Classified US diplomatic cables, leaked
by the whistleblower site WikiLeaks, contain accounts of Representative
Wexler's discussion with IDF Intelligence Chief Amos Yadlin on the threat
of Iran. The differences that exist between the intelligence community
in interpretations of the Iranian nuclear program as well as the relationship
between Iran and the Palestinians were also presented.
S E C R E T TEL AVIV 001060
SIPDIS
E.O. 12958: DECL: 05/13/2019
TAGS: PREL MPOS KNNP IR IS
SUBJECT: REP. WEXLER DISCUSSES IRAN WITH IDF INTELLIGENCE CHIEF YADLIN
Classified By: DCM Luis G, Moreno, Reason 1.4 (b) (d)
¶1. (S) Representative Robert Wexler (D, Florida), accompanied
by Deputy Chief of Staff Joshua Rogin and DCM Moreno, met with Israel
Defense Forces Intelligence Chief, MG Amos Yadlin, on Sunday 10 May
2009. MG Yadlin focused his discussion on the preparations for the
upcoming visit of Prime Minister Netanyahu to the United States and
the Iranian nuclear program. MG Yadlin informed Rep. Wexler that the
PM was preparing intensely for his upcoming visit to Washington. In
addition to hours of policy review, the PM had been provided significant
amounts of intelligence from the IDI and Mossad on Iran's nuclear
program. The intelligence presented included assessments of the current
status of the Iranian program; timelines, effects of sanctions; views
of the international community; and outcomes of engagement. The differences
that exist between the intelligence community in interpretations of
the Iranian nuclear program as well as the relationship between Iran
and the Palestinians were also presented. MG Yadlin indicated that
the IDF had presented its information last week, leaving the cabinet
on Friday 08 May 2009 to consider policy options and how information
will be presented during the upcoming visit to Washington. Although
no direct feedback was provided, MG Yadlin opined that the PM appears
determined on Iran.
¶2. (S) Rep. Wexler asked MG Yadlin to expand on the differences
in the interpretations of the intelligence. MG Yadlin explained that
until 2003, Iran had violated the Nuclear Proliferation Treaty by
having a weaponization group and although Iran could show civilian
uses for a missile program and a fissile program, there was no justification
for a weaponization group. He went on to say that Iran halted its
program in 2003 after the invasion of Iraq, but reinvigorated the
program in 2005. He expressed that some in the US agree with this
and others do not. He went on to explain that Israel is not in a position
to underestimate Iran and be surprised like the US was on 11 September
2001.
¶3. (S) MG Yadlin explained that Israel tries to be more precise
than the US in estimating Iran's intentions and timeline for obtaining
a nuclear bomb. Iran is in the position of wanting to pay only a minimum
cost for its current program. It does not want to be North Korea or
what Iraq was before 2003. Iran intends to keep resolutions and sanctions
at a certain manageable level and continue to produce low enriched
uranium until there is enough for several bombs. MG Yadlin stated
that Iran could decide to produce a bomb by 2010, but Iran is waiting
for the right time in the future and that there are some who will
always doubt it despite the evidence.
¶4. (S) Rep. Wexler then asked about the prospect of engagement.
MG Yadlin said he does not oppose engagement, and in fact gave a speech
approximately six months ago
expressing that Israel needed to find a way to find positives in engagement.
He feels there needs to be an agreed upon deadline; a measure for
success or failure; and a plan B if
engagement does not work in order for engagement to have any chance.
He also expressed strongly that engagement should have already started.
MG Yadlin outlined four possible outcomes of engagement. Two good
outcomes would be the Iranian nuclear program stopped or a failure
of engagement that allows Russia and China to see the US made all
efforts to prevent the program diplomatically and allows for greater
cooperation in the future. Two bad outcomes would be Iran playing
for time with no claim of failure on the part of engagement or a bad
bargain that still allows Iran to obtain a nuclear bomb even if in
a longer timeline. Rep. Wexler went on to discuss that there is a
third good option in that the President may have better leverage with
the American public to support action if engagement efforts are attempted
and failed. Rep Wexler recommended that the Israeli people need to
consider the US perspective and public opinion. MG Yadlin responded
that he is not recommending the US enter a third front, but it has
to be understood that Israel sees things differently and that Israel
has to be ready and can not remove the military option from the table.
Rep Wexler stated that he expected Israel would be pleasantly surprised
by the President's acceptance of all possible options in regards to
Iran.