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Report on Human Rights
Practices for 2000
Yemen
The Republic of Yemen, comprising the former (northern)
Yemen Arab Republic (YAR) and (southern) People's Democratic Republic of
Yemen (PDRY), was proclaimed in 1990. Following a brief but bloody
civil war in mid-1994, the country was reunified under the Sana'a-based
government. President Ali Abdullah Saleh is the leader of the General
People's Congress (GPC), which dominates the Government. He was
elected by the legislature to a 5-year term in 1994, and was elected to
another 5-year term in the country's first nationwide direct presidential
election in September 1999, winning 96.3 percent of the vote. The
Constitution provides that the President be elected by popular vote from at
least two candidates endorsed by Parliament, and the election was generally
free and fair; however, there were some problems, including the lack of a
credible voter registration list. In addition the President was not
opposed by a truly competitive candidate because the candidate selected by
the leftist opposition did not receive the minimum number of votes required
to run from the GPC-dominated Parliament (the other opposition party chose
not to run its own candidate, despite its seats in Parliament). The
President's sole opponent was a member of the GPC. The first
Parliament elected by universal adult suffrage was convened in 1993.
Parliamentary elections were held again in 1997, with the Yemeni Socialist
Party (YSP), formerly the main party of the PDRY and a previous coalition
partner of the GPC, leading an opposition boycott. The GPC won an
absolute majority in the 1997 Parliament, with the opposition Islamist and
tribal Yemeni Grouping for Reform (Islaah) as the only other major party
represented. International observers judged the elections as
reasonably free and fair, while noting some problems with the voting.
The Parliament is not yet an effective counterweight to executive
authority, although it increasingly demonstrates independence from the
Government. Real political power rests with the executive branch,
particularly the President. The judiciary is nominally independent,
but is weak and severely hampered by corruption, executive branch
interference, and the frequent failure of the authorities to enforce
judgments.
The primary state security apparatus is the Political
Security Organization (PSO), an independent agency that reports directly to
the President. The Criminal Investigative Department (CID) of the
police reports to the Ministry of Interior and conducts most criminal
investigations and makes most arrests. The Central Security
Organization (CSO), also a part of the Ministry of Interior, maintains a
paramilitary force. The civilian authorities do not maintain
effective control of the security forces. Members of the security
forces, particularly the PSO, committed numerous, serious human rights
abuses.
Yemen is a very poor country; about 40 percent of the
population live in poverty. Its embryonic market-based economy,
despite a major economic reform program, remains impeded by excessive
government interference and widespread corruption. Its annual per
capita gross national product (GNP) fell from $377 in 1997 to $342 in 1998,
but rose to $368 in 1999. Agriculture accounts for approximately 22
percent of GNP, industry for approximately 27 percent, and services for
approximately 51 percent. Oil is the primary source of foreign
exchange. Other exports include fish, livestock, coffee, and
detergents. Remittances from citizens working abroad (primarily in
Saudi Arabia and other Arab Persian Gulf states) also are important.
However, remittances were reduced sharply after Saudi Arabia and other Gulf
states expelled up to 850,000 Yemeni workers during the Gulf War because of
the Government's lack of support for the U.N. coalition. The Gulf
states also suspended most assistance programs, and much Western aid was
reduced. Foreign aid has begun to reemerge as an important source of
income. The unemployment rate is estimated at 35 percent, and is
highest in the southern governorates, where, prior to unity, most adults
were employed by the PDRY Government.
The Government generally respected its citizens' human
rights in some areas and continued to improve its human rights performance;
however, its record was poor in several other areas, and serious problems
remain. There are significant limitations on citizens' ability to
change their government. Security forces committed a number of
extrajudicial killings. Members of the security forces tortured and
otherwise abused persons, and continued to arrest and detain citizens
arbitrarily, especially oppositionists in the south and other persons
regarded as "secessionists." However, during the year, the
Government issued directives intended to align the country's arrest,
interrogation, and detention procedures more closely with internationally
accepted standards, and such directives generally were implemented in
practice. Prison conditions are poor, and some detainees were held in
private prisons not authorized by the Government. However, during the
year, with the cooperation of the Government, the International Committee
of the Red Cross conducted a comprehensive inspection of the country's
prisons. PSO officers have broad discretion over perceived national
security issues. Despite constitutional constraints, security
officers routinely monitor citizens' activities, search their homes, detain
citizens for questioning, and mistreat detainees. The Government
fails to hold members of the security forces accountable for abuses, and
there were no convictions of security officials for abuses during the year.
Prolonged pretrial detention is a serious problem, and judicial corruption,
inefficiency, and executive interference undermine due process. The
Government continued to implement a comprehensive long-term program for
judicial reform. The law limits freedom of speech and of the press,
and the Government frequently harassed, intimidated, and detained
journalists. However, harassment of journalists lessened during the
year. Nonetheless, journalists practice self-censorship. The
Government at times limits freedom of assembly. The Government
imposes some restrictions on freedom of religion, and places some limits on
freedom of movement. The Government adopted measures to decentralize
government authority by establishing locally elected governorate and
district councils. In February the Government hosted a major
symposium of the U.N. Commission on Human Rights (UNCHR), chaired by U.N.
High Commissioner Mary Robinson, on the human rights aspects of
international development. The Government displayed official
receptiveness to and support for donor-funded democracy and human rights
programs. Violence and discrimination against women are problems.
Female genital mutilation (FGM) is practiced on a limited scale, primarily
along the coastal areas of the Red Sea. Although the practice is
discouraged publicly, the authorities do not prohibit it. There is
some discrimination against the disabled. Discrimination against
religious, racial, and ethnic minorities is a problem. The Government
influences labor unions. Child labor is a problem.
There was a significant decrease in the number of
kidnapings of foreigners, which was at least in part the result of the
Government's establishment of a special court to try kidnapers and other
violent offenders. The campaign of bombings--the devices sometimes
were little more than noise bombs--that had continued for several years,
particularly in the southern governorates, appears to have abated, although
there were a few explosions during the year. Observers attribute
these bombings to tribal disputes, religious extremists, and antigovernment
political groups based in the country and abroad.
RESPECT FOR HUMAN RIGHTS
Section 1 Respect for the Integrity of the Person,
Including
Freedom From:
a. Political and Other Extrajudicial Killing
Security forces committed a number of extrajudicial
killings. There were some reports during the year that security
forces at checkpoints killed or injured persons whom they believed were
engaging in criminal activity and resisting arrest.
In May security forces killed Ghassan Qasim Mani, a
student in Al-Dalah governorate, during a violent confrontation between
security forces and armed citizens. Another student and four police
officers were injured in the confrontation, which occurred while security
officials were conducting a weapons search in the vicinity of Al-Jalilah.
In August Sabah Seif Salem reportedly died while being
detained in a prison in the Al-Udain district of Ibb governorate. Her
family claimed that security officials tortured her to extract a confession
of adultery. The director of Ibb security ordered that an autopsy be
performed and called in the head of Al-Udain's security office for
questioning. The investigation found that Salem was pregnant when she
was detained for questioning and went into labor while in police custody.
She was transported to a clinic, but died as a result of complications
during childbirth. Salem's baby also died. The investigation
concluded that Salem had not been tortured (see Section 1.c.).
One police officer was killed and eight others wounded
after intervening to settle a land dispute in the village of Qud Qarow in
Aden governorate; several villagers were wounded, but none were reported
killed. The circumstances of the police officer's death were unclear
(see Section 1.f.).
No security officials were tried or convicted for abuses
during the year.
In July 1999, a court in Tawila in Al-Mahweet
governorate convicted the town's security chief and two police officers of
first-degree murder for torturing to death a teenager taken into their
custody on theft charges in March 1999. All three officials were
fired. The security chief was sentenced to 10 years in jail and
ordered to pay $19,000 (3,116,000 riyals) in compensation to the victim's
family. The two police officers each were sentenced to 5 years in
jail.
There was credible evidence that security forces killed
a prisoner in detention in late 1997 or early 1998. Wadia Al-Shaibani,
a 22-year-old who was arrested in connection with the July 1997 bombings in
Aden, apparently died after suffering a beating at the Soleyban police
facility in Aden. Government authorities declined to investigate;
they claimed that Al-Shaibani committed suicide. The Human Rights
Committee of the Consultative Council (an advisory board to the President)
in 1998 investigated Al-Shaibani's death; however, it was unable to
persuade the authorities to investigate the death or to bring charges
against security officials.
On October 12, terrorists in a small bomb-laden boat
attacked the USS Cole, a U.S. naval ship, as it refueled in Aden harbor.
The explosion killed 17 sailors and wounded 39 others. The
investigation into the attack was ongoing, and 6 suspects were in custody
at year's end.
Tribal violence resulted in a number of killings and
other abuses, and the Government's ability to control tribal elements
remained limited. In addition, tensions between the Government and
various tribes periodically escalated into violent confrontations (see
Section 5).
Persons continued to be killed and injured in
unexplained bombings and shootings that occurred during the year. In
most cases, it was impossible to determine who was responsible for such
acts or why they occurred, and there were no claims of responsibility.
The Government accused southern oppositionists of perpetrating some
incidents, but the opposition denied any involvement. Some cases
appeared to have criminal, religious, or political motives; others appeared
to be cases of tribal revenge or land disputes. In June 1998, the
President established a committee to study the phenomenon of revenge
killings and to make recommendations on how to combat the problem.
There was no news on the committee's work or its findings at year's end.
In December 1998, a group of 16 Western tourists was
kidnaped by terrorists in Abyan governorate near Mudiyah. The next
day, government forces surrounded the area and attempted a rescue
operation. Four of the hostages and three of the terrorists were
killed. There were varying reports as to whether the government
forces inadvertently killed any of the hostages in the crossfire.
However, at least two apparently were shot deliberately by the kidnapers.
The Government has stated that its decision to intervene was based on its
belief that the hostages' lives were in immediate danger. The trial
of the four surviving terrorists, including Aden-Abyan Islamic Army (AAIA)
leader Zein Al-Abidine Al-Mihdar (also known as Abu Hassan), began in
January 1999, and in May 1999 they all were found guilty. Abu Hassan,
who during his trial publicly and repeatedly admitted to all charges
against him, a second Yemeni, Abdallah Al-Jundaydi, and a Tunisian, were
sentenced to death; the remaining defendant was sentenced to 20 years'
imprisonment. The Tunisian's sentence was commuted to 20 years' at
the first appellate review, and the Supreme Court in October 1999 commuted
Al-Jundaydi's sentence to 20 years as well. Abu Hassan's death
sentence was upheld by the Supreme Court in October 1999 and approved by
President Saleh. He was executed by firing squad on October 17, 1999.
There were no allegations of lack of due process in Abu Hassan's trial or
during the subsequent appeal process. The trial of seven additional
AAIA members on terrorism charges began in October 1999 and ended in June;
the group's leader and a second defendant were convicted and received jail
sentences of 7 and 3 years; the remaining five defendants were acquitted
(see Section 1.e.).
b. Disappearance
Members of the security forces continue to arrest and detain citizens for
varying periods of time without charge or notification to their families.
Many detainees are associated with the YSP or other opposition parties and
are accused of being "secessionists." Such detentions are
temporary; detainees typically are released within weeks or, at most,
months. Those who are not released eventually are charged.
In 1998 at the invitation of authorities, delegations
from the UNHRC and Amnesty International visited the country to investigate
the whereabouts of persons who have "disappeared" in custody
since unification. In 1997 the Government had promised AI that it
would look into 27 cases of persons who died after they reportedly
"disappeared" while in government custody during the violence
associated with the civil war in 1994. In its follow-up report issued
in July 1999, AI criticized the Government for not keeping this promise.
The Government claims that it responded to AI and passed the results of its
investigations to the UNHRC, but that the information AI provided was
inadequate for effective investigation and conclusive action. Both
the U.N. Committee on Disappearances and AI also continue to allege that
there are hundreds of unresolved disappearances dating from the preunity
period in the former PDRY, particularly from its 1986 civil war. The
Government asserts that it cannot be held responsible for cases that took
place within the former PDRY prior to unity; however, it has set up a
computer database in the Ministry of Foreign Relations to track
disappearances, including those dating from the preunity period. The
Government states that the scarcity of records resulting from the country's
lack of an effective national registry hindered its attempts during the
year to create database files, especially for persons who disappeared in
the PDRY in the 1970's. AI has received no credible reports of new
disappearances in the last 6 years.
Some tribes seek to bring their political and economic
concerns to the attention of the Government by kidnaping and holding
hostages. Foreign businessmen, diplomats, and tourists are the
principal targets. During the year, eight foreigners were kidnaped
(six men, one woman, and one child), as well as a much higher number of
citizens. A total of 159 foreigners have been kidnaped since 1992.
The legal magazine Al-Qistas, in a 1998 study, found that Sana'a, Marib,
and Shabwa are the areas in which a foreigner is most likely to be kidnaped.
Kidnaping victims rarely are injured, and the authorities generally have
been successful in obtaining the negotiated release of foreign hostages.
However, in June a Norwegian diplomat on vacation was killed near Sana'a
during an exchange of fire between checkpoint police and his abductors.
There has been a marked decline in tribal kidnapings of
foreigners, from 13 cases involving 41 persons in 1997 to 10 cases
involving 27 persons in 1998 to 9 cases involving 21 persons in 1999 to 6
cases involving 8 persons during the year. Kidnapings had been a
persistent problem in the past, due to the judiciary's frequent failure to
impose sentences against accused kidnapers because some persons linked to
kidnapings were members of prominent tribes or had links with such tribes.
In most cases, the kidnapings were settled out of court, with no suspects
facing trial; however, this practice has changed. In August 1998, the
Government issued by presidential decree a law that stipulated severe
punishments up to and including capital punishment for persons involved in
kidnaping, "carjacking," attacking oil pipelines, and other acts
of banditry and sabotage. In October 1999, the Government announced
the establishment of a special court in Sana'a to implement this law and
created a special prosecutor to investigate and try those charged under its
provisions. In May the court sentenced an individual who had kidnaped
three German tourists in November 1999 to 12 years in jail. In June
the kidnaper of an American in 1997, and later a group of European
tourists, received a 20-year sentence; in July two additional kidnapers
received 15-year jail sentences. The arrests, trials, and convictions
continue. The Government's prosecution of persons charged with
kidnaping appears to have had a deterrent effect. There were no
reports of tribal opposition or interference in the arrests or the judicial
process connected with these cases.
c. Torture and other Cruel, Inhuman or Degrading
Treatment or Punishment
The Constitution is ambiguous on its prohibition of
cruel or inhuman punishment; however, members of the security forces
tortured and otherwise abused persons in detention. Arresting
authorities are known to use force during interrogations, especially
against those arrested for violent crimes. Detainees sometimes are
confined in leg-irons and shackles, despite the passage of a law in 1998
outlawing this practice.
The Government has acknowledged publicly that torture
takes place but has claimed that the use of torture is not government
policy. Nevertheless, the Government has not taken effective steps to
end the practice or to punish those who commit such abuses. A
government prosecutor has cited illiteracy and lack of training among
police and security officials as reasons for the persistence of the use of
undue force in prisons; a human rights activist has suggested that
corruption and pressure from superiors to produce convictions also plays a
role. The immunity of all public employees from prosecution for
crimes allegedly committed while on duty also hinders accountability;
prosecutors must obtain permission from the Attorney General to investigate
members of the security forces, and the head of the Appeals Court formally
must lift their immunity before they are tried. Low salaries for
police officers, about $37 to $56 (6,000 to 9,000 riyals) per month, also
contribute to corruption and police abuse.
In August Sabah Seif Salem reportedly died while being
detained in a prison in the Al-Udain district of Ibb governorate. Her
family claimed that security officials tortured her to extract a confession
of adultery. The director of Ibb security directed that an autopsy be
performed and called in the head of Al-Udain's security office for
questioning. The investigation found that Salem was pregnant when she
was detained for questioning and went into labor while in police custody.
She was transported to a clinic, but died as a result of complications
during childbirth. Salem's baby also died. The investigation
concluded that Salem had not been tortured (see Section 1.a.).
In July 1999, a court convicted three security force
officials of murder for torturing a teenager to death (see Section 1.a.);
however, there were no reported convictions of security officers for abuses
during the year. In February Major Hisham Al-Ghazali, the most senior
of three CID officials convicted of torture in 1998, was reassigned to
investigative duties. Abdullah Al-Qaradi, the prosecutor for
investigation and security for Sana'a governorate, objected to the
reassignment, but he was overruled by the CID's Director General, Hussein
Ali Haitham.
In April 1999, Sana'a municipality police arrested Naji
Saleh Al-Khowlani for his alleged involvement in a car theft ring.
Al-Khowlani was held for 2 months, during which time prison officials
reportedly tortured him during regular nightly interrogation sessions in
which officials would attempt to elicit a confession and extract
information by burning him with a cigarette lighter. A medical report
documented burn marks and other injuries on Al-Khowlani's body. No
action was taken during the year to investigate this case.
The trial of seven alleged members of the AAIA on
terrorism charges, which began in October 1999, ended in June. The
group's leader, Saleh Haidara Al-Atwi, and another defendant, Haidara
Nasser Al-Mashraqi, were sentenced to 7 and 3 years in prison,
respectively. The remaining five defendants were acquitted. Two
of the defendants were tried in absentia. Four claimed that the
prosecution coerced and tortured them into making self-incriminating
statements and confessions (see Section 1.e.). The judge issued a
ruling prohibiting the publication of details about the trial.
The eight Britons and two Algerians convicted in Aden in
August 1999 of possession of illegal weapons and explosives and conspiring
to commit terrorist acts in Aden claimed during their trial during the year
that they had been tortured; two claimed that they had been abused sexually
(see Section 1.e.).
In 1998 several individuals on trial in Aden in
connection with a series of bombings in 1997 testified publicly that they
had been tortured. One defendant claimed that he had been raped while
in custody. There is credible evidence that one other person arrested
in connection with the same bombings died as a result of beatings inflicted
by security officials. According to eyewitnesses who also claimed to
have been tortured, Wadia Al-Shaibani was beaten first in a criminal
security office in Aden, then transferred to the Soleyban police facility,
where he was tortured to death (see Section 1.a.). No charges have
been filed against security officials.
In a related case in 1998 in which 31 persons were
accused of conspiracy in Mahra governorate in 1997, several of the suspects
claimed that they had confessed only because they had been tortured.
Defense attorneys asserted the existence of films that would prove their
clients' allegations that they had been beaten, and asked the judge to view
the films. The judge denied this request. In late October 1998,
the court sentenced three of the defendants to death, found one innocent,
and sentenced the others to jail for periods ranging from 6 to 10 years.
The Constitution may be interpreted as permitting
amputations in accordance with Shari'a (Islamic law). There have been
no reports of amputations since 1991. However, a small number of
persons who have been found guilty of theft and sentenced to amputation
remain in jail awaiting the implementation of their sentences. The
Shari'a-based law permits physical punishment such as flogging for some
crimes. For example, in July two individuals convicted of kidnaping
were sentenced to 80 lashes (the penalty for the consumption of alcohol) in
addition to a period of imprisonment because they had been intoxicated
during the commission of their crime. In Ibb governorate in January,
Mohamed Tahbit Al-Su'mi, after being tried and convicted, was stoned to
death for the 1992 rape and murder of his 12-year-old daughter.
Capital punishment usually is carried out by firing squad; stoning is
almost unheard of, but was approved in this case due to the unusual
brutality of the crime. In rare cases involving particularly
egregious crimes, such as the rape and murder of children, the law permits
the ritual display in public of the bodies of executed criminals. The
ostensible purpose of this practice is to demonstrate to the families of
victims that justice has been served and to prevent blood feuds between
tribes.
Police used excessive force in September when they
intervened to settle a land dispute in the village of Qud Qarow in Aden
governorate (see Sections 1.a. and 1.f.).
Tribal violence continued to be a problem during the
year, causing numerous deaths and injuries (see Section 5).
Prison conditions are poor and do not meet
internationally recognized minimum standards. Prisons are
overcrowded, sanitary conditions are poor, and food and health care are
inadequate. Inmates depend on relatives for food and medicine.
Many inmates lack mattresses or bedding. Prison authorities often
exact money from prisoners and refuse to release prisoners until family
members pay a bribe. Tribal leaders misuse the prison system by
placing "problem" tribesmen in jail, either to punish them for
noncriminal indiscretions or to protect them from retaliation or violence
motivated by revenge. Refugees, persons with mental problems, and
illegal immigrants sometimes are arrested without charge and placed in
prisons with common criminals.
Conditions are equally poor in women's prisons, in which
children likely are to be incarcerated along with their mothers. By
custom and preference, babies born in prison generally remain in prison
with their mothers. Female prisoners sometimes are subjected to
sexual harassment and violent interrogation by male police and prison
officials. The law requires male members of the families of female
prisoners to arrange their release; however, female prisoners regularly are
held in jail past the expiration of their sentences because their male
relatives refuse to authorize their release due to the shame associated
with their alleged behavior. The Government's Supreme National
Committee for Human Rights, working with the National Women's Committee,
has developed a plan to establish a shelter in Sana'a that would house 50
of these abandoned women and provide them with vocational education.
The committee is seeking donor assistance and hopes to establish additional
shelters in other governorates.
Unauthorized "private" prisons are a problem.
Most such prisons are in rural areas controlled by tribes, and many are
simply a room in a tribal sheikh's house. Persons detained in such
prisons often are held for strictly personal or tribal reasons and without
trial or sentencing. There are credible reports of the existence of
private prisons in government installations, although these prisons are not
sanctioned by senior officials. In July Mohamed Naji Alao, a
parliamentarian and founder of the human rights NGO the Organization for
the Defense of Human Rights, discovered that several private prisons were
being operated at government facilities in Sana'a. He reported them
to the President, who immediately ordered the unlawful prisons closed, and
the offenders arrested. In April 1999, the chairman of the Sana'a
governorate prosecutor's office, Salem Ahmed Al-Shaiba, inspected several
illegal prisons operated by the Sana'a governor's office and sent his
findings to the Attorney General. According to Al-Shaiba's findings,
19 individuals had been imprisoned beyond their legal sentence; several
prisoners were being detained in handcuffs illegally; numerous individuals
were being detained illegally in connection with civil or commercial cases
or because they had disobeyed a tribal sheikh; and 43 persons from one
region (Shibam Al-Gharas) were being detained on the same charge (shooting
at a truck). Al-Shaiba informed the Attorney General that he had
requested then-Sana'a governor Naji Al-Sufi to release the illegally
imprisoned individuals, but that the governor had taken no action.
Later that year, Al-Shaiba reported being harassed by then-governor
Al-Sufi. The Attorney General took no action on the findings of the
inspection report. Al-Shaiba took a voluntary leave of absence from
his post, and eventually left the country. Governor Al-Sufi was
relieved of his post in October 1999, but was never charged with a crime
(see Section 1.e.).
During the year, the Government issued directives
intended to align the country's arrest, interrogation, and detention
procedures more closely with internationally accepted standards. For
example, the Ministry of Interior created new detention/interrogation
centers in each governorate (including four in Sana'a), to prevent suspects
from being detained with convicted criminals. The Government also
formally instructed police and prison officials that detainees be provided
adequate food, that prisoners be released upon completion of their
sentences, and that juveniles (with the exception of those convicted of
murder) be incarcerated in facilities separated from adults. In
addition, the Government created a female police force and developed
regulatory guidance for their activities to better respond to the needs of
female prisoners and female victims of crimes. The Government's
directives generally were implemented in practice.
In January the Government's Supreme National Committee
for Human Rights led a government initiative to establish and finance,
along with private sector contributions, a special "charity fund"
to be used to enable the release of prisoners who, in keeping with tribal
or Islamic law, were being held in prison pending payment of restitution to
their victims, despite having completed their sentences. The
President celebrated the Islamic holy month of Ramadan by appointing a
high-level interministerial committee, chaired by the Minister of Interior,
to inspect all major prisons in the country, both to identify prisoners
whom the fund could help and to investigate conditions. The
inspection committee immediately released persons being held illegally,
developed recommendations for reform, and arranged for the eventual release
of over 1,000 prisoners who had been held beyond their sentences (in
violation of the law) until they could pay restitution. The Human
Rights Committee of the Consultative Council continued to conduct spot
checks of prisons and to arrange for the expeditious release of persons
held improperly.
The Government tightly controls access to detention
facilities by NGO's, although it sometimes permits local and international
human rights monitors access to persons accused of crimes. During the
year, the International Committee of the Red Cross (ICRC), with the
Government's full cooperation, conducted a comprehensive inspection of the
country's major prisons. While serious problems remain, the ICRC
acknowledged the Government's commitment to penal reform and noted that the
Government had made significant improvements since the last ICRC inspection
(in 1995), especially with regard to the incarceration of mentally ill
persons.
The PSO does not permit access to its detention centers.
d. Arbitrary Arrest, Detention, or Exile
The law provides due process safeguards; however, security forces
arbitrarily arrest and detain persons. Enforcement of the law is
irregular and in some cases nonexistent, particularly in cases involving
security offenses. According to the law, detainees must be arraigned
within 24 hours of arrest or be released. The judge or prosecuting
attorney must inform the accused of the basis for the arrest and decide
whether detention is required. In no case may a detainee be held
longer than 7 days without a court order. Despite these
constitutional and other legal provisions, arbitrary arrest and prolonged
detention without charge are common practices. In April Parliament
passed a new Police Law, which established the mandate, duties, and
procedures for police. Draft provisions would have permitted police
to conduct searches without a warrant and to open fire on gatherings of
five or more persons if police suspected imminent violence or criminal
activity. Following a campaign by human rights organizations,
opposition political parties, and the press, Parliament amended the law to
remove the provisions.
In September forces from the CSO used excessive force in
attacking the village of Qud Qarow in Aden governorate, reportedly
arresting 30 persons (see Sections 1.a. and 1.f.)
During the year, journalists continued to be detained
briefly for questioning concerning articles that they wrote that were
critical of the Government or that the Government considered sensitive (see
Section 2.a.). However, there was a significant decrease in the
number of such incidents from the previous year.
The law provides detainees with the right to inform
their families of their arrests and to decline to answer questions without
an attorney present. There are provisions for bail. In practice
many authorities abide by these provisions only if bribed.
Defense lawyers claimed that the eight Britons and two
Algerians arrested in December 1998 for possessing illegal weapons and
explosives and conspiring to commit terrorist acts in Aden (see Sections
1.c. and 1.e.) were denied their right to legal counsel. They also
contended that defense doctors were not permitted to examine their clients
in order to investigate allegations of torture and sexual abuse.
Several months after the defense's request, the Government arranged for an
independent physician to examine those arrested; however, it did not allow
the defense to observe the examination and did not provide a report.
The trial concluded in August 1999, although according to the law, the
violation of the right to counsel should have suspended the case. The
court sentenced the main suspects to jail terms of 7 and 3 years,
respectively. Five other defendants received jail terms ranging from
5 to 7 years. The seven defendants appealed the verdict. Two of
the Britons received 7-month sentences and were ordered released for time
served; another, for reasons of poor health, was ordered released for time
served. The three returned to the United Kingdom in October 1999.
Citizens regularly complained that security officials
did not observe due process procedures when arresting and detaining
suspects, particularly those accused of involvement in political violence.
There also were complaints that private individuals hired lower-level
security officials to intervene on their behalf and harass their business
rivals. Security forces sometimes detained demonstrators (see Section
2.b.). In August 1999, then-governor of Sana'a Naji Al-Sufi
reportedly ordered the arrest of Hafed Fadhil, a lawyer representing the
opposing party in a case involving one of the governor's friends. In
September 1999, he illegally detained judge Mohammed Saad Amer, a member of
the Sana'a appeals court, for 2 days (see Section 1.e.). The governor
was relieved of his post in October 1999.
In cases where a criminal suspect is at large, security
forces sometimes detain a relative while the suspect is being sought.
The detention may continue while the concerned families negotiate
compensation for the alleged wrongdoing. Arbitration, rather than the
court system, commonly is used to settle cases.
The Government has failed to ensure that detainees and
prisoners are incarcerated only in authorized detention facilities.
The Ministry of Interior and the PSO operate extrajudicial detention
facilities. A large percentage of the total prison population
consists of pretrial detainees. There have been allegations that a
large number of persons have been imprisoned for years without
documentation concerning charges against them, their trials, or their
sentences.
Aziz Mohamed Musaid, who was arrested in Taiz in
September 1998 and charged with intent to commit adultery, has not yet been
brought to trial and remains in prison because the presiding judge, Abdul
Jabar Taha Al-Kharasani, has refused to adjudicate the case. The
charges did not appear to be supported by solid evidence, and the local
press has characterized Al-Kharasani as corrupt. In October 1999, Al-Kharasani
was ordered by the Minister of Interior to turn over his cases, including
Musaid's, to another judge, but he has refused to do so.
While some cases of those being held without charge have
been redressed through the efforts of local human rights groups and
government inspection missions (and some illegally detained prisoners
released), the authorities have not investigated or resolved these cases
adequately.
Unauthorized, private prisons also exist in tribal areas
in which the Government does not exercise authority effectively.
Persons detained in these prisons often are held for strictly personal
reasons and without trial or sentencing (see Sections 1.c. and 1.e.).
The Government does not use forced exile. However,
at the end of the 1994 civil war, the Government denied amnesty to the 16
most senior leaders of the armed, secessionist Democratic Republic of Yemen
(DRY) who fled abroad. Although they were not forced into exile, they
are subject to arrest if they return. The trial of the so-called
"16" concluded in March 1998 (see Section 1.c.).
e. Denial of Fair Public Trial
The Constitution provides for an "autonomous" judiciary and
independent judges; however, the judiciary is not fully independent, and is
weak and severely hampered by corruption, executive branch interference,
and the frequent failure of the authorities to enforce judgments.
Judges are appointed by the executive branch, and some have been harassed,
reassigned, or removed from office following rulings against the
Government. For example, there were credible reports that in 1999
then-governor of Sana'a Naji Al-Sufi repeatedly interfered with and
attempted to intimidate members of the judiciary, including by assaulting a
defense lawyer, detaining at least two judges, and harassing the chairman
of Sana'a governorate's prosecutor's office, Salem Ahmed Al-Shaiba, after
Al-Shaiba reported to the Attorney General that the governor's office was
running illegal prisons (see Section 1.c.). Governor Al-Sufi was
relieved of his post in October 1999, but no legal action was taken against
him. Al-Shaiba has left the country. Many litigants maintain,
and the Government acknowledges, that a judge's social ties and
susceptibility to bribery sometimes have greater influence on the verdict
than the law or the facts of the case. Many judges are poorly
trained, and some closely associated with the Government often render
decisions favorable to it. The judiciary is hampered further by the
Government's frequent reluctance to enforce judgments. Tribal
elements sometimes threaten and harass members of the judiciary. For
example, in August members of the Bani Dhubian tribe kidnaped judge Abdu
Rahman Abu Taleb, who was presiding over a land dispute case involving the
tribe.
There are five types of courts: Criminal; civil
and personal status (for example, divorce and inheritance); kidnaping/terrorism;
commercial; and court martial.
All laws are codified from Shari'a, under which there
are no jury trials. Criminal cases are adjudicated by a judge, who
plays an active role in questioning witnesses and the accused. Under
the Constitution and by law, the Government must provide attorneys for
indigent defendants; however, in practice this never occurs. Despite
a stipulation that the Government provide (and fund) legal aid to indigent
defendants, the law does not explicitly prohibit trying criminal defendants
without a lawyer, and the judicial budget currently does not allow for
defense attorneys. Judges sometimes "appoint" attorneys
present in their courtrooms to represent indigent defendants; however, such
attorneys are not required legally to take the case, although most accept
in order to avoid displeasing judges before whom they must appear later.
By law prosecutors are a part of the judiciary and
independent of the Government; however, in practice prosecutors look upon
themselves as an extension of the police. They do not receive the
normal judicial training that judges do, nor do they practice their legal
obligation to prosecute police who delay reporting arrests and detentions.
Defense attorneys are allowed to counsel their clients,
address the court, and examine witnesses. Defendants, including those
in commercial courts, have the right to appeal their sentences.
Trials are public; however, all courts may conduct closed sessions
"for reasons of public security or morals." Foreign
litigants in commercial disputes have complained of biased rulings.
However, some foreign companies have won cases against local defendants,
and some such decisions have been enforced.
In addition to regular courts, the law permits a system
of tribal adjudication for noncriminal issues, although in practice tribal
"judges" often adjudicate criminal cases as well. The
results of such mediation carry the same if not greater weight as court
judgments. Persons jailed under the tribal system usually are not
charged formally with a crime but stand publicly accused of their
transgression.
Prior to unification, approximately half of the judges
working in southern Yemen were women. However, after the 1994 civil
war, conservative leaders of the judiciary reassigned many southern female
judges to administrative or clerical duties. Although several female
judges continue to practice in Aden, there are no female judges in northern
courts.
The Government continued the program it began in late
1997 to reform the judiciary. This comprehensive, long-term reform
program is intended to improve the operational efficiency and statutory
independence of the judiciary by placing reform-minded personnel into the
courts; forming an inter-ministerial council to oversee the reform project;
publishing a judicial code of ethics; and making the Supreme Court smaller,
more efficient, and less corrupt. Foreign donors have offered to
provide assistance in implementing judicial reform, which the Government
has accepted. While the program has not yet been completed, some
attorneys cite improvements, including a reduction in the number of Supreme
Court justices from 90 to 40, an increase in judges' salaries in order to
deter corruption, an increase in the Ministry of Justice's budget, and
participation by judges in workshops and study tours conducted by foreign
judicial officials. However, the reform program's effect is not yet
clear. In October 1999, the Government established a special court to
try persons charged with kidnaping, "carjacking," attacking oil
pipelines and other acts of banditry and sabotage (see Section 1.b.).
Several persons tried in this special court have received lengthy jail
sentences, which appears to have had a deterrent effect on tribal
kidnapings.
In February 1999, a U.N. Development Program (UNDP) team
visited the country to conduct an assessment that would serve as the basis
of a second judicial reform program, which was scheduled to begin in
January and end in 2002. In March 1999, the team noted the
Government's willingness to address long-standing issues of accountability
and transparency, and to implement laws more effectively. The
program's goals are to modernize Ministry of Justice equipment, improve the
country's legal libraries, provide special training for the Attorney
General's office, enhance public awareness of the rule of law, and secure a
building for the Supreme Court. The UNDP continues to seek donor
funding for the program.
Another judicial reform program, financed by
international assistance, was initiated in January and is to last through
March 2002. The program focuses on the Ministries of Justice and of
Legal and Parliamentary Affairs and is to provide training in business and
commercial law for judges; a diagnostic study of judicial education
curriculum; training on drafting of legislation; and a review of the
country's commercial laws to identify and fix gaps or inconsistencies.
The program is ongoing.
The security services continued to arrest and
prosecutors charge and try persons alleged to be linked to various
shootings, explosions, bombings, and other acts of violence. Citizens
and human rights groups alleged that the judiciary did not observe due
process standards in these cases.
Eight Britons and two Algerians who were arrested in
December 1998 were tried from February to August 1999 in Aden on charges of
possessing illegal weapons and explosives and conspiring to commit
terrorist acts. The 6-month trial did not meet minimum international
standards for due process. Defense lawyers claimed that the
prosecution lacked adequate evidence, and that the defendants were
tortured, sexually abused, and denied access to their lawyers (see Section
1.c.). In August 1999, the court sentenced the main suspects, the
18-year-old stepson and 17-year-old son of Islamic militant Abu Hamza
Al-Masri, to jail terms of 7 and 3 years, respectively. The
Government has accused Al-Masri, head of the London-based organization
Supporters of Shari'a, of involvement with the AAIA, which has carried out
at least one fatal terrorist act in Yemen. Five other defendants
received jail terms ranging from 5 to 7 years. The seven defendants
appealed the verdict. Two of the Britons received 7-month sentences
and were ordered released for time served; another, for reasons of poor
health, was ordered released for time served in early summer 1999.
Their release was delayed because both the defense and the prosecution
appealed the verdicts. The Appeals Court upheld the verdicts, and the
three were released. They returned to the United Kingdom in October
1999.
The trial of seven additional AAIA members on terrorism
charges, which began in October 1999, ended in June. Two were found
guilty and given jail sentences; the remaining five were acquitted.
Two of the defendants were tried in absentia. Four claimed that the
prosecution coerced and tortured them into making self-incriminating
statements and confessions (see Section 1.c.). The judge issued a
ruling prohibiting the publication of details about the trial.
The Government claims that it does not hold political
prisoners. Local opposition politicians and human rights activists
generally accept this claim; however, some international human rights
groups and members of the opposition-in-exile dispute the claim.
At the end of the 1994 civil war, the President pardoned
nearly all who had fought against the central Government, including
military personnel and most leaders of the unrecognized DRY. The
Government denied amnesty to the 16 most senior leaders of the DRY (one of
whom now is presumed dead), who fled abroad. The DRY leaders are
subject to arrest if they return. In 1997 and 1998, the so-called
"16" were tried in absentia on various charges, including forming
a secessionist government, conspiracy, and forming a separate military.
All but two were found guilty, and in March 1998, a judge sentenced five of
the defendants to death and 3 to 10 years in jail. Six persons
received suspended sentences, and two were acquitted. Many opposition
figures have urged the President to issue an amnesty for those who received
sentences, in the interest of promoting reconciliation between the north
and south. The President has stated that it is up to the judicial
system to pass judgment. Defense attorneys have appealed to a higher
court, but no judgment has yet been rendered.
f. Arbitrary Interference with Privacy, Family,
Home or
Correspondence
Despite constitutional provisions against government
interference with privacy, security forces routinely search homes and
private offices, monitor telephones, read personal mail, and otherwise
intrude into personal matters for alleged security reasons. Such
activities are conducted without legally issued warrants or judicial
supervision. Security forces regularly monitor telephone
conversations and interfere with the telephone service of government
critics and opponents. Security forces sometimes detain relatives of
suspects (see Section 1.d.). Government informers monitor meetings
and assemblies (see Section 2.b.).
The law prohibits arrests or the serving of a subpoena
between the hours of sundown and dawn. However, persons suspected of
crimes sometimes are taken from their homes in the middle of the night,
without search warrants.
In September forces from the CSO used excessive force
when they intervened to settle a land dispute in the village of Qud Qarow
in the Buraiqah district of Aden governorate. The dispute was between
a businessman, who claimed to have purchased land in the adjacent mountains
where he had built a quarry, and armed villagers, who claimed that they,
not the Government, owned the land and were due compensation. During
an initial confrontation, one police officer was killed and eight others
wounded; several villagers were wounded, but none were reported killed.
The circumstances of the police officer's death were unclear. In
response, CSU forces charged the village, reportedly arresting 30 persons,
mistreating citizens, looting and destroying houses, and leaving 200
families homeless.
Jews traditionally face social (but not legal)
restrictions on their residence and their employment (see Section 5).
According to a 1995 Ministry of Interior regulation, no citizen may marry a
foreigner without Interior Ministry permission (see Section 5). This
regulation does not carry the force of law, and appears to be enforced
irregularly. However, some human rights groups have raised concerns
about the regulation.
An estimated 16,000 persons use the Internet, and 5,371
persons subscribe to it. The Government does not impose restrictions
on Internet use, but most persons find that equipment and subscriptions
costs are prohibitively high. Teleyemen, a parastatal company under
the Ministry of Telecommunications, is the country's sole Internet service
provider. According to Teleyemen (see Section 2.a.), the Government
blocks sexually explicit web sites; however, with the exception of
mowj.com, which is the web site of the Yemeni National Opposition Front
(MOWJ), it does not block politically oriented web sites. For
example, Abu Hamza's web page (see Section 1.e.) is not blocked. The
Government claims that it does not monitor Internet usage, but some persons
suspect their e-mail messages are read by security authorities. There
have been no reports that the Government has taken action against Internet
users.
Section 2 Respect for Civil Liberties, Including:
a. Freedom of Speech and Press
The Constitution restricts freedom of speech and of the
press "within the limits of the law," and the Government
influences the media and limits press freedom. Some security
officials attempt to influence press coverage by threatening, harassing,
and detaining journalists. Although most citizens are uninhibited in
their private discussions of domestic and foreign policies, some are
cautious in public, fearing harassment for criticism of the Government.
The Penal Code criminalizes, with fines and up to 5 years in jail,
"the humiliation of the State, the Cabinet, or parliamentary
institutions," the publication of "false information" that
"threatens public order or the public interest," and "false
stories intended to damage Arab and friendly countries or their relations
with Yemen."
The relative freedom of the press permitted between
unification (1990) and the civil war (1994) has not been reestablished.
An atmosphere of government pressure on independent and political party
journals continues at a higher level than before the civil war. The
international human rights group the Committee to Protect Journalists
continued to criticize the Government for restrictions, harassment, and
arbitrary detention directed at journalists.
The Ministry of Information influences the media by its
control of most printing presses, by subsidies to certain newspapers, and
by its ownership of the country's sole television and radio outlets.
Only one newspaper, the thrice-weekly Aden independent Al-Ayyam, owns its
own press. The Government selects the items to be covered in news
broadcasts, and often does not permit broadcast reporting critical of the
Government. However, during the 1999 presidential election campaign,
the media extensively covered both candidates and reported in full the many
critical comments made by the President's opponent. The Government
televises parliamentary debates but may edit them selectively to remove
criticism.
In 1998 the Government implemented regulations for the
1990 Press Law. The new regulations specify that newspapers must
apply annually to the Government for licensing renewal, and that they must
show continuing evidence of about $4,375 (700,000 riyals) in operating
capital. Some journalists welcomed the new regulations, saying that
they were long overdue. Others claimed that they were designed to
drive some opposition newspapers out of business.
Although newspapers ostensibly are permitted to
criticize the Government, journalists sometimes censor themselves,
especially when writing on such sensitive issues as government policies
toward the southern governorates, relations with Saudi Arabia and other
foreign governments, and official corruption. The penalties for
exceeding these self-imposed limits can be arrest for libel, dismissal from
employment, or extrajudicial harassment. Editors-in-chief legally are
responsible for everything printed in their newspapers, regardless of
authorship. Some journalists reported being threatened by security
officials to change the tone and substance of their reporting.
Journalists must have a permit to travel abroad, although there were no
reports that this restriction was enforced during the year (see Section
2.d.).
During the year, journalists continued to be detained
for questioning for short periods of time for writing articles that were
critical of the Government or that the Government considered sensitive
subjects, primarily issues involving Saudi Arabia. However, there was
a decline in the number of such incidents from the previous year, and most
individual journalists and the Yemeni Journalists Syndicate agree that
extralegal governmental harassment is less of a problem now than it was in
the recent past. Some journalists claim that most harassment now
comes from the police, in particular the CID, and no longer the PSO.
Cases and ongoing trials involving journalists often are not resolved
formally, but rather are settled through unofficial agreements between the
Government and the journalists.
Two cases during the year involved articles that
criticized the Government of Saudi Arabia. In February the Ministry
of Information filed a lawsuit against Dr. Qasim Sallam, the secretary
general of the opposition Arab Socialist Baath Party, and the party's
newspaper, Al-Ihya Al-Arabi, for an article Sallam wrote entitled "The
Danger-dom of Saudi Arabia," which alleged that there were supporters
of Israel in the Saudi leadership. The case was pending at year's
end. In August 1999, Jamal Ahmed Amer, a journalist for Al-Wahdawi
newspaper and member of the opposition Nasserist Party, was detained and
held incommunicado for 6 days for writing an article critical of
Yemeni-Saudi relations. Al-Wahdawi's editor, Abdelaziz Sultan, also
was called in for questioning. In February Amer was tried and found
guilty of "harming national interests" and "publishing an
article not based on accurate documents." The judge suspended
publication of Al-Wahdawi for 1 month, banned Amer from practicing
journalism for 1 year, and fined Amer $31 (5,000 riyals). The editors
of Al-Wahdawi and Al-Ihya Al-Arabi claimed that the actions taken against
them by the Ministry of Information were a direct result of pressure by the
Government of Saudi Arabia. Amer's lawyer appealed the case, which
was pending at year's end. Amer continued to write for another
newspaper, Al-Usbu'. He has filed a suit against the Minister of
Interior; this suit also was pending at year's end.
In March Ali Al-Sarari, editor-in-chief of the YSP
newspaper Al-Thawri, received a suspended 3-month prison sentence for
publishing a story alleging that two soldiers were being held in the
Mukallah prosecutors office on attempted rape charges. The Government
claimed that the story was published to inflame north-south tensions.
Also in March, a Sana'a court dismissed the cases
brought against the Ministry of Information by the opposition Islaah, YSP,
and Nasserist parties. The parties had claimed that the official
media had neglected to broadcast the final communiques issued at the
conclusion of their party meetings and conferences in violation of the
Constitution's provision of equal media time for all political parties.
The official media provides extensive coverage of the GPC.
In May a CID officer destroyed journalist Khaled
Al-Hammadi's camera as he attempted to photograph a student demonstration
at Sana'a University, despite the fact that he had received permission to
cover the event.
Also in May, Hisham Ba Sharahil, the editor of Al-Ayyam,
was charged with "instigating the use of force and terrorism" and
"publishing false information" for publishing an interview with
Islamic militant Abu Hamza Al-Masri (see Section 1.e.) in August 1999.
He also was charged with "insulting public institutions" for
publishing an article critical of the Director of Aden Security. The
trial was suspended to allow Ba Sharahil to undergo medical treatment.
In February Ba Sharahil also was called in for questioning in connection
with an article published in Al-Ayyam criticizing the Aden municipal
government's allowing the destruction of a building that once had been a
synagogue. He again was called in for question in April following
publication in Al-Ayyam of a letter of support for Ba Sharahil in his
dispute with the Director of Aden Security from the secessionist Movement
of Self-Determination for South Arabia (HATAM).
In June Al-Tajammu newspaper and its editor in chief,
Abdulrahman Abdullah, were tried for an article published in November 1999,
which accused the Supreme Court of corruption. Abdullah received a
6-month suspended sentence, and the newspaper was fined.
In July security officials detained a journalist for
Al-Balagh newspaper for 6 days for reporting that an Iraqi teacher had
raped six female students in Amran governorate's College of Education.
The story turned out to be false, and the newspaper later apologized for
circulating it. Also in July, security officials harassed the
correspondents of the London-based Arabic Sayyidaty and the United Arab
Emirates-based Sahrat Al-Khalij magazines when they tried to report on
alleged serial killings at Sana'a University's medical school (see Section
5).
In August Saif Al-Hadhri, the editor in chief of
Al-Shumu newspaper, was convicted of libel in connection with a series of
articles reporting high-level corruption in the Ministries of Electricity,
Agriculture, Education and Finance. The judge fined Al-Hadhri $437
(70,000 riyals) and suspended him for 7 months. Al-Hadhri also was
ordered to pay the Minister and Deputy Minister of Education's legal fees
and $12,500 (2 million riyals) in compensation. Al-Hadhri appealed
the judgment, and the case was pending at year's end. In July
Al-Hadhri was abducted from his office for 1 day by 30 armed men, whom he
claimed were security officials.
In February 1999, the Ministry of Information closed
Al-Shoura, the newspaper of the Islamist opposition party Union of Popular
Forces (UPF), as well as a new, competing version of the same newspaper.
The second version of Al-Shoura appeared following an ideological split in
the UPF. Under the Press Law, it is illegal for more than one
newspaper to use the same name. Some journalists allege that the
Government financed the second Al-Shoura in order to create a pretext to
shut down the outspokenly critical original Al-Shoura. A court
allowed the original Al-Shoura to resume publication and upheld the
suspension of the second Al-Shoura, but an appeals court later ordered the
original newspaper to cease publication pending the Supreme Court's
decision as to which faction had the right to Al-Shoura's name. The
original Al-Shoura resumed publication in August.
In August 1999, journalist and lawyer Nabil Al-Amoudi
was brought before the Abyan preliminary court for writing an article
critical of the Government and the human rights situation in the country.
The case still was pending at year's end.
In August 1999, security officials detained Jamil
Al-Samit, a journalist for the Taiz-based official newspaper
Al-Jumhurriyah, for writing an article about the use of excessive force by
the military in putting down a civilian protest in the village of Quradah.
He was detained in prison for several weeks.
The Yemeni Journalists Syndicate defends freedom of the
press and publicizes human rights concerns. For example in September
it sponsored a symposium on the media and human rights. Critics claim
that the Syndicate is ineffective because it has too many nonjournalist
members who support government policy. In 1999 several independent
and opposition party journalists formed a rival union, the Committee for
the Defense of Journalists, under the leadership of Hisham Ba Sharahil, the
publisher of Al-Ayyam newspaper, to defend more vigorously journalists
harassed by the Government.
Customs officials confiscate foreign publications
regarded as pornographic or objectionable because of religious or political
content. In April PSO officials in Taiz detained Faysal Said Fara'a,
the director of a private cultural center, for a day of questioning
following his alleged receipt of banned books dealing with the opposition.
There were no reports during the year that the Ministry of Information
delayed the distribution of international Arabic-language dailies in an
effort to decrease their sales in the country, as had occurred in previous
years. However, authorities monitor foreign publications, banning
those that they deem harmful to national interests. For example in
April the owner of a Sana'a bookstore was arrested by the PSO for selling
banned copies of an edition of the London-based Arabic magazine Al-Magalah,
which featured a cover story on President Saleh's son Ahmed, the Commander
of the Republican Guard.
An author must obtain a permit from the Ministry of
Culture to publish a book. Most books are approved, but the process
is time-consuming for the author. The author must submit copies of
the book to the Ministry. Officials at the National Library must read
and endorse the text. It is then submitted to a special committee for
final approval. If a book is not deemed appropriate for publication,
the Ministry simply does not issue a decision. Publishers usually do
not deal with an author who has not yet obtained a permit.
An estimated 16,000 persons use the Internet, and 5,371
persons subscribe to it. The Government does not impose restrictions
on Internet use, but most persons find that equipment and subscriptions
costs are prohibitively high. Teleyemen, a parastatal company under
the Ministry of Telecommunications, is the country's sole Internet service
provider. With the exception of mowj.com, the web site of the Yemeni
National Opposition Front, the Government does not block politically
oriented web sites (see Section 1.f.).
Academic freedom is restricted somewhat because of the
extreme politicization of university campuses. A majority of
professors and students align themselves with either the ruling GPC party
or the opposition Islaah party. Each group closely monitors the
activities of the other. Top administrative positions usually are
awarded to political allies of these two major parties. There were
several clashes between GPC- and Islaah-affiliated students during the
year, but no serious violence.
b. Freedom of Peaceful Assembly and Association
There are no constitutional restrictions on the right to
assemble peacefully; however, the Government limited this right in
practice. The Government claims that it bans and disrupts some
demonstrations to prevent them from degenerating into riots and violence.
The Government requires a permit for demonstrations, but it issues them
routinely. In August police in Aden briefly detained five members of
the YSP who convened a political meeting without a permit. Government
informers monitor meetings and assemblies. In September 1998,
following violent demonstrations earlier that year, the Government sent a
draft law to Parliament that would impose significant limitations on the
right to assemble and to demonstrate. The draft law was criticized by
many lawyers, human rights activists, and members of Parliament. The
Parliament continues to withhold action on this proposed law. Draft
provisions of a new Police Law would have permitted police to open fire on
gatherings of five or more persons if police suspected imminent violence or
criminal activity; however, the provisions were removed after a campaign by
human rights organizations, opposition political parties, and the press
(see Section 1.d.).
Although it banned a similar demonstration in 1999, in
April the Government allowed the opposition to organize a rally in Mukallah
in Hadramaut governorate to commemorate the deaths of the two persons who
were killed by police during violent demonstrations there in April 1998.
Five thousand persons reportedly attended the rally. Also in April,
the Government detained 19 opposition activists in Abyan governorate for
questioning for several days; the opposition claims this was done to
prevent them from holding a similar rally. In May hundreds of persons
in Al-Dalah governorate peacefully marched to protest Government security
policies and to demand an investigation into the death of a student during
a violent confrontation between security forces and armed citizens earlier
in the month (see Section 1.a.). During the year, the opposition
organized mass demonstrations in Al-Dalah and Lahaj governorates and a
number of smaller marches throughout the country. In May thousands of
students at Sana'a University organized a peaceful march to protest the
university administration's delay in investigating alleged serial killings
at the medical school (see Section 5). In September 300 women
demonstrated in Al-Ghaida in Al-Mahra governorate to protest the preface to
a book of statistics on the governorate written by the governor, which they
believed contained derogatory comments about residents of the governorate.
In November an estimated 30,000 to 50,000 citizens, mostly women and
children, peacefully demonstrated in Sana'a to protest Israeli actions
against Palestinians in Israel, the West Bank, and Gaza during the fall.
There are no constitutional restrictions on the freedom
of association, and the Government generally respects this right in
practice. Associations must obtain an operating license from the
Ministry of Social Affairs or the Ministry of Culture, which usually is a
routine matter.
c. Freedom of Religion
The Constitution declares that Islam is the state
religion and also provides for freedom of religion, and the Government
generally respects this right in practice; however, there were some
restrictions. Followers of other religions are free to worship
according to their beliefs and to wear religiously distinctive ornaments or
dress; however, the Government forbids conversions, requires permission for
the construction of new places of worship, and prohibits non-Muslims from
proselytizing. The Constitution states that Shari'a is the source of
all legislation.
Under Islam the conversion of a Muslim to another
religion is considered apostasy, a crime punishable by death. There
were no reports of cases in which the crime was charged or prosecuted by
government authorities. In January the director of the Aden office of
the U.N. High Commissioner for Refugees (UNHCR) received a report that a
Somali refugee, Mohammed Haji, who allegedly had converted from Islam to
Christianity after his arrival in the country, had been arrested for
apostasy. The UNHCR's investigation found that the refugee had been
detained previously by police in Aden and at the UNHCR's Al-Jahin camp.
The refugee was registered with the UNHCR under a Christian name but
maintained an address in Sana'a under a Muslim name. He is married to
a Muslim woman and has an Islamic marriage certificate. The UNHCR
believed that authorities detained the refugee on criminal rather than
religious grounds. In August Haji's case was dismissed, and he was
remanded to immigration detention. Later that month, UNHCR resettled
Haji and his family to New Zealand.
Official government policy does not prohibit or provide
punishment for the possession of non-Islamic religious literature.
However, there are unconfirmed reports that foreigners, on occasion, have
been harassed by police for possessing such literature. In addition,
some members of the security forces occasionally censor the mail of
Christian clergy who minister to the foreign community, ostensibly to
prevent proselytizing.
There are unconfirmed reports that some police, without
the authorization or knowledge of their superiors, on occasion have
harassed and detained persons suspected of apostasy in order to compel them
to renounce their conversions.
The Government does not allow the building of new
non-Muslim public places of worship without permission; however, in 1998
the country established diplomatic relations with the Vatican and agreed to
the construction and operation of a "Christian center" in Sana'a.
The Papal Nuncio, resident in Kuwait, presented his credentials to the
Yemeni Government in March. Yemen's ambassador to Italy was
accredited to the Vatican in July 1999. President Saleh paid an
official visit to the Vatican at the time of his state visit to Italy in
April.
Public schools provide instruction in Islam but not in
other religions. However, almost all non-Muslims are foreigners who
attend private schools.
In February the Government revised its travel
regulations to allow Yemeni-origin Jews on third-country passports to
travel to Yemen, as well as Yemeni-origin Israelis with laissez-passer
travel documents. The first such visitors arrived in March.
The Government has taken steps to prevent the
politicization of mosques in an attempt to curb extremism. Private
Islamic organizations may maintain ties to pan-Islamic organizations and
operate schools, but the Government monitors their activities.
Following unification of North and South Yemen in 1990,
owners of property previously expropriated by the Communist government of
the former People's Democratic Republic of Yemen, including religious
organizations, were invited to seek restitution of their property.
However, implementation of the process, including for religious
institutions, has been extremely limited, and very few properties have been
returned to any previous owner.
Nearly all of the country's once sizable Jewish
population has emigrated. There are no legal restrictions on the few
hundred Jews who remain, although there are traditional restrictions on
places of residence and choice of employment (see Section 5).
d. Freedom of Movement Within the Country, Foreign
Travel, Emigration and Repatriation
The Government places some limits on freedom of
movement. In general the Government does not obstruct domestic
travel, although the army and security forces maintain checkpoints on major
roads. There were a few reports during the year that security forces
at checkpoints killed or injured persons whom they believed were engaging
in criminal activity and resisting arrest (see Section 1.a.).
In certain areas, armed tribesmen occasionally man
checkpoints alongside military or security officials, and subject travelers
to physical harassment, bribe demands, or theft.
The Government does not obstruct routinely foreign
travel or the right to emigrate and return. However, journalists must
have a permit to travel abroad. There were no reports that the
restriction on journalists was enforced during the year (see Section 2.a.).
Women must obtain permission from a male relative before applying for a
passport or departing the country.
Immigrants and refugees traveling within the country
often are required by security officials at government checkpoints to show
that they possess resident status or refugee identification cards.
The law does not include provisions for granting refugee
or asylee status in accordance with the provisions of the 1951 U.N.
Convention Relating to the Status of Refugees and its 1967 Protocol.
However, the Government continues to grant refugee status on a group basis
to Somalis who have arrived in Yemen after 1991.
In 1999 the Government offered asylum to 9,311 Somalis,
who fled the fighting in that country. This brought the total number
of registered Somali refugees in the country to 55,186. The
Government also cooperated with the UNHCR in assisting refugees from
Eritrea (2,500 persons), Ethiopia (2,403 persons) and various other
countries (362 persons). The Government permitted the UNHCR to
monitor the situation of 2,000 Iraqis in Yemen.
Approximately 32,862 Somali refugees have been
integrated into society and are no longer receiving food or financial
assistance from the UNHCR. However, they still are eligible for
medical treatment at UNHCR facilities in Aden and Sana'a. In
addition, the UNHCR provides small loans to refugee women who wish to
initiate income-generating activities. Somali-language education is
provided in urban areas of Aden.
The UNHCR provides food and medical assistance for up to
12,408 Somalis and Ethiopians in a refugee camp at Al-Jahin in Abyan
governorate. Children receive schooling in the camp, and adults are
eligible for vocational training. The Government in 1998 approved a
new UNHCR facility to be built at a site in Lahaj governorate; the facility
still was under construction at year's end. The UNHCR, in
coordination with the Government, issues identification cards to Somali
refugees and recognized refugees of other nationalities. The
Government has developed plans to establish a national refugee commission
composed of the Ministries of Interior and Foreign Affairs, and the
Immigration Authority.
The UNHCR reports that the Government consults with it
prior to returning illegal immigrants to their countries of origin in order
to avoid the involuntary repatriation of refugees with a credible fear of
persecution. There were no reports of the forced return of persons to
a country where they feared persecution. The UNHCR facilitated the
voluntary repatriation of some Eritrean and Ethiopian refugees, as well as
the voluntary return of 1,856 Somali refugees to areas of Somalia that are
considered safe. Additionally, the UNHCR in Yemen, in collaboration
with several Western governments, resettles vulnerable refugees.
Section 3 Respect for Political Rights: The
Right of Citizen
to Change Their Government
The Constitution provides citizens with the right to
change their government; however, there are significant limitations in
practice. The Government by law is accountable to the Parliament;
however, the Parliament is not yet an effective counterweight to executive
authority. Decisionmaking and real political power still rest in the
hands of the executive branch, particularly the President. In
addition, the Constitution prohibits the establishment of parties that are
contrary to Islam, oppose the goals of the Yemeni revolution, or violate
the country's international commitments.
The President appoints the Prime Minister, who forms the
Government. The Cabinet consists of 24 ministers. Parliament is
elected by universal adult suffrage; the first such election was held in
1993. International observers judged the most recent parliamentary
elections (held in 1997) as "reasonably free and fair," despite
some problems associated with the voting.
Ali Abdullah Saleh, the President and leader of the GPC,
was elected to a 5-year term in the country's first nation-wide direct
presidential election in September 1999, winning 96.3 percent of the vote.
The Constitution provides that the President be elected by popular vote
from at least two candidates endorsed by Parliament, and the election was
generally free and fair; however, there were some problems, including the
lack of a credible voter registration list. In addition the President
was not opposed by a truly competitive candidate because the candidate
selected by the leftist opposition coalition did not receive from the
GPC-dominated Parliament the minimum number of votes required to run (the
other opposition party chose not to run its own candidate, despite its
seats in Parliament). The President's sole opponent was a member of
the GPC. There was no significant violence associated with the
election.
The President has the authority to introduce legislation
and promulgate laws by decree when Parliament is not in session.
Decrees must be approved by Parliament 30 days after reconvening. In
theory if a decree is not approved, it does not become law; in practice, a
decree remains in effect unless it is later affirmatively rejected by
Parliament. Although the Constitution also permits Parliament to
initiate legislation, to date it has not done so. Parliament
generally is relegated to debating policies that the Government already has
submitted, although it sometimes successfully revises or blocks draft
legislation submitted by the Government. Despite the fact that the
President's party enjoys an absolute majority, Parliament has rejected or
delayed action on major legislation introduced by the Government, and on
occasion it has forced significant modification. The Parliament also
has criticized strongly the Government for some actions, including the
lifting of subsidies that led to widespread violence in June 1998.
Ministers frequently are called to Parliament to defend actions, policies,
or proposed legislation, although they may and sometimes do refuse to
appear. Parliamentarians at times are sharply critical during these
sessions. Parliamentarians and parliamentary staff attended foreign
NGO-sponsored training workshops designed to increase their independence
and effectiveness.
The President is advised by the 59-member Consultative Council, a board of
appointed notables chaired by a former prime minister. The Council
advises the President on a range of issues but has no constitutional
powers.
Formal government authority is centralized in Sana'a;
many citizens, especially in urban areas, complain about the inability of
local and governorate entities to make policy or resource decisions.
Responding to these concerns, in January the Parliament passed the
government-submitted Local Authority Law. The new law, considered by
the Government as an important part of its ongoing democratization program,
is intended to decentralize authority by establishing locally elected
district and governorate councils. The councils would be headed by
government-appointed governors. The first elections for the councils
were scheduled for February 2001.
On November 19, Parliament approved several amendments
to the Constitution, including amendments that would extend the terms of
Members of Parliament from 4 to 6 years and the President from 5 to 7
years, allow the President to dissolve Parliament without a referendum in
rare instances, abolish the President's ability to issue parliamentary
recess decrees, and transform the Consultative Council into a
presidentially appointed Shura Council with limited legislative and
candidate approval powers. The amendments were to be approved in a
national referendum scheduled for February 2001.
In some governorates, tribal leaders exercise
considerable discretion in the interpretation and enforcement of the law.
Central government authority in these areas often is weak.
The multiparty system remains weak. The GPC
dominates the Parliament, and Islaah is the only other party of
significance. All parties must be registered in accordance with the
Political Parties Law of 1991, which stipulates that each party must have
at least 75 founders and 2,500 members. Some oppositionists contend
that they are unable to organize new parties because of the prohibitively
high legal requirements on the minimum number of members and leaders.
Twelve parties participated in the 1997 elections, compared with 16 in
1993. The YSP and several smaller parties boycotted the 1997
elections, leading to lower voter turnout in the south. These same
parties also boycotted the country's first nationwide direct presidential
election in September 1999. There was no significant violence
associated with this election. Two new parties were established in
1999: The Yemeni Green Party and the Union of Democratic Forces.
The Government provides financial support to political
parties, including a small stipend to publish their own newspapers.
However, the YSP claims that the Government has yet to return the assets it
seized from the party during the 1994 civil war.
Although women vote and hold office, these rights often
are limited by cultural norms and religious customs, and women are
underrepresented in Government and politics. Two women were elected
to the Parliament in 1997 (the same number as in 1993), and an increasing
number hold senior leadership positions in the Government or in the GPC.
Voter registration of women is less than half that of men. Many
Akhdam, a small ethnic minority that may be descendants of African slaves,
are not permitted to participate in the political process, mainly due to
their inability to obtain citizenship. There no longer are any
credible reports that citizen members of religious minorities are not
permitted to participate in the political process.
Section 4 Governmental Attitude Regarding
International and
Nongovernmental Investigation of Alleged Violations of Human Rights
The concept of local nongovernmental human rights
organizations is relatively new, with the first groups forming only in the
years since unification. Several groups held workshops and other
activities during the year without government interference and often with
government support.
The Government cooperates with NGO's, although NGO's
complain that there is a lack of response to their requests from government
officials. The Government's ability to be responsive is limited in
part by a lack of material and human resources. In 1998 the
Government introduced a new draft law for regulating the formation and
activities of NGO's. While more liberal than the law it is designed
to replace, the proposal still contains significant limitations on such
organizations. The Parliament again refused to take any action on the
proposed new law during the year.
The Taiz-based Human Rights Information and Training
Center (HRITC), perhaps the country's most respected domestic human rights
NGO, places particular emphasis on education and NGO training. During
the year, the HRITC sponsored numerous public lectures, training workshops,
and conferences, and participated in several meetings of the international
human rights community. The HRITC publishes the quarterly human
rights journal Our Rights and regularly prints and distributes a brochure
entitled Know Your Rights. During the year, the HRITC also published
several works, including a translation of international human rights
documents and laws, a book on violence against women, and a study on the
role of women in local NGO's. Several donors have supported the
HRITC. The HRITC, in cooperation with a foreign embassy, coordinated
the series of events conducted by Penal Reform International from September
1998 to February 1999 (see Section 1.c.). The HRITC did not conduct
any investigations into alleged human rights abuses during the year.
The Organization for the Defense of Human Rights, a lawyers' group formed
in 1999 by attorney and parliamentarian Mohamed Naji Alao, discovered that
several illegal private prisons were being operated at government
facilities in Sana'a. He reported them to the President, who
immediately ordered the unlawful prisons closed and offenders arrested (see
Section 1.c.).
The Yemeni Organization for the Defense of Liberties and
Human Rights is based in Aden. Although the organization continued to
suffer from a lack of funds, it actively publicized human rights abuses,
particularly in the south, and provided support to new human rights NGO's.
The activities of Al-Nushataa, or The Activists, a group
formed in 1999 by former members of the Yemeni Human Rights Organization
(YHRO), were limited to organizing a children's parliament, which
familiarized secondary school children with the country's legislature.
The activities of the National Center for Human Rights and Democratic
Development (NCHRDD) were limited to an inspection tour of several Sana'a
police stations.
In 1998 and 1999, Penal Reform International (PRI), a
London-based NGO, conducted a fact-finding mission to Yemen and, with the
support of a foreign embassy and the HRITC, organized prison management
training workshops for prison and security officials. PRI identified
several issues of concern, including the mistreatment of prisoners, lack of
education and resources for prison officials, and unsanitary and
overcrowded conditions.
Amnesty International, Human Rights Watch, the
Parliament of the European Union, and the Committee to Protect Journalists
observe the country closely. The International Committee of the Red
Cross (ICRC) maintains a resident representative. The Government has
given these groups broad access to government officials, records, refugee
camps, and prisons. The Government had acknowledged some abuses that
were alleged in a 1997 Amnesty International report and rejected other
allegations. Amnesty International's follow-up report, issued in July
1999, criticized the Government for not keeping its promise to investigate
some of these abuses. The Government claims that it responded to
Amnesty International and passed the results of its investigations to the
UNCHR, but that the information the organization provided was inadequate
for effective investigation and conclusive action.
In February the Government hosted a major symposium of
the UNCHR, chaired by U.N. High Commissioner Mary Robinson, on the human
rights aspects of international development. Robinson signed a
Memorandum of Intent for a technical assistance grant of $300,000, half of
which would be used to fund a resident UNCHR consultant who, working under
the umbrella of the UNDP, would serve as an advisor to the Supreme National
Committee on Human Rights and oversee UNCHR programs in the country.
The YHRO is a local human rights group headquartered in
Sana'a, with branches in seven other cities. It was founded by the
Government. Oppositionists as well as some human rights experts have
viewed its findings as unobjective. The head of the YHRO, a member of
the judiciary, was transferred from his post as head of the Sana'a Court of
Appeals to the Dhamar Court of Appeals in 1998. This was seen by some
observers as a demotion or an attempt by the Government to marginalize the
judge, who was seen as too independent on human rights questions.
The Supreme National Committee for Human Rights, which
was formed in 1997 and reports to the Deputy Prime Minister/Minister of
Foreign Affairs, is responsible for ensuring that the country meets its
obligations with respect to implementing international human rights
conventions and investigating specific instances of abuse. The
Committee views using education as a means to effect cultural change as its
highest priority. To this end, it continued during the year to seek
donor support for a project to incorporate human rights education into
secondary school curricula and to provide 1-day human rights workshops for
police officers, which it began in 1999. The committee has been less
active in investigating specific cases of abuse. Many persons alleged
that it has not followed up on its stated commitment to investigate
allegations of human rights violations. For example, the committee
has not investigated the alleged torture of Naji Saleh Al-Khowlani during
detention by police in Sana'a in 1999 (see Section 1.c.), and it declined
to investigate the case of Wadia Al-Shaibani, who reportedly died in late
1997 while in the custody of security forces in Aden (see Section 1.a.).
In the latter case, it accepted the official coroner's report of death by
suicide. The committee conducted no investigations of alleged human
rights violations during the year, claiming that it had received no such
reports. The committee continues to be hampered by a lack of human
and material resources.
However, the committee has been active on prison reform.
In January it led a government initiative to establish and, with the help
of private sector contributions, to finance a special "charity
fund" to be used to enable the release of prisoners who, in keeping
with tribal or Islamic law, were being held in prison pending payment of
restitution to their victims, despite having completed their sentences.
The committee participated in the subsequent inspections conducted to
identify prisoners whom the fund could help and to assess prison conditions
(see Section 1.c.). Working with the National Women's Committee, the
committee during the year developed a plan to establish a shelter in Sana'a
that would house and provide vocational education for 50 abandoned women.
The committee is seeking donor assistance and hopes to establish additional
shelters in other governorates. In 1999 following an inspection of
Sana'a central prison, the committee arranged for minors who were
incarcerated with adults to be incarcerated separately in two age groups:
11 to 14 years old and 15 to 18 years old. Fifty juvenile inmates
were moved from the prison to an orphanage run by the Ministry of Social
Affairs, where they now attend school and participate in other activities
(see Sections 1.c. and 4). The committee also initiated a project,
with the support of local businessman, to build the country's first youth
reformatory, but still is seeking financing to purchase land on which to
build the reformatory (see Section 5).
In October the Human Rights Committee of the President's
Consultative Council, in cooperation with the NCHRDD, inspected several
police stations in Sana'a to determine whether police were following proper
procedures and to develop recommendations for the Minister of Interior on
training for police officers. The Committee has had limited success
in investigating human rights abuses and conducted no other investigations
during the year.
The Parliament's human rights committee in the past has
investigated some reports of human rights abuses, but its activities during
the year were limited to participating in various prison inspections.
The committee's chairman claims that he would like to increase the
activities of the committee, especially in the area of press freedoms, but
cites lack of official and financial support as constraints. The
committee has no authority except to issue reports.
The Committee to Combat Torture is composed of 100 senior parliamentarians
and party leaders, including some opposition members, but apparently was
inactive during the year.
The Center for Future Studies, a think tank affiliated
with the Islaah Party, issues an annual report on human rights practices,
providing a wide-ranging overview of human rights. There is little
follow-up to the report.
Two delegations from the UNHRC visited in late 1998.
One delegation looked into what progress the Government had made on cases
of "disappearances" (see Section 1.b.). The other conducted
an assessment of the Government's need for technical assistance,
particularly for the Supreme National Committee on Human Rights.
Section 5 Discrimination Based on Race, Sex,
Religion,
Disability, Language, or Social Status
The Constitution states that "all citizens are equal in general rights
and duties," and that society "is based on social solidarity,
which is based on justice, freedom, and equality according to the
law;" however, discrimination based on race, sex, disability, and, to
a lesser extent, religion, exists. Entrenched cultural attitudes
often prevent women from enjoying equal rights.
Women
Although spousal abuse reportedly is common, it
generally is undocumented. Violence against women and children is
considered a family affair and usually is not reported to the police.
In the country's traditional society, an abused woman would be expected to
take her complaint to a male relative (rather than the authorities), who
should intercede on her behalf or provide her sanctuary if required.
One survey conducted by Sana'a University and the Dutch Ministry of Justice
found that nearly 50 percent of the 120 women interviewed stated that they
had been beaten; 1 in 5 claimed to have been threatened with death.
Despite the high incidence rates reported, only 3 percent of women had ever
sought help from an outsider or the police. The laws pertaining to
violence against women rarely are enforced. The only
institutionalized aid for victimized women is a small battered-women's
shelter in Aden. The press and women's rights activists only recently
have begun to investigate or report on violations of women's rights.
Violence against women was the subject of a women's conference held in Aden
in July and of two conferences held in 1999, and the issue became a topic
of heated public debate following rumors of serial killings of female
students at Sana'a University's medical school. Rumors that 16 women
were murdered now appear to be unfounded; police believe the Sudanese
morgue attendant now on trial for the murder of two female students
fabricated accounts of having killed more. However, the press'
extensive coverage highlighted authorities' dismissive treatment of the
female students' concerns and a lack of interest in their security.
In May 5,000 students marched to protest the university administration's
handling of the case (see Section 2.b.).
The Penal Code allows for leniency for persons guilty of
committing a "crime against honor," a euphemism for violent
assaults or killings committed against a female for her perceived immodest
or defiant behavior. Legal provisions regarding violence against
women state that an accused man should be put to death for murdering a
woman. However, a husband who murders his wife and her lover may be
fined or imprisoned for a term not to exceed 1 year. Despite the
apparent sanctioning of honor killings, most citizens, including women's
activists, believe the phenomenon is not widespread. Some Western
NGO's claim that the practice is more prevalent, but admit to a lack of
evidence to support such claims.
Women face significant restrictions on their role in
society. The law, social custom, and Shari'a discriminate against
women. Men are permitted to take as many as four wives, although very
few do so. By law the minimum age of marriage is 15. However,
the law largely is not enforced, and some girls marry as early as age 12.
In 1998 some conservative Members of Parliament attempted to eliminate the
"minimum age" requirement on the grounds that parents should
decide when their daughters are old enough to marry. Their draft law
failed by a large majority. A 1998 draft law to raise the minimum age
of marriage to 18 also failed by a large majority. The law stipulates
that the wife's "consent" to the marriage is required;
"consent" is defined as "silence" for previously unwed
women and "pronouncement of consent" for divorced women.
The husband and the wife's "guardian" (usually her father) sign
the marriage contract; in Aden and some outlying governorates, the wife
also signs. The practice of bride-price payments is widespread,
despite efforts to limit the size of such payments.
The law provides that the wife must obey the husband. She must live
with him at the place stipulated in the contract, consummate the marriage,
and not leave the home without his consent. Husbands may divorce
wives without justifying their action in court. A woman has the legal
right to divorce; however, she must provide a justification, such as her
husband's nonsupport, impotence, or taking of a second wife without her
consent. However, the expense of hiring a lawyer is a significant
deterrent, as is the necessity for rural women to travel to a city to
present their case. A woman seeking a divorce also must repay the
mahr (a portion of her bride price), which creates an additional hardship.
As the mahr usually is in the hands of her family, the refusal by a family
to pay the mahr effectively can prevent a divorce. The family's
refusal to accept the woman back into the home also may deter divorce, as
few other options are available to women. When a divorce occurs, the
family home and older children often are awarded to the husband. The
divorced woman usually returns to her father's home or to the home of
another male relative. Her former husband must continue to support
her for another 3 months, since she may not remarry until she proves that
she is not pregnant.
Women who seek to travel abroad must obtain permission
from their husbands or fathers to receive a passport and to travel.
They also are expected to be accompanied by male relatives. However,
enforcement of this requirement is irregular.
Shari'a-based law permits a Muslim man to marry a Christian or Jewish
woman, but no Muslim woman may marry outside of Islam. Yemeni women
do not have the right to confer citizenship on their foreign-born spouses;
however, they may confer citizenship on children born in Yemen of
foreign-born fathers.
According to a 1995 Interior Ministry regulation, any citizen who wishes to
marry a foreigner must obtain the permission of the Ministry. A
Yemeni woman wishing to marry a foreigner must present proof of her
parents' approval to the Interior Ministry. A foreign woman who
wishes to marry a Yemeni man must prove to the Ministry that she is
"of good conduct and behavior," and "is free from contagious
disease." There are no corresponding requirements for men to
demonstrate parental approval, good conduct, or freedom from contagious
diseases. Although the regulation does not have the force of law and
is applied irregularly, some human rights groups have raised concerns about
it.
The Government consistently supports women's rights and the expansion of
the public role of women. The President frequently speaks publicly
about the importance of women's political participation and economic
development. In 1999 the Prime Minister mandated that all ministries
must promote at least one woman to the director general level; at year's
end, only the Interior Ministry had failed to do so, although it had
initiated an aggressive campaign to recruit, train, and deploy female
police officers. Several ministries have a number of female directors
general. In March the Prime Minister established the Supreme Council
for Women, an independent governmental body charged with promoting women's
issues in the Government. With the Government's active support,
bilateral and multilateral donors have initiated long-term (1994-2004)
projects worth $31 million (4.96 billion riyals) aimed at advancing
vocational education and reproductive health for women and girls.
According to the most recent Government statistics
(1998), 64.15 percent of women are illiterate, compared with approximately
31.25 percent of men. The fertility rate is 6.5 children per woman.
Most women have little access to basic health care. Only
approximately 22 percent of births are attended by trained health-care
personnel. In some cases, where clinics are available, women do not
use them because they are unable to afford them or reach them from their
remote villages, have little confidence in them, or their male relatives or
they themselves refuse to allow a male doctor to examine them.
Donor-funded maternal and child health programs attempt to address these
issues through programs designed to train midwives who serve rural
populations.
In general women in the south, particularly in Aden, are
better educated and have had somewhat greater employment opportunities than
their northern counterparts. However, since the 1994 civil war, the
number of working women in the south appears to have declined, due not only
to the stagnant economy but also to increasing cultural pressure from the
north.
The National Women's Committee (NWC), a
government-sponsored semi-independent women's association, promotes female
education and civic responsibility through seminars and workshops and by
coordinating donors' programs. The committee's chairwoman sits on the
Prime Ministerial Supreme Council for Women. There are a number of
recently formed NGO's working for women's advancement, including the Social
Association for Productive Families, which promotes vocational development
for women; the Women and Children's Department of the Center for Future
Studies, which organizes seminars and publishes studies on women and
children; the Woman and Child Development Association, which focuses on
health education and illiteracy; and the Yemeni Council for Motherhood and
Childhood, which provides microcredit and vocational training to women.
Children
While the Government has asserted its commitment to
protect children's rights, it lacks the resources necessary to ensure
adequate health care, education, and welfare services for children.
The UNDP estimates that 30 percent of children are malnourished. The
infant mortality rate in 1999 was 75 deaths per 1,000 births, down from 105
per 1,000 in 1998. Male children receive preferential treatment over
female children; after the age of 1, male children have a 12 percent
greater chance of survival than females, a result of the comparative
neglect of female children.
The law provides for universal free education for 9
years, which is compulsory, but this provision is not enforced. Many
children, especially girls, do not attend primary school. Education
for females is not encouraged in some tribal areas, where girls often are
kept home to help their mothers with child care, housework, and farm work.
According to UNICEF's "Report on Children and Women in Yemen:
1998," an estimated 45 percent of primary-school-age children (ages 6
to 15) do not attend school. Some rural areas have no schools for
their school-age population. In 1998 to encourage girls' attendance
at school, the Government passed a law that eliminated school fees and the
requirement of uniforms for girls. According to the UNICEF report,
enrollment of girls in school increased by 4 percent in 1998.
Enrollment of boys declined 10 percent because increasing numbers of older
boys from poor families left school to work.
In 1999 following an inspection of Sana'a central
prison, the Supreme National Committee for Human Rights arranged for minors
who previously had been incarcerated with adults to be incarcerated
separately in two age groups: 11 to 14 years old and 15 to 18 years
old. Fifty juvenile inmates were moved from the prison to an
orphanage run by the Ministry of Social Affairs, where they now attend
school and participate in other activities (see Sections 1.c. and 4).
The Committee also initiated a project, with the support of local
businessmen, to build the country's first youth reformatory, but still is
seeking financing to purchase land on which to build the reformatory (see
Section 4).
Child marriage is common in rural areas. Although
the law requires that a girl be 15 to marry, the law is not enforced, and
marriages of girls as young as age 12 occur.
Female genital mutilation (FGM), which is widely
condemned by international health experts as damaging to both physical and
psychological health, is practiced by some citizens. According to a
1997 demographic survey conducted by the Government, nearly one-fourth (23
percent) of women who have ever been married have been subjected to FGM.
However, the prevalence of the practice varies substantially by region.
Citizens of African origin or those living in communities with heavy
African influence are more likely to practice FGM. For example,
according to the survey, approximately 69 percent of women living in
coastal areas were subjected to FGM, compared with 15 percent in
mountainous regions, and 5 percent in the plateau and desert regions.
The procedure is confined mainly to excision, with infibulation being
practiced only among East African immigrants and refugees. FGM rarely
is reported among Shaf'ai Sunnis, and the Zaydi Shi'a reputedly do not
practice it at all. The Government's publication of the data on FGM
was an important first step in addressing this problem; however, while some
government health workers and officials actively and publicly discouraged
the practice, the Government has not proposed legislation to outlaw it nor
have local women's groups adopted the problem as a major concern.
In January the Prime Minister established the Higher
Council of Motherhood and Childhood (HCMC), a semiautonomous
interministerial entity responsible for formulating policy and programs to
improve the status of children. The HCMC participates in the World
Bank's Child Development Program and the Arab Council for Childhood and
Development's program for street children.
People with Disabilities
Persons with mental and physical disabilities face
distinct social prejudices, as well as discrimination in education and
employment. In 1998 the Government mandated acceptance of disabled
students in schools, exempted them from paying tuition, and required that
schools be made more accessible to disabled students; however, it is
unclear to what extent these laws have been implemented. There is no
national law mandating the accessibility of buildings for the disabled.
Some disabled persons are reduced to begging to support themselves.
During the year, donors financed the establishment of three new schools for
the disabled in Taiz governorate. Mentally ill patients, particularly
those who commit crimes, are imprisoned and even shackled when there is no
one to care for them. Persons with mental problems sometimes are
arrested without charge and placed in prisons alongside criminals (see
Section 1.c.). The ICRC, in cooperation with the Yemeni Red Crescent
Society, built and now staffs separate detention facilities for mentally
disabled prisoners. These facilities are located in Sana'a, Ibb, and
Taiz, and collectively are able to care for a population of 300 persons.
The Handicapped Society, the country's largest NGO
involved in assisting the disabled, was founded in 1988 and has branches in
13 governorates. Funded by international donors (primarily the
Swedish organization Radda Barnen) and a modest annual grant from the
Government, the Handicapped Society provides rehabilitation assistance and
vocational training, and sponsors cultural and sports activities for
disabled persons. The Ministry of Education has assigned three
teachers to teach students at the disabled-accessible classrooms at the
Society's Sana'a branch. Believing that the needs of disabled women
were not being addressed adequately by the Handicapped Society, activists
in 1998 established with government support the Challenge Society.
The Challenge Society provides 85 disabled females between the ages of 6
and 30 with medical care, support services, and vocational training.
In March three disabled teenagers toured the country on specially adapted
bicycles and, supported by the Ministry of Youth and Sports and private
sector contributions, took their bike tour to several Arab countries.
Religious Minorities
Apart from a small but undetermined number of Christians
and Hindus of South Asian origin in Aden, Jews are the only indigenous
religious minority. Their numbers have diminished significantly--from
several tens of thousands to a few hundred--due to voluntary emigration
over the past 50 years. Although the law makes no distinction, Jews
traditionally are restricted to living in one section of a city or village
and often are confined to a limited choice of employment, usually farming
or handicrafts. Jews may, and do, own real property.
Christian clergy who minister to the foreign community are employed in
teaching, social services, and health care. Occasionally the security
authorities harass such clergy by censoring their mail, ostensibly to
prevent proselytizing (see Section 2.c.).
In July 1998, a gunman killed three nuns belonging to the Sisters of
Charity order in Hodeidah. The Government took swift action and
immediately arrested the individual. The Government determined that
he was deranged and committed him to a psychiatric institution.
A hospital in Jibla operated by the Baptist Church has
experienced occasional harassment from local Islamic extremists who feared
that the hospital might be used to spread Christianity. There have
been no reports of threats of violence by extremists in several years.
National/Racial/Ethnic Minorities
Citizens with a noncitizen parent, called
"muwalladin," sometimes face discrimination in employment and in
other areas. Persons who seek employment at Sana'a University or
admission to the military academy by law must demonstrate that they have
two Yemeni parents. Nonetheless, many senior government officials,
including members of Parliament and ministers, have only one Yemeni parent.
In some cases, naturalization of the non-Yemeni parent is sufficient to
overcome the "two-Yemeni-parent" requirement.
A small group of persons claiming to be the descendants
of ancient Ethiopian occupiers of Yemen who later were enslaved, are
considered the lowest social class. Known as the "Akhdam"
(servants), they live in squalor and endure persistent social
discrimination. Beginning in September 1999, the Government's Social
Fund for Development (SFD) initiated a program for "special needs
groups," which focused particularly on the Akhdam. During the
year, the SFD conducted an education project for Akhdam children in
Hodeidah governorate, provided support to an NGO conducting field research
on Akhdam needs in Sana'a governorate, and improved the quality of the
water supply and built two classrooms for the Akhdam community in Taiz
governorate.
There have been reports by human rights groups that some
immigrants of African origin have difficulty in securing Interior Ministry
permission to marry Yemeni citizens. An Interior Ministry regulation
requires that marriages of citizens and foreigners be approved in advance
by the Ministry (see also Section 1.f.).
Tribal violence continued to be a problem during the
year, and the Government's ability to control tribal elements responsible
for kidnapings, shootings, and other acts of violence remained limited.
In January 22 persons were killed and 35 injured in tribal disputes in
Shabwa and Al-Baida governorates. In one incident, 10 persons were
killed and 3 injured when a fight at school between 2 children from
different tribes escalated into violence. In another incident, a
member of the Ba Haider tribe killed a fellow tribesman in retaliation for
the killing of his father 20 years ago. The Nehm and Al-Haymah tribes
also are involved in an ongoing violent feud in which several persons have
been killed. In February tribesmen from the Nehm blocked the Sana'a
Highway, opening fire on and killing three of the police officers
dispatched to dismantle the roadblock. Up to 16 persons reportedly
were killed in the ensuing fighting. The Deputy Governor of Sana'a
was shot to death in August in what police believe was a tribally related
revenge killing. Tensions, which periodically escalate into violent
confrontations, continue between the Government and the Khowlan and other
tribes in Marib governorate.
Section 6 Worker Rights
a. The Right of Association
The Constitution provides that citizens have the right
to form unions; however, this right is restricted in practice. The
Government seeks to place its own personnel in positions of influence
inside unions and trade union federations. The 1995 Labor Law
(amended in 1997) provides both for the right to form unions and for the
right to strike.
The Yemeni Confederation of Labor Unions (YCLU) remains
the sole national umbrella organization. The YCLU claims 350,000
members in 15 unions and denies any association with the Government,
although it works closely with the Government to resolve labor disputes
through negotiation. Observers suggest that the Government likely
would not tolerate the establishment of an alternative labor federation
unless it believed such an establishment to be in its best interest.
By law civil servants and public sector workers, and
some categories of farm workers, may not join unions. Only the
General Assembly of the YCLU may dissolve unions. The law provides
equal labor rights for women, and it confirms the freedom of workers to
associate. The Labor Law does not stipulate a minimum membership for
unions, nor does it limit them to a specific enterprise or firm.
Thus, citizens may associate by profession or trade.
Strikes are not permitted unless a dispute between
workers and employers is "final" and "incontestable" (a
prior attempt must have been made to settle through negotiation or
arbitration). The proposal to strike must be submitted to at least 60
percent of all concerned workers, of whom 25 percent must vote in favor of
the proposal. Permission to strike also must be obtained from the
YCLU. Strikes for explicit "political purposes" are
prohibited. In practice the law tends to discourage strikes.
There were several small strikes during the year.
In February a group of school teachers in Taiz governorate struck for a day
because they had not received their January salaries. Also in
February, Sana'a municipality garbage collectors struck for a day,
demanding payment of overdue wages and a salary increase. In June the
staff of Sana'a University struck for a week to demand an increase in their
salaries and overdue bonus payments. In August the staff of Al-Thawra
public hospital in Sana'a struck for 10 days for higher wages. In
September workers at the Yemen Hunt Oil Company in Marib governorate struck
for a wage increase. There were no reports of violence in connection
with these strikes.
The YCLU is affiliated with the Confederation of Arab
Trade Unions and the formerly Soviet-controlled World Federation of Trade
Unions.
b. The Right to Organize and Bargain Collectively
The 1995 Labor Law provides workers with the right to
organize and bargain collectively. The Government permits these
activities; however, it seeks to influence them by placing its own
personnel inside groups and organizations. All collective
bargaining agreements must be deposited with and reviewed by the Ministry
of Labor, a practice criticized by the International Labor Organization
(ILO). Agreements may be invalidated if they are "likely to
cause a breach of security or to damage the economic interests of the
country." Despite these restrictions, several such agreements
exist in fact. Unions may negotiate wage settlements for their
members and may resort to strikes or other actions to achieve their
demands. Public sector employees must take their grievances to court.
The law protects employees from antiunion
discrimination. Employers do not have the right to dismiss an
employee for union activities. Employees may appeal any disputes,
including cases of antiunion discrimination, to the Ministry of Labor.
Employees also may take a case to the Labor Arbitration Committee, which is
chaired by the Ministry of Labor and also consists of an employer
representative and a YCLU representative. Such cases often are
disposed favorably toward workers, especially if the employer is a foreign
company.
There are no export processing zones in operation; an
EPZ is planned for Aden.
c. Prohibition of Forced or Compulsory Labor
The Constitution prohibits forced or compulsory labor,
and there were no reports of its practice. The law does not prohibit
forced or bonded labor by children specifically, but such practices are not
known to occur.
d. Status of Child Labor Practices and Minimum Age
for
Employment
Child labor is common, especially in rural areas.
Many children are required to work in subsistence farming because of the
poverty of their families. Even in urban areas, children work in
stores and workshops, sell goods on the streets, and beg. The law
does not prohibit forced or bonded labor by children specifically, but such
practices are not known to occur (see Section 6.c.).
The established minimum age for employment is 15 in the
private sector and 18 in the public sector. By special permit,
children between the ages of 12 and 15 may work. The Government
rarely enforces these provisions, especially in rural and remote areas.
The Government also does not enforce laws requiring 9 years of compulsory
education for children, and many school-aged children work instead of
attending school, particularly in areas where schools are not easily
accessible.
The results of the 1994 national census showed that
231,655 children between the ages of 10 and 14 years, or 6.5 percent of all
children in that age group, were working. Experts believe that the
number has increased since 1994.
After the Government ratified the ILO's Convention 182
on the Worst Forms of Child Labor in July, the Consultative Council adopted
the ILO's Child Labor Strategy to address persistent child labor problems.
A special council, under the leadership of the Minister of Labor, uses the
strategy as a government-wide guideline for enforcing existing child labor
laws and formulating and implementing new laws.
In June the Ministry of Labor signed a $1.3 million agreement with the
ILO's International Program on the Elimination of Child Labor (IPEC).
Under the program, the Ministry will establish a child labor department,
train teachers to make school curricula more relevant to rural children,
mobilize media to discuss child labor, establish a microenterprise program
to help families establish businesses that will allow their children to
stay in school, and seek the support of civil society to remove children
from hazardous jobs. In addition the Ministry of Insurance and Social
Affairs has developed a plan to establish six centers for street children
over the next 5 years.
The Ministry of Labor occasionally inspects factories in
the major population areas. Ministry officials state that they lack
the resources to enforce child labor laws more effectively. However,
since a great percentage of the country's underage work force is in the
agricultural sector in remote rural areas, it is difficult for the
Government to protect most child workers.
e. Acceptable Conditions of Work
There is no established minimum wage for any type of
employment. The Labor Law states that "it shall not be
permissible that the minimal level of the wage of a worker should be less
than the minimal wages of government civil servants." According
to the Ministry of Labor, the average minimum wage of civil servants is
approximately $37 to $56 (6,000 to 9,000 riyals) per month. Private
sector workers, especially skilled technicians, earn a far higher wage.
The average wage does not provide a decent standard of living for a worker
and family. A combination of inflation and the loss of
government-provided subsidies continued to erode wages.
The law specifies a maximum 48-hour workweek with a
maximum 8-hour workday, but many workshops and stores operate 10- to
12-hour shifts without penalty. The workweek for government employees
is 35 hours: 7 hours per day Saturday through Wednesday.
The Ministry of Labor is responsible for regulating
workplace health and safety conditions. The requisite legislation for
regulating occupational health is contained in the Labor Law, but
enforcement is weak to nonexistent. Many workers regularly are
exposed to toxic industrial products and develop respiratory illnesses.
Some foreign-owned companies as well as major Yemeni manufacturers
implement higher health, safety, and environmental standards than the
Government requires. Workers have the right to remove themselves from
dangerous work situations and may challenge dismissals in court.
f. Trafficking in Persons
The law prohibits trafficking in persons, and there were
no reports that persons were trafficked to, from, within, or through the
country.
Source: The
Country Reports on Human Rights Practices, U.S. State Department,
February 2000.
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