U.S. Urges Israeli Cooperation on Missiles
(June 17, 1966)
This letter from the State Department encourages
Israel to dismantle some of its weaponry in hopes of reciprocity from
the Arab states. Its purpose is to avert an Arab-Israeli arms race,
fueled by the Soviet Union and worsening the Cold War.
Airgram From the Department of State to the Embassy
in Israel/1/
CA-12335
Washington, June 17, 1966, 8:26 p.m.
SUBJECT
Israeli and UAR Offensive Missiles
REF
Tel Aviv's 1229 and A-1000/2/
1. The Department agrees with Embassy Tel Aviv that
Prime Minister Eshkol's stand on the missile question is eminently reasonable
and encouraging. We consider it provides a basis for further efforts
to resolve this aspect of the UAR-Israel arms race. However, before
considering how this question might best be handled further in both
Tel Aviv and Cairo, we believe it would be helpful to clarify the kind
of UAR undertakings which Israel would consider acceptable, and the
kind Israel would be prepared to make in return. This is the more important
in view of the Israeli estimate of the UAR missile program which implies
that acquisition of gyros is the sole obstacle to activation of a 50-60
missile UAR stockpile. If Eshkol, whether or not he is firmly convinced
of the accuracy of this estimate, feels his actions must be governed
by it, the question of undertakings may involve verification and/or
destruction.
2. What we have in mind would be some sort of private statement by
each side, through the US or in some other manner, that each is prepared
to abandon both indigenous offensive (meaning surface-to-surface ballistic)
missile activities and acquisition of such missiles from abroad. To
see how feasible this might be, Embassy Tel Aviv is requested to approach
Eshkol along the following lines soon after his return from Africa:
A. We are gratified at the Prime Minister's statesmanlike position
on the missile question evidenced in the May 24 conversation.
B. We believe this may afford an opportunity to encourage the UAR to
abandon its missile program if Israel were to do likewise. We would
have in mind that neither nation would (1) import offensive missiles
or parts or (2) make such missiles or parts. We would assume that private
declarations, either through the US or in some other manner, would be
acceptable. (FYI. It would be helpful to have as precise a statement
from Eshkol as possible on these points. End FYI.) If Eshkol resists
committing Israel on its indigenous program the Embassy may state that
continuing research work in either Israel or the UAR would presumably
not be precluded. However, missile production and testing would have
to be foresworn.
C. You should mention in low key that US information on the UAR missile
program does not support the Israeli assessment handed to Ambassador
Barbour on May 24. If discussion ensues on this question, you may say
that, for example, our information indicates the UAR is having trouble
with numerous aspects of its program, including structural problems,
guidance difficulties, other design problems, and skyrocketing costs
of research and development.
D. If Eshkol raises questions about either verification or destruction,
you should seek his reasons. You may suggest that he remain flexible
on these questions for the moment, until UAR views can be ascertained.
You may point out in this connection that we recognize these questions
may become problems but that we think such factors as the rising costs
and poor progress of the UAR missile program, as well as Cairo's presumed
desire for Israeli restraint, might make some mutually advantageous
arrangement possible.
3. FYI. The Department is giving careful thought to possible modalities
for enabling Israel and the UAR, should some private understanding be
attained on non-introduction of missiles, to carry off the matter publicly
without undue repercussions should the two countries so desire. End
FYI.
4. For Cairo. The Department would appreciate the Embassy's comments
on possible modalities that might help enable Nasser to make a private
self-denying declaration of some sort on missiles. On what basis might
some public position be desirable and feasible? It occurs to the Department
that the UAR leadership may already have given thought to this subject,
what with the lagging progress of its current missile program, its growing
economic headaches generally, and the prospect that as things now stand
Israel will probably be in position to deploy offensive missiles long
before the UAR can demonstrate a capability to do so.
Rusk
/1/Source: National Archives and Records
Administration, RG 59, Central Files 1964-66, DEF 12 UAR. Secret; Exdis.
Drafted by Wolle; cleared by Symmes, Brewer, Rochlin, Toumanoff, Garthoff,
Sisco, DePalma, and Acting SCI Deputy Director J. Wallace Joyce; and
approved by Davies. Also sent to Cairo and repeated to Paris and London.
/2/See Document 293 and footnote 3
thereto.
Sources: Foreign
Relations of the United States, 1964-1968, V. 20, Arab-Israeli Dispute
1967-1968. DC: GPO,
2001. |