Report on Human Rights Practices for 2000
Syria
Despite the existence of some institutions of democratic
government, the political system places virtually absolute authority in the
hands of the President. Former President Hafiz Al-Asad died on June
10 after 30 years in power. Immediately following Al-Asad's death,
the Parliament amended the Constitution, reducing the mandatory minimum age
of the President from 40 to 34 years old, which allowed his son, Bashar Al-Asad
to be legally eligible for nomination by the ruling Ba'th party. On
July 10, Bashar was elected by referendum in which he ran unopposed, and
received 97.29 percent of the vote. Key decisions regarding foreign policy,
national security, internal politics, and the economy are made by the
President, with counsel from his ministers, high-ranking members of the
ruling Ba'th Party, and a relatively small circle of security advisers.
Although the Parliament is elected every 4 years, the Ba'th Party is
ensured a majority. The Parliament cannot initiate laws, but only
assesses and sometimes modifies those proposed by the executive branch.
The Constitution provides for an independent judiciary, but this is not the
case in the exceptional (state of emergency) security courts, which are
subject to political influence. The regular courts display
independence, although political connections and bribery can influence
verdicts. In general all three branches of government are influenced
to varying degrees by leaders of the Ba'th Party, whose primacy in state
institutions is mandated by the Constitution.
The powerful role of the security services in
government, which extends beyond strictly security matters, stems in part
from the state of emergency that has been in place almost continuously
since 1963. The Government justifies martial law because of the state
of war with Israel and past threats from terrorist groups. Syrian
Military Intelligence and Air Force Intelligence are military agencies,
while General Security, State Security, and Political Security come under
the purview of the Ministry of Interior. The branches of the security
services operate independently of each other and outside the legal system.
Their members commit serious human rights abuses.
The economy is based on commerce, agriculture, oil
production, and government services. There is a generally inefficient
public sector, a private sector, and a mixed public/private sector.
The still-dominant state role in the economy, a complex bureaucracy,
overarching security concerns, endemic corruption, currency restrictions, a
lack of modern financial services and communications, and a weak legal
system hamper economic growth. The Government has sought to promote
the private sector through investment incentives, exchange rate
consolidation, and deregulation, especially with regard to financial
transactions governing imports and exports. However, in recent years,
diminished foreign aid, drought, fluctuating prices for oil and
agricultural commodities, and regional recession have hurt the economy.
Uncertainty about the Middle East peace process and sporadic tension over
Iraq has diminished investor confidence in the region. Consequently,
Syria posted negative gross domestic product (GDP) rates of 4.4 percent in
1997, 1.2 percent in 1998, and an estimated 2 percent in 1999. A high
population growth rate of 3.3 percent continues to erode whatever economic
gains are made. It is estimated that real per capita GDP again decreased in
1999. However, the Government has been very successful in controlling
the money supply, with inflation remaining in the 2 percent range in 1998.
Despite a 25 percent wage increase for public and private sector employees
and a 20 percent increase for pensions, wage and benefits increases
generally have not kept pace with cost of living increases. The gap
between the rich and poor remained, with many public sector workers relying
on second jobs to make ends meet.
The human rights situation remained poor, and the
Government continues to restrict or deny fundamental rights, although there
were improvements in some areas. The Ba'th Party dominates the
political system, as provided for by the Constitution, and citizens do not
have the right to change their government. The Government uses its
vast powers so effectively that there is no organized political opposition,
and there have been very few antiregime manifestations. Serious
abuses include the widespread use of torture in detention; poor prison
conditions; arbitrary arrest and detention; prolonged detention without
trial; fundamentally unfair trials in the security courts; an inefficient
judiciary that suffers from corruption and, at times, political influence;
infringement on citizens' privacy rights; denial of freedom of speech and
of the press, despite a slight loosening of censorship restrictions; denial
of freedom of assembly and association; some limits on freedom of religion;
and limits on freedom of movement.
The Government does not officially allow independent
domestic human rights groups to exist; however, there were reports that
several domestic human rights organizations and civil society groups began
meeting regularly during the year. Violence and societal
discrimination against women are problems. The Government
discriminates against the stateless Kurdish minority, suppresses worker
rights, and child labor occurs. In November the Government declared
an amnesty for 600 political prisoners and detainees and a general pardon
for some nonpolitical prisoners and closed the Mazzah prison, which
reportedly held numerous political prisoners and detainees. In
December the Government transferred 54 Lebanese prisoners from Syrian to
Lebanese custody.
RESPECT FOR HUMAN RIGHTS
Section 1 Respect for the Integrity of the Person,
Including Freedom From:
a. Political and Other Extrajudicial Killing
There were no reports of political killings during the
year.
In November security forces killed 4 Bedouins during the
Government's intervention in armed clashes between Bedouin shepherds and
Druze residents of Suwayda Province (see Sections 1.c. and 5). In
October 1999, government forces moved against a residential compound and
boat dock owned by President Asad's brother, Rif'at Al-Asad. A number
of Rif'at's supporters, including military guards, were sequestered in the
compound, and the clash resulted in an unconfirmed number of deaths,
including government forces. The Government reportedly claimed that
the clash was the consequence of enforcing "legal measures" that
were taken against Rif'at and his supporters because of "violations of
civil and military laws."
There were reports in 1999 of corporal punishment of
army recruits that led to injury or death (see Section 1.c.).
In 1998 3 policemen were convicted in 1998 and sentenced
to 10 years of hard labor by the Aleppo criminal court for the torture and
killing of a 50-year-old man accused of heroin dealing, marking the first
time since 1994 that members of the security forces were held accountable
for their actions.
There were no reports of deaths in detention; however,
such deaths have occurred in the past. Previous deaths in detention
have not been investigated by the Government, and the number and identities
of prisoners who died in prisons since the 1980's remain unknown.
In 1998 Lebanon's military prosecutor charged 18 members
of the Lebanese Forces, an outlawed rightwing Christian militia, with
carrying out the December 1996 bombing of a bus in Damascus. Eleven
of the 18 persons charged were in custody. There were no further
developments in the case during the year.
b. Disappearance
There were no confirmed reports of politically motivated
disappearances. Despite inquiries by international human rights
organizations and foreign governments, the Government offered little new
information on the welfare and whereabouts of persons who have been held
incommunicado for years or about whom no more is known other than the
approximate date of their detention, including Palestinians and Jordanian
and Lebanese citizens who reportedly were abducted from Lebanon during and
after Lebanon's civil war (see Section 1.d.).
c. Torture and Other Cruel, Inhuman, or
Degrading Treatment or Punishment
Despite the existence of constitutional provisions and
several Penal Code penalties for abusers, there was credible evidence that
security forces continued to use torture. Former prisoners and
detainees report that torture methods include administering electrical
shocks; pulling out fingernails; forcing objects into the rectum; beating,
sometimes while the victim is suspended from the ceiling; hyperextending
the spine; and using a chair that bends backwards to asphyxiate the victim
or fracture the victim's spine. Although torture may occur in
prisons, torture is most likely to occur while detainees are being held at
one of the many detention centers run by the various security services
throughout the country, and particularly while the authorities are trying
to extract a confession or information about an alleged crime or alleged
accomplices.
The Government has denied the use of torture and claims
that it would prosecute anyone believed guilty of using excessive force or
physical abuse. Past victims of torture have identified the officials
who beat them, up to the level of brigadier general. If allegations
of excessive force or physical abuse are to be made in court, the plaintiff
is required to initiate his own civil suit against the alleged abuser.
Courts do not order medical examinations for defendants
who claim that they were tortured (see Section 1.e). There were reports in
1999 of the corporal punishment of army recruits that led to injury or
death (see Section 1.a.).
There were credible reports of torture during the year,
including one prisoner who alleged he had been tortured while held in
solitary confinement for 3 months. The Government reportedly tortured
some of the Islamist prisoners who were detained during the large-scale
arrests in late 1999 and early 2000 (see Sections 1.d. and 2.c.).
In October police used teargas and batons to disperse
several large demonstrations directed against diplomatic missions and
international agencies in reaction to the Israeli Government's use of force
against Palestinians in Israel, the West Bank, and Gaza; an indeterminate
number of demonstrators and police personnel were injured (see Section
2.b.).
In November 200 persons were injured during clashes in
Suwayda province involving Druze residents, Bedouin shepherds, and security
forces (see Sections 1.a. and 5).
Prison conditions vary but generally are poor and do not
meet minimum international standards for health and sanitation.
Facilities for political or national security prisoners generally are worse
than those for common criminals. The prison in Palmyra, where many
political and national security prisoners have been kept, is widely
considered to have the worst conditions. At some prisons, authorities
allow visitation, but in other prisons, security officials demand bribes
from family members who wish to visit incarcerated relatives.
Overcrowding and the denial of sufficient nourishment occurs at several
prisons. According to Human Rights Watch, prisoners and detainees are
held without adequate medical care, and some prisoners with significant
health problems reportedly are denied medical treatment. Some former
detainees have reported that the Government prohibits reading materials,
even the Koran, for political prisoners.
The Government does not permit independent monitoring of
prison or detention center conditions.
d. Arbitrary Arrest, Detention, or Exile
Arbitrary arrest and detention are problems. The
Emergency Law, which authorizes the Government to conduct preventive
arrests, overrides Penal Code provisions against arbitrary arrest and
detention, including the need to obtain warrants. Officials contend
that the Emergency Law is applied only in narrowly defined cases.
Nonetheless, in cases involving political or national security offenses,
arrests generally are carried out in secret, and suspects may be detained
incommunicado for prolonged periods without charge or trial and are denied
the right to a judicial determination for the pretrial detention.
Some of these practices are prohibited by the state of emergency, but the
authorities are not held to these strictures.
The Government has been known to detain relatives of
detainees or of fugitives in order to obtain confessions or the fugitive's
surrender (see Section 1.f.).
Defendants in civil and criminal trials have the right
to bail hearings and the possible release from detention on their own
recognizance. There is no bail option for those accused of national
security offenses. Unlike defendants in regular criminal and civil
cases, security detainees do not have access to lawyers prior to or during
questioning.
Detainees have no legal redress for false arrest.
Security forces often do not provide detainees' families with information
on their welfare or location while in detention. Consequently, many
persons who have disappeared in past years are believed to be in long-term
detention without charge or possibly to have died in detention. It
appears that the number of new disappearances has declined in recent years,
although this circumstance may be due to the Government's success in
deterring opposition political activity rather than a loosening of the
criteria for detention. Many detainees brought to trial have been
held incommunicado for years, and their trials often have been unfair (see
Section 1.e.). There were reliable reports that the Government did
not notify foreign governments when their citizens were arrested or
detained.
Pretrial detention may be lengthy, even in cases not
involving political or national security offenses. The criminal
justice system is backlogged. Many criminal suspects are held in
pretrial detention for months and may have their trials extended for
additional months. Lengthy pretrial detention and drawn-out court
proceedings are caused by a shortage of available courts and the absence of
legal provisions for a speedy trial or plea bargaining (see also Section
1.e.).
It is not known whether any Turkomen from among hundreds
detained in 1996 remain in detention.
There were reports of large-scale arrests of Syrian and
Palestinian Islamists between late December 1999 and February.
Hundreds of persons allegedly were arrested in the cities of Damascus, Hama,
Aleppo, and Homs. Most of those arrested reportedly were released
after signing an agreement not to participate in political activities;
however, some may remain in detention.
There were reliable reports that security forces
arrested several minors on unspecified political charges during the year.
The minors reportedly were held in adult facilities for 6 months, had no
access to legal counsel, and were not allowed visits from family members.
There were unconfirmed reports that a large number of Jordanian prisoners
were released between May and July. However, according to Amnesty
International (AI), only three of the released Jordanians had been held for
political reasons.
In May there were media reports that Communist Action
Party leaders Aslan 'Abd Al-Karim and Fateh Jamous and oppositionist Randa
Ayoubi were released from prison; they reportedly were not required to
agree to abstain from participating in political activities. In
August Sheikh Hashim Minqara, a leader of the Islamic Tawheed Movement who
was arrested in Lebanon in 1985 reportedly was released.
In November the Government declared an amnesty for 600
political prisoners and detainees and a general pardon for some
nonpolitical prisoners, including some who were held under the Economic
Penal Code. The amnesty was covered in the media and reportedly was
the first time that the Government acknowledged that it held persons for
political reasons. There are credible reports that the 600 detainees,
including members of the Muslim Brotherhood, the Islamic Salvation Party,
the Communist Action Party, and some Kurds, are being released
incrementally. The Government also closed the Mazzah prison in
November, which reportedly held numerous political prisoners and detainees.
In December the Government transferred 54 Lebanese
political prisoners and detainees from Syrian to Lebanese custody (see
Section 1.e.).
A prisoner amnesty that was announced in July 1999 is
believed to have benefited some political prisoners and detainees.
While the total number of those released is unknown, AI identified six
prisoners held for political reasons who were released. Unconfirmed
reports suggest that as many as 600 prisoners may have been released.
According to AI, hundreds of persons held for political reasons also were
released in 1998. Prior to the 1998-2000 releases, the last
significant release of political detainees took place in late 1995, with
approximately 2,200 to 3,000 persons believed to have been released.
Some former prisoners reportedly were required to sign loyalty oaths or
admissions of guilt as a condition of their release. Most of those
arrested in a mass crackdown in 1980 have been released; however, some may
remain in prolonged detention without charge. Some union and
professional association officials detained in 1980 may remain in detention
(see Sections 2.b. and 6.a.). AI reported in 1998 that "hundreds
of Lebanese, Palestinians, and Jordanians have been arbitrarily arrested,
some over two decades ago, and remain in prolonged and often secret
detention."
The number of remaining political detainees is unknown.
In June prior to the November prison amnesty, AI estimated that there were
approximately 1,500 political detainees in the country; many of the
detainees reportedly are suspected supporters of the Muslim Brotherhood and
the pro-Iraqi wing of the Ba'th party. There also are Jordanian, Lebanese,
and Palestinian political detainees. According to Amnesty
International, security forces also detain family members of suspected
oppositionists (see Section 1.f.). Estimates of detainees are
difficult to confirm because the Government does not verify publicly the
number of detentions without charge, the release of detainees or amnestied
prisoners, or whether detainees subsequently are sentenced to prison (see
Section 1.e.).
In October 1998, the Jordanian Government requested that
the Syrian Government account for 429 named Jordanian nationals, 239 of
whom Jordan claims have been missing since they entered Syria, and 190 of
whom Jordan claims are imprisoned in Syria. Families of missing
Jordanians allege that there are more than 700 Jordanians in Syrian
detention. According to press reports, government sources stated that the
names provided by Jordan were being examined and that the Government would
respond officially. To date there has been no published official
response.
Former prisoners are subject to a so-called "rights
ban," which begins from the day of sentencing and lasts until 10 years
after the expiration of the sentence. Persons subject to this ban are
not allowed to vote, run for office, or work in the public sector; they
often also are denied passports.
The Government has exiled citizens in the past, although
the practice is prohibited by the Constitution. The Government
refuses to reissue the passports of citizens who fled the country in the
1980's; such citizens consequently are unable to return to the country.
There were no known instances of forced exile during the
year.
e. Denial of Fair Public Trial
The Constitution provides for an independent judiciary,
but the two exceptional courts dealing with alleged security cases are not
independent of executive branch control. The regular court system
displays considerable independence in civil cases, although political
connections and bribery sometimes influence verdicts.
The judicial system is composed of the civil and
criminal courts, military courts, security courts, and religious courts,
which adjudicate matters of personal status such as divorce and
inheritance. The Court of Cassation is the highest court of appeal.
The Supreme Constitutional Court is empowered to rule only on the
constitutionality of laws and decrees; it does not hear appeals.
Civil and criminal courts are organized under the
Ministry of Justice. Defendants before these courts are entitled to
the legal representation of their choice; the courts appoint lawyers for
indigents. Defendants are presumed innocent; they are allowed to
present evidence and to confront their accusers. Trials are public,
except for those involving juveniles or sex offenses. Defendants may
appeal their verdicts to a provincial appeals court and ultimately to the
Court of Cassation. Such appeals are difficult because the courts do
not provide verbatim transcripts of cases--only summaries prepared by the
presiding judges. There are no juries.
Military courts have the authority to try civilians as
well as military personnel. The venue for a civilian defendant is
decided by a military prosecutor. There were continuing reports that
the Government operates military field courts in locations outside
established courtrooms. Such courts reportedly observe fewer of the
formal procedures of regular military courts.
The two security courts are the Supreme State Security
Court (SSSC), which tries political and national security cases, and the
Economic Security Court (ESC), which tries cases involving financial
crimes. Both courts operate under the state of emergency, not
ordinary law, and do not observe constitutional provisions safeguarding
defendants' rights.
Charges against defendants in the SSSC often are vague.
Many defendants appear to be tried for exercising normal political rights,
such as free speech. For example, the Emergency Law authorizes the
prosecution of anyone "opposing the goals of the revolution,"
"shaking the confidence of the masses in the aims of the
revolution," or attempting to "change the economic or social
structure of the State." Nonetheless the Government contends
that the SSSC tries only persons who have sought to use violence against
the State.
Under SSSC procedures, defendants are not present during
the preliminary or investigative phase of the trial, during which the
prosecutor presents evidence. Trials usually are closed to the
public. Lawyers are not ensured access to their clients before the
trial and are excluded from the court during their client's initial
interrogation by the prosecutor. Lawyers submit written defense pleas
rather than oral presentations. The State's case often is based on
confessions, and defendants have not been allowed to argue in court that
their confessions were coerced. There is no known instance in which
the court ordered a medical examination for a defendant who claimed that he
was tortured. The SSSC reportedly has acquitted some defendants, but
the Government does not provide any statistics on the conviction rate.
Defendants do not have the right to appeal verdicts, but sentences are
reviewed by the Minister of Interior, who may ratify, nullify, or alter
sentences. The President also may intervene in the review process.
Accurate information on the number of cases heard by the
SSSC is difficult to obtain, although hundreds of cases are believed to
pass through the court annually. Many reportedly involved charges
relating to membership in various banned political groups, including the
Party of Communist Action and the pro-Iraqi wing of the Ba'th Party.
Sentences as long as 15 years have been imposed in the past. The
Government permitted delegates from AI to attend a session of the SSSC in
1997; however there have been no visits by human rights nongovernmental
organizations (NGO's) since then (see Section 4).
The Economic Security Court (ESC) tries persons for
alleged violations of foreign exchange laws and other economic crimes.
The prosecution of economic crimes is not applied uniformly, as some
government officials or business persons with close connections to the
Government likely have violated the country's strict economic laws without
prosecution. Like the SSSC, the ESC does not ensure due process for
defendants. Defendants may not have adequate access to lawyers to
prepare their defenses, and the State's case usually is based on
confessions. Verdicts may be influenced by high-ranking government
officials. Those convicted of the most serious economic crimes do not
have the right of appeal, but those convicted of lesser crimes may appeal
to the Court of Cassation. A significant prisoner amnesty for
individuals convicted of economic crimes was announced in July 1999.
Theoretically this amnesty may have benefited thousands of persons.
In May late president Hafiz Al-Asad amended the Economic Penal Code to
allow defendants in economic courts to be released on bail. The
bail provision does not extend to those accused of forgery, counterfeiting,
or auto theft; however, the amendment is intended to provide relief for
those accused of other economic crimes, many of whom have been in pretrial
detention for long periods of time. These amendments to the Economic
Penal Code also limit the categories of cases that can be tried in the ESC.
In November the Government approved a general pardon for nonpolitical
prisoners and a reduction of sentences by one-third for persons convicted
of economic crimes, with a provision to commute sentences entirely for
persons who return embezzled funds to investors within 1 year of the law's
effective date.
Prisoner amnesties in July 1999 and November are
believed to have benefited some political prisoners and detainees.
The Government also transferred 54 Lebanese political prisoners and
detainees from Syrian to Lebanese custody in December (see Section 1.d.).
The Government has released virtually all of those
arrested at the time President Asad took power in 1970. However, at
least two persons arrested during that period may remain in prison, despite
the expiration of one of the prisoners' sentences.
The Government in the past denied that it held political
prisoners, arguing that, although the aims of some prisoners may be
political, their activities, including subversion, were criminal. The
official media reported that the 600 beneficiaries of the November amnesty
were political prisoners and detainees; this reportedly was the first time
that the Government acknowledged that it held persons for political
reasons. Nonetheless, the Emergency Law and the Penal Code are so
vague, and the Government's power so broad, that many persons were
convicted and are in prison for the mere expression of political opposition
to the Government.
The exact number of political prisoners is unknown.
f. Arbitrary Interference with Privacy,
Family, Home, or Correspondence
Although laws provide for freedom from arbitrary
interference, the Emergency Law authorizes the security services to enter
homes and conduct searches with warrants if security matters, very broadly
defined, are involved. The security services selectively monitor
telephone conversations and fax transmissions. The Government
sometimes opens mail destined for both citizens and foreign residents.
It also prevents the delivery of human rights materials. In August
1999, authorities repealed a 5-year ban on entry of Jordanian newspapers
(also see Section 2.a.).
The Government continues its practice of threatening or
detaining the relatives of detainees or of fugitives in order to obtain
confessions, minimize outside interference, or prompt the fugitive's
surrender (see Section 1.d.). There have been reports that security
personnel force prisoners to watch relatives being tortured in order to
extract confessions. According to AI, security forces also detain
family members of suspected oppositionists (see Section 1.d.).
Security checkpoints continue to exist, although
primarily in military and other restricted areas. There are few
police checkpoints on main roads and in populated areas. Generally,
the security services set up checkpoints to search for smuggled goods,
weapons, narcotics, and subversive literature. The searches take
place without warrants. In the past, the Government and the Ba'th
Party monitored and attempted to restrict some citizens' visits to foreign
embassies and cultural centers.
Section 2 Respect for Civil Liberties, Including:
a. Freedom of Speech and Press
The Constitution provides for right to express opinions
freely in speech and in writing, but the Government restricts these rights
significantly in practice. The Government strictly controls the
dissemination of information and permits no written or oral criticism of
the President, the President's family, the Ba'th Party, the military, or
the legitimacy of the regime. The Government also does not permit
sectarian issues to be raised. Detention and beatings for individual
expressions of opinion that violate these unwritten rules sometimes occur,
although not as frequently as in the past.
The Emergency Law allows the Government broad discretion
in determining what constitutes illegal expression. It prohibits the
publishing of "false information," which opposes "the goals
of the revolution " (see Section 1.e.). In the past, the
Government has imprisoned journalists for failing to observe press
restrictions. In May 1999, a defamation case filed against a
journalist was reported widely in the press. The case was believed to
be the first in which a journalist was tried for what he had published; he
was cleared of guilt by the court. State security services are known
to threaten local journalists, including with the removal of credentials,
for articles printed outside the country. There were reports that
journalists temporarily lost their credentials during the year after they
allegedly reported on issues deemed sensitive by the military. For example,
in September authorities revoked temporarily the credentials of a local
journalist who wrote an article that the Government deemed politically
sensitive.
The Ministry of Information and the Ministry of Culture
and National Guidance censor the domestic and foreign press. They
usually prevent publication or distribution of any material deemed
threatening or embarrassing by the security services to high levels of the
Government. Censorship usually is stricter for materials in Arabic.
Commonly censored subjects include: The Government's human rights
record; Islamic fundamentalism; allegations of official involvement in drug
trafficking; aspects of the Government's role in Lebanon; graphic
descriptions of sexual activity; material unfavorable to the Arab cause in
the Middle East conflict; and material that is offensive to any of the
country's religious groups. In addition most journalists and writers
practice self-censorship to avoid provoking a negative government reaction.
Recent trends toward a modest relaxation of censorship
increased during the year. In his July inaugural speech, President
Bashar Al-Asad emphasized the principle of media transparency. Since
July both the print and electronic media at times have been critical of
Ba'th Party and government performance and have reported openly on a range
of social and economic issues. While this relaxation of censorship
did not extend to domestic politics or foreign policy issues, it was a
notable departure from past practice. Damascus-based correspondents
for regional Arab media also were able to file reports on internal
political issues, such as rumored governmental changes, new political
discussion groups, and the possible introduction of new parties to the
Ba'th Party-dominated National Progressive Front. In November the
Ba'th Party Regional Command voted to amend the press law to allow
constituent parties of the National Progressive Front to publish newspapers
and to open party headquarters. In November the Prime Minister
rescinded a 1986 ban on the printing of publications by public institutions
without prior approval from the Prime Minister.
A group of 99 Syrian intellectuals published a petition
in a Lebanese newspaper in September calling for lifting martial law,
ending the state of emergency in effect since 1963, releasing political
prisoners, and expanding civil liberties in accordance with the provisions
of the Constitution. The Government did not respond directly to the
petition by year's end; however, the Government did take several of the
steps called for in the petition (see Section 1.d.). The Government
did not take action against any of the intellectuals who signed the
petition by year's end. In December a local human rights organization
published an open letter in a Lebanese newspaper calling for the closure of
the notorious Tadmur prison.
The media broadened somewhat their reporting on regional
developments, including the Middle East peace process. The media
covered some peace process events factually, but other events were reported
selectively to buttress official views. The government-controlled
press increased its coverage of official corruption and governmental
inefficiency. There are no privately owned newspapers, although
foreign-owned, foreign-published newspapers circulate relatively freely.
In August 1999, authorities repealed a 5-year ban on entry of Jordanian
newspapers (also see Section 1.f.).
The Government or the Ba'th Party owns and operates the
radio and television companies and the newspaper publishing houses.
The Ministry of Information closely monitors the radio and television news
programs to ensure adherence to the government line. The Government
does not interfere with broadcasts from abroad. Satellite dishes have
proliferated throughout all regions and in neighborhoods of all social and
economic categories, and in July the Government officially approved
regulations permitting the importation of satellite receivers.
Cellular telephone service was introduced early in the year, although
prohibitive cost severely limits the number of subscribers. Internet
access and access to e-mail is limited, although efforts are underway to
provide greater Internet access, especially to universities and businesses.
The Government blocks access to selected Internet sites that contain
information deemed politically sensitive or pornographic in nature.
The Government also blocks access to servers that provide free e-mail
services. In 1999 and in September, telephone service to the offices
and residences of several European embassies and the home of an American
officer was disrupted, allegedly because the lines had been used to access
Internet providers outside the country. Telephone service in 1999 was
restored in response to diplomatic protest by the European embassies;
however, diplomats and citizens continue to experience regular disruptions
of telephone service. The Ministry of Culture and National Guidance
censors fiction and nonfiction works, including films. It also
determines which films may not be shown at the cultural centers operated by
foreign embassies. The Government prohibits the publication of books
and other materials in Kurdish; however, there are credible reports that
Kurdish language materials are available in the country (see Section 5).
The Government restricts academic freedom. Public
school teachers are not permitted to express ideas contrary to government
policy, although authorities allow somewhat greater freedom of expression
at the university level.
b. Freedom of Peaceful Assembly and Association
Freedom of assembly does not exist under the law.
Citizens may not hold demonstrations unless they obtain permission from the
Ministry of Interior. Most public demonstrations are organized by the
Government or the Ba'th Party. The Government selectively applied the
law during the year, permitting some demonstrations. The Government
applies the restrictions on public assembly in Palestinian refugee camps,
where controlled demonstrations have been allowed.
In October there were numerous demonstrations, most of
which were permitted or organized by the Government, and some of which were
directed against diplomatic missions and international agencies in reaction
to the Israeli Government's use of force against Palestinians in Israel,
the West Bank, and Gaza. On October 4, police did not take adequate
steps to protect diplomatic property during a violent demonstration.
However, during a subsequent violent demonstration on October 6, police
used tear gas, shields, batons, and threats of lethal force to disperse
rock-throwing demonstrators and protect diplomatic property.
Observers stated that the police acted with restraint. About 50
police personnel and numerous demonstrators were injured in the
demonstration (see Section 1.c.). The Government subsequently
permitted additional demonstrations with a significant security force
presence; such demonstrations remained peaceful.
In November there were large demonstrations in Suwayda
province following violent clashes between Bedouin shepherds and Druze
residents of the province (see Sections 1.a., 1.c., and 5).
The Government restricts freedom of association.
Private associations must be registered with the Government in order to be
considered legal. Some groups have not been able to register,
presumably because the Government views them as political, even though the
groups presented themselves as cultural or professional associations.
Unregistered groups generally may not hold meetings; however, there are
credible reports that several domestic human rights organizations and civil
society groups held regular meetings during the year. The Government
usually grants registration to groups not engaged in political or other
activities deemed sensitive. The authorities do not allow the
establishment of independent political parties.
In 1980 the Government dissolved, and then reconstituted
under its control, the executive boards of professional associations after
some members staged a national strike and advocated an end to the state of
emergency. The associations have not been independent since that time
and generally are led by members of the Ba'th Party, although nonparty
members may serve on their executive boards. It is not known whether
any persons detained in 1980 crackdowns on union and professional
association officials remain in detention (see Sections 1.d. and 6.a.).
c. Freedom of Religion
The Constitution provides for freedom of religion, and
the Government generally respects this right in practice; however, it
imposes restrictions in some areas. The only advantage given to a
particular religion by the Constitution is the requirement that the
President be a Muslim. There is no official state religion; Sunni
Muslims constitute the majority of the population.
All religions and orders must register with the
Government, which monitors fund raising and requires permits for all
meetings by religious groups, except for worship. Recognized
religious groups receive free utilities and are exempt from real estate
taxes and taxes on official vehicles. There is a strict de facto
separation of church and state. Religious groups tend to avoid any
involvement in internal political affairs. The Government, in turn,
generally refrains from becoming involved in strictly religious issues.
The Government considers militant Islam a threat to the
regime and follows closely the practice of its adherents. The
Government has allowed many new mosques to be built; however, sermons are
monitored and controlled, and mosques are closed between prayers.
There were credible reports of large-scale arrests of
Syrian and Palestinian Islamists affiliated with the Muslim Brotherhood and
the Islamic Salvation Party in late 1999 and early 2000. Some of the
Islamist prisoners reportedly were tortured in detention. A number of
these prisoners reportedly were released during the year (see Sections 1.c.
and 1.d.).
Although the law does not prohibit proselytizing, the
Government discourages such activity in practice, particularly when it is
deemed a threat to the generally good relations among religious groups.
Foreign missionary groups are present but operate discreetly. The
Government banned Jehovah's Witnesses as a politically-motivated Zionist
organization in 1964.
Officially all schools are government-run and
nonsectarian, although some schools are run in practice by Christian, Druze,
and Jewish minorities. There is mandatory religious instruction in
schools, with government-approved teachers and curriculums. Religion
courses are divided into separate classes for Muslim, Druze, and Christian
students. Jews have a separate primary school, which offers religious
instruction in Judaism, in addition to traditional subjects. Although
Arabic is the official language in public schools, the Government permits
the teaching of Armenian, Hebrew, Syriac (Aramaic), and Chaldean in some
schools on the basis that these are "liturgical languages."
Religious groups are subject to their respective
religious laws on marriage, divorce, child custody, and inheritance (see
Section 5).
Government policy officially disavows sectarianism of
any kind. However, in the case of the Alawis, religion can be a
contributing factor in determining career opportunities. For example,
members of the President's Alawi sect hold a predominant position in the
security services and military, well out of proportion to their percentage
of the population, which is estimated to be 12 percent (see Section 3).
For primarily political rather than religious reasons,
Jews generally are barred from government employment and do not have
military service obligations. Jews also are the only religious
minority group whose passports and identity cards note their religion.
d. Freedom of Movement Within the Country,
Foreign Travel, Emigration, and Repatriation
The Government limits freedom of movement. The
Government restricts travel near the Golan Heights. Travel to Israel
is illegal. In November 1999, the Government eased many of its travel
restrictions, which made it easier for most citizens to travel abroad.
In December the Government lifted the ban on travel to Iraq. Exit
visas generally no longer are required for women, men over 50 years old,
and citizens living abroad. In the past, individuals have been denied
permission to travel abroad on political grounds, although government
officials deny that this practice occurs. The authorities may
prosecute any person found attempting to emigrate or travel abroad
illegally, or who is suspected of having visited Israel. Women over
the age of 18 have the legal right to travel without the permission of male
relatives. However, a husband may file a request with the Ministry of
Interior to prohibit his wife's departure from the country (see Section 5).
The Government's use of police checkpoints has been reduced (see Section
1.f.).
In July the Government announced that emigres who did
not complete mandatory military service can pay a fee to avoid being
conscripted while visiting the country.
In November the Government temporarily sealed access to
parts of Suwayda province for several weeks to nonresidents following
violent clashes between resident Druze and Bedouin shepherds (see Section
5).
As of June 383,199 Palestinian refugees were registered
with the United Nations Relief and Works Agency (UNRWA) in the country.
In general Palestinian refugees no longer report unusual difficulties
travelling in and out of the country, as was the case in the past.
The Government restricts entry by Palestinians who are not resident in the
country. The Government does not allow Palestinian residents of Gaza
to visit the country.
Citizens of any Arab country may enter the country
without a visa. However, citizens of Iraq, Sudan, and Somalia must
demonstrate that they have an invitation from a business or individual
citizen.
There are no laws with provisions for dealing with
refugees and asylees in accordance with the provisions of the 1951 U.N.
Convention Relating to the Status of Refugees or its 1967 Protocol.
The Government cooperates on a case-by-case basis with the office of the
United Nations High Commissioner for Refugees (UNHCR) and other
humanitarian organizations in assisting refugees. The Government
provides first asylum but is selective about extending protection to
refugees; approximately 2,455 persons sought asylum through the UNHCR
during the first 9 months of the year. Although the Government denied
any forced repatriation of those who may have had a valid claim to refugee
status, in 1998 it apparently forcibly repatriated Iraqi, Somali, Algerian,
and Libyan refugees. As of August 1999, there were an estimated
21,319 non-Palestinian refugees in the country, of whom about 3,962 were
receiving assistance from the UNHCR, including 1,315 refugees of Iraqi
origin.
Section 3 Respect for Political Rights: The
Right of Citizens to Change Their Government
Although citizens ostensibly vote for the President and
Members of Parliament, they do not have the right to change their
government. The late President Hafiz Al-Asad was confirmed by
unopposed referenda five times after taking power in 1970. His son,
Bashar Al-Asad, also was confirmed by an unopposed referendum in July.
Political opposition to the President is not tolerated. The President
and his senior aides, particularly those in the military and security
services, ultimately make most basic decisions in political and economic
life, with a very limited degree of public accountability.
Moreover, the Constitution mandates that the Ba'th Party is the ruling
party and is ensured a majority in all government and popular associations,
such as workers' and women's groups. Six smaller political parties
also are permitted and, along with the Ba'th Party, make up the National
Progressive Front (NPF), a grouping of parties that represents the sole
framework of legal political party participation for citizens. While
created ostensibly to give the appearance of a multiparty system, the NPF
is dominated by the Ba'th Party and does not change the essentially
one-party character of the political system. Non-Ba'th Party members
of the NPF exist as political parties largely in name only and conform
strictly to Ba'th Party and government policies. There were reports
in the regional Arab media that the Government is considering legislation
to expand the NPF to include new parties and several parties previously
banned.
The Ba'th Party dominates the Parliament, which is known
as the People's Council. Although parliamentarians may criticize
policies and modify draft laws, the executive branch retains ultimate
control over the legislative process. Since 1990 the Government has
allowed independent non-NPF candidates to run for a limited allotment of
seats in the 250-member People's Council. The current number of non-NPF
deputies is 83, ensuring a permanent absolute majority for the Ba'th
Party-dominated NPF. Elections for the 250 seats in the People's
Council last took place in 1998.
The Government is headed by a Cabinet, which the
President has the discretion to change. In March former President
Hafez Al-Asad accepted the resignations of all of the members of his
Cabinet who resigned because the late President reportedly believed that
the change would improve government and economic performance. On
March 13, the late President appointed a new Cabinet consisting of 36
ministers; 26 Ba'th Party members, 6 NPF ministers, and 4
"independents" aligned with the Government.
Persons who have been convicted by the State Security
Court may be deprived of their political rights after they are released
from prison. Such restrictions include a prohibition against engaging
in political activity, the denial of passports, and a bar on accepting
government jobs and some other forms of employment. The duration of
such restrictions may last from 10 years to the remainder of the former
prisoner's life. The Government contends that this practice is
mandated by the Penal Code; it has been in effect since 1949.
Women and minorities, with the exception of the Jewish
population and stateless Kurds (see Section 5), participate in the
political system without restriction. Nonetheless, women are
underrepresented in Government. There are 2 female cabinet ministers
and 26 female Members of Parliament.
Section 4 Governmental Attitude Regarding
International and Nongovernmental Investigation of Alleged Violations of
Human Rights
The Government does not allow the existence of local
human rights groups. One or two human rights groups once operated
legally but subsequently were banned by the Government. However,
there are credible reports that several domestic human rights organizations
and civil society groups met regularly during the year.
Amnesty International (AI) visited Syria for 2 weeks in
1997, the second major visit by an international human rights organization
(after a Human Rights Watch visit in 1995). These were the first such
meetings held by government officials with an international human rights
organization. There have been no such meetings since.
As a matter of policy, the Government in its exchanges
with international groups denies that it commits human rights abuses.
It has not permitted representatives of international organizations to
visit prisons. The Government states that it now responds in writing
to all inquires from NGO's regarding human rights issues, including the
cases of individual detainees and prisoners, through an interagency
governmental committee established expressly for that purpose. Human
Rights Watch reported in 1997 that the Government had not responded to its
request to account publicly for the possibly thousands of citizens who were
executed at Tadmur prison in the 1980's. The Government usually
responds to queries from human rights organizations and foreign embassies
on specific cases by claiming that the prisoner in question has violated
national security laws.
Section 5 Discrimination Based on Race, Sex,
Religion, Disability, Language, or Social Status
The Constitution provides for equal rights and equal
opportunity for all citizens. In practice membership in the Ba'th
Party or close familial relations with a prominent party member or
government official can be important for economic, social, or educational
advancement. Party or government connections can pave the way for
entrance into better elementary and secondary schools, access to lucrative
employment, and greater power within the Government, the military, and the
security services. Certain prominent positions, such as that of
provincial governor, are reserved solely for Ba'th Party members.
Apart from some discrimination against Kurds, there are no apparent
patterns of systematic government discrimination based on race, sex,
religion, disability, language, or social status. However, there are
varying degrees of societal discrimination in each of these areas.
Women
Violence against women occurs, but there are no reliable
statistics regarding the prevalence of domestic violence or sexual assault.
The vast majority of cases likely are unreported, and victims generally are
reluctant to seek assistance outside the family. There are no laws
against spousal rape. One preliminary academic study suggested that
domestic violence is the largest single reason for divorces, and that such
abuse is more prevalent among the less-educated and person who live in
rural areas. Battered women have the legal right to seek redress in
court, but few do so because of the social stigma attached to such action.
The Syrian Women's Federation offers services to battered wives to remedy
individual family problems. The Syrian Family Planning Association
also attempts to deal with this problem. Some private groups,
including the Family Planning Association, have organized seminars on
violence against women, which were reported by the government press.
There are no specifically designated shelters or safe havens for battered
women who seek to flee their husbands.
The Constitution provides for equality between men and
women and equal pay for equal work. Moreover, the Government has
sought to overcome traditional discriminatory attitudes toward women and
encourages women's education. However, the Government has not yet
changed personal status, retirement, and social security laws that
discriminate against women. Christians, Muslims, and other religious
groups are subject to their respective religious laws on marriage, divorce,
and inheritance (see Section 2.c.). In addition some secular laws
discriminate against women. For example, under criminal law, the
punishment for adultery is twice that as for the same crime committed by a
man. "Honor" crimes (a euphemism that refers to violent
assaults with intent to murder against a female by a male for alleged
sexual misconduct) do occur.
For Muslims personal status law on divorce is based on
Shari'a (Islamic law), and some of its provisions discriminate against
women. For example, husbands may claim adultery as grounds for
divorce, but wives face more difficulty in presenting the same argument.
If a woman requests a divorce from her husband, she may not be entitled to
child support in some instances. In addition under the law a woman
loses the right to custody of boys when they reach age 9 and girls at age
12.
Inheritance for Muslims is based on Shari'a.
Accordingly Muslim women usually are granted half of the inheritance share
of male heirs. However, Shari'a mandates that male heirs provide
financial support to the female relatives who inherit less. For
example, a brother who inherits an unmarried sister's share from their
parents' estate is obligated to provide for the sister's well-being.
If the brother fails to do so, she has the right to sue.
Polygyny is legal but is practiced only by a small
minority of Muslim men.
A husband may request that his wife's travel abroad be
prohibited (see Section 2.d.). Women generally are barred from
travelling abroad with their children unless they are able to prove that
the father has granted permission for the children to travel.
Women participate actively in public life and are
represented in most professions, including the military. Women are
not impeded from owning or managing land or other real property.
Women constitute approximately 7 percent of judges, 10 percent of lawyers,
57 percent of teachers below university level, and 20 percent of university
professors.
Children
There is no legal discrimination between boys and girls
in school or in health care. Education is compulsory for all
children, male or female, between the ages of 6 and 12. According to
the Syrian Women's Union, about 46 percent of the total number of students
through the secondary level are female.
Nevertheless, societal pressure for early marriage and
childbearing interferes with girls' educational progress, particularly in
rural areas, where dropout rates for female students remain high.
The law emphasizes the need to protect children, and the
Government has organized seminars on the subject of child welfare.
Although there are cases of child abuse, there is no societal pattern of
abuse against children. The law provides for severe penalties for
those found guilty of the most serious abuses against children.
People with Disabilities
The law prohibits discrimination against the disabled
and seeks to integrate them into the public sector work force.
However, implementation is spotty. Regulations reserving 2 percent of
government and public sector jobs for the disabled are not implemented
rigorously. The disabled do not have recourse to the courts regarding
discrimination. There are no laws that mandate access to public
buildings for the disabled. The Minister of Social Affairs announced
plans during the year to offer vocational training for disabled persons
through local NGO's and to mandate that the Government hire 4 percent of
its workforce from the disabled population.
Religious Minorities
Although there is significant religious tolerance,
religion or ethnic affiliation can be a contributing factor in determining
career opportunities. For example, members of the President's Alawi
sect hold a predominant position in the security services and military,
well out of proportion to their percentage of the population.
Nevertheless, government policy officially disavows sectarianism.
There generally is little societal discrimination or
violence against religious minorities, including Jews. However, on
October 12, a group of Palestinians threw bricks, stones, and Molotov
cocktails at a synagogue in Damascus, apparently in reaction to the Israeli
Government's use of force against Palestinians in the occupied territories.
No one was injured in the attack; however, the synagogue was damaged
slightly and was closed for approximately 1 month. The Government
took immediate steps to ensure that the Jewish community would be protected
from further attacks, including arresting the perpetrators and posting
guards around synagogues and the Jewish quarter of Damascus.
National/Racial/Ethnic Minorities
The Government generally permits national and ethnic
minorities to conduct traditional, religious, and cultural activities.
However, the Government's attitude toward the Kurdish minority is a
significant exception to this policy. Although the Government
contends that there is no discrimination against the Kurdish population, it
has placed limits on the use and teaching of the Kurdish language. It
also restricts the publication of books and other materials written in
Kurdish (see Section 2.a.), Kurdish cultural expression, and, at times, the
celebration of Kurdish festivals. The Government tacitly accepts the
importation and distribution of Kurdish language materials, particularly in
the northeast region in which most of the Kurds in the country reside.
Some members of the Kurdish community have been tried by the Supreme State
Security Court for expressing support for greater Kurdish autonomy or
independence. Although the Asad Government stopped the previous
practice of stripping Kurds in Syria of their Syrian nationality (some
120,000 lost Syrian nationality under this program in the 1960's), it never
restored their nationality. As a result, those who had lost their
nationality and their children have been unable to obtain Syrian
nationality and passports, or even identification cards and birth
certificates. Without Syrian nationality, these stateless Kurds, who
according to UNHCR estimates number about 200,000, are unable to own land,
are not permitted to practice as doctors or engineers or be employed by the
Government, are ineligible for admission to public hospitals, and have no
right to vote, according to Human Rights Watch. They also encounter
difficulties in enrolling their children in school. Stateless Kurdish
men legally may not marry Syrian citizens.
In November there were violent clashes in Suwayda
province, reportedly stemming from a longstanding dispute between Bedouin
shepherds and Druze residents over grazing and property rights. There were
large demonstrations following the killings (see Section 2.b.). The
Government deployed 5,000 army troops and sealed off the area with military
checkpoints, temporarily preventing nonresidents from entering the Suwayda
province (see Section 2.d.). A number of Druze, Bedouin, and security
force personnel were killed and injured during the clashes.
Section 6 Worker Rights
a. The Right of Association
Although the Constitution provides for this right,
workers are not free to establish unions independent of the Government.
All unions must belong to the General Federation of Trade Unions (GFTU),
which is dominated by the Ba'th Party and is in fact a part of the State's
bureaucratic structure. The GFTU is an information channel between
political decisionmakers and workers. The GFTU transmits instructions
downward to the unions and workers but also conveys information to
decisionmakers about worker conditions and needs. The GFTU provides
the Government with opinions on legislation, organizes workers, and
formulates rules for various member unions. The GFTU president is a
senior member of the Ba'th Party. He and his deputy may attend
cabinet meetings on economic affairs. The GFTU controls nearly all
aspects of union activity.
The law does not prohibit strikes, except in the
agricultural sector. Nevertheless, workers are inhibited from
striking because of previous government crackdowns on strikers. In
1980 the security forces arrested many union and professional association
officials who planned a national strike. Some of them are believed to
remain in detention, either without trial or after being tried by the State
Security Court (see Sections 1.d. and 2.b.).
The GFTU is affiliated with the International
Confederation of Arab Trade Unions.
In 1992 Syria's eligibility for tariff preferences under
the U.S. Generalized System of Preferences was suspended because the
Government failed to take steps to afford internationally recognized worker
rights to workers.
b. The Right to Organize and Bargain
Collectively
The right to organize and bargain collectively does not
exist in any meaningful sense. Government representatives are part of
the bargaining process in the public sector. In the public sector,
unions do not normally bargain collectively on wage issues, but there is
some evidence that union representatives participate with representatives
of employers and the supervising ministry in establishing minimum wages,
hours, and conditions of employment. Workers serve on the boards of
directors of public enterprises, and union representatives always are
included on these boards.
The law provides for collective bargaining in the
private sector, but any such agreement between labor and management must be
ratified by the Minister of Labor and Social Affairs, who has effective
veto power. The Committee of Experts of the International Labor
Organization (ILO) has long noted the Government's refusal to abolish the
Minister's power over collective contracts.
Unions have the right to litigate disputes over work
contracts and other workers' interests with employers and may ask for
binding arbitration. In practice labor and management representatives
settle most disputes without resort to legal remedies or arbitration.
Management has the right to request arbitration, but this right seldom is
exercised. Arbitration usually occurs when a worker initiates a
dispute over wages or severance pay.
Since the unions are part of the Government's
bureaucratic structure, they are protected by law from antiunion
discrimination. There were no reports of antiunion discrimination.
There are no unions in the seven free trade zones.
Firms in the zones are exempt from the laws and regulations governing
hiring and firing, although they must observe some provisions on health,
safety, hours, and sick and annual leave.
c. Prohibition of Forced or Compulsory Labor
There is no law prohibiting forced or compulsory labor,
including that performed by children. There were no reports of forced
labor involving children or foreign or domestic workers. Forced labor
has been imposed as a punishment for some convicted prisoners.
d. Status of Child Labor Practices and
Minimum Age for Employment
The 1959 Labor Law protects children from exploitation
in the workplace. Independent information and audits on government
enforcement are not available. Although it is not prohibited by law,
there were no reports of coerced or bonded labor (see Section 6.c.) due to
the relative ease with which a work permit may be obtained. In
December the Parliament approved legislation that raises the private sector
minimum age for employment from 12 to 15 years for most types of
nonagricultural labor, and from 16 to 18 years for heavy work. In all
cases, parental permission is required for children under the age of 16.
The law prohibits children from working at night. However, all these
laws apply only to children who work for a salary. Those who work in
family businesses and are not technically paid a salary--a common
phenomenon--do not fall under the law. The Government claims that the
expansion of the private sector has led to more young children working.
Education is compulsory for all children, male or female, between the ages
of 6 and 12.
The Ministry of Labor and Social Affairs monitors
employment conditions for persons under the age of 18, but it does not have
enough inspectors to ensure compliance with the laws. The Ministry
has the authority to specify the industries in which children 15 and 16
years of age may work. The majority of children under age 16 who are
working do so for their parents in the agricultural sector without
remuneration. The ILO report found that 10.5 percent of children
under the age of 18 participate in the labor force, which amounts to 4.7
percent of the total work force. Working hours for youths of legal
age to work do not differ from those established for adults. Children
under the age of 16 are prohibited by law from working in mines, at
petroleum sites, or in other dangerous fields. Children are not
allowed to lift, carry, or drag heavy objects. The exploitation of
children for begging purposes also is prohibited. The Labor
Inspection Department performs unannounced spot checks of employers on a
daily basis to enforce these regulations; however, the scope of these
checks is unknown.
e. Acceptable Conditions of Work
The Minister of Labor and Social Affairs is responsible
for enforcing minimum wage levels in the public and private sectors. In
August the Government increased public sector minimum wages by 25 percent
to $57 (2,664 Syrian pounds) per month, plus other compensation (for
example, meals, uniforms, and transportation). In October the
Government increased private sector minimum wages by 25 percent to $53
(2,425 Syrian pounds) per month in urban areas and $49 (2,237 Syrian
pounds) in rural areas. These wages still do not provide a decent
standard of living for a worker and family. As a result, many workers
in both the public and private sectors take additional jobs or are
supported by their extended families. In the past, a committee of
labor, management, and government representatives submitted recommended
changes in the minimum wage to the Minister, and private sector salary
increases matched those in the public sector.
The statutory workweek for administrative staff is 6
days of 6 hours each, and laborers work 6 days a week of 8 hours each.
In some cases a 9-hour workday is permitted. The laws mandate 1
24-hour rest day per week. Rules and regulations severely limit the
ability of an employer to dismiss employees without cause. Even if a
person is absent from work without notice for a long period, the employer
must follow a lengthy procedure of trying to find the person and notify
him, including through newspaper notices, before he is able to take any
action against the employee. Dismissed employees have the right to
appeal before a committee of representatives from the union, management,
the Ministry of Labor and Social Affairs, and the appropriate municipality.
Such committees usually find in favor of the employee. Dismissed
employees are entitled to 80 percent of salary benefits while the dispute
is under consideration. No additional back wages are awarded should
the employer be found at fault, nor are wage penalties imposed in cases
where the employer is not found at fault. The law does not protect
temporary workers who are not subject to regulations on minimum wages.
Small private firms and businesses employ such workers to avoid the costs
associated with hiring permanent employees.
The law mandates safety in all sectors, and managers are
expected to implement them fully. In practice there is little
enforcement without worker complaints, which occur infrequently despite
government efforts to post notices on safety rights and regulations.
Large companies, such as oil field contractors, employ safety engineers.
The ILO noted in August 1998 that a provision in the
Labor Code allowing employers to keep workers at the workplace for as many
as 11 hours a day might lead to abuse. However, there have been no
reports of such abuses. Officials from the Ministries of Health and
Labor inspect work sites for compliance with health and safety standards.
Such inspections appear to be haphazard, apart from those conducted in
hotels and other facilities that cater to foreigners. The enforcement
of labor laws in rural areas also is more lax than it is in urban areas,
where inspectors are concentrated. Workers may lodge complaints about
health and safety conditions, with special committees established to
adjudicate such cases. Workers have the right to remove themselves
from hazardous conditions without risking loss of employment.
f. Trafficking in Persons
There are no laws that specifically prohibit trafficking
in persons; however, there were no reports that persons were trafficked in,
to, or from the country. Standard labor laws would be applied in the
event of allegations of trafficking.
Source: The
Country Reports on Human Rights Practices, U.S. State Department,
February 2000.
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