied responsibility for the incident. Avery was walking outside during curfew in Jenin when an IDF armored personnel carrier approached him. In December 2004 a lawyer petitioned the Israeli high court to require military authorities to investigate Avery's shooting. According to B'tselem an IDF internal investigation concluded it was impossible to determine whose gunfire hit Avery. On February 28, the high court ordered the IDF to investigate the incident further; however, the Judge Advocate General, following the interview of civilian eyewitnesses, decided not to launch a criminal investigation. At year's end the high court had not decided whether to order the IDF to open a criminal investigation.

In 2003 Israel began requiring foreigners entering Gaza to sign a waiver providing that "the Government of the State of Israel and its organs cannot be held responsible for death, injury and/or damage/loss of property which may be incurred as a result of military activity." The requirement continued on a selective basis throughout the year.

UNRWA and other groups reported improvement in transporting goods to Palestinian refugees in the occupied territories, with some reported delays. Since October 2004 Israeli authorities have often denied UNRWA's staff access to the Barta'a area in the West Bank, due to lack of permits to enter the seam zone. UNRWA staff also reported some abuse and intimidation at the seam zone gates by IDF personnel.

UNRWA staff in the West Bank and Gaza had been harassed and staff members kidnapped by Palestinians. On May 18, three armed Palestinian gunmen entered an UNRWA clinic in the al-Fariah refugee camp in the northern West Bank, threatened an UNRWA doctor, fired shots into the air, proceeded to the UNRWA girls' school, threatened the school's principal, and demanded the school dismiss one of the teachers.

On August 8, the ICRC suspended operations in Gaza after unidentified Palestinians fired bullets at its offices in Khan Yunis. On August 16, the ICRC resumed operations after receiving PA security assurances.

For four years Israeli authorities have denied access to Gaza to Physicians for Human Rights, which offered weekly "mobile clinics" in Palestinian villages, and the group had only limited access to the West Bank.

The law states that all Palestinians are equal without discrimination because of race, gender, color, religion, political views, or disability.

There was no reliable data on the incidence of violence against women. PA law does not explicitly prohibit domestic violence, but assault and battery are crimes. There were reports that Palestinian domestic violence had increased since 2000. Human rights groups reported an increase in family "honor" killings during the year.

During the year family members killed four women and injured another in so-called honor crimes, according to human rights groups. On May 2, two sisters from East Jerusalem were strangled and a third severely injured by their older brother. One sister reportedly engaged in an extramarital relationship, and the others tried to intervene to save her. On April 30, the father of a Palestinian Christian woman from Ramallah fatally bludgeoned her, reportedly in response to her relationship with a Palestinian Muslim. In September clashes erupted between Christians in Taybeh and Muslims from nearby villages after the family of a Muslim woman killed her for reportedly engaging in a relationship with a Christian man.

Women's shelters do not exist. Women generally approached village or religious leaders for assistance.

There were no special laws regarding women's rights in the workplace. Before 2000 women increasingly worked outside the home, often encountering discrimination and, occasionally, sexual harassment. Women were underrepresented in professional life, although a small group was prominent in politics, medicine, law, teaching, and NGOs.

Palestinian women endured social prejudice and repression. Education and cultural restrictions associated with marriage occasionally prevented women from completing mandatory schooling or attending college. Families often disowned Muslim and Christian women who married outside their faith. Local officials sometimes advised such women to leave their communities to prevent harassment.

For Muslims personal status law is derived from Shari'a (Islamic law). Ecclesiastical courts rule on personal status issues for Christians. Shari'a pertaining to women is part of the 1976 Jordanian Status Law, which includes inheritance and marriage laws. Women can inherit under Shari'a but not an equal share. Legally, men may take more than one wife; the practice was rare. Women may make "stipulations" in marriage contracts to protect their interests in divorce and child custody; however, only an estimated 1 percent did so. Children often stayed with the mother after divorce. Until a child reached legal maturity, men paid child support and alimony, depending on the man's income.

Although MOEHE's stated commitment is to provide children access to educational facilities and ensure their welfare, it must rely on the international community for assistance to build capacity for child protection and development.

The PA provides for compulsory education through the ninth grade. The MOEHE and Central Bureau of Statistics contrasted 2004-05 basic school enrollment (89.2 percent in grades 1 to 10) with much lower enrollment at the secondary stage (10.8 percent in grades 11 and 12), concluding this indicated a significant dropout rate.Girls who married before the ninth grade left school at the behest of husbands, and in rural areas and refugee camps, boys left school to help support their families.

Internal closures, checkpoints, and the separation barrier significantly impeded students and teachers in reaching educational facilities (see sections 2.a. and 2.d.).

In areas under curfew, all classes were cancelled. In 2004 and during the year, the number and frequency of curfews declined; the majority of restrictions centered around closures. Prior to the Israeli withdrawal from Gaza in August, one thousand UNRWA teachers in the south of Gaza had to travel through checkpoints to schools in north and central Gaza. Nearly 76 percent of UNRWA's schools operated double-shifts with average classrooms of 40.5 pupils.

Education and health care professionals judged that the violence produced lack of focus, nightmares, and behavioral problems. OCHA reported during the year that 42 percent of students in Gaza recorded lower school achievement since 2000. One-third of Palestinian children have had their education disrupted.

OCHA reported that since September 2000, Palestinian universities had approximately $4.85 million (22.3 million NIS) of infrastructure destroyed due to Intifada violence, while Palestinian schools suffered $5.2 million (23.9 million NIS) of damage. According to the MOEHE, 4 percent (150 thousand students) of the Palestinian population pursued higher education studies at 11 universities, 5 university colleges, and 25 society colleges in the West Bank and Gaza.

According to a 2003 report by the Jerusalem Center for Social and Economic Rights, Palestinians constituted 33 percent of the city's total population, but the municipal budget accorded to East Jerusalem was only 10.9 percent. As a result East Jerusalem schools were underfunded and overcrowded, and schools refused to enroll new students due to lack of classroom space.

In 2001 the Israeli high court ordered the municipality to build 245 new classrooms within the next 4 years. Over the past 4 years, the municipality budgeted for 47 new East Jerusalem classrooms; however, none were built. Of the 161 classrooms built in East Jerusalem within the last 4 years, 148 were budgeted during the 1990s and under construction at the time of the 2001 ruling. At year's end no classrooms were under construction.

On September 11, 10 thousand East Jerusalem students stayed home after their parents called a strike to protest lack of classrooms and "intolerable" conditions. The Israeli education ministry blamed East Jerusalem residents, claiming classroom shortage resulted from residents' refusal to sell land for school construction.

In August Palestinian teachers living in the West Bank were directed to obtain permits to cross the checkpoints to reach their schools in East Jerusalem. After extended delays, by December 21, authorities issued 237 of a total of 249 requested. In the interim the MOEHE used substitute teachers and asked teachers with access to East Jerusalem to carry a double load of classes.

The PA health ministry immunized children, and PA insurance provided basic children's medical care, for a small monthly fee. The latest available figures showed a slight improvement in nutrition from 2003 when 3.4 percent of Palestinian children suffered from acute malnutrition and 10.7 percent suffered from chronic malnutrition.

Child abuse was not a widespread problem. The law does not explicitly prohibit child abuse, but sanctions parents who failed to protect children from abuse. PA courts may protect children in cases of neglect or abuse.

The law provides that no one under 14 can work. Those between 15 and 18 can be employed under limited conditions (see section 6.d.). There is no juvenile court system, but certain judges specialized in juvenile cases.

International and domestic NGOs promoted educational, medical, and cultural services for children, and other groups specialized in the needs of children with disabilities.

Palestinian terrorist groups used minors to conduct attacks, smuggle weapons, or act as human shields. On August 29, the IDF arrested a 14-year-old Palestinian at the Huwwara checkpoint, near Nablus, as he attempted to smuggle three pipe bombs.

Palestinian law does not specifically prohibit trafficking in persons; however, there were no reports that persons were trafficked to, from, or within the occupied territories.

Access to public facilities was not mandated in the occupied territories. There was discrimination against Palestinians with disabilities in most spheres, including education, employment, transportation, and access to public facilities. The Health, Development, Information, and Policy Institute estimated that 10 percent of the approximately 29 thousand Palestinians injured in the past 5 years would have permanent disabilities.

Care for Palestinians with disabilities was a problem. Some institutions cared for persons with disabilities; however, they were underfunded. Cultural stigmas and inadequate funding resulted in poor quality care. The PA depended on NGOs to care for persons with physical disabilities and offered substandard care for those with mental disabilities. In February 2004 the health ministry, with input from the World Health Organization (WHO), released a strategy for mental health services calling for increased care for mental health patients and their reintegration into the community.During the year the health ministry worked closely with WHO to formulate a five-pronged strategy to develop public mental health services in the West Bank and Gaza.

There is no legal discrimination against homosexuals, and there were no specific reports of abuse because of sexual orientation. However, cultural traditions and religion reject homosexuality, and Palestinians alleged that public and PA security officers harassed, abused, and sometimes arrested homosexuals because of their sexual orientation.

The law permits workers to form and join unions of their choice without previous authorization. In March 2003 the International Labor Organization (ILO) funded the Department of Law at Birzeit University to lead a project to disseminate the 2001 labor law and to draft bylaws. Birzeit gathered employers and union representatives to discuss the labor law, and the group developed 28 bylaws. All the bylaws were approved by the PA during the period from 2004 to year's end and were published in the Palestinian Gazette.

Workers may establish unions without government authorization. The two most active union organizersare the General Union for Palestinian Workers and the Palestine General Federation of Trade Unions (PGFTU). The PGFTU is a member of the international confederation of free trade unions. Both are registered with the labor ministry.

Workers in Jerusalem may establish unions but may not join West Bank federations; however, this restriction was not enforced. Workers holding Jerusalem identity cards may belong simultaneously to West Bank unions and the General Federation of Labor (Histadrut).

Palestinians working in Israel or Jerusalem prior to 2000 were partial members of Histadrut; 1 percent of their wages was withheld. Partial membership entitled them to limited benefits. Histadrut and West Bank union officials negotiated an agreement in 1995 to transfer half of this fee to the PGFTU, which claimed it was owed $6.5 million (29.9 million NIS). One Palestinian official, however, claimed Histadrut owed Palestinians $2.2 million (10.1 million NIS).

The labor law provides for the right to strike. Prospective strikers must provide written warning to the other party and the ministry of labor two weeks in advance of the basis for the strike. (Strikes affecting public utilities require four weeks notice.) In practice strikers had little protection from retribution. Unions seeking to strike must accept labor ministry arbitration and are subject to disciplinary action if they reject the result.

A majority of workers in the occupied territories were self‑employed or unpaid family helpers. Approximately 35 percent worked for wages. UNRWA and the PA employed most such workers. The labor law stated that a mediator from the ministry should resolve conflicts. If the ministry cannot resolve a dispute, it can be referred to a special committee and, eventually, to a special court. Accordingly, in practice the right to strike remained questionable.

There were no export processing zones in the occupied territories, although the Gaza Industrial Estate previously enjoyed free trade access to foreign markets.

The law states that work is a right, duty, and honor and that the PA will strive to provide it to any individual capable of performing it. According to a labor ministry official, the PA also interpreted this law to mean that forced and compulsory labor is prohibited. The law also states that children shall not be exploited or allowed to perform work, which might damage their safety, health, or education.

The minimum employment age is 15, and there are special conditions for employment between 15 and 18. The law prohibits minors from working at night, hard labor, and travel beyond their domicile. However, many underage children worked in family farms and shops, as street vendors, or in small manufacturing enterprises. Representatives from the PA ministries of labor and social affairs said Palestinian children working in Israeli settlements faced security problems, exploitation, and harassment since there was no enforceable law to monitor and protect child laborers. Officials said Palestinian child workers illegally entered green-line Israel where they could be exploited.

The high secondary school dropout rate (see section 5) implied a significant level of child labor. As of September the PA had only 10 child labor inspectors for the West Bank and Gaza.

The ILO and UNICEF worked with the PA to develop its capacity to protect child rights. UNICEF representatives reported it worked to promote education in projects targeting attitudes and practices of caretakers and children. The PA has an agreement with the ILO to allow ILO's International Program for the Elimination of Child Labor (IPEC) activities in West Bank and Gaza; however, IPEC reported no activities during the year.

There was no minimum wage. Prior to 2000 average wages for full-time workers provided a decent living standard; however, the living standard dropped significantly over the past five years.

The normal workweek was 45 to 48 hours, but maximum workweek laws were not effectively enforced. The PA observed religious holidays but they were not formally incorporated in labor law. Although it is not obligatory for an employer to provide Christians with Sunday off, employers are required to allow Christians to attend church on Sunday if the employee desires. In some establishments employers offered Christians the option of taking Sunday off, rather than Friday.

The PA labor ministry was responsible for safety standards, but its enforcement ability was limited. The ministry stated new factories and workplaces met international health and safety standards, but older ones did not. Palestinians who worked in Israel must contribute to the National Insurance Institute and received limited benefits.

The Occupied Territories

(including area subject to the jurisdiction of the Palestinian Authority)