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Report on Human Rights Practices for 2001
Algeria
President Abdelaziz Bouteflika was elected in April 1999 to a 5-year
term. Bouteflika had served as Foreign Minister in a previous government.
The President is the constitutional head of state, appoints and dismisses
the Prime Minister, and may dissolve the legislature. According to the
Constitution, the Prime Minister appoints the cabinet ministers; however,
in practice the President has taken a key role in designating the members
of the Cabinet. The military establishment strongly influences defense
and foreign policy. Abdelaziz Bouteflika was regarded throughout the
1999 election campaign as the candidate most favored by the dominant
security establishment and the most likely winner. At the end of the
campaign, the other six candidates withdrew, credibly charging massive
fraud by the military, and Bouteflika was elected easily, although with
a turnout as low as 30 percent. The presidential election campaign was
marked by increased openness; however, international observers and political
parties pointed out numerous problems with the conduct of the elections.
A September 1999 national referendum, which asked citizens whether they
agreed with the President's peace plan (which included an amnesty program
for the extremists fighting to overthrow the Government), was free of
charges of fraud. The peace plan won a reported 98 percent majority,
with a reported 85 percent turnout. President Bouteflika is not affiliated
formally with any political party, but he has the parliamentary support
of a six-party coalition. In June 1997, Algeria held its first parliamentary
elections since January 1992 and elected the first multiparty parliament
in the country's history. The Government's cancellation of the 1992
elections, which the Islamic Salvation Front (FIS) was poised to win,
suspended the democratization process and a transition to a pluralistic
republic, and escalated fighting, which still continues, between the
security forces and armed insurgent groups seeking to overthrow the
Government and impose an Islamic state. The Government does not always
respect the independence of the judiciary.
The Government's security apparatus is composed of the army, air force,
navy, the national gendarmerie, the national police, communal guards,
and local self-defense forces. All of these elements are involved in
counterinsurgency and counterterrorism operations and are under the
control of the Government. The security forces committed serious human
rights abuses, although allegations of such abuses continued to decline.
The $147.6 billion economy is slowly developing from a state-administered
to a market-oriented system. The Government has implemented stabilization
policies and structural reforms. However, privatization of state enterprises
has made little progress, and there has been little progress on reform
of the banking and housing construction sectors. The state-owned petroleum
sector's output represented approximately a quarter of the national
income and more than 96 percent of export earnings during the year.
Noncompetitive and unprofitable state enterprises constitute the bulk
of the nonhydrocarbon industrial sector. The agricultural sector, which
produces grains, fruit, cattle, fiber, vegetables, and poultry, makes
up 10 to 12 percent of the economy. Algeria is a middle-income country;
annual per capita income is approximately $1,700 in a population of
31.5 million. Officially, about 30 percent of the working-age population
is unemployed, and about 70 percent of persons under the age of 30 cannot
find adequate employment.
Despite continued improvements, particularly in addressing problems
of torture and arbitrary detention, the human rights situation remained
generally poor, and serious problems persisted, including the excessive
use of force, increased restrictions on freedom of expression, and failure
to account for past disappearances. The massacre of civilians by armed
terrorist groups also continued. There are significant limitations on
citizens' right to change their government.
The security forces committed extrajudicial killings, tortured, beat
or otherwise abused detainees, and arbitrarily arrested and detained,
or held incommunicado, individuals; however, in general such abuses
continued to decline. Most such cases were committed against suspected
members of armed groups in the context of the Government's continued
battle with terrorism. Security forces also committed serious abuses
in connection with riots and demonstrations in the Kabylie region during
the spring and summer. Security forces killed more than 50 civilians
and injured hundreds while attempting to suppress the disturbances,
during which many demonstrators burned and looted government buildings,
political party offices, and public and private property.
Security-force involvement in disappearances from previous years remains
unresolved. An international NGO noted that the Government continued
to improve prison conditions. Prolonged pretrial detention and lengthy
trial delays are problems, although the practice of detention beyond
the legal limit appears to be less frequent. Although the Constitution
provides for an independent judiciary, executive branch decrees restrict
some of the judiciary's authority. The authorities do not always respect
defendants' rights to due process. Illegal searches and infringements
on citizens' privacy rights also remained problems.
There was no overt censorship of information. The print media is relatively
free and the independent press commented regularly and openly and expressed
a wide range of views on significant issues such as terrorist violence
and surrenders under the amnesty program. However, some elements of
the news media practiced self-censorship. On June 27, the Government
enacted broad amendments to the Penal Code that impose high fines and
prison terms of up to 24 months for defamation or "insult of"
government figures, including the President, Members of Parliament,
judges, members of the military and "any other authority of public
order." Although there were no reported prosecutions under the
amendment to the Penal Code, during the year, the Government prosecuted
a number of journalists for defamation under the pre-amendment Penal
Code for articles that the journalists had written (see Section 1.c.).
Unlike in the past when electronic media expressed only government
policy, government-controlled radio and television stations presented
a variety of views, including those critical of the Government, especially
during the violence that took place in the Kabylie region of the country
in the spring and summer. However, the Government continued to restrict
freedom of speech, press, assembly, association, and movement in varying
degrees throughout the year.
The Government also places some restrictions on freedom of religion.
On June 27, the Government enacted amendments to the Penal Code that
provided for prison sentences and fines for any person not approved
by the Government convicted of preaching in a mosque. The amendments
also provided penalties for persons found guilty of preaching "contrary
to the noble nature of the mosque or likely to offend the cohesion of
society." During the year, the National Democratic Institute (NDI),
the International Committee of the Red Cross (ICRC) and Freedom House
visited the country, in many cases at the invitation of the Government.
Domestic violence against women, the Family Code's limits on women's
civil rights and societal discrimination against women remained serious
problems. Child abuse was a problem. Amazigh ethnic, cultural, and linguistic
rights were the objects of demonstrations and riots in the spring and
continued throughout the year. Amazigh concerns are represented by at
least two political parties with seats in Parliament. Child labor was
a problem.
Armed groups committed numerous serious abuses and killed hundreds
of civilians, including infants. There was a significant decrease in
such violence compared with 2000. Armed terrorists continued their widespread
campaign of insurgency, targeting government officials, families of
security-force members, and civilians. The killing of civilians during
the year often was the result of rivalry between terrorist groups and
to facilitate the theft of goods needed by the armed groups. Violence
by terrorist groups is also used to extort money.
Armed groups left small bombs in cars, cafes, and markets, which killed
and maimed indiscriminately. Some killings, including massacres, also
were attributed to revenge, banditry, and land grabs. Press reports
estimated that approximately 1,980 civilians, terrorists, and security
force members died during the year in the ongoing domestic turmoil.
The violence appears to have occurred primarily in the countryside,
as the security forces largely forced the insurgents out of the cities.
There were numerous instances in which armed groups kidnaped women and
girls, raped them, and forced them into servitude.
After his 1999 election, President Bouteflika stated that a total of
about 100,000 persons had been killed during the previous 8 years.
RESPECT FOR HUMAN RIGHTS
Section 1 Respect for the Integrity of the Person, Including Freedom
From:
a. Arbitrary or Unlawful Deprivation of Life
The security forces committed extrajudicial killings, mostly during
clashes with armed terrorist groups. The number of such killings in
connection with such clashes decreased by about 19 percent during the
year compared with 2000. On March 11, security forces backed by helicopters
pursued and killed seven suspected terrorists in Skikda, 316 miles east
of Algiers. In late April, Government forces surrounded for 11 days
an abandoned mine used as a stronghold by the terrorist Salifast Group
for Call and Combat calling for the terrorists to surrender. Security
forces then used explosives to collapse the mine, killing 70 persons.
The Government maintains that security forces resort to lethal force
only in the context of armed clashes with terrorists. The Government
also contends that, as a matter of policy, disciplinary action is taken
against soldiers or policemen who are guilty of violating human rights,
and that some disciplinary action was taken during the year. However,
the government does not release routinely specific information regarding
punishments of military and security force personnel.
On April 18, Massinissa Guermah, a 19-year-old Amazigh high school
student, died in the custody of security forces of gunshot wounds received
from an AK-47 semi-automatic weapon. In a report of the Issaad commission
appointed by the Government which investigated the incident, security
force witnesses testified that the weapon had fired inadvertently when
it slipped from a gendarme's hand while the safety mechanism was unlocked.
According to an Amnesty International report, this version has been
challenged by a witness who claimed that he heard Guermah plead his
innocence to gendarmes before the shots were fired. During the April
22-28 demonstrations and riots that ensued in the Kabylie region following
Guermah's death, security forces used excessive force, killing at least
45 rioters and demonstrators and injuring many hundreds more. While
putting down the riots, security forces used live (not rubber) rounds
on the crowd, shooting some persons in the back (see Sections 1.c, 1.d,
2.b, and 5). Press reports have estimated that as many as 80 rioters
may have died at the hands of security forces during the riots that
continued into the summer. Ten days after Guermah's death, the local
gendarmerie issued a statement claiming that the official responsible
for the death of Guermah had been court-martialed. The Government appointed
two separate commissions to investigate Guermah's death and the violence
that followed it. One was composed of members of the National Assembly.
The report of the other commission, headed by respected Amazigh jurist
Mohand Issaad, found that the security forces version of the death was
"not satisfactory," blamed gendarmerie units for using excessive
force in putting down the demonstrations, and found that the units did
so without orders. The report, which criticized a lack of security-force
cooperation that hampered the Commission's ability to gather information,
was released to the press by the President and received significant
media coverage. The National Assembly commission had not issued a report
by year's end.
There were no reports of progovernment militia killing civilians during
the year, as they had in the past.
In November 1999, prominent FIS leader Abdelkader Hachani, who had
spoken out in favor of peace and reconciliation, was shot and killed
in Algiers. In December 1999, authorities arrested a suspect, who had
the murder weapon in his possession. The suspect, Fouad Boulemia, was
tried in March, found guilty, and sentenced to death.
Armed groups targeted both security-force members and civilians. Civilian
and security force casualties at the hands of armed groups decreased
by about 35 percent compared with 2000. In many cases, terrorists randomly
targeted civilians in an apparent attempt to create social disorder.
Armed groups killed numerous civilians, including infants, in massacres
and with small bombs. Bombs left in cars, cafes, and markets killed
and maimed persons indiscriminately (see Section 1.g.).
Some killings also were attributed to revenge, banditry, and land grabs.
The violence took place primarily in the countryside, as the security
forces largely have forced the insurgents out of the cities. The killing
of civilians often was the result of rivalry between terrorist groups
and to facilitate the theft of goods needed by the armed groups. Violence
by terrorist groups also is used to extort money. In April the independent
press reported the Government's discovery of documents used by a terrorist
group to track the "Islamic Tax" or money paid by individuals
to the terrorist groups to avoid violent reprisals. As well as the use
of small bombs, terrorist tactics included creating false roadblocks
outside the cities, often by using stolen police uniforms weapons, and
equipment. After his 1999 election, President Bouteflika acknowledged
that a more accurate accounting of the number of persons killed during
the previous 8 years placed the total at about 100,000.
Press reports estimated that approximately 1,980 civilians, terrorists,
and security force members died during the year as a result of the ongoing
violence, a reduction from the 2,588 who died during the previous year.
For example, on the night of January 27, terrorists slit the throats
of 25 villagers in the town of El-Guetaibia, 124 miles west of Algiers.
The terrorists raped two teenage girls before killing them and abducted
a 23-year-old woman. On February 10, 26 persons were killed in the town
of Cherata, 74 miles south of Algiers. On March 16, terrorists attacked
and killed seven persons in the small town of Aomar in the Wilaya of
Bouira. On April 1, armed-group members slit the throats of a family
of five in the town of Ain Agba, 72 miles south of Algiers. The terrorists
then left a bomb in the house, which later exploded, injuring one of
the villagers who discovered the bodies. At 1:00 a.m. on July 25, armed
terrorists entered a pizza shop in the tourist town of Tipaza and opened
fire with automatic weapons, killing two persons. On August 10, five
members of a family were killed in Chelf, including a mother and three
children who were shot in their sleep. On August 30, a bomb set in an
Algiers market place killed 2 persons and injured more than 30 others.
On September 13, in Taourirt, a community located about 30 miles to
the east of Bouira; a car bomb killed one man and injured another. On
October 2, a bomb planted by terrorists in a pizzeria in Laghouat, about
240 miles south of Algiers, exploded killing one customer and injuring
eight others. On November 14, a woman picking olives was wounded seriously
by a bomb set by terrorists near a footpath. On the same day, terrorists
at a false roadblock shot and killed a soldier. Both incidents took
place in Bouira, 54 miles southeast of Algiers.
b. Disappearance
There were no credible reports during the year of disappearances in
which the security forces were implicated. However, there have been
credible reports of thousands of disappearances occurring over a period
of several years in the mid-90's, many of which involved the security
forces. A Ministry of Interior office in each district accepts cases
from resident families of those reported missing. Credible sources state
that the offices have provided little useful information to the families
of those who disappeared. On May 10, the Minister of Interior told the
National Assembly that the Ministry had agreed to investigate 4,880
cases. The Ministry reported that it provided information to the families
in 3,000 of those cases. In 1,600 of the cases, families requested administrative
action to obtain death certificates for their missing relatives. While
there have been no reported prosecutions of security-force personnel
stemming from these cases, government officials reported in November
2000 that between 350 and 400 security officials had been punished for
"human rights abuses." Families of the missing persons, defense
attorneys, and local human rights groups insist that the Government
could do more to solve the outstanding cases. The Government asserts
that the majority of reported cases of disappearances either were committed
by terrorists disguised as security forces or involved former armed
Islamist supporters who went underground to avoid terrorist reprisals.
In September 2000, Amnesty International reported that since 1994 more
than 4,000 persons had disappeared after being detained by security
forces. Amnesty International stated that some persons died in custody
from torture or were executed, but many others reportedly were alive.
Local NGO sources noted that a few of the persons who disappeared were
released from captivity by the security forces, but that there had been
no public information about these cases, due to the fear of reprisal
against those released. Some human rights activists assert that a number
of the persons who disappeared still are alive in the hands of the security
forces, but offer no evidence to support this assertion.
Terrorist groups continued to kidnap scores of civilians. In many instances,
the victims disappeared, and the families were unable to obtain information
about their fate. Armed groups kidnapped young women and girls and held
them captive for extended periods for the purpose of rape and servitude
(see Sections 1.a., 1.c., 5, 6.c., and 6.f.).
c. Torture and Other Cruel, Inhuman, or Degrading Treatment or Punishment
Both the Constitution and legislation ban torture and other cruel,
inhuman, or degrading treatment; however, according to local human rights
groups and defense lawyers, the police at times resort to torture when
interrogating persons including those suspected of being involved with,
or having sympathies for, armed insurgency groups.
There continued to be reports of police torture and other abuse of
detainees during the year. After its October 2000 visit (see Section
4), Amnesty International stated that although there were "substantially
fewer" cases of torture "in comparison to some years ago,"
such cases nevertheless "continue to occur." Many victims
of torture hesitate to make public such allegations due to fear of government
retaliation.
The Interior Ministry and the National Observatory of Human Rights
(ONDH) have stated publicly that the Government would punish those persons
who violated the law and practiced torture. Government officials reported
in November 2000 that between 350 and 400 security officials had been
punished for human rights abuses, although the Government provided no
details regarding the abuses that such officials committed or the punishment
that they received. There was no independent mechanism available to
verify the Government's claim.
In early August 2000, the Government announced new policies, enacted
into law and implemented in July, concerning the Police Judiciaire (PJ),
the officers who interrogate suspects when they first are arrested to
determine whether there are grounds for prosecution. Local judges now
are required to grade the performance of PJ officers operating in their
jurisdiction in an effort to ensure that the officers comply with the
law in their treatment of suspects. In addition any suspect held in
preventative detention is to undergo a medical examination at the end
of the detention, whether the suspect requests it or not. International
NGO's and local lawyers have reported that these new procedures were
generally being followed in practice.
The Government used excessive force in some instances to put down demonstrations
and riots throughout the year in the largely Amazigh Kabylie region.
Outdoor demonstrations in the Kabylie region turned violent from April
22 to 28, following the death in security forces' custody of a 19-year-old
Amazigh high school student (see Section 1.a.). Security forces used
live ammunition against demonstrators, including against youths throwing
stones and Molotov cocktails. According to the Ministry of the Interior,
security forces killed 45 protesters and injured 491 between April 22
and April 28. Some of those killed or injured had been shot in the back.
Amnesty International reported that press reports indicated that as
many as 80 persons were killed through mid-year. In addition the Government
detained a large number of persons for short periods in connection with
the violence. Amnesty International reported that security forces tortured,
beat, and otherwise abused a number of them (see Section 1.d.). Although
the Government allowed several subsequent demonstrations to take place,
it used force to disrupt several other demonstrations that were held
throughout the spring and summer (see Section 2.b.).
The Government appointed two separate commissions to look into the
Kabylie events. One commission, headed by respected Amazigh jurist Mohand
Issaad, issued its final report on December 29. The Issaad report concluded
that gendarmerie units had used excessive force in putting down the
April 22 to 28 demonstrations, but that they had done so without official
orders. The report was released to the press and received significant
media coverage.
Following a bombing against a military unit in the area, security forces
arrested Said Zaoui and approximately 20 other men in Dellys on February
7. The detainees reportedly were tortured and Zaoui reportedly remained
in detention. In April police arrested three students who were on their
way to a gym class in the Kabylie region, and reportedly beat them while
they were in custody (see Section 1.d).
In June 2000 following a bomb blast in Dellys, police rounded up a
group of 200 persons who had been attending the local mosque. The group
was taken to police headquarters and beaten. One person died from the
injuries he sustained. Members of the group took legal action against
the police and, as a result, the local chiefs of the police and the
Gendarmerie were fired and two of the offending officers were arrested.
In December 1999, a terrorist bomb killed and injured police in the
town of Dellys. Within hours security forces rounded up and detained
more than 100 persons of both sexes and a variety of ages. Police officers
beat many of the detainees and threw them into the crater made by the
terrorist bomb. One of the mistreated persons died of a heart attack
the next day. A senior regional police commander ordered the police
to stop these actions. In response to complaints from the mistreated
persons, the authorities suspended the local commanders of 2 different
security services and prosecuted 21 members of the security forces (see
Section 1.a.).
Armed terrorist groups committed numerous abuses, such as beheading,
mutilating, and dismembering their victims, including infants, children,
and pregnant women. These groups also used bombs that killed and injured
persons (see Sections 1.a. and 1.g.). Deaths at the hands of armed groups
decreased by about 35 percent, from 1,525 in 2000 to 1,124 during the
year. Terrorists also committed dozens of rapes of female victims, many
of whom subsequently were murdered. There were also frequent reports
of other young women and girls being abducted, raped for weeks at a
time by group leaders and other members, and forced into servitude (see
Sections 1.a., 1.b., 5, 6.c., and 6.f.).
Prison conditions are Spartan, but generally meet international standards.
An international NGO noted that the Government continued to improve
prison conditions. Prisoners generally were found to be in good health
and benefited from adequate food and expanded visitation rights. The
provision of medical treatment remained limited.
In general the Government does not permit independent monitoring of
prisons or detention centers. However, since October 1999, the Government
allowed regular International Committee of the Red Cross (ICRC) visits
to prisons administered by the Ministry of Justice. The ICRC did not
visit FIS leaders in prison or under house arrest.
d. Arbitrary Arrest, Detention, or Exile
The Constitution prohibits arbitrary arrest and detention; however,
the security forces continued arbitrarily to arrest and detain citizens,
although such practices continued to decrease during the year.
The Constitution stipulates that incommunicado detention in criminal
cases prior to arraignment may not exceed 48 hours, after which the
suspect must be charged or released. However, according to the 1992
Antiterrorist Law, the police may hold suspects in prearraignment detention
for up to 12 days, although police must inform suspects of the charges
against them. In practice the security forces generally adhered to this
12-day limit in terrorist cases and to the 48-hour limit in non-terrorist
cases during the year.
The 1992 Antiterrorist Law suspended the requirement that the police
obtain warrants in order to make an arrest. During the year, the police
made limited use of this law. However, according to defense attorneys,
police who execute searches without a warrant routinely fail to identify
themselves as police and abuse those who ask for identification (see
Section 1.f.).
In April three students were arrested in two separate incidents in
the Kabylie region. One died in custody and the other two subsequently
were released. The death in custody precipitated demonstrations and
riots in the region throughout the spring and summer (see Sections 1.a.,
1.c., 2.b., and 5).
The Government detained and soon thereafter released hundreds of persons
in connection with the demonstrations and riots that took place in the
Kabylie region in the spring and summer. Amnesty International reported
that the police tortured or otherwise abused persons in custody (see
Section 1.a).
At year's end, FIS president Abassi Madani, who was released from prison
in 1997, remained under house arrest and was allowed to receive visits
only from members of his family (see Section 2.d.), although he made
numerous press statements and conducted interviews while under house
arrest. Jailed oppositionist and FIS vice president Ali Belhadj, who
had been held incommunicado from 1992 until 1998, was allowed contact
with members of his family, who spoke to the press on his behalf.
Police and communal guards sometimes detain persons at checkpoints
(see Section 1.f.). There are reports of police arresting close relatives
of suspected terrorists in order to force the suspects to surrender.
According to Amnesty International, on April 4, 2000, police arrested
73-year-old El-Hadj M'lik in front of several witnesses. He had been
questioned previously concerning his sons, one of whom is believed to
be a member of a terrorist group. Security officials reassured the family,
on two separate occasions, that M'lik would be returned to them. However,
he had not been returned by year's end and the government has released
no further information on the case during the year.
Prolonged pretrial detention is a problem. Persons accused of crimes
sometimes did not receive expeditious trials; however, instances of
long-term detention appeared to decrease somewhat during the past year
(see Section 1.e.). Hundreds of state enterprise officials who were
arrested on charges of corruption in 1996 remained in detention. Three
or four of the higher-ranking detainees were released in 2000. Some
local human rights activists and NGO's claim that the Government continues
to keep some former prisoners under surveillance and requires them to
report periodically to police.
Forced exile is not a legal form of punishment and is not known to
be practiced. However, numerous cases of self-imposed exile involve
former FIS members or individuals who maintain that they have been accused
falsely of terrorism as punishment for openly criticizing government
policies.
One such case was resolved in September 2000, when Ali Bensaad, a professor
at the University of Constantine who had been in exile in Germany, returned
to the country. The former exile was issued a limited (6-month) passport,
which allowed him to return. Bensaad is pursuing redress in the court
system for the "machinations" he claims were perpetrated against
him by former high-ranking officials; there were no developments in
Bensaad's case by year's end.
e. Denial of Fair Public Trial
The Constitution provides for an independent judiciary; however, in
practice the Government does not always respect the independence of
the judicial system. The Minister of Justice appoints the judges. A
judge's term is 10 years. The Government reportedly may remove judges
at will. In November 1999, President Bouteflika named a commission to
review the functioning of the judiciary and to recommend ways to improve
it. In August 2000, after the commission submitted its report that was
published in the Government's Official Journal, the President announced
a massive reorganization of the judiciary. He changed approximately
80 percent of the heads of the 187 lower courts and all but three of
the presidents of the 37 higher-level courts. Most of the court heads
were reassigned to new locations; however, a number were replaced outright.
Whereas women previously only headed a few courts, women at year's end
headed 26.
The judiciary is composed of the civil courts, which try cases involving
civilians, and the military courts, which have tried civilians on security
and terrorism charges. There is also a Constitutional Council, which
reviews the constitutionality of treaties, laws, and regulations. Although
the Council is not part of the judiciary, it has the authority to nullify
laws found unconstitutional. The Council has nine members: Three of
the members (including the council president) are appointed by the President;
two are elected by the upper house of the Parliament; two are elected
by the lower house of the Parliament; one is elected by the Supreme
Court; and one is elected by the Council of State. Regular criminal
courts try those individuals accused of security-related offenses. Long-term
detentions of suspects awaiting trial again appeared to decrease somewhat
during the year (see Section 1.d.)
According to the Constitution, defendants are presumed innocent until
proven guilty. They have the right to confront their accusers and may
appeal the conviction. Trials are public, and defendants have the right
to legal counsel. However, the authorities do not always respect all
legal provisions regarding defendants' rights, and continue to deny
due process. Some lawyers do not accept cases of defendants accused
of security-related offenses, due to fear of retribution from the security
forces. Defense lawyers for members of the banned FIS have suffered
harassment, death threats, and arrest.
There are no credible estimates of the number of political prisoners;
some observers estimate the number to be several thousand. An unknown
number of persons who could be considered political prisoners are serving
prison sentences because of their Islamist sympathies and membership
in the FIS. There are credible estimates that the Government released
5,000 political prisoners after President Bouteflika's 1999 election.
International humanitarian organizations did not request visits with
political prisoners during the year; therefore, it is unclear whether
the Government would permit such organizations to visit political prisoners.
In general the Government does not permit independent monitoring of
prisons or detention centers; however, over the past 24 months, it has
permitted the ICRC to monitor general prison conditions in civilian
prisons (see Section 1.c.).
f. Arbitrary Interference with Privacy, Family, Home or Correspondence
Authorities frequently infringed on citizens' privacy rights. The Constitution
provides for the inviolability of the home, but the state of emergency
authorizes provincial governors to issue exceptional warrants at any
time. Security forces also entered residences without warrants. According
to defense attorneys, police who execute searches without a warrant
routinely fail to identify themselves as police and abuse persons who
ask for identification. Security forces deployed an extensive network
of secret informers against both terrorist targets and political opponents.
The Government monitors the telephones of, and sometimes disconnects
service to, political opponents, journalists, and human rights groups
(see Sections 2.a., 3, and 4). There are reports of police arresting
close relatives of suspected terrorists in order to force the suspects
to surrender (see Section 1.d.).
Armed terrorists entered private homes either to kill or kidnap residents
or to steal weapons, valuables, or food. After massacres that took place
in their villages, numerous civilians fled their homes. Armed terrorist
groups consistently used threats of violence to extort money from businesses
and families across the country.
g. Use of Excessive Force and Violations of Humanitarian Law
In response to rioting in April in the Kabylie region, gendarme units
used excessive force. Rioters were shot with lethal (not rubber) rounds,
often in the back. A report issued by the Issaad Commission, appointed
by the Government to investigate the violence, found that the gendarmes
acted without orders. The Government claimed that the gendarmes who
fired the shots were disciplined.
Armed groups continued to be responsible for numerous, indiscriminate
killings. Terrorists left bombs at several markets and other public
places during the year, killing and injuring dozens of persons. In rural
areas, terrorists continued to plant bombs and mines, which often targeted
security force personnel. For example, according to press reports, on
February 25, a bomb explosion killed 3 and injured 27 near a bus station
in Laghouat, 240 miles south of Algiers. On March 6, a bomb blast in
the province of Jijel killed 2 and wounded 15. On March 9, a homemade
bomb killed two persons and injured five in Skikda. A bomb in Lakhdari
injured two communal guards on March 26. On April 1, armed group members
slit the throats of five family members in the town of Ain Agba, 72
miles south of Algiers. The terrorists then left a bomb in the house,
which later exploded injuring one of the villagers who discovered the
bodies. On August 30, a bomb set in an Algiers market place killed 2
persons and injured more than 30 others. On September 13, in Taourirt,
a community located about 30 miles east of Bouira, a car bomb killed
one man and injured another. On October 2, a bomb planted by terrorists
in a pizzeria in Laghouat, 240 miles south of Algiers, exploded, killing
one customer and injuring eight others. On November 14, a bomb set by
terrorists near a footpath seriously wounded a woman picking olives.
On the same day, terrorists at a false roadblock shot and killed a soldier.
Both incidents took place in Bouira, southeast of Algiers. As in the
past, such random lethal terrorist attacks occurred throughout the year.
Section 2 Respect for Civil Liberties, Including:
a. Freedom of Speech and Press
The Constitution provides for freedom of speech; however, the Government
restricts this right in practice. A 1990 law specifies that freedom
of speech must respect "individual dignity, the imperatives of
foreign policy, and the national defense." The state of emergency
decree gives the Government broad authority to restrict these freedoms
and to take legal action against what it considers to be threats to
the state or public order. However, the Government did not enforce these
regulations strictly, and the large number of independent press publications
reported regularly on security matters without penalty. The government-controlled
press reports on terrorism in an increasingly straightforward and accurate
manner.
On June 27, the Government enacted a series of amendments to the Penal
Code that give the Government authority to impose high fines and harsh
jail sentences in cases in which reporters "defame insult or injure"
government officials. Government officials include the President, Members
of Parliament, judges, members of the military, and "any other
authority of public order." Under the new law, any person found
guilty of defaming the President may be sentenced to between 3 and 12
months in prison and a fine of between $649 (50,000 dinars) and $3,247
(250,000 dinars). The punishments are doubled for repeat offenders.
Under the new law, publications whose employees are found guilty of
an offense against the President may be fined from $6,494 (500,000 dinars)
to $32,468 (2,500,000 dinars). Editors and owners of such publications
may also be prosecuted. Broad provisions in the new law provide for
prison terms of between 2 and 24 months and fines ranging from $129
(10,000 dinars) to $6,494 (500,000 dinars) for "any person who
insults a judge, a civil servant, or one of the representatives of public
order with a word, a gesture, a threat, a piece of correspondence, a
piece of writing or a drawing while they are exercising their profession,
and does so with the intention of offending their honor, their authority,
or the respect required of their profession." The law, as amended,
provides the same punishments for anyone who "commits insult, contempt
or defamation" directed at "Parliament or one of its chambers,
tribunals, courts of justice, the People's National Army, or any other
authority of public order." No journalist had been charged under
the new law by year's end; however, the Government brought defamation
cases against journalists during the year under the old provisions of
the Penal Code.
On March 14, six journalists from the Arabic daily newspaper Errai
were convicted of defaming the former head of security of the Wilaya
of Oran. The men were sentenced to 2 months in jail (suspended) and
a fine of $28 (2,000 dinars). On July 19, Fawzia Ababsah, managing editor
of the French-language daily newspaper, L'Authentique, was tried in
abstentia and sentenced to 6 months in prison for defamation of Secretary
General Mahmoudi of the Finance Confederation (a union of financial
workers). Ababsah was charged for an article that she wrote attempting
to refute charges that Mahmoudi had made against the owner of L'Authentique,
retired General Mohammed Betchine. Under the law, a person tried in
abstentia has the right to "oppose" any such decision and
have the case reheard at the same level. Ababsah stated that she intended
to oppose the finding in her case. The results of her opposition had
not been published by year's end.
According to the Ministry of Health, it no longer forbids medical personnel
from speaking to journalists, and such personnel spoke to the press
during the year.
The Government's definition of security information often extended
beyond purely military matters to encompass broader political affairs.
In 1995 FIS officials who had been freed from detention in 1994 received
direct orders from the Justice Ministry to make no further public statements.
This ban remains in force. In general journalists exercised self-censorship
by not publishing criticism of specific senior military officials, although
in some cases the press criticized current and retired military officers.
In 1994 the Government issued an interministerial decree that independent
newspapers could print security information only from official government
bulletins carried by the government-controlled Algerian Press Service
(APS). However, independent newspapers openly ignored the directive,
and the trend toward increased openness about security-force activities
continued during the year. The Government continued to provide the press
with more information than in the past about the security situation.
Unlike in past years, when journalists deliberately did not report on
current possible abuses by security forces to avoid difficulties with
the Government, the independent press reported openly on abuses by the
gendarmerie during the recent violence in the Kabylie region and in
other contexts (see Sections 1.a, 1.c., 1.d., 2.b., and 5). There also
was significant coverage of NGO activity aimed at publicizing government
abuses committed in the past.
Other than El Moujahid, which is the official government newspaper
and reflects the majority RND party's views, there were no newspapers
affiliated with any political parties. However, other parties, including
legal Islamist political parties, have access to the independent press,
in which they may express their views without government interference.
Opposition parties also disseminate information via the Internet and
comuniques.
In mid-June, two independent newspapers (El Watin and Al-Khabar) began
to print in a privately run printing plant with privately obtained newsprint.
This ended the Government's monopoly on printing companies and newsprint
imports. However, most independent newspapers continue to rely on the
Government for printing and paper imports. There was no overt use of
the Government's power to halt newspaper publications during the year.
The Government continued to exercise pressure on the independent press
through the state-owned advertising company, which was created in 1996.
All state-owned companies that wish to place an advertisement in a newspaper
must submit the item to the advertising company, which then decides
in which newspapers to place it. In an economy in which state companies'
output and government services still represent approximately two-thirds
of national income, government-provided advertising constitutes a significant
source of advertising revenue for the country's newspapers. Advertising
companies tend to provide significant amounts of advertising to publications
with a strong anti-Islamist editorial line and to withhold advertising
from newspapers on political grounds, even if such newspapers have large
readerships or offer cheap advertising rates.
President Bouteflika stated in 1999 that the media ultimately should
be at the service of the State. Radio and television remained under
government control, with coverage biased in favor of the Government's
policies. Parliamentary debates are televised live. A May parliamentary
debate regarding the State of the Nation that lasted several days was
broadcast live, without edits and in its entirety. It provided a national
forum for all representative parties, including opposition parties critical
of the Government. Satellite-dish antennas are widespread, and millions
of citizens have access to European and Middle Eastern broadcasting.
A five-member delegation from Reporters Without Borders visited the
country in June 2000. The group was allowed to meet freely with the
interlocutors of their choice and concluded that the press enjoyed increasing
press freedom. However, the delegation also noted a number of continued
barriers to full press freedom.
Many artists, intellectuals, and university educators fled the country
after widespread violence began in 1992; however, some continued to
return during the year. A growing number of academic seminars and colloquiums
occurred without governmental interference, including a May forum on
Judicial Reform sponsored by the Freedom House, which enjoyed wide press
coverage. University students staged numerous small strikes early in
the year in support of the protests in Kabylie. The Government did not
interfere in any political or economic seminars, as it had in the past.
b. Freedom of Peaceful Assembly and Association
The Constitution provides for the right of assembly; however, the 1992
Emergency Law and government practice sharply curtail this right. Citizens
and organizations must obtain permits from the appointed local governor
before holding public meetings. The Government frequently grants licenses
to political parties, NGO's, and other groups to hold indoor rallies.
In April in the Kabylie mountain region Berbers held outdoor demonstrations
commemorating the 21st anniversary of the Berber Spring of 1980, when
Berbers protested the imposition of Arabization on Berber culture. After
the death of a 19-year-old Amazigh high school student in security-force
custody, confrontations became violent between demonstrators, including
stone- and Molotov cocktail-throwing youth, and Government security
forces. Many demonstrators burned and looted government buildings, political
party offices, and public and private property. These riots were suppressed,
often with excessive force including live fire in some instances, killing
more than 50 persons and injuring many hundreds more. Two official commissions
were appointed to investigate events during the year; one commission
issued its final report in December; the other had not issued a report
by year's end (see Sections 1.a, 1.c., 1.d., and 5).
After the April violence, the Government permitted some demonstrations
(most of them unsanctioned) to take place. On May 3, the largest political
demonstration to take place in Algiers since 1998 concluded peacefully.
The event protested government actions in quelling unrest in the Kabylie
region. On May 7, a "March of Mourning" of more than 10,000
persons was held in Bejaia without government interference. The organizers
of the two separate marches that joined did not seek government permission.
However, before the event Minster of Interior Noureddine Zerhouni publicly
announced that the Government would "tolerate" the marches.
On May 10, a march of 8,000 to 10,000 persons in support of the Kabylie
Berbers took place in Algiers without government permission; the Government
did not interfere with the march. On May 21, tens of thousands of Kabylie
residents demonstrated at Tizi Ouzou with only minimal interference
from security forces. Protesters demanded that the Government withdraw
the gendarmerie from Kabylie, recognize Amazigh as a co-equal national
language with Arabic, indemnify victims of recent disturbances, and
postpone national school exams so Berber students would not be disadvantaged
for participating in the demonstrations.
Nonetheless, the Government at times used force to disperse demonstrations
that became violent. On May 31, as many as 20,000 demonstrators marched
in Algiers with the tacit approval of the Government. Security forces
used tear gas and water cannons to break up the demonstrations when
600 to 700 protestors became violent, throwing stones at police. On
June 14, the Government dispersed with tear gas and water cannons a
march of more than 250,000 protesters after small groups of marchers
became violent and burned and later destroyed property and looted a
police station, a bus depot, and stores and businesses. In reaction
the Government announced a ban on demonstrations in the capital.
Some other unlicensed groups continue to be active, including groups
dedicated to the cause of persons who have disappeared. Such groups
continued to hold regular demonstrations outside government buildings
during the year. On November 8, security forces in Constantine disrupted
a demonstration by family members of persons who had disappeared. When
the crowd of approximately 100 persons arrived at the town hall for
a regular demonstration (usually held weekly), they were met by security
forces who demanded that they disperse. When the demonstrators refused
to leave, security forces forcibly dispersed them, reportedly using
truncheons. One person was injured (see Section 1.c.). In November 2000
police used force to disrupt a march by families of the disappeared,
and arrested five persons.
Four subsequently were released; the fifth was tried and convicted
of attacking a security officer (see Section 2.b.). In March 2000, in
the western cities of Relizane and Oran, the Government arrested 40
persons during 2 separate demonstrations that occurred about a week
apart; however, those arrested were released after brief detention.
The Government granted a license to a group of Islamists, including
founders of the banned FIS party, to hold a meeting on July 9.
The Constitution provides for the right of association; however, the
1992 Emergency Law and government practice severely restrict it. The
Interior Ministry must approve all political parties before they may
be established (see Section 3). In January 2000, the Government refused
to approve the Wafa Party on the grounds that many of its members had
belonged to the outlawed FIS. The Government closed the Party's offices
in November 2000. The Front Democratique, which is headed by former
Prime Minister Sid Ahmed Ghozali, applied for registration in May 2000,
but received no response within the time period specified by law for
governmental decision on such cases (see Section 3). On March 29, the
Interior Minister stated that the information in the party's application
was too vague and that the Ministry was in the process of gathering
the information it needed to make a decision. The Front Democratique
had not been licensed by year's end. The Interior Ministry licenses
all nongovernmental associations and regards all associations as illegal
unless they have licenses. It may deny a license to, or dissolve, any
group regarded as a threat to the Government's authority, or to the
security or public order of the State. After the Government suspended
the parliamentary election in 1992, it banned the FIS as a political
party, and the social and charitable groups associated with it. Membership
in the FIS remains illegal, although at least one former FIS leader
announced publicly that he intended to form a cultural youth group.
Domestic NGO's must be licensed by the Government and are prohibited
from receiving funding from abroad. Some unlicensed groups operate openly.
c. Freedom of Religion
The Constitution declares Islam to be the state religion but prohibits
discrimination based on religious belief and the Government generally
respects this right in practice; however, there are some restrictions.
Islam is the only legal religion, and the law limits the practice of
other faiths; however, the Government follows a de facto policy of tolerance
by not inquiring into the religious practices of individuals.
The law prohibits public assembly for purposes of practicing a faith
other than Islam. However, Roman Catholic churches in the country, including
a cathedral in Algiers (the seat of the Archbishop), conduct services
without government interference. There are only a few smaller churches
and other places of worship; non-Muslims usually congregate in private
homes for religious services.
Because Islam is the state religion, the country's education system
is structured to benefit Muslims. Education is free to all citizens
below the age of 16, and the study of Islam is a strict requirement
in the public schools, which are regulated by the Ministry of Education
and the Ministry of Religious Affairs.
The Government appoints preachers to mosques and gives general guidance
on sermons. The Government monitors activities in mosques for possible
security-related offenses and bars their use as public meeting places
outside of regular prayer hours. The Ministry of Religious Affairs provides
some financial support to mosques and has limited control over the training
of imams.
On June 27, the Government enacted a series of amendments to the Penal
Code to specify prison sentences and fines for preaching in a mosque
by individuals who have not been recognized by the Government as imams.
Such unauthorized persons may be sentenced to prison terms of 1 to 3
years and fines ranging from $130 (10,000 dinars) to $1,298 (100,000
dinars). Any person (including imams recognized by the government) found
guilty of speaking out during prayers at the mosque in a manner that
is "contrary to the noble nature of the mosque or likely to offend
the cohesion of society or serve as an apology for such actions"
may be sentenced to 3 to 5 years in prison and fines of up to $2,597
(200,000 dinars). The amendments make no attempt to specify what constitutes
preaching that is "contrary to the noble nature of the mosque or
likely to offend public cohesion." There were no reported cases
in which the Government invoked the new amendments by year's end.
Conversions from Islam to other religions are rare. Islam does not
recognize conversion to other faiths at any age. However, the Constitution's
provisions concerning freedom of religion prohibit any Government sanction
against conversion. Because of safety concerns and potential legal and
social problems, Muslim converts practice their new faith clandestinely.
The Family Code, which is based on Shari'a (Islamic law), prohibits
Muslim women from marrying non-Muslims, although this regulation is
not always enforced. The code does not restrict Muslim men from marrying
non-Muslim women. Under both Shari'a and civil law, children born to
a Muslim father are Muslim, regardless of the mother's religion.
Non-Islamic proselytizing is illegal, and the Government restricts
the importation of non-Islamic literature for widespread distribution.
Personal copies of the major works of other religions, such as the Bible,
may be brought into the country. Non-Islamic religious texts and music
and video selections no longer are difficult to locate for purchase.
The Government prohibits the dissemination of any literature that portrays
violence as a legitimate precept of Islam.
The country's 10-year civil conflict has pitted self-proclaimed radical
Muslims against the general Islamic population. After his 1999 election,
President Bouteflika acknowledged that a more accurate accounting of
the number of persons killed during the previous 8 years placed the
total at about 100,000. Extremist self-proclaimed "Islamists"
have issued public threats against all "infidels" in the country,
both foreigners and citizens, and have killed both Muslims and non-Muslims,
including missionaries. The majority of the country's terrorist groups
do not, as a rule, differentiate between religious and political killings.
During the year, terrorists continued attacks against the Government
and civilians (see Sections 1.a. and 1.g.).
In 1994 the Armed Islamic Group (GIA) declared its intention to eliminate
Jews, Christians, and polytheists from Algeria. The GIA has not yet
retracted that declaration and, as a result, the mainly foreign Christian
community tends to curtail its public activities.
d. Freedom of Movement Within the Country, Foreign Travel, Emigration,
and Repatriation
The law provides for freedom of domestic and foreign travel, and freedom
to emigrate; however, the Government at times restricts these rights.
The Government does not allow foreign travel by senior officials of
the banned FIS. FIS President Abassi Madani, who was released from prison
in 1997, remains under house arrest (see Section 1.d.). The Government
also does not permit young men who are eligible for the draft and who
have not yet completed their military service to leave the country if
they do not have special authorization; such authorization may be granted
to students and to those individuals with special family circumstances.
The Family Code does not permit married females under 19 years of age
to travel abroad without their husband's permission, although this provision
generally is not followed in practice. In the spring of 1999, the Government
allowed travel abroad by representatives of organizations pursuing information
on relatives who allegedly "disappeared" due to the actions
of the security forces. These organizations, which were hosted by human
rights NGO's, held public discussions on those who had disappeared.
Under the state of emergency, the Interior Minister and the provincial
governors may deny residency in certain districts to persons regarded
as threats to public order. The Government also restricts travel into
four southern provinces, where much of the hydrocarbon industry and
many foreign workers are located, in order to enhance security in those
areas.
The police and the communal guards operate checkpoints throughout the
country. They routinely stop vehicles to inspect identification papers
and to search for evidence of terrorist activity. They sometimes detain
persons at these checkpoints.
Armed groups intercept citizens at roadblocks, often using stolen police
uniforms and equipment in various regions to rob them of their cash
and vehicles. On occasion armed groups killed groups of civilian passengers
at these roadblocks (see Section 1.a.).
The Constitution and the law provide for the granting of asylum and
refugee status in accordance with the 1951 U.N. Convention Relating
to the Status of Refugees and its 1967 Protocol. The Government grants
asylum and cooperates with the office of the U.N. High Commissioner
for Refugees (UNHCR) and other humanitarian organizations in assisting
refugees. The Government provides first asylum to approximately 165,000
refugee Sahrawis, former residents of the Western Sahara who left that
territory after Morocco took control of it in the 1970's. UNHCR, the
World Food Program (WFP), the Algerian Red Crescent, and other organizations
are assisting Sahrawi refugees. The country also hosts an estimated
5,000 Palestinian refugees, most of whom no longer require international
assistance. In the mid-1990's, the Government worked with international
organizations to respond to Tuareg refugees from Mali and Niger. Most
Tuaregs voluntarily repatriated from 1996 to 1999. There were no reports
of the forced return of persons to a country where they feared persecution.
Section 3 Respect for Political Rights: The Right of Citizens to Change
Their Government
The Constitution provides citizens with the right to change their government;
however, there are significant limitations to this right in practice.
The strong prerogatives of the executive branch, supported by the entrenched
power of the military and the bureaucracy, prevent citizens from exercising
this right. The withdrawal of six presidential candidates in 1999 amidst
credible charges of fraud, and the election of President Bouteflika,
highlighted the continued dominance of the military elite in the process
of selecting the country's political leadership.
President Bouteflika was elected in an April 1999 presidential election
that was seriously flawed by the withdrawal 1 day before the election
of all other candidates, who charged that the military already had begun
to implement plans to produce a fraudulent Bouteflika victory. Until
those allegations surfaced, the campaign had been conducted fairly,
with all candidates widely covered in both state-owned and private media.
The conduct of the campaign--although regulated as to the use of languages
other than Arabic, and as to the timing, location, and duration of meetings--was
free, and all candidates traveled extensively throughout the country.
One potential candidate was denied the ability to run because the electoral
commission determined that he could not prove that he had participated
in Algeria's war of independence against France, a legal requirement
for candidates for President born before July 1942. With the withdrawal
of the other candidates and the absence of foreign observers, it was
impossible to make an accurate determination of turnout for the election;
although it apparently was as low as 30 percent, the Government claimed
a 60 percent turnout. The next presidential election is scheduled for
April 2004.
Under the Constitution, the President has the authority to rule by
decree in special circumstances. The President subsequently must submit
to the Parliament for approval decrees issued while the Parliament was
not in session. The President did not exercise such authority during
the year. The Parliament has a popularly elected lower chamber, the
National Popular Assembly (APN), and an upper chamber, the National
Council, two-thirds of whose members are elected by municipal and provincial
councils. The President appoints the remaining one-third of the National
Council's members. Legislation must have the approval of three-quarters
of both the upper and lower chambers' members. Laws must originate in
the lower chamber.
In 1997, Algeria held its first elections to the APN since elections
were canceled in 1992, and elected the first multiparty parliament in
the country's history. Candidates representing 39 political parties
participated, along with several independent candidates. Under a system
of proportional representation, the government-supported party, the
National Democratic Rally (RND) won a plurality of 154 seats out of
a total of 371. In their final report, neutral observers stated that,
of the 1,258 (of the country's 35,000) voting stations that they assessed,
1,169 produced satisfactory results, 95 were problematic, and 11 were
unsatisfactory. In 1997 the provincial election commissions announced
the results of their adjudication of the appeals filed by various political
parties. The RND lost some seats but remained the overall victor in
the Assembly elections. The next parliamentary elections are expected
to take place in April or May 2002.
Since 1997 the law requires that potential political parties receive
official approval from the Interior Ministry before they may be established.
To obtain approval, a party must have 25 founders from across the country
whose names must be registered with the Interior Ministry. Two parties
have failed to receive registration. In January 2000, the Government
refused to approve the Wafa party because of its perceived ties to the
FIS (see Section 2.b.). On March 29, the Interior Minister stated that
the information in the Front Democratique's application for recognition,
which was filed in May 2000, was too vague, and that the Ministry was
in the process of gathering the information it needed to make a decision.
The party's application remained pending at year's end. No party may
use religion, Amazigh heritage, or Arab heritage as a basis of organizing
for political purposes. The law also bans political party ties to nonpolitical
associations and regulates party financing and reporting requirements.
The more than 30 existing political parties represent a wide spectrum
of viewpoints and engage in activities that range from holding rallies
to issuing communiques. The Government continues to ban the FIS as a
political party (see Section 2.b.). With the exception of the leading
progovernment party (RND), and the National Liberation Front (FLN),
political parties sometimes encounter difficulties when dealing with
local officials, who hinder their organizational efforts. The Government
monitors private telephone communications, and sometimes disconnects
telephone service to political opponents for extended periods (see Section
1.f.). While opposition parties access to state-controlled electronic
media remains limited, opposition party leaders increasingly have been
permitted to represent their views on television and on the radio, even
those views directly critical of the Government. Further, televised
parliamentary debates aired uncensored and uncut allow all parties access
to the electronic media. The independent press also publicizes their
views.
The percentage of women in government and politics does not correspond
to their percentage of the population. The new Cabinet, named in May,
has no female members. Thirteen of the 380 members of the lower house
of Parliament are women. The upper house has six female members. In
September 1999, President Bouteflika appointed the first female provincial
governor. A woman heads a workers' party, and all the major political
parties except one had women's divisions headed by women.
The Amazighs, an ethnic Berber minority of about 9 million centered
in the Kabylie region, participate freely and actively in the political
process. From April through the remainder of the year, Amazighs held
a series of demonstrations, some violent; security forces in some instances
put down violent demonstrations with excessive force (see Sections 1.a.,
1.c., 1.d., and 2.b.).
Two major opposition parties originated in the Amazigh-populated region
of the country: The Socialist Forces Front and the Rally for Culture
and Democracy. These two parties represent Amazigh political and cultural
concerns in the Parliament and the media. The two Amazigh-based parties
were required to conform with the 1997 changes to the Electoral Law
that stipulate that political parties must have at least 25 founders
from across the country.
The Tuaregs, a people of Amazigh origin, do not play an important role
in politics, due to their small numbers, estimated in the tens of thousands,
and their nomadic existence.
Section 4 Governmental Attitude Regarding International and Nongovernmental
Investigation of Alleged Violations of Human Rights
The most active independent human rights group is the Algerian League
for the Defense of Human Rights (LADDH), an independent organization
that has members throughout the country. The LADDH is not permitted
access to government officials or to prisons, except as under the normal
consultations allowed between a lawyer and a client. The less-active
Algerian League for Human Rights (LADH) is an independent organization
based in Constantine. The LADH has members throughout the country who
follow individual cases. Human rights groups report occasional harassment
by government authorities in the form of obvious surveillance and cutting
off of telephone service (see Section 1.f.).
Unlike in previous years, when such visits were banned, since the beginning
of 2000 the Government has welcomed a variety of international NGO's.
The Rights Consortium, a combined effort of Freedom House, the International
Center for Journalists, and the American Bar Association, visited the
country in January, February, and May. An additional trip scheduled
for the fall was postponed due to uncertainty in the region due to flooding.
Similarly, the National Democratic Institute has been active, and visited
the country eight times during the year. NDI has brought in international
political experts from around the world to work with the local groups.
The Institute also had taken representatives of all the country's major
political parties to the U.S. promoting democratization, including by
meeting regularly with and conducting seminars for political parties
and training them in a variety of political skills ranging from grassroots
consensus development to constituent services.
Doctors Without Borders requested visas to visit the Kabylie region
in June. Their requests were denied because the Government maintained
that the Algerian medical system was sufficiently handling the demand
for medical care.
Delegations from Amnesty International, the ICRC, Human Rights Watch,
Freedom House, the FIDH, and Reporters Without Borders visited the country
in 2000 at the Government's invitation. Amnesty International visited
in May 2000 and again in October 2000, and, after its May visit, claimed
that the delegation had been "able to move around the country freely"
and that "no restrictions were imposed" on its activities.
Amnesty International did not seek meetings with members of the FIS
in prison or under house arrest. The organization stated that there
had been "a significant drop in the level of violence and killings,
and the reports of arbitrary arrests, prolonged incommunicado detention,
torture, disappearances, and unfair trials have also diminished significantly."
However, Amnesty International maintained that many serious concerns
had not been addressed, including resolving past abuses such as disappearances
and extrajudicial killings. Moreover, during its October visit, Amnesty
International claimed that the Government was not cooperating adequately
or providing the organization with quality information. The organization
also claimed that the Government was staging demonstrations opposing
the Amnesty International visit. Despite requests to visit, Amnesty
International claims that it has not been allowed entry into the country
since 2000. The ICRC began visiting the country to observe prison conditions
in 1999, and has continued such visits twice yearly.
A delegation from Human Rights Watch met with government officials
in May 2000. The delegation stated that it was "allowed to travel
freely and meet with officials, lawyers, nongovernmental organizations,
and victims and families of victims of abuses by the Government and
armed groups."
The U.N. Working Group on Enforced or Involuntary Disappearances, which
asked in 2000 to visit the country, had not been granted access by year's
end. The Government had also not responded positively to requests to
visit from the U.N. Special Rapporteur on Torture and the U.N. Special
Rapporteur on Extrajudicial Executions.
The National Observatory for Human Rights (ONDH) was established by
the Government in 1992 to report human rights violations to the authorities;
however, in February President Bouteflika announced the creation of
a new Human Rights Commission to replace the ONDH and the national Human
Rights Ombudsman.
The new National Consultative Commission for the Promotion and Protection
of Human Rights was formally established on October 9, and it held an
initial meeting on October 24. The Commission is made up of 45 members,
22 of whom belong to governmental bodies and 23 of whom come from civil
society and NGO's. The nongovernmental members include representatives
of Islamic religious organizations, the Red Crescent Society, and women's
rights advocacy groups. The President approves nominees, and the Commission's
budget and secretariat (which the Government says will be "independent")
come from his office.
The Commission's mandate includes: Reporting on human rights issues;
coordinating with police and justice officials; advocating domestic
and international human rights causes; mediating between the Government
and the population; and providing expertise on human rights issues to
the Government.
Domestic NGO's must be licensed by the Government and are prohibited
from receiving funding from abroad. Some unlicensed groups operate openly.
Section 5 Discrimination Based on Race, Sex, Religion, Disability,
Language, or Social Status
The Constitution prohibits discrimination based on birth, race, sex,
belief, or any other personal or social condition; however, women continue
to face legal and social discrimination.
Women
Women's rights advocates assert that spousal abuse is common, but there
are no reliable statistics regarding its extent. Spousal abuse is more
frequent in rural than urban areas and among less-educated persons.
There are no specific laws against spousal rape. Rape is illegal, and
in principle a spouse could be charged under the law. However, there
are strong societal pressures against a woman seeking legal redress
against her spouse for rape, and there have been no reports of the law
being applied in such cases. Battered women must obtain medical certification
of the physical effects of an assault before they lodge a complaint
with the police. However, because of societal pressures, women frequently
are reluctant to endure this process. There are very few facilities
offering safe haven for abused women, and many more are needed. Women's
rights groups have experienced difficulty in drawing attention to spousal
abuse as an important social problem, largely due to societal attitudes.
There are several rape-crisis centers run by women's groups, but they
have few resources.
There is a rape crisis center that specializes in caring for women
who are victims of rape by terrorists (see Sections 1.a, 1.b., 1.c.,
6.c., and 6.f.). On July 14, a group of young men raided a shantytown
area near the oil town of Hassi-Messaoud, raping and seriously wounding
dozens of single women who live there. The violence was incited by an
imam who accused the women of prostitution and questioned why they were
working while men in the town were unemployed. On July 23, a similar
attack took place in the area of Tebessa, a trading center east of Algiers.
During the year, extremists sometimes specifically targeted women.
There were numerous incidents of women and girls being killed and mutilated
in massacres. Armed terrorist groups reportedly kidnapped young women
and held them captive for extended periods for the purposes of rape
and servitude (see Sections 1.a., 1.b., 1.c., 6.c., and 6.f.).
The law prohibits prostitution, and it is not considered to be a problem.
Some aspects of the law and many traditional social practices discriminate
against women. The 1984 Family Code, which is based in large part on
Shari'a, treats women as minors under the legal guardianship of a husband
or male relative. For example, a woman must obtain a father's approval
to marry. Divorce is difficult for a wife to obtain except in cases
of abandonment or the husband's conviction for a serious crime. Husbands
generally obtain the right to the family's home in the case of divorce.
Custody of the children normally is awarded to the mother, but she may
not enroll them in a particular school or take them out of the country
without the father's authorization. Only males are able to confer citizenship
on their children. Muslim women are prohibited from marrying non-Muslims;
Muslim men may marry non-Muslim women (see Section 2.c.).
The Family Code also affirms the Islamic practice of allowing a man
to marry up to four wives, although this rarely occurs in practice.
A wife may sue for divorce if her husband does not inform her of his
intent to marry another woman prior to the marriage.
Women suffer from discrimination in inheritance claims; in accordance
with Shari'a, women are entitled to a smaller portion of an estate than
are male children or a deceased husband's brothers. According to Shari'a,
such a distinction is justified because other provisions require that
the husband's income and assets are to be used to support the family,
while the wife's remain, in principle, her own. However, in practice
women do not always have exclusive control over assets that they bring
to a marriage or income that they earn themselves. Married females under
19 years of age may not travel abroad without their husbands' permission
(see Section 2.d.). However, women may take out business loans and are
the sole custodians of their dowries. In its 2000 report, the International
Labor Organization (ILO) Committee of Experts (COE) noted that the Government
has stated that, despite incorporating equality between men and women
into the legislative and regulatory texts governing the workplace, in
practice women still are confronted with discrimination in employment
resulting from stereotypes that exist regarding a woman's place in society.
While social pressure against women pursuing higher education or a
career exists throughout the country, it is much stronger in rural areas
than in major urban areas. Women constitute only 10 percent of the work
force. Nonetheless, women may own businesses, enter into contracts,
and pursue opportunities in government, medicine, law, education, the
media, and the armed forces. About 25 percent of judges are women, a
percentage that has been growing in recent years. President Bouteflika's
changes to the judiciary in August increased the number of courts headed
by women (see Section 1.e.).
Although the law bans sexual discrimination in the workplace, the leaders
of women's organizations report that violations are commonplace. Labor
Ministry inspectors do little to enforce the law.
There are numerous women's rights groups, although the size of individual
groups is small. Their main goals are to foster women's economic welfare
and to amend aspects of the Family Code.
Armed terrorist groups reportedly kidnapped young women and held them
captive for extended periods for the purposes of rape and servitude
(see Sections 1.a., 1.b., 1.c., 6.c., and 6.f.).
Children
The Government attempts to protect children. It provides free education
for children 6 to 15 years of age. Approximately 94 to 96 percent of
children attend at least some school. More than 85 percent of children
complete the ninth grade. Boys and girls generally receive the same
treatment in education, although girls are slightly more likely to drop
out. The Government provides free medical care for all citizens--albeit
in often rudimentary facilities. The Ministry of Youth and Sports has
programs for children, but such programs face serious funding problems.
Child abuse is a problem. Hospitals treat numerous child-abuse cases
every year, but many cases go unreported. Laws against child abuse have
not led to notable numbers of prosecutions against offenders. Legal
experts maintain that the Penal and Family Codes do not offer children
sufficient protection. NGO's that specialize in care of children cite
an increase in domestic violence aimed at children, which they attribute
to the "culture of violence" developed during the years since
1992 and the social dislocations caused by the movement of rural families
to the cities to escape terrorist violence. Such NGO's have educational
programs aimed at reducing the level of violence, but lack funding.
Children often are the victims of terrorist attacks.
Armed terrorist groups reportedly kidnapped young women and held them
captive for extended periods for the purposes of rape and servitude
(see Sections 1.a., 1.b., 1.c., 6.c., and 6.f.).
Economic necessity compels many children to resort to informal employment,
such as street vending (see Section 6.d.).
Persons with Disabilities
The Government does not mandate accessibility to buildings or government
services for persons with disabilities. Public enterprises, in downsizing
the work force, generally ignore a law that requires that they reserve
1 percent of their jobs for persons with disabilities. Social security
provides for payments for orthopedic equipment, and some NGO's receive
limited government financial support. The Government also attempts to
finance specialized training, but this initiative remains rudimentary.
National/Racial/Ethnic Minorities
The Amazighs are an ethnic minority centered in the Kabylie region.
Amazigh nationalists have sought to maintain their own cultural and
linguistic identity in the face of the Government's continued Arabization
program. The law requires that Arabic be the official language and requires,
under penalty of fines, that all official government business be conducted
in Arabic. The law may be interpreted to require that Arabic be used
for all broadcasts on national television and radios, for dubbing or
subtitling all nonArabic films, for medical prescriptions, and for medical
equipment. However, in practice one of the two Government television
stations has a regular news program in Amazigh, and one of the Government
radio stations broadcasts entirely in that language. As part of the
national charter signed in 1996, the Government and several major political
parties agreed that the Amazigh culture and language were major political
components of the country's identity. In September 1999, President Bouteflika
stated that the Amazigh language would never be an official language;
during the year he stated that the enhancement of the status of the
Amazigh language would require a constitutional amendment. However,
on October 3, Prime Minister Benflis reportedly agreed to recognize
the Amazigh language as a national language. There are professorships
in Amazigh culture at the University of Tizi Ouzou. Amazighs hold influential
positions in government, the army, business, and journalism.
From April throughout the remainder of the year, Amazighs held a series
of demonstrations, some violent; security forces in some instances put
down violent demonstrations with excessive force (see Sections 1.a.,
1.c., 1.d., and 2.b.).
The Tuaregs, a people of Amazigh origin, live an isolated, nomadic
existence and are relatively few in numbers.
Section 6 Worker Rights
a. The Right of Association
Workers are required to obtain government approval to establish a union,
and the Government may invalidate a union's legal status if its objectives
are determined to be contrary the established institutional system,
to public order, good morals or the laws or regulations in force. There
are no legal restrictions on a workers right to join a union.
About two-thirds of the labor force belong to unions. There is an umbrella
labor confederation, the General Union of Algerian Workers (UGTA) and
its affiliated entities, which dates from the era of a single political
party. The UGTA encompasses national unions that are specialized by
sector. There are also some autonomous unions, such as unions for Air
Algerie pilots (SPLA), executives of the state-owned hydrocarbon company
Sonatrach (FNPA), airport technicians (SNTMA), and teachers (CNES).
The 1990 law on labor unions requires the Labor Ministry to approve
a union application within 30 days. The Autonomous Unions Confederation
(CSA) has attempted since early 1996 to organize the autonomous unions,
but without success. The application that the CSA filed with the Labor
Ministry still was pending at year's end, although the CSA continues
to function without official status. The labor union organized by the
banned FIS, the Islamic Workers Union (SIT), was dissolved in 1992 because
it had no license.
Under the state of emergency, the Government is empowered to require
workers in both the public and private sectors to stay at their jobs
in the event of an unauthorized or illegal strike. According to the
1990 Law on Industrial Relations, workers may strike only after 14 days
of mandatory conciliation or mediation. (The Government on occasion
offers to mediate disputes.) The law states that decisions reached in
mediation are binding on both parties. If no agreement is reached in
mediation, the workers may strike legally after they vote by secret
ballot to do so. A minimum level of public services must be maintained
during public sector service strikes.
During the year, the ILO Committee of Experts requested the Government
to take steps through legislation to ensure that no provisions of Legislative
Decree 92-03 are applied against workers peacefully exercising the right
to strike. The decree defines as subversive acts, or acts of terrorism,
offenses directed against the stability and normal functioning of institutions
through any action taken with the intention of "obstructing the
operation of establishments providing public service" or of "impeding
traffic or freedom of movement in public places." The Government
claimed that the Decree is not directed against the right to strike
or the right to organize and has never been used against workers exercising
the right to strike peacefully.
On March 20, labor unions held a "general day of protest"
against government privatization plans. Members of unions in the petrochemical,
steel, tobacco, industrial vehicles, electronics, and utilities sectors
participated.
The 1-day strike had little effect on daily life, but it gained the
attention of government officials and highlighted the unions' concerns
about economic reforms. On March 28, the Federation of Finance and Planning
Employees held a general strike to protest recently adopted reforms
to the Central Bank. The strike was publicized poorly and had little
effect.
Unions may form and join federations or confederations, affiliate with
international labor bodies, and develop relations with foreign labor
groups. For example, the UGTA is a member of the International Confederation
of Free Trade Unions (ICFTU). However, the law prohibits unions from
associating with political parties and also prohibits unions from receiving
funds from foreign sources. The courts are empowered to dissolve unions
that engage in illegal activities.
b. The Right to Organize and Bargain Collectively
The law provides for collective bargaining for all unions, and the
Government permits this right in practice. The law prohibits discrimination
by employers against union members and organizers, and provides mechanisms
for resolving trade union complaints of antiunion practices by employers.
It also permits unions to recruit members at the workplace. However,
the law prohibits unions from associating with political parties and
also prohibits unions from receiving funds from foreign sources. The
courts are empowered to dissolve unions that engage in illegal activities.
The Government has established an export processing zone in Jijel.
Workers in the Export Processing Zone have the same rights as other
workers in the country.
c. Prohibition of Forced or Compulsory Labor
Forced or compulsory labor is incompatible with the Constitution's
provisions on individual rights, and the Penal Code prohibits compulsory
labor, including forced or bonded labor by children. While the Government
generally enforces the ban effectively, armed terrorist groups reportedly
kidnap young women and girls hold them captive for weeks at a time,
during which group members rape them and force them into servitude (see
Sections 1.a., 1.b., 1.c., 5, and 6.f.).
The ILO's Committee of Experts has noted that the law that requires
persons who have completed a course of higher education or training
to perform a period of service of between 2 and 4 years in order to
obtain employment or work in an occupation, is not compatible with relevant
ILO conventions dealing with forced labor. The Committee stated that
it has been urging the Government for many years to cease imposing prison
labor to rehabilitate persons convicted for expressing certain political
views.
d. Status of Child Labor Practices and Minimum Age for Employment
The minimum age for employment is 16 years. Inspectors from the Ministry
of Labor enforce the minimum employment age by making periodic or unannounced
inspection visits to public sector enterprises. They do not enforce
the law effectively in the agricultural or private sectors. UNICEF reported
in October that approximately 5 percent of children work in some capacity,
and there is no child labor in the industrial sector; however, economic
necessity compels some children to resort to informal employment, such
as street vending. The Government prohibits forced and bonded labor
by children. Armed terrorist groups frequently kidnaped young women
and held them captive for weeks at a time. During this time, group members
raped them and forced them into servitude (see Sections 1.a., 1.b.,
1.c., 5, and 6.c.).
On February 9, the Government ratified ILO Convention 182 on the worst
forms of child labor.
e. Acceptable Conditions of Work
The law defines the overall framework for acceptable conditions of
work but leaves specific agreements on wages, hours, and conditions
of employment to the discretion of employers in consultation with employees.
The Government fixes by decree a monthly minimum wage for all sectors;
however, this is not sufficient to provide a decent standard of living
for a worker and family. The minimum wage is approximately $105 (8,000
dinars) per month. Ministry of Labor inspectors are responsible for
ensuring compliance with the minimum wage regulation; however, their
enforcement is inconsistent.
In July 2000, the standard workweek was shortened to 37.5 hours. Workers
who work beyond the standard workweek receive premium pay on a sliding
scale from "time and a half" to "double time," depending
on whether the overtime is worked on a normal work day, a weekend, or
a holiday.
There are well-developed occupation and health regulations codified
in the law, but government inspectors do not enforce these regulations
effectively. There were no reports of workers being dismissed for removing
themselves from hazardous working conditions. Because employment generally
is based on very detailed contracts, workers rarely are subjected to
conditions in the workplace about which they were not previously informed.
If workers are subjected to such conditions, they first may attempt
to renegotiate the employment contract and, that failing, resort to
the courts.
f. Trafficking in Persons
The law does not prohibit specifically trafficking in persons. Armed
terrorist groups frequently kidnapped young women and held them captive
for weeks at a time, during which group members raped them and forced
them into servitude (see Sections 1.a., 1.b., 1.c., 5, and 6.c.). There
is a rape crisis center in Algiers that specializes in caring for women
who are victims of rape by terrorists.
Source: The
Country Reports on Human Rights Practices,
U.S. State Department, March 2002
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