Report on Human Rights Practices for 2001
Iraq
Political power in Iraq1 lies exclusively in a repressive
one-party apparatus dominated by Saddam Hussein and members of his extended
family. The provisional Constitution of 1968 stipulates that the Arab
Ba'th Socialist Party governs Iraq through the Revolutionary Command Council
(RCC), which exercises both executive and legislative authority. President
Saddam Hussein, who also is Prime Minister, Chairman of the RCC, and Secretary
General of the Regional Command of the Ba'th Party, wields decisive power.
Hussein and his Government continued to refer to an October 1995 non-democratic
"referendum" on his presidency, in which he received 99.96 percent
of the vote. This referendum included neither secret ballots nor opposing
candidates, and many credible reports indicated that voters feared possible
reprisal for a dissenting vote. Ethnically and linguistically the Iraqi
population includes Arabs, Kurds, Turkmens, Assyrians, Yazidis, and Armenians.
The religious mix likewise is varied and consists of Shi'a and Sunni Muslims
(both Arab and Kurdish), Christians (including Chaldeans and Assyrians),
and a small number of Jews and Mandaeans. Civil uprisings have occurred
in previous years, especially in the north and the south. The Government
has reacted with extreme repression against those who oppose or even question
it. The judiciary is not independent, and the President may override any
court decision.
The Government's security apparatus includes militias attached to the
President, the Ba'th Party, and the Interior Ministry. Military and
paramilitary forces often fulfill an internal security role. The military
and security forces play a central role in maintaining the environment
of intimidation and fear on which government power rests. The Government
makes no attempt to acknowledge, investigate, or punish officials or
members of the military or security forces accused of human rights abuses.
Military and security forces committed widespread, serious, and systematic
human rights abuses.
The country has a population of approximately 22 million. The Government
owns all major industries and controls most of the highly centralized
economy, which is based largely on oil production. The Iran-Iraq and
Gulf Wars damaged the economy, and the country has been under U.N. sanctions
since its 1990 invasion of Kuwait. Sanctions ban all exports, except
oil sales, under U.N. Security Council Resolution 986 and subsequent
resolutions (the "oil-for-food" program). Under the program,
the country also is permitted, under U.N. control, to import food, medicine,
supplies for water, sanitation, electricity, agricultural, and educational
projects, and spare parts for the oil sector. Reliable economic statistics
are unavailable; however, estimates for GDP are approximately $57 billion.
The Government's human rights record remained extremely poor. Citizens
do not have the right to change their government. The Government continued
to execute summarily alleged political opponents and leaders in the
Shi'a religious community. Reports suggest that persons were executed
merely because of their association with an opposition group or as part
of a continuing effort to reduce prison populations. The Government
continued to be responsible for disappearances and to kill and torture
persons suspected of--or related to persons suspected of--economic crimes,
military desertion, and a variety of other activities. Security forces
routinely tortured, beat, raped, and otherwise abused detainees. Prison
conditions are extremely poor and at times life threatening. The Government
reportedly has conducted "prison cleansing" campaigns to kill
inmates in order to relieve overcrowding in the prisons. The authorities
routinely used arbitrary arrest and detention, prolonged detention,
and incommunicado detention, and continued to deny citizens the basic
right to due process. Saddam Hussein and his inner circle of supporters
continued to impose arbitrary rule. The Government continued to infringe
on citizens' privacy rights.
The Government restricts severely freedoms of speech, the press, assembly,
association, religion, and movement. The U.N. Special Rapporteur on
the situation of human rights in the country issued a report in January
detailing ongoing, grievous violations of human rights by the Government.
The U.N. Commission on Human Rights and the U.N. General Assembly passed
resolutions in April and November criticizing the Government's suppression
of these freedoms. Human rights abuses remain difficult to document
because of the Government's efforts to conceal the facts, including
its prohibition on the establishment of independent human rights organizations,
its persistent refusal to grant visits to human rights monitors, and
its continued restrictions designed to prevent dissent. Denied entry
to the country, the Special Rapporteur bases his reports on the Government's
human rights abuses on interviews with recent emigrants, interviews
with opposition groups and others that have contacts inside the country,
and on published reports from outside the country. Violence and discrimination
against women occur. The Government has enacted laws affording a variety
of protections to women; however, it is difficult to determine the practical
effects of such protections. The Government neglects the health and
nutritional needs of children, and discriminates against religious minorities
and ethnic groups. The Government restricts severely trade union rights.
Child labor persists, and there were instances of forced labor.
The Kurdistan Democratic Party (KDP) and the Patriotic Union of Kurdistan
(PUK) have controlled most areas in the three northern provinces of
Erbil, Duhok, and Sulaymaniah since the Government withdrew its military
forces and civilian administrative personnel from the area after the
1991 Kurdish uprising. The KDP and the PUK fought one another from 1994
through 1997. In September 1998, they agreed to unify their separate
administrations and to hold new elections in July 1999. The cease-fire
has held; however, reunification measures have not been implemented.
The PUK held municipal elections in February 2000 and the KDP held municipal
elections in May, the first elections held in the Kurdish-controlled
areas since 1992. Foreign and local election observers reported that
the elections generally were fair. The KDP, PUK, and opposition groups
committed human rights abuses. However, the PUK and KDP have enacted
laws establishing an independent judiciary, providing for freedom of
religion, freedom of the press, freedom of assembly, the right to form
political parties, and women's and workers' rights, and, according to
press reporting and independent observers, both groups generally observed
such laws in practice. In addition both the PUK and KDP have established
human rights ministries to monitor human rights conditions, to submit
reports to relevant international bodies, including the ICRC, on worthy
cases, and to recommend ways to end abuses.
RESPECT FOR HUMAN RIGHTS
Section 1 Respect for the Integrity of the Person, Including Freedom
From:
a. Arbitrary or Unlawful Deprivation of Life
The Government committed numerous political and other extrajudicial
killings. The Government has a long record of executing perceived or
alleged opponents. In a report released by the U.N. Secretary General
on September 13, the U.N. Special Rapporteur criticized the Government
for the "sheer number of executions" taking place in the country,
the number of "extrajudicial executions on political grounds,"
and "the absence of a due process of the law." The list of
offenses requiring a mandatory death penalty has grown substantially
in the past few years and now includes anything that could be characterized
as "sabotaging the national economy," including forgery, as
well as smuggling cars, spare parts, material, heavy equipment, and
machinery. The Special Rapporteur has noted that membership in certain
political parties is punishable by death, that there is a pervasive
fear of death for any act or expression of dissent, and that there are
recurrent reports of the use of the death penalty for such offenses
as "insulting" the President or the Ba'th Party. "The
mere suggestion that someone is not a supporter of the President carries
the prospect of the death penalty," the Special Rapporteur stated.
The Government made no attempt to answer allegations of either past
or present political or extrajudicial killings, investigate such abuses,
nor identify and punish the perpetrators.
In a report released in January, Amnesty International reported that
in October 2000 the Government had executed dozens of women accused
of prostitution.
In February the Government reportedly executed 37 political detainees
for opposition activity. According to press reports, prominent Kurd
writer Muhammad Jamil Bandi Rozhbayani was killed in March after a visit
to his home by intelligence service personnel investigating his writings
regarding the Government's Arabization and ethnic cleansing programs.
In May the Government reportedly executed two Shi'a clerics, Abdulsattar
Abed-Ibrahim al-Mausawi and Ahmad al-Hashemi, for claiming that the
Government was involved in the killing of a Shi'a cleric in 1999 and
the killings of four engineers from the Electricity Board for receiving
bribes in May (see Section 1.d.). According to credible reporting, in
June security forces killed another Shi'a cleric, Hussein Bahar al-Uloom,
for refusing to appear on television to congratulate Qusay Saddam Hussein
for his election to a Ba'th Party position.
Such killings continue an apparent government policy of eliminating
prominent Shi'a clerics who are suspected of disloyalty to the Government.
In 1998 and 1999, the Government killed a number of leading Shi'a clerics,
prompting the former Special Rapporteur in 1999 to express his concern
to the Government that the killings might be part of a systematic attack
by government officials on the independent leadership of the Shi'a Muslim
community (see Section 2.c.). The Government did not respond to the
Special Rapporteur's letter.
In September the Government executed 28 political prisoners in Abu
Ghurayb prison as a part of its "prison cleansing" campaign.
During 2000 the Special Rapporteur received reports referring to a "prison
cleansing" execution campaign taking place in Abu Ghurayb, Radwaniyah,
and other prisons. Opposition groups, including the Supreme Council
for the Islamic Revolution in Iraq (SCIRI), the Iraqi Communist Party
(ICP), the Iraqi National Congress (INC), and others with a network
inside the country, provided detailed accounts of summary executions,
including the names of hundreds of persons killed. A former officer
from the Mukhabarat (Intelligence Service) reported that he participated
in a 1998 mass murder at Abu Ghurayb prison following a Revolutionary
Command Council directive to "clean out" the country's prisons.
The Government's motive for such high numbers of summary executions--estimated
at more than 3,000 since 1997--may be linked to reported intimidation
of the population and reduction of prison populations. The Government
has made no effort to investigate current or past cases, answer accusations
about the executions, or identify and punish the perpetrators.
As in previous years, there were numerous credible reports that the
Government continued to execute persons thought to be involved in plotting
against Saddam Hussein or the Ba'th Party. These executions included
high-ranking civilian, military, and tribal leaders. For example, in
March army Major General Tariq Sa'dun was arrested, tortured, and executed
for criticizing the Government. Also in March, according to Amnesty
International (AI) and press reports, three officers from the Iraqi
Air Force: Sa'eed 'Abd al-Majid 'Abd al-Ilah, Fawzi Hamed al-'Ubaidi,
and Fares Ahmad al-'Alwan, were executed.
Government agents targeted for killing family members of defectors
(see Section 1.f.). For example, in May the Government reportedly tortured
to death the mother of three Iraqi defectors for her children's opposition
activities. In 2000 government agents reportedly killed Safiyah Hassan,
who allegedly criticized publicly the Government for killing her husband
and two sons, Hussein and Saddam Kamal. Her husband and sons had been
senior government officials; however, the brothers defected to Jordan
in 1996. The Government offered the men immunity if they returned to
the country; however, upon their return, government agents killed them
and their father.
In October 2000, security forces reportedly beheaded a number of women
suspected of prostitution and some men suspected of facilitating or
covering up such activities (see Section 5). Security agents reportedly
decapitated numerous women and men in front of their family members.
According to Amnesty International (AI), the victim's heads were displayed
in front of their homes for several days. Thirty of the victims' names
reportedly were published, which included three doctors and one medical
assistant.
Reports of deaths due to poor prison conditions continued (see Section
1.c.).
Many persons who were displaced forcibly still lived in tent camps
under harsh conditions, which also resulted in many deaths (see Sections
2.d. and 5).
As in previous years, the Government continued to deny the widespread
killings of Kurds in the north of the country during the "Anfal"
Campaign of 1988 (see Sections 1.b. and 1.g.). Both the Special Rapporteur
and Human Rights Watch (HRW) have concluded that the Government's policies
against the Kurds raise questions of crimes against humanity and violations
of the 1948 Genocide Convention.
Political killings and terrorist actions continued in the Kurd-controlled
north of the country. For example, assailants assassinated the governor
of Arbil, Fransu Hariri. PUK and KDP investigators blamed Islamic groups
for the killing. In June the Supreme Council for the Islamic Revolution
in Iraq reported that its members killed Raed Khidir, a Ba'th Party
official in southern Iraq. In 2000 unknown persons killed the leader
of the Democratic Nationalist Union of Kurdistan, Sirbit Mahmud. In
July 2000, unknown assailants killed parliamentary deputy Osman Hassan.
Also in July 2000, PUK forces reportedly killed a number of members
of the Iraqi Communist Workers Party (IWCP), and KDP forces killed several
members of the Iraqi Turkmen Front (ITF). Neither the PUK nor the KDP
released information regarding investigations into the killings.
b. Disappearance
There continued to be widespread reports of widespread disappearances.
Hundreds still were missing in the aftermath of the brief Iraqi military
occupation of Erbil in August 1996. Many of these persons may have been
killed surreptitiously late in 1997 and throughout 1998, in the reported
"prison-cleansing" campaign (see Section 1.a.). Sources inside
the country reported the existence of special prison wards that hold
individuals whose whereabouts, status, and fate was not disclosed (see
Section 1.c.). The missing were primarily from the Kurd minority but
include members of the Assyrian, Turkmen, and Yazidi community. In August
AI reported that the Government has the world's worst record for numbers
of persons who have disappeared and remain unaccounted for. The whereabouts
of Hashem Hasan, a journalist and professor, who was arrested as he
attempted to leave the country in 1999, remained unknown at year's end
(see Section 2.a.).
The Government continued to ignore the more than 16,000 cases conveyed
to it in 1994 and 1995 by the U.N., as well as requests from the Governments
of Kuwait and Saudi Arabia to account for the whereabouts of those who
had disappeared during Iraq's 1990-91 occupation of Kuwait, and from
Iran regarding the whereabouts of prisoners of war that Iraq captured
in the 1980-88 Iran-Iraq war. The majority of the 16,496 cases known
to the Special Rapporteur are persons of Kurdish origin who disappeared
during the 1988 Anfal Campaign. The Special Rapporteur estimated that
the total number of Kurds who disappeared during that period could reach
several tens of thousands. Human Rights Watch (HRW) estimated the total
at between 70,000 and 150,000, and AI at more than 100,000. The second
largest group of cases known to the Special Rapporteur consists of Shi'a
Muslims who were reported to have disappeared in the late 1970's and
early 1980's as their families were expelled to Iran due to their alleged
Persian ancestry.
The Government failed to return, or account for, a large number of
Kuwaiti citizens and citizens of other countries who were detained during
the Iraqi occupation of Kuwait and continues to refuse to cooperate
with the Tripartite Commission to resolve the cases. Of 609 cases of
missing Kuwaiti citizens under review by the Tripartite Commission on
Gulf War Missing, only 3 have been resolved. The Government denies having
any knowledge of the others and claims that any relevant records were
lost in the aftermath of the Gulf War. In a December report to the U.N.
Security Council, the U.N. Secretary General criticized the Government's
refusal to cooperate with the U.N. on the issue of the missing Kuwaiti
citizens. Iran reports that the Government still has not accounted for
5,000 Iranian prisoners of war (POW's) missing since the Iran-Iraq War.
In 1997 and 1999, AI documented the repeated failure by the Government
to respond to requests for information about persons who have disappeared.
The report detailed numerous unresolved cases dating from the early
1980's through the mid-1990's. The report concludes that few victims
became targets of the Government because of any crime they had committed;
rather, they were arrested and held as hostages in order to force a
relative, who may have escaped abroad, to surrender. Others were arrested
because of their family's link to a political opponent or simply because
of their ethnic origin (see Sections 1.d. and 1.f.).
The Special Rapporteur and several human rights groups continued to
request that the Government provide information about the 1991 arrest
of the late Grand Ayatollah Abdul Qasim Al-Khoei and 108 of his associates.
The Ayatollah died while under house arrest in Al-Najaf. Other individuals
who were arrested with him have not been accounted for, and the Government
refuses to respond to queries regarding their status. Similarly, AI
identified a number of Ayatollah Sadeq Al-Sadr's aides who were arrested
in the weeks prior to his killing in February 1999 (see Sections 1.a.,
1.d., and 1.g.). Their whereabouts remained unknown. In its November
1999 report, AI identified eight aides of Al-Sadr who disappeared.
In addition to the tens of thousands of reported disappearances, human
rights groups reported during the year that the Government continued
to hold thousands of other citizens in incommunicado detention (see
Sections 1.c., 1.d., and 1.e.).
c. Torture and Other Cruel, Inhuman, or Degrading Treatment or Punishment
The Constitution prohibits torture; however, the security services
routinely and systematically tortured detainees. According to former
prisoners, torture techniques included branding, electric shocks administered
to the genitals and other areas, beating, pulling out of fingernails,
burning with hot irons and blowtorches, suspension from rotating ceiling
fans, dripping acid on the skin, rape, breaking of limbs, denial of
food and water, extended solitary confinement in dark and extremely
small compartments, and threats to rape or otherwise harm family members
and relatives. Evidence of such torture often was apparent when security
forces returned the mutilated bodies of torture victims to their families.
There were persistent reports that the families were made to pay for
the cost of executions. Refugees who arrived in Europe often reported
instances of torture to receiving governments, and displayed scars and
mutilations to substantiate their claims. In August AI released a report
entitled "Iraq: Systematic Torture of Political Prisoners,"
which detailed the systematic and routine use of torture against suspected
political opponents and, occasionally, other prisoners.
In May Saad Keis Naoman, an Iraqi soccer player who defected to Europe,
reported that he and his teammates were beaten and humiliated at the
order of Uday Saddam Hussein for poor performances. He was flogged until
his back was bloody, forcing him to sleep on his stomach in the tiny
cell in Al-Radwaniya prison in which he was jailed. His account supports
allegations made by Sharar Haydar Mohamad Al-Hadithi, a former Iraqi
international soccer player, who stated in August 1999 that he and his
teammates were tortured on Uday Hussein's orders for not winning matches.
In 2000 three soccer players who played for a team that lost an October
game in the Asian Cup quarter finals, reportedly were whipped and detained
for 3 days. In 1997 members of the national football team reportedly
were beaten and tortured on Uday's orders because of poor play in a
World Cup qualifying match.
The Special Rapporteur continued to receive reports that arrested persons
routinely were subjected to mistreatment, including prolonged interrogations
accompanied by torture, beatings, and various deprivations. For some
years, the Special Rapporteur has expressed concern about cruel and
unusual punishments prescribed by the law, including amputations and
brandings. In 2000 the authorities reportedly introduced tongue amputation
as a punishment for persons who criticize Saddam Hussein or his family,
and on July 17, government authorities reportedly amputated the tongue
of a person who allegedly criticized Saddam Hussein. Authorities reportedly
performed the amputation in front of a large crowd. Similar tongue amputations
also reportedly occurred in the city of Hilla during the year. The Government
never has acknowledged such reports, conducted any investigation, nor
taken action against those tortured prisoners.
Human rights organizations and opposition groups continued to receive
reports of women who suffered from severe psychological trauma after
being raped while in custody. Security forces also reportedly sexually
assaulted both government officials and opposition members in order
to blackmail them into compliance. Former Mukhabarat member Khalid Al-Janabi
reported that a Mukhabarat unit, the Technical Operations Directorate,
used rape and sexual assault in a systematic and institutionalized manner
for political purposes. The unit reportedly also videotaped the rape
of female relatives of suspected oppositionists and used the videotapes
for blackmail purposes and to ensure their future cooperation (see Section
1.f.).
The security forces allegedly raped women who were captured during
the Anfal Campaign and during the occupation of Kuwait. The Government
never has acknowledged these reports, conducted any investigation, nor
taken action against those who committed the rapes.
Prison conditions are extremely poor and life threatening. There reportedly
are numerous official, semiofficial, and private prisons throughout
the country. Overcrowding is a serious problem. In May 1998, Labor and
Social Affairs Minister Abdul Hamid Aziz Sabah stated in an interview
that "the prisons are filled to five times their capacity and the
situation is serious." Sabah was dismissed from his post after
the interview, and the government-owned daily newspaper Babel reiterated
the Government's long-standing claim that it holds virtually no prisoners.
It was unclear to what extent the mass executions committed pursuant
to the "prison cleansing" campaign have reduced overcrowding
(see Section 1.a.).
Certain prisons are infamous for routine mistreatment of detainees
and prisoners. Abu Ghurayb, Baladiat, Makasib, Rashidiya, Radwaniyah,
and other prisons reportedly have torture chambers. There are numerous
mentally ill prisoners at Al-Shamma'iya prison in Baghdad, which reportedly
is the site of torture and a number of disappearances. The Al-Radwaniyah
detention center is a former POW facility near Baghdad and reportedly
the site of torture as well as mass executions (see Section 1.a.).
In 2000 the Special Rapporteur reported receiving information about
two detention facilities in which prisoners are locked in metal boxes
the size of coffins that reportedly are opened for only 30 minutes each
day. A multistory underground detention and torture center reportedly
was built under the general military hospital building close to the
Al-Rashid military camp on the outskirts of Baghdad. The Center for
Human Rights of the Iraqi Communist Party stated that the complex includes
torture and execution chambers. A section reportedly is reserved for
prisoners in a "frozen" state--that is, those whose status,
fate, or whereabouts are not disclosed (see Section 1.b.).
Hundreds of Fayli (Shi'a) Kurds and other citizens of Iranian origin,
who had disappeared in the early 1980's during the Iran-Iraq war, reportedly
were being held incommunicado at the Abu Ghurayb prison.
In 2000 the Iraqi Communist Party reported that 13 prisoners died at
Makaseb detention center in December 1999 and January 2000 as a result
of torture and poor prison conditions. The 13 prisoners reportedly were
among the Shi'a detained in the aftermath of the protests following
the February 1999 assassination of Sheik Al-Sadr (see Section 1.g.).
In August 2000, the ICP reported that three political prisoners died
from illnesses contracted in Abu Ghurayb prison. The prisoners reportedly
were denied medical treatment.
The Government does not permit visits by human rights monitors.
Iraqi Kurdish regional officials reported in 2000 that prisons in the
three northern provinces were open to the International Committee for
the Red Cross (ICRC) and other international monitors. According to
the ICRC, regular and consistent improvement in conditions was observed
on their weekly prison visits to declared prisons. However, both the
PUK and the KDP reportedly maintain private, undeclared prisons, and
both groups reportedly deny access to ICRC officials. There were reports
that authorities of both the PUK and KDP tortured detainees and prisoners.
d. Arbitrary Arrest, Detention, or Exile
The Constitution and the Legal Code explicitly prohibit arbitrary arrest
and detention; however, the authorities routinely engaged in these practices.
The Special Rapporteur continued to receive reports of widespread arbitrary
arrest and detention, often for long periods of time, without access
to a lawyer or the courts. As indicated in the November 1999 AI report,
"Iraq: Victims of Systematic Repression," many thousands of
persons have been arrested arbitrarily in the last few years because
of suspected opposition activities or because they were related to persons
sought by the authorities. Those arrested often were taken away by plainclothes
security agents, who offered no explanation and produced no warrant
to the person or family members (see Section 1.f.). The authorities
deny detainees legal representation and visits by family members. In
most cases, family members do not know the whereabouts of detainees
and do not make inquiries due to fear of reprisal. Many persons are
taken away in front of family members, who hear nothing further until
days, months, or years later, when they are told to retrieve the often-mutilated
corpse of their relative. There also were reports of the widespread
practice of holding family members and close associates responsible
for the alleged actions of others (see Section 1.f.).
In July the Government initiated an arrest and detention campaign involving
thousands of individuals who initially had volunteered to serve in the
newly formed Al-Quds militia force, but who had not shown up for training.
Mass arbitrary arrests and detentions often occurred in areas in which
antigovernment leaflets were distributed. In June the Coalition for
Justice in Iraq reported that the Government arrested dozens of lawyers
and jurists for distributing antigovernment leaflets. The leaflets reportedly
indicated the authors' intent to expose the Government's violations
of human rights. Security forces arrested hundreds of persons in al-Najaf,
Karbala, and the Shi'a section of Baghdad following an anonymous distribution
of antigovernment leaflets in 2000. Other arrests have no apparent basis.
In September the Government arrested and expelled six U.N. humanitarian
workers and refused to provide any evidence as a basis for its actions
(see Section 1.g.).
According to international human rights groups, numerous foreigners
arrested arbitrarily in previous years also remained in detention.
The Government reportedly targeted the Shi'a Muslim community for arbitrary
arrest and other abuses. For example, in May the Government reportedly
executed two Shi'a clerics, Abdulsattar Abed-Ibrahim al-Mausawi and
Ahmad al-Hashemi, for claiming that the Government was involved in the
killing of a Shi'a cleric in 1999 and the killings of four engineers
from the Electricity Board for receiving bribes. In the weeks preceding
the February 1999 killing of Ayatollah Sadeq Al-Sadr and two of his
sons, many of Al-Sadr's aides were arrested, and their whereabouts still
were unknown at year's end (see Sections 1.a., 1.b., and 1.g.). Hundreds
more reportedly were arrested and the houses of many demolished in the
weeks following the killing (see Section 1.g.).
Hundreds of Fayli (Shi'a) Kurds and other citizens of Iranian origin,
who had disappeared in the early 1980's during the Iran-Iraq war, reportedly
were being held incommunicado at the Abu Ghurayb prison. According to
a report received by the Special Rapporteur in 1998, such persons have
been detained without charge for close to 2 decades in extremely harsh
conditions. The report states that many of the detainees were used as
subjects in the country's outlawed experimental chemical and biological
weapons programs.
Although no statistics were available, observers estimated the number
of political detainees to be in the tens of thousands, some of whom
have been held for decades.
In May the press reported that the authorities released 3,000 prisoners
who paid bribes to prison officials to have their prison terms cut.
One former prisoner said his family paid approximately $3,125 (5 million
Iraqi Dinars) for him to be released after serving 7 years of his original
15-year sentence.
The Government announced in June 1999 a general amnesty for citizens
who had left the country illegally or were exiled officially for a specified
period of time but failed to return after the period of exile expired
(see Section 2.d.). No citizens are known to have returned to the country
based upon this amnesty. An estimated 1 to 2 million self-exiled citizens
reportedly remain fearful of returning to the country.
The PUK and the KDP reportedly hold some political prisoners and detainees
in the north of the country. The KDP and PUK reached agreement for the
mutual release of political prisoners in 1999. In March 2000, the KDP
released 10 PUK prisoners and the PUK released 5 KDP prisoners (see
Section 1.g.). During the year, PUK and KDP officials reported that
all remaining PUK and KDP political prisoners and detainees had been
exchanged per the agreement.
e. Denial of Fair Public Trial
The judiciary is not independent, and there is no check on the President's
power to override any court decision. In 1999 the Special Rapporteur
and international human rights groups observed that the repressive nature
of the political and legal systems precludes the rule of law. Numerous
laws facilitate continued repression, and the Government uses extrajudicial
methods to extract confessions or coerce cooperation.
There are two parallel judicial systems: the regular courts, which
try common criminal offenses; and the special security courts, which
generally try national security cases but also may try criminal cases.
In addition to the Court of Appeal, there is the Court of Cassation,
which is the highest court.
Special security courts have jurisdiction in all cases involving espionage
and treason, peaceful political dissent, smuggling, currency exchange
violations, and drug trafficking. According to the Special Rapporteur
and other sources, military officers or civil servants with no legal
training head these tribunals, which hear cases in secret. Authorities
often hold defendants incommunicado and do not permit contact with lawyers
(see Section 1.d.). The courts admit confessions extracted by torture,
which often served as the basis for conviction (see Section 1.c.). Many
cases appear to end in summary execution, although defendants may appeal
to the President for clemency. Saddam Hussein may grant clemency in
any case that suits his political goals or personal predilection. There
are no Shari'a (Islamic law) courts; however, regular courts are empowered
to administer Shari'a in cases involving personal status, such as divorce
and inheritance.
Procedures in the regular courts in theory provide for many protections;
however, the Government often assigns to the security courts cases that,
on their legal merits, would appear to fall under the jurisdiction of
the regular courts. Trials in the regular courts are public, and defendants
are entitled to counsel, at government expense in the case of indigents.
Defense lawyers have the right to review the charges and evidence brought
against their clients. There is no jury system; panels of three judges
try cases. Defendants have the right to appeal to the Court of Appeal
and then to the Court of Cassation.
The Government shields certain groups from prosecution for alleged
crimes. For example, a 1990 decree grants immunity to men who commit
"honor crimes," a violent assault with intent to commit murder
against a women by a relative for her perceived immodest behavior or
alleged sexual misconduct (see Section 5). A 1992 decree grants immunity
from prosecution to members of the Ba'th Party and security forces who
killed anyone while in pursuit of army deserters. Unconfirmed but widespread
reports indicate that this decree has been applied to prevent trials
or punishment of government officials.
It was difficult to estimate the number of political prisoners, because
the Government rarely acknowledges arrests or imprisonments, and families
are afraid to talk about arrests. Many of the tens of thousands of persons
who disappeared or were killed in the past few years originally were
held as political prisoners.
Both the PUK-and the KDP-controlled local administrations maintain
separate judicial systems. They use the Iraqi legal code. Both come
under a separate Supreme Court of Cassation. During the year, PUK and
KDP officials reported that all PUK and KDP political prisoners and
detainees had been exchanged in accordance with a 1999 agreement. However,
the PUK and the KDP reportedly continued to hold some political prisoners
and detainees (see Section 1.d.).
f. Arbitrary Interference With Privacy, Family, Home, or Correspondence
The Government frequently infringed on citizens' constitutional right
to privacy, particularly in cases allegedly involving national security.
The law defines security offenses so broadly that authorities effectively
are exempt from the legal requirement to obtain search warrants, and
searches without warrants are commonplace. The Government routinely
ignored constitutional provisions designed to protect the confidentiality
of mail, telegraphic correspondence, and telephone conversations. The
Government periodically jammed news broadcasts from outside the country,
including those of opposition groups (see Section 2.a.). The security
services and the Ba'th Party maintain pervasive networks of informers
to deter dissident activity and instill fear in the public.
The authorities continued systematically to detain, abuse, and kill
family members and close associates of alleged government opponents
(see Sections 1.a., 1.b., 1.d., and 1.g.). For example, in May the authorities
reportedly tortured to death the mother of three defectors because of
her children's opposition activities. In June 2000, a former general
reportedly received a videotape of security forces raping a female family
member. He subsequently received a telephone call from an intelligence
agent who stated that another female relative was being held and warned
him to stop speaking out against the Government.
In November 1999, the Government expelled more than 4,000 families
that had sought refuge in Baghdad after the 1991 Gulf War.
The Government continues its Arabization campaign of ethnic cleansing
designed to harass and expel ethnic Kurds and Turkmen from government-controlled
areas. According to press reports and opposition sources, the Government
has displaced forcibly hundreds of families. As in previous years, the
regime periodically sealed off entire districts in Kirkuk and conducted
day-long, house-to-house searches (see Sections 2.d. and 5). Government
officials also took hostage members of minority groups to intimidate
their families into leaving their home regions (see Sections 1.d., 2.d.,
and 5).
In the past, the authorities demolished the houses and detained and
executed family members of Shi'a who protested government actions (see
Section 1.g.).
The Special Rapporteur noted that guilt by association is facilitated
by administrative requirements imposed on relatives of deserters or
other perceived opponents of the Government. For example, relatives
who do not report deserters may lose their ration cards for purchasing
government-controlled food supplies, be evicted from their residences,
or face the arrest of other family members. The Supreme Council for
the Islamic Revolution in Iraq reported in October and December 1999
that authorities denied food ration cards to families that failed to
send their young sons to the "Lion Cubs of Saddam" compulsory
weapons training camps (see Section 5). Conscripts are required to secure
a guarantor to sign a document stating that the named conscript would
not desert military service and that the guarantor would accept personal
responsibility if the conscript deserted.
The Special Security Office reportedly continued efforts to intimidate
the relatives of opposition members. Relatives of citizens outside the
country who were suspected of sympathizing with the opposition were
forced to call the suspected opposition members to warm them against
participating in opposition conferences or activities.
g. Use of Excessive Force and Violations of Humanitarian Law In Internal
Conflicts
The authorities continued to detain, abuse, and kill family members
and close associates of alleged government opponents (see Sections 1.a.,
1.b., and 1.f.). The Government has continued a campaign of intimidation
directed at U.N. and nongovernmental organization (NGO) relief workers.
In February the Foreign Minister threatened to break off official ties
to U.N. workers supervising Oil-for-Food Program distribution in northern
Iraq, and to revoke their visas and deport them. In September the Government
expelled six U.N. humanitarian relief workers without providing any
explanation.
The Government continued to "Arabize" certain Kurdish areas,
such as the urban centers of Kirkuk and Mosul, through the forced movement
of local residents from their homes and villages and their replacement
by Arabs from outside the area (see Sections 2.d. and 5).
Landmines in the north, mostly planted by the Government before 1991,
continued to kill and maim civilians. Many of the mines were laid during
the Iran-Iraq and Gulf Wars; however, the army failed to clear them
before it abandoned the area. Landmines also are a problem along the
Iraq-Iran border throughout the central and southern areas in the country.
There is no information regarding civilian casualties or the Government's
efforts, if any, to clear old mine fields in areas under the central
Government's control. According to reports by the U.N. Office of Project
Services, the Mines Advisory Group, and Norwegian Peoples' Aid, landmines
have killed more than 3,000 persons in the three northern governates
since the 1991 uprising. The Special Rapporteur repeatedly has reminded
the Government of its obligation under the Landmines Protocol to protect
civilians from the effects of mines. Various NGO's continued efforts
to remove landmines from the area and increase awareness of mines among
local residents.
In December 1998, the Government declared that mine-clearing activity
was subversive and ordered NGO workers performing such activity to leave
the country. In April 1999, a New Zealander working for the U.N. mine-clearing
program in the north was shot and killed at close range by an unknown
assailant. The KDP arrested a person who claimed to have killed the
U.N. worker on behalf of Saddam Hussein's Fedayeen. In April Kurd sources
accused the Government of exploding a bomb near an NGO working on mine
clearing in the north.
Following the February 1999 killing of Ayatollah Mohammad Sadeq Al-Sadr
and his sons (see Section 1.a.), there were widespread reports of military
assaults on protesters in areas of Baghdad heavily populated by Shi'a,
and in cities with a Shi'a majority such as Karbala, Nasiriyah, Najaf,
and Basra, in which hundreds of persons were killed. While a funeral
for Al-Sadr was prohibited, spontaneous gatherings of mourners took
place in the days after his death. Government security forces used excessive
force in breaking up these illegal gatherings, killing hundreds of persons.
In 2000 authorities continued to target alleged supporters of Al-Sadr.
In February 2000, security officials reportedly executed 30 religious
school students who had been arrested after Al-Sadr's killing. In March
2000, numerous Shi'a who fled the country in 1999 and 2000, told HRW
that security forces interrogated, detained, and tortured them. In May
2000, six additional students who were arrested following the killing
were sentenced to death.
In 1999 and 2000, as a reprisal for the disturbances following Al-Sadr's
killing, the Government expelled approximately 4,000 Shi'a families
from Baghdad.
After the 1991 Gulf War, victims and eyewitnesses described war crimes
perpetrated by the Government, including deliberate killing, torture,
rape, pillage, and hostage-taking. HRW and other organizations have
worked with various governments to bring a genocide case at the International
Court of Justice against the Government for its conduct of the Anfal
campaign against the Kurds in 1988.
No hostilities were reported between the two major Iraqi Kurdish parties
in de facto control of northern Iraq. The KDP and the PUK agreed in
September 1998 to unify their administrations; however, little progress
was made at the time toward implementing the agreement. In October 1999,
senior officials from the two parties agreed on a series of measures,
including prisoner exchanges, the return of internally displaced persons
(IDP's) to their homes, and arrangements for freedom of movement between
their respective areas. Most of the measures were not implemented (see
Section 1.d.). However, during the year, the two main Kurdish parties
reported some progress toward full implementation of the Washington
Agreement, including the return of 3,000 IDP's displaced since the 1995-96
fighting, improved movement between the Kurd-controlled areas, and the
exchange of all prisoners.
Armed hostilities, which resulted in deaths were reported between the
PUK and Islamic Groups, the PUK and the Kurdistan Workers Party (PKK),
and the KDP and the PKK. The heaviest fighting began in September, when
a newly created Islamist group, the Jund al-Islam, seized control of
some villages near the Iranian border and attempted to institute a strictly
Islamic theocratic regime. According to press and opposition reporting,
the Jun al-Islam attacked PUK fighters near Halabjah, killing dozens
of persons. Intermittent fighting between the PUK, and the Jund al-Islam,
and other Islamic groups continued until late November, when an agreement
between those involved and the Iranian Government dissolved the Jund
al-Islam and imposed a cease-fire.
In July 2000, the PUK reportedly ordered all opposition groups to move
their offices out of Sulaymaniah's city center following a number of
bombings; the IWCP reportedly refused to move. PUK security forces subsequently
killed at least six IWCP members and arrested several others at an IWCP
office in Sulaymaniah. PUK forces also killed several IWCP members who
were inside a car. In connection with this dispute, the PUK closed the
IWCP-affiliated Independent Women's Organization and the Women's Protection
Center in July 2000 and detained temporarily 12 women who had been staying
at an abused women's shelter within the Center. The PUK announced that
it would investigate the security forces' actions; however, no information
was available by year's end.
There were no Turkish military invasions into the country during the
year.
Section 2 Respect for Civil Liberties, Including:
a. Freedom of Speech and Press
The Constitution provides for freedom of speech and of the press "in
compliance with the revolutionary, national, and progressive trend;"
however, in practice the Government does not permit freedom of speech
or of the press, and does not tolerate political dissent in areas under
its control. In November 2000, the U.N. General Assembly criticized
the Government's "suppression of freedom of thought, expression,
information, association, and assembly." The Special Rapporteur
stated in October 1999 that citizens lived "in a climate of fear,"
in which whatever they said or did, particularly in the area of politics,
involved "the risk of arrest and interrogation by the police or
military intelligence." He noted that "the mere suggestion
that someone is not a supporter of the President carries the prospect
of the death penalty." In June the Human Rights Alliance reported
that the Government had killed more than 500 journalists and other intellectuals
in the past decade.
The Ministry of Culture and Information periodically held meetings
at which they issued general guidelines for the press. Foreign journalists
must work from offices located within the ministry building and are
accompanied everywhere they go by ministry officers, who reportedly
restrict their movements and make it impossible for them to interact
freely with citizens.
The Government, the Ba'th Party, or persons close to Saddam Hussein
own all print and broadcast media, and operate them as propaganda outlets.
They generally do not report opposing points of view that are expressed
either domestically or abroad. A 1999 Freedom House report rated press
freedom in the country at 98 out of a possible 100 points, with 0 being
the most free and 100 being the most controlled. Several statutes and
decrees suppress freedom of speech and of the press, including: Revolutionary
Command Council Decree Number 840 of 1986, which penalizes free expression
and stipulates the death penalty for anyone insulting the President
or other high government officials; Section 214 of the Penal Code, which
prohibits singing a song likely to cause civil strife; and the 1968
Press Act, which prohibits the writing of articles on 12 specific subjects,
including those detrimental to the President, the Revolutionary Command
Council, and the Ba'th Party. In February opposition press reported
that the Government added the penalty of cutting out the tongue of anyone
who ridiculed the President. There were several reports during the year
that the penalty was imposed on citizens (see Section 1.e.).
Each reporter must inform a security officer regarding the nature of
news intended for the foreign media, and intelligence officers screen
broadcasts before they are aired. In September the Government threatened
to fire any journalist who issued a report detrimental to national security.
In September 1999, Hashem Hasan, a journalist and Baghdad University
professor, was arrested after declining an appointment as editor of
one of Uday Hussein's publications. The Paris-based Reporters Sans Frontieres
(RSF) sent a letter of appeal to Uday Hussein; however, Hassan's fate
and whereabouts remained unknown at year's end (see Section 1.b.).
According to the Special Rapporteur, journalists are under continuous
pressure to join the Ba'th party and must follow the mandates of the
Iraqi Union of Journalists, headed by Uday Hussein. According to Iraqi
sources, in 1999 Uday Hussein dismissed hundreds of union members who
had not praised Saddam Hussein and the Government sufficiently or often
enough (see Section 6.a.).
The Government regularly jams foreign news broadcasts (see Section
1.f.). Satellite dishes, modems, and fax machines are banned, although
some restrictions reportedly were lifted in 1999. Government-controlled
areas have only two terrestrial television channels, the official Iraq
Television and Youth TV, owned by Uday Saddam Hussein. The Information
Ministry announced a plan to make limited satellite television service
available, offering eight channels at a cost of $33 to $38 (10,000 to
12,000 dinars) per month, twice the average wage of a government employee.
In September Uday Hussein reportedly had assumed control of the satellite
television service.
Books may be published only with the authorization of the Ministry
of Culture and Information. The Ministry of Education often sends textbooks
with progovernment propaganda to Kurdish regions; however, Kurds routinely
remove propaganda items from such textbooks.
The Government does not respect academic freedom and exercises strict
control over academic publications and foreign travel by academics.
University staff are hired and fired depending on their support for
the Government.
In the north, many independent newspapers have appeared over the past
8 years, as have opposition radio and television broadcasts. The absence
of central authority permits significant freedom of expression, including
criticism of the regional Kurdish authorities; however, most journalists
are influenced or controlled by various political organizations. Satellite
services and related equipment for telephone, fax, Internet, and television
services are available. Although the rival Kurdish parties in the north,
the PUK and KDP, state that full press freedom is allowed in areas under
their respective control, in practice neither effectively permits distribution
of the opposing group's newspapers and other literature.
The Internet was available widely through Internet cafes in major urban
centers in Kurdish-controlled areas. In government-operated Internet
cafes, users only are permitted to view Web sites provided by the Ministry
of Culture and Information. The regional authorities did not try to
limit access to preapproved web sites; however, they often monitored
web usage by individuals.
b. Freedom of Peaceful Assembly and Association
The Constitution provides for freedom of assembly; however, the Government
restricted this right in practice. Citizens may not assemble legally
other than to express support for the Government. The Government regularly
orchestrated crowds to demonstrate support for the Government and its
policies through financial incentives for those who participate and
threats of violence against those who do not.
The Constitution provides for freedom of association; however, the
Government restricts this right in practice. The Government controls
the establishment of political parties, regulates their internal affairs,
and monitors their activities. New political parties must be based in
Baghdad and are prohibited from having any ethnic or religious character.
The political magazine Alef-Be, which is published by the Ministry of
Culture and Information, reported in December 1999 that two political
groups would not be permitted to form parties because they had an insufficient
number of members. The magazine reprinted the conditions necessary to
establish political parties, which include the requirement that a political
group must have at least 150 members over the age of 25. A 1999 law
also stipulates that new parties must "take pride" in the
1958 and 1968 revolutions, which created the republic and brought the
Ba'th party to power. Several parties are outlawed specifically, and
membership in them is a capital offense (see Section 3). The law prescribes
the death penalty for anyone "infiltrating" the Ba'th Party.
In the Kurdish-controlled north, numerous political parties and social
and cultural organizations exist. The KDP-and PUK-controlled administrations
impose restrictions on some political parties and groups they consider
security risks, or that refuse to register as political parties or to
participate in local elections. The PUK and KDP have forced political
parties that violate these rules to shut down. Neither the KDP nor PUK
allow the other group to open party offices in territory under their
control; however, they do allow other political parties to operate in
those territories and include them in their administrations.
c. Freedom of Religion
The Constitution provides for freedom of religion provided that it
does not violate "morality and public order;" however, the
Government severely limited freedom of religion in practice. Islam is
the official state religion.
The Ministry of Endowments and Religious Affairs monitors places of
worship, appoints the clergy, approves the building and repair of all
places of worship, and approves the publication of all religious literature.
More than 95 percent of the population are Muslim. The (predominantly
Arab) Shi'a Muslims constitute a 60 to 65 percent majority, while Sunni
Muslims make up 32 to 37 percent (approximately 18 to 20 percent are
Sunni Kurds, 13 to 16 percent are Sunni Arabs, and the rest are Sunni
Turkmens). The remaining approximately 5 percent consist of Christians
(Assyrians, Chaldeans, Roman Catholics, and Armenian Orthodox), Yazidis,
and a small number of Jews and Mandaeans.
The Government does not recognize political organizations that have
been formed by Shi'a Muslims or Assyrian Christians. These groups continued
to attract support despite their illegal status. There are religious
qualifications for government office; candidates for the National Assembly,
for example, "must believe in God" (see Section 3).
Although Shi'a Arabs are the largest religious group, Sunni Arabs traditionally
have dominated economic and political life. Sunni Arabs are at a distinct
advantage in all areas of secular life, including civil, political,
military, and economic. Shi'a and Sunni Arabs are not distinct ethnically.
Shi'a Arabs have supported an independent country alongside Sunni Arabs
since the 1920 Revolt, many joined the Ba'th Party, and Shi'a formed
the core of the army in the 1980-88 Iran-Iraq War.
The Government has for decades conducted a brutal campaign of murder,
summary execution, and protracted arbitrary arrest against the religious
leaders and followers of the majority Shi'a Muslim population (See Sections
1.a., 1.d., and 1.g.). Despite nominal legal protection of religious
equality, the Government has repressed severely the Shi'a clergy and
those who follow the Shi'a faith. Forces from the Mukhabarat, General
Security (Amn Al-Amm), the Military Bureau, Saddam's Commandos (Fedayeen
Saddam), and the Ba'th Party have killed senior Shi'a clerics, desecrated
Shi'a mosques and holy sites, and interfered with Shi'a religious education.
Security agents reportedly are stationed at all the major Shi'a mosques
and shrines and search, harass, and arbitrarily arrest worshipers.
The following government restrictions on religious rights remained
in effect during the year: Restrictions and outright bans on communal
Friday prayer by Shi'a Muslims; restrictions on the loaning of books
by Shi'a mosque libraries; a ban on the broadcast of Shi'a programs
on government-controlled radio or television; a ban on the publication
of Shi'a books, including prayer books and guides; a ban on funeral
processions other than those organized by the Government; a ban on other
Shi'a funeral observances such as gatherings for Koran reading; and
the prohibition of certain processions and public meetings that commemorate
Shi'a holy days. Shi'a groups report that they captured documents from
the security services during the 1991 uprising that listed thousands
of forbidden Shi'a religious writings.
In June 1999, several Shi'a opposition groups reported that the Government
instituted a program in the predominantly Shi'a districts of Baghdad
that used food ration cards to restrict where individuals could pray.
The ration cards, part of the U.N. oil-for-food program, reportedly
are checked when the bearer enters a mosque and are printed with a notice
of severe penalties for those who attempt to pray at an unauthorized
location.
Shi'a groups reported numerous instances of religious scholars being
subjected to arrest, assault, and harassment in the past several years,
particularly in the internationally renowned Shi'a academic center of
Najaf. In 2000 AI reported that the Government deported systematically
tens of thousands of Shi'a (both Arabs and Kurds) to Iran in the late
1970's and early 1980's, on the basis that they were of Persian descent.
According to Shi'a sources, religious scholars and Shi'a merchants who
supported the schools financially were the principal targets for deportation.
After the 1991 popular uprising, the Government relaxed some restrictions
on Shi'a attending the schools. However, the revival of the schools
appears to have exceeded greatly the Government's expectations, and
led to an increased government crackdown on the Shi'a religious establishment,
including the requirement that speeches by imams in mosques be based
upon government-provided material that attacked fundamentalist trends.
Authorities continued to target alleged supporters of Grand Ayatollah
Al-Sadr during the year (see Sections 1.a. and 1.g.). The Government
neither acknowledged nor investigated the reported arrest and execution
in February and May 2000 of 36 religious school students.
The Government consistently politicizes and interferes with religious
pilgrimages, both of Iraqi Muslims who wish to make the Hajj to Mecca
and Medina and of Iraqi and non-Iraqi Muslim pilgrims who travel to
holy sites within the country (see Section 2.d.). For example, in 1998
the U.N. Sanctions Committee offered to disburse vouchers for travel
and expenses to pilgrims making the Hajj; however, the Government rejected
this offer. In 1999 the Sanctions Committee offered to disburse funds
to cover Hajj-related expenses via a neutral third party; the Government
again rejected the offer. Following the December 1999 passage of U.N.
Security Council Resolution 1284, the Sanctions Committee again sought
to devise a protocol to facilitate the payment for individuals making
the journey. The Sanctions Committee proposed to issue $250 in cash
and $1,750 in travelers checks to each individual pilgrim to be distributed
at the U.N. office in Baghdad in the presence of both U.N. and Iraqi
officials. The Government again declined and, consequently, no Iraqi
pilgrims were able to take advantage of the available funds or, in 2000,
of the permitted flights. The Government continued to insist that these
funds would be accepted only if they were paid in cash to the government-controlled
central bank, not to the Hajj pilgrims.
Twice each year--on the 10th day of the Muslim month of Muharram and
40 days later in the month of Safar--Shi'a pilgrims from throughout
the country and around the world travel to the Iraqi city of Karbala
to commemorate the death there centuries ago of the Imam Hussein. The
Government for several decades has interfered with these Ashura commemorations
by preventing processions on foot into the city. In 1998 and 1999, violent
incidents were reported between Iraqi pilgrims on one side and Ba'th
party members and security forces enforcing the ban on the other. In
2000 security forces opened fire on persons who attempted to walk from
Al-Najaf to Karbala (see Section 1.g.). During the year, there were
no reports of violence during the pilgrimage; however, the Government
reportedly imposed travel restrictions.
The Government also has sought to undermine the identity of minority
Christian (Assyrian and Chaldean) and Yazidi groups.
The Special Rapporteur and others reported that the Government has
engaged in various abuses against the country's 350,000 Assyrian and
Chaldean Christians, especially in terms of forced movements from northern
areas and repression of political rights (see Section 2.d.). Most Assyrians
live in the northern governates, and the Government often has accused
them of collaborating with Iraqi Kurds. In the north, Kurdish groups
often refer to Assyrians as Kurdish Christians. Military forces destroyed
numerous Assyrian churches during the 1988 Anfal Campaign and reportedly
tortured and executed many Assyrians. Both major Kurdish political parties
have indicated that the Government occasionally targets Assyrians, as
well as ethnic Kurds and Turkmens, in expulsions from Kirkuk in order
to attempt to Arabize the city (see Section 2.d.).
The Government imposes repressive measures on Yazidis (see Section
5).
d. Freedom of Movement Within the Country, Foreign Travel, Emigration,
and Repatriation
The Government restricts movement within the country of citizens and
foreigners. Police checkpoints are common on major roads and highways.
Persons who enter sensitive border areas and numerous designated security
zones are subject to arrest.
The Government requires citizens to obtain specific government authorization
and expensive exit visas for foreign travel. Citizens may not make more
than two trips abroad annually. Before traveling abroad, citizens are
required to post collateral, which is refundable only upon their return.
There are restrictions on the amount of currency that may be taken out
of the country. Women are not permitted to travel outside the country
alone; male relatives must escort them (see Section 5). Prior to December
1999, every student who wished to travel abroad was required to provide
a guarantor who would be liable if the student failed to return. In
December 1999, authorities banned all travel for students (including
those in grade school), canceled spring and summer holidays, and enrolled
students in compulsory military training and weapons-use courses.
In an apparent effort to convince citizens living abroad to return
to the country, government radio announced in June 1999 an amnesty for
teachers who left the country illegally after the Gulf War. Shortly
thereafter the Revolutionary Command Council decreed a general amnesty
for all citizens who either had left the country illegally or who had
failed to return after the period of exile had expired (see Section
1.d.). In October 1999, Justice Minster Shabib Al-Maliki announced that
authorities may seize assets belonging to citizens living outside the
country who did not return in response to the amnesty decree. A special
ministerial committee was formed to track and monitor citizens inside
the country who received money from relatives living abroad.
A November 1999 law provides for additional penalties for citizens
who attempt to leave the country illegally. Under the law, a prison
term of up to 10 years and "confiscation of movable and immovable
property" is to be imposed on anyone who attempts to leave illegally.
Similar penalties face anyone found to encourage or assist persons banned
from travel, including health care professionals, engineers, and university
professors. In 2000 the director of the Real Estate Registration Department
stated that pursuant to the decree, the Government confiscated the property
of a number of persons.
The Government restricts foreign travel by journalists, authors, university
professors, doctors, scientists, and all employees of the Ministry of
Information. Security authorities interrogate all media employees, journalists,
and writers upon their return from foreign travel.
The Government consistently politicizes and interferes with religious
pilgrimages, both of Muslim citizens who wish to make the Hajj to Mecca
and Medina and of citizen and noncitizen Muslim pilgrims to holy sites
in the country (see Section 2.c.).
Foreign spouses of citizens who have resided in the country for 5 years
(1 year for spouses of government employees) are required to apply for
naturalization as citizens. Many foreigners thus become subject to travel
restrictions. The penalties for noncompliance include, but are not limited
to, loss of the spouse's job, a substantial financial penalty, and repayment
of any governmental educational expenses. The Government prevents many
citizens who also hold citizenship in another country, especially the
children of Iraqi fathers and foreign-born mothers, from visiting the
country of their other nationality.
The U.N. Secretary General estimated that there are more than 500,000
IDP's remaining in the 3 northern provinces (Arbil, Dohuk, and Sulaymaniah),
most of whom fled government-controlled areas in early 1991 during the
uprising that followed the Gulf War. The Government continued its Arabization
policy by discriminating against and forcibly relocating the non-Arab
population, including Kurds, Turkmens, and Assyrians living in Kirkuk,
Khanaqin, Sinjar, Makhmour, Tuz, Khoramatu, and other districts. Most
observers view the policy as an attempt to decrease the proportion of
non-Arab citizens in the oil-rich Kirkuk region, and thereby secure
Arab demographic control of the area.
Non-Arab citizens are forced to either change their ethnicity on their
identity documents and adopt Arabic names or be expelled to the Kurd-controlled
northern governates. Persons may avoid expulsion if they relinquish
their Kurdish, Turkmen, or Assyrian identity and register as Arabs.
Persons who refuse to relinquish their identity may have their assets
expropriated and their ration cards withdrawn prior to being deported.
The Revolutionary Command Council has mandated that new housing and
employment be created for Arab residents who have been resettled in
Kirkuk, while new construction or renovation of Kurd-owned property
reportedly is prohibited. Non-Arabs may not sell their homes, except
to Arabs, nor register or inherit property. Authorities estimate that
since 1991, more than 100,000 persons have been displaced as part of
the Arabization program.
According to numerous deportees in the north, the Government generally
uses a systematic procedure to evict and deport non-Arab citizens. Frequently,
a security force official demands that a family change its ethnicity
from Kurdish or Turkmen to Arab. Subsequently, security officials frequently
arrest the head of household and inform the other family members that
the person will be imprisoned until they agree to settle elsewhere in
the country. Such families frequently choose to move to the north; family
members must sign a form that states that the departure is voluntary
and they are not allowed to take any property or their food ration cards
issued under the U.N. oil-for-food program. The Government frequently
transfers the families' houses to Arab Ba'th Party members.
Those expelled are not permitted to return. The Special Rapporteur
reported in 1999 that citizens who provide employment, food, or shelter
to returning or newly arriving Kurds are subject to arrest. The Government
denies that it expels non-Arab families.
According to the U.N. High Commissioner for Refugees (UNHCR), hundreds
of thousands of Iraqi refugees remained abroad. Apart from those suspected
of sympathizing with Iran, most fled after the Government's suppression
of the civil uprising of 1991; others are Kurds who fled during the
Anfal Campaign of 1988. Of the 1.5 million refugees who fled following
the 1991 uprisings, the great majority, particularly Kurds, have repatriated
themselves in northern areas outside of government control.
The Government does not cooperate with the UNHCR, does not provide
first asylum, and does not respect the rights of refugees.
Approximately 12,000 Turkish Kurds who have fled civil strife in southeastern
Turkey remain in northern areas controlled by the central Government.
The UNHCR is treating such displaced persons as refugees until it reaches
an official determination of their status.
During the year, the KDP and PUK reiterated their September 1998 agreement
to begin returning to their rightful homes the many thousands of persons
each side had expelled as a result of intra-Kurdish fighting in the
three northern provinces. In June the first 70 families were returned.
In April 2000, the UNHCR noted that displaced persons still were living
in tents or in open, unheated buildings (see Section 1.g.).
In August 1999, the KDP reportedly imposed a blockade on eight Assyrian
villages near Aqra. Some sources indicated that KDP forces reportedly
reentered one of the villages a couple of days later, rounded up the
villagers, and publicly beat two of them. The KDP denied that the blockade
or village raids occurred.
Section 3 Respect for Political Rights: The Right of Citizens to Change
Their Government
Citizens do not have the right to change their government. The President
wields power over all instruments of government. Most important officials
either are members of Saddam Hussein's family or are family allies from
his hometown of Tikrit. Although the Government has taken steps to increase
the perception of democracy, the political process still is controlled
firmly by the State. The 1995 so-called referendum on Saddam Hussein's
presidency was not free and was dismissed as a sham by most international
observers. It included neither voter privacy nor opposing candidates,
and many credible reports indicated that voters feared possible reprisal
if they cast a dissenting vote. A total of 500 persons reportedly were
arrested in Karbala, Baghdad, and Ramadi provinces for casting negative
ballots, and a member of the intelligence services reportedly was executed
for refusing to vote for the President.
There are strict qualifications for parliamentary candidates; by law
the candidates for the National Assembly must be over 25 years old and
"believe in God, the principles of the July 17-30 revolution, and
socialism." Elections for the National Assembly were held in March
2000; 220 of the 250 parliamentary seats were contested and presidential
appointees filled the 30 remaining seats. Out of the 250 seats, members
of the Ba'th reportedly won 165 seats, independents won 55, and 30 were
appointed by Saddam Hussein to represent the northern provinces. According
to the Special Rapporteur, the Ba'th Party allegedly instructed a number
of its members to run as nominally independent candidates. Saddam Hussein's
son Uday was elected to the National Assembly by receiving 99.9 percent
of the vote.
Full political participation at the national level is restricted to
members of the Arab Ba'th Socialist Party, who are estimated to constitute
approximately 8 percent of the population. The political system is dominated
by the Party, which governs through the Revolutionary Command Council.
President Saddam Hussein heads the council. However, the RCC exercises
both executive and legislative authority. The RCC dominates the National
Assembly, which is completely subordinate to it and the executive branch.
Opposition political organizations are illegal and severely suppressed.
Membership in certain political parties is punishable by death. In October
2000 security forces reportedly executed eight persons on charges of
forming an opposition organization (see Sections 1.a. and 2.b.). In
1991 the RCC adopted a law that theoretically authorized the creation
of political parties other than the Ba'th Party. However, in practice
the law is used to prohibit parties that do not support the President
and the Government. In 1999 various media published articles claiming
that Saddam Hussein instructed officials in October 1999 to consider
the formation of new political parties, a state council, and a new constitution.
However, a Ministry of Culture and Information magazine later reported
that the only two groups that attempted to form a party were refused
for having an insufficient number of members.
The Government does not recognize the various political groupings and
parties that have been formed by Shi'a Muslims, Kurds, Assyrians, Turkmens,
or other communities. These political groups continued to attract support
despite their illegal status.
The percentages of women and minorities in government and politics
does not correspond to their percentages of the population. The law
provides for the election of women and minorities to the National Assembly;
however, they have only token representation.
In the north, all central government functions have been performed
by local administrators, mainly Kurds, since the Government withdrew
its military forces and civilian administrative personnel from the area
after the 1991 uprising. A regional parliament and local government
administrators were elected in 1992. The parliament last met in May
1995. The two major Kurdish parties in de facto control of the north,
the KDP and the PUK, battled one another from 1994 through 1997. In
September 1998, they agreed to unify their separate administrations
and to hold new elections in July 1999. The cease-fire has held; however,
reunification measures have not been implemented. The PUK held municipal
elections in February 2000 and the KDP held municipal elections in May,
the first elections held in the Kurdish-controlled areas since 1992.
Foreign and local election observers reported that the elections generally
were fair.
The KDP reportedly requires membership lists from ethnic minority political
parties. The Government also imposes additional restrictions on some
political parties (see Section 2.b.).
Section 4 Governmental Attitude Regarding International and Nongovernmental
Investigation of Alleged Violations of Human Rights
The Government does not permit the establishment of independent human
rights organizations. Citizens have established several human rights
groups abroad and in northern areas not under government control. Monitors
from most foreign and international human rights groups are not allowed
in the country. However, the Government allows several international
humanitarian and aid organizations to operate in the country.
The Government harassed and intimidated relief workers and U.N. personnel
throughout the country, continued threatening to arrest or kill relief
workers in the north, and staged protests against U.N. offices in the
capital (see Sections 1.g. and 2.a.). In September the Government arrested
and expelled six U.N. humanitarian workers without providing a basis
for its actions.
As in previous years, the Government did not allow the U.N. Special
Rapporteur to visit the country, nor did it respond to his requests
for information.
In November the U.N. Commission on Human Rights and the U.N. General
Assembly issued a report that noted "with dismay" the lack
of improvement in the situation of human rights in Iraq. The report
strongly criticized the "systematic, widespread, and extremely
grave violations of human rights" and of international humanitarian
law by the Government, which it stated resulted in "all-pervasive
repression and oppression sustained by broad-based discrimination and
widespread terror." The report called on the Government to fulfill
its obligations under international human rights treaties.
For the ninth consecutive year, the Commission called on the U.N. Secretary
General to send human rights monitors to "help in the independent
verification of reports on the human rights situation in Iraq."
The U.N. Subcommission on Prevention of Discrimination and Protection
of Minorities made a similar request. The Government continued to ignore
these requests.
The Government operates an official human rights group that routinely
denies allegations of abuses.
Section 5 Discrimination Based on Race, Sex, Religion, Disability,
Language, or Social Status
The Constitution and the legal system provide for some rights for women,
children, and minorities; however, in practice the Government systematically
violates these rights.
Women
Domestic violence against women occurs but little is known about its
extent. Such abuse customarily is addressed within the tightly knit
family structure. There is no public discussion of the subject, and
no statistics are published. Spousal violence constitutes grounds for
divorce and may be prosecuted; however, suits brought on such charges
reportedly are rare. Under a 1990 law, men who committed honor crimes
may receive immunity from prosecution (see Section 1.e.).
Rape is prohibited by law; however, security forces rape family members
of persons in the opposition a punishment. No information is available
regarding the frequency or severity of rape in society.
Prostitution is illegal. During the year, the Government reportedly
beheaded women accused of prostitution (see Section 1.a.).
The Government states that it is committed to equality for women, who
make up approximately 20 percent of the work force. It has enacted laws
to protect women from exploitation in the workplace and from sexual
harassment; to permit women to join the regular army, Popular Army,
and police forces; and to equalize women's rights in divorce, land ownership,
taxation, and suffrage. It is difficult to determine the extent to which
these protections are afforded in practice. Women are not allowed to
travel outside the country alone (see Section 2.d.).
In April 2000, the PUK declared that immunity would not be given for
honor crimes in the area under its control. Several active women's organizations
operate in the Kurd-controlled regions in the north. In September the
KDP began admitting women into the police academy in preparation for
the planned integration of women into the police force.
Children
No information is available regarding whether the Government has enacted
specific legislation to promote the welfare of children. However, the
Special Rapporteur and several human rights groups have collected a
substantial body of evidence indicating the Government's continued disregard
for the rights and welfare of children. Education for boys is compulsory
through the sixth grade. Children may continue in public schools through
grade 12, but children often leave after grade 6 to help in family enterprises.
The Government claims that it also has enacted laws to make education
for girls compulsory.
The Government's failure to comply with relevant U.N. Security Council
resolutions has led to a continuation of economic sanctions. There were
widespread reports that food and medicine that could have been made
available to the general public, including children, were stockpiled
in warehouses or diverted for the personal use of some government officials.
The executive director of the U.N. office in charge of the oil-for-food
program confirmed the insufficient placement of orders in a January
2000 letter to the Government, in which he expressed concern about the
low rate of submission of applications in the health, education, water,
sanitation, and oil sectors. He also stated that of the $570 million
worth of medicines and medical supplies that had arrived in the country
through the oil-for-food program in 1998 and 1999, only 48 percent had
been distributed to clinics, hospitals, and pharmacies.
The Government's management of the oil-for-food program did not take
into account the special requirements of children between the ages of
1 and 5, despite the U.N. Secretary General's specific injunction that
the Government modify its implementation procedures to address the needs
of this vulnerable group. In 1999 UNICEF issued the results of the first
surveys of child and maternal mortality in the country that have been
conducted since 1991. The surveys were conducted between February and
May 1999, in cooperation with the Government in the southern and central
regions, and in cooperation with the local Kurdish authorities in the
north. The surveys revealed that in the south and center parts of the
country, home to 85 percent of the population, children under 5 years
old were dying at more than twice the rate that they were a decade before.
In contrast mortality rates for children under 5 years old in the Kurdish-controlled
north dropped in the period between 1994 and 1999. The Special Rapporteur
criticized the Government for "letting innocent people suffer while
[it] maneuvered to get sanctions lifted." Had the Government not
waited 5 years to adopt the oil-for-food program in 1996, he stated
in October 1999, "millions of innocent people would have avoided
serious and prolonged suffering."
For the 8th, the Government held 3-week training courses in weapons
use, hand-to-hand fighting, rappelling from helicopters, and infantry
tactics for children between 10 and 15 years of age. Camps for these
"Saddam Cubs" operated throughout the country. Senior military
officers who supervised the course noted that the children held up under
the "physical and psychological strain" of training that lasted
for as long as 14 hours each day. Sources in the opposition report that
the army found it difficult to recruit enough children to fill all of
the vacancies in the program. Families reportedly were threatened with
the loss of their food ration cards if they refused to enroll their
children in the course. The Supreme Council for the Islamic Revolution
in Iraq reported in October 1999 that authorities were denying food
ration cards to families that failed to send their young sons to Saddam
Cubs compulsory weapons-training camps (see Section 1.f.). Similarly,
authorities reportedly withheld school examination results to students
unless they registered in the Fedayeen Saddam organization (see Section
1.f.).
Government officials allegedly took children from minority groups in
order to intimidate their families to leave cities and regions in which
the Government wishes to create a Sunni Arab majority (see Sections
1.d., 1.f., and 2.d.).
Persons with Disabilities
No information was available regarding the Government's policy towards
persons with disabilities.
Religious Minorities
The country's cultural, religious, and linguistic diversity is not
reflected in its political and economic structure. Various segments
of the Sunni Arab community, which itself constitutes a minority of
the population, effectively have controlled the Government since independence
in 1932. Shi'a Arabs, the religious majority of the population, have
long been economically, politically, and socially disadvantaged. Like
the Sunni Kurds and other ethnic and religious groups in the north,
the Shi'a Arabs of the south have been targeted for particular discrimination
and abuse (see Section 2.c.).
Assyrian groups reported several instances of mob violence by Muslims
against Christians in the north in the past few years.
Although few Jews remain in the country, government officials frequently
make anti-Semitic statements.
National/Racial/Ethnic Minorities
Non-Arabs are denied equal access to employment, education, and physical
security. Non-Arabs are not permitted to sell their homes except to
Arabs, nor to register or inherit property. The Government continued
to relocate forcibly the non-Arab population, including Kurds, Turkmens,
and Assyrians living in Kirkuk, Sinjar, and other districts (see Sections
1.f. and 2.d.).
Assyrians and Chaldeans are considered by many to be a distinct ethnic
group, as well as the descendants of some of the earliest Christian
communities. These communities speak a different language (Syriac),
preserve traditions of Christianity, and have a rich cultural and historical
heritage that they trace back more than 2,000 years. Although these
groups do not define themselves as Arabs, the Government, without any
historical basis, defines Assyrians and Chaldeans as such, evidently
to encourage them to identify with the Sunni-Arab dominated Government
(see Section 2.c.).
The Government does not permit education in languages other than Arabic
and Kurdish. Thus, in areas under government control, Assyrian and Chaldean
children are not permitted to attend classes in Syriac.
The Constitution does not provide for a Yazidi identity. Many Yazidis
consider themselves to be ethnically Kurdish, although some would define
themselves as both religiously and ethnically distinct from Muslim Kurds.
However, the Government, without any historical basis, has defined the
Yazidis as Arabs. There is evidence that the Government has compelled
this reidentification to encourage Yazidis to join in domestic military
action against Muslim Kurds. Captured government documents included
in a 1998 HRW report describe special all-Yazidi military detachments
formed during the 1988-89 Anfal campaign to "pursue and attack"
Muslim Kurds. The Government imposes the same repressive measures on
Yazidis as on other groups (see Section 2.c.).
Citizens considered by the Government to be of Iranian origin must
carry special identification and often are precluded from desirable
employment. Over the years, the Government has deported hundreds of
thousands of citizens of Iranian origin.
Ethnic and religious minorities face some discrimination and harassment
by Kurds in the north. In areas of the north under Kurdish control,
classes in Syriac and Turkish have been permitted in primary schools
run by Assyrian or Turkmen parties, since the 1991 uprising against
the Government. However, teaching of Syriac reportedly remains restricted.
The Kurdish administrations also require that all school children begin
learning Arabic in primary school.
Assyrian groups reported several instances of mob violence by Muslims
against Christians in the north in the past few years. Assyrians continue
to fear attacks by the PKK, a Turkish-based terrorist organization that
operates against indigenous Kurds in northern Iraq. In 2000 Christians
reported feeling caught in the middle of intra-Kurdish fighting. Some
Assyrian villagers reported in 2000 being pressured to leave the countryside
for the cities as part of a campaign by indigenous Kurdish forces to
deny the PKK access to possible food supplies. There were no reports
during the year of the Kurdistan Regional Government's investigation
into a series of bombings in 1998 and 1999 that many Assyrian groups
believed were part of a terror campaign designed to intimidate them
into leaving the north.
Ethnic Turkmen also claim discrimination by Kurdish groups, including
the required use of the Kurdistan flag in Turkmen schools and the assignment
of Kurdish teachers to Turkmen schools.
Section 6 Worker Rights
a. The Right of Association
There are no trade unions independent of government control. The Trade
Union Organization Law of 1987 established the Iraqi General Federation
of Trade Unions (IGFTU), a government controlled trade union structure,
as the sole legal trade federation. The IGFTU is linked to the Ba'th
Party, which uses it to promote party principles and policies among
union members.
Workers in private and mixed enterprises, but not public employees
or workers in state enterprises, have the right to join local union
committees. The committees are affiliated with individual trade unions,
which in turn belong to the IGFTU.
In 1999 Uday Hussein reportedly dismissed hundreds of members of the
Iraqi Union of Journalists for not praising Saddam Hussein and the Government
sufficiently (see Section 2.a.). Also in 1999, Uday Hussein reportedly
jailed at least four leaders of the Iraqi National Students Union for
failing to carry out his orders to take action against students known
for their criticism of the situation in the country.
The Labor Law restricts the right to strike. According to the International
Confederation of Free Trade Unions, such restrictions on the right to
strike include penal sanctions. No strike has been reported for during
the past 2 decades.
The IGFTU is affiliated with the International Confederation of Arab
Trade Unions and the formerly Soviet-controlled World Federation of
Trade Unions.
In the Kurd-controlled northern region, the law allows persons to form
and join trade unions and other organizations, and to use such organizations
for political action. Dozens of trade groups have been formed since
1991.
b. The Right to Organize and Bargain Collectively
The right to bargain collectively is not recognized. The Government
sets salaries for public sector workers, the majority of employed persons.
Wages in the much smaller private sector are set by employers or negotiated
individually with workers. Government workers frequently are shifted
from one job and work location to another to prevent them from forming
close associations with other workers. The Labor Code does not protect
workers from antiunion discrimination, an omission that has been criticized
repeatedly by the Committee of Experts of the International Labor Organization
(ILO).
There are no export processing zones.
c. Prohibition of Forced or Compulsory Labor
Compulsory labor is prohibited by law; however, the Penal Code mandates
prison sentences, including compulsory labor, for civil servants and
employees of state enterprises for breaches of labor "discipline,"
including resigning from a job. According to the ILO, foreign workers
in the country have been prevented from terminating their employment
and returning to their native countries because of government-imposed
penal sanctions on persons who do so. There is no information available
regarding forced and bonded labor by children.
d. Status of Child Labor Practices and Minimum Age for Employment
The employment of children under the age of 14 is prohibited, except
in small-scale family enterprises. However, children reportedly are
encouraged increasingly to work in order to help support their families
because of the country's harsh economic conditions. The law stipulates
that employees between the ages of 14 and 18 work fewer hours per week
than adults. Each year the Government enrolls children as young as 10
years of age in a paramilitary training program (see Section 5). There
is no information available regarding forced and bonded labor by children
(see Section 6.c.).
The Government has not ratified ILO Convention 182 on the worst forms
of child labor.
e. Acceptable Conditions of Work
There was no information available regarding minimum wages.
Most workers in urban areas work a 6-day, 48-hour workweek. The head
of each ministry sets hours for government employees. Working hours
for agricultural workers vary according to individual employer-employee
agreements.
Occupational safety programs are in effect in state-run enterprises.
Inspectors ostensibly inspect private establishments, but enforcement
varies widely. There was no information regarding workers' ability to
remove themselves from work situations that endanger their health or
safety.
f. Trafficking in Persons
There was no information available regarding whether trafficking in
persons is prohibited by law, or whether persons were trafficked to,
from, or within the country.
_____________
1 The United States does not have diplomatic representation
in Iraq. This report draws to a large extent on non-U.S. Government
sources.
Source: The
Country Reports on Human Rights Practices, U.S.
State Department, March 2002 |