Telegram Responding to U.S. Concerns About Raids in Jordan
(November 22, 1966)
This telegram relates the reactions of Prime Minister Eshkol and diplomat Abba
Eban in response to the raids on Jordan.
Here, the Prime Minister states that Israel was not trying to overthrow King Hussein's regime,
and is dedicated to creating a secure border.
1780. Ref: State 88408; Tel Aviv 1741./2/
/2/Telegram 88408 to Tel Aviv, November 21, instructed the Embassy
to continue to emphasize U.S. concern with the situation in Jordan and
to outline developments at the United Nations so that the Israeli Government
would understand the strength of the opinion against it in the Security
Council. (Ibid., POL 32-1 ISR-JORDAN/UN) Telegram 1741 from Tel Aviv,
November 21, reported a conversation with Foreign Office Director General
Levavi, in which Barbour deplored the consequences of Israeli raid,
stressing its impact on King Hussein. (Ibid.)
1. In mtg this afternoon, after discussing situation in SC reported
septel, I told FonMin Eban that I assumed there no necessity for me
to emphasize further the seriousness of the situation resulting from
the Israeli Nov 13 raid, particularly insofar as its consequences in
Jordan. I said that in worst event Hussein's regime will be displaced
and at best damage of inestimable magnitude has been done to Hussein's
attitude toward Israel and his estimate of Israeli intentions. This
situation abundantly clear and I would spare him repetition.
2. Eban acknowledged full comprehension on part GOI now and its apprehensions.
He said this understandably was reason he sought mtg. Having consulted
at length with PM Eshkol, he wished to give some of GOI's thinking as
to future. He expressed confidence in and gratitude for basic foundation
of US-GOI relations. He cited help of U.S. in security field and its
assistance in UN refugee and Syrian debates as components in making
this a "good year" for Israel and a high point in US-Israeli
relations. He went on that essential now is to get over current divergence.
Basic factor which had been introduced into Arab-Israeli confrontation
in recent times was concept of "popular war." This had given
scope to non-governmental terrorist organizations hitherto under wraps.
Attacks on Israel's capital (Romema dynamiting) and on railway between
capital and main city added new dimension to security problem. GOI had
reacted against harborers of agents involved. He admitted effect on
Jordanian regime not as anticipated and dangerous situation had resulted.
3. PM has now approved as basic GOI policy the reestablishment of stability
in Jordan. GOI will welcome any ideas as to measures which will promote
this purpose. Meanwhile, PM has ordered "maximum restraint."
This means no reaction to further popularly inspired incidents. Of course,
in event of major military attack, GOI will defend itself. (Here Eban
cited report earlier today of intention of commander of Jordanian brigade
to take matters into own hands. I replied we had report apparently on
same item but markedly different in most important element namely that
commander in question was going to petition the King for authority.
This seemed to reassure him.)
4. In implementation this policy GOI will endeavor first to minimize
contact. Scopus convoy scheduled for tomorrow will not go. Trains on
Jerusalem-Tel Aviv route will not run at night. Fences will be constructed
in Jerusalem area at two points along railway. I asked about cultivation
on Syrian border in DZ. He said GOI attempting through Bull to get informal
three power--Israel, Syria and UN--negotiations going to settle fields
on basis of status quo.
5. Of more continuing impact, PM has instructed that major effort be
made to improve static defense in hope that even if it impossible to
seal borders entirely at least infiltration can be made "less easy."
Guards will be increased and technical devices sought. Any U.S. ideas
will be welcome.
6. Eban wondered whether U.S. had any influence with Egyptians which
might be utilized to assist King. Israeli impression is that subversion
being fomented in Nablus is PLO inspired and although Shuquairy not
Nasser agent his organization is in Egypt. I noted our stock with Nasser
not high but it possible he also might not be anxious overthrow Hussein
this time and might exercise moderating influence on his own.
7. Finally, Eban said King could be assured in firmest terms that Israeli
policy as to Jordan and its disinterest in acquiring West Bank has not
changed. Raid was not prelude or rehearsal for invasion. It merely got
out of hand.
8. Conversation confirms that PM and other members GOI deeply shaken
by developments. Also shocked by revelation of degree of precariousness
of Hussein regime which, although they admit we told them repeatedly,
they had been unable to comprehend. They probably have further taught
themselves importance to Israel of Hashemite dynasty, idea which they
adopted intellectually but less than wholeheartedly. Lesson may be worthwhile.
Barbour
Source: National Archives and Records Administration, RG 59, Central
Files 1964-66, POL 32-1 ISR-JORDAN. Secret; Priority. Repeated to USUN,
Amman, Beirut, Cairo, Damascus, London, Paris, and Jerusalem and passed
to the White House, DOD, CIA, USIA, and NSA.
Sources: Foreign
Relations of the United States, 1964-1968, V. 18, Arab-Israeli
Dispute 1964-1967. DC: GPO,
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