Memorandum Warning President About Pressure To Aid Israel
(January 12, 1966)
This is a very revealing memo that gives a good
sense of the behind the scenes political games played in Middle East
diplomacy and how the pro-Israel
lobby operates and is sometimes countered by the bureaucracy.
Memorandum From the President's Deputy Special Assistant for National
Security Affairs (Komer) to President Johnson 1
Washington, January 12, 1966, 11 a.m.
Our Israeli Affairs. Mike Feldman says he hopes to
see you in the next few days, probably to pass on a complaint about
how poorly we're treating Israel.
In fact, I wouldn't be surprised if you got a letter from Eshkol shortly.
Such gambits are part of a standard Israeli effort
to put pressure on us for more military and economic help. I've been
through them before and, as I wrote you,/2/ the best response is to
play a little hard to get ourselves (and make clear we won't be muscled)
before coming through. We end up spending less this way. Thus we've
held up informing Israel of your economic aid decision just yet; we're
also waiting till we can propose to you a solution on planes for Jordan
and Israel.
One development has infuriated the Israelis. To counter
all the public criticism they generated about US aid to Nasser and arms to other Arabs, somebody in the Pentagon defensively leaked
that the Israelis were secretly buying fancy missiles from France. We
haven't made them feel any better by pointing out that, while we deplore
the leak, it serves them right.
Although Israel will complain about a crisis of confidence,
this is par for the course. So is sending Feldman and Feinberg in to
harry you. Thus, I'd see merit in telling Feldman to pass back word
that we naturally bridle when Israel tells us how to run our business
and that, if Israel expects help from us, it must be a two-way street.
We could well afford to hold the line for another few weeks before easing
up.
If you feel that we are trying to play too cozy a
game, however, we can ease up. We can short-circuit most Zionist criticism by leaking the tank deal to Israel (even though this risks
flak from Arabs, especially Nasser). We could also go ahead with the
economic aid package, and then with the planes. In sum, we have more
than enough goodies in hand to stem any tide of criticism. The only
real issue is whether to play hard to get a bit longer as a lesson,
or to begin caving now.
R. W. Komer
Keep holding back till February
Start easing up now 3
1. Source: Johnson Library, National Security File,
Memos to the President, McGeorge Bundy, Vol. 18. Secret. Filed with
a January 12 covering memorandum from Bundy to the President noting
that it replaced a memorandum that he and Komer had sent earlier and
expressing disappointment that the Israelis were "still trying
to use the Feldman/Feinberg channel for serious business."
2. A January 5 memorandum from Komer to the President
noted several items that Komer attributed to an Israeli effort to put
public pressure on the United States for more aid. He recommended telling
the Israelis that "we simply refuse to do business this way."
A note from Bundy on the memorandum endorsed Komer's recommendation.
Johnson wrote "See me" on the memorandum. (Ibid., Country
File, Israel, Vol. 5) Bundy stated in the January 12 memorandum cited
in footnote 1 above that he had not done so because of the press of
other business.
3. Neither option is checked.
Sources: U.S. Government. Foreign
Relations of the United States, 1964-1968, V. 18, Arab-Israeli Dispute
1964-1967. DC: GPO,
2000. Department of State. |