Memorandum Advising President Johnson Regarding Israeli Complaints About
U.S. Support
(December 28, 1965)
This memorandum to President Johnson outlines Israel's response to news that the United States was arming
Arab nations while withholding defense aid to Israel, as well as delaying
news on the US plans for economic aid well below Israel's request. In
this memo, Presidential advisor Komer exhibits a harsh attitude towards
Israel.
Memorandum From the President's Deputy Special Assistant
for National Security Affairs (Komer) to President Johnson/1/
Washington, January 12, 1966, 11 a.m.
Our Israeli Affairs. Mike Feldman says he hopes to
see you in the next few days, probably to pass on a complaint about
how poorly we're treating Israel. In fact, I wouldn't be surprised if
you got a letter from Eshkol shortly.
Such gambits are part of a standard Israeli effort to put pressure
on us for more military and economic help. I've been through them before
and, as I wrote you,/2/ the best response is to play a little hard to
get ourselves (and make clear we won't be muscled) before coming through.
We end up spending less this way. Thus we've held up informing Israel
of your economic aid decision just yet; we're also waiting till we can
propose to you a solution on planes for Jordan and Israel.
One development has infuriated the Israelis. To counter
all the public criticism they generated about US aid to Nasser and arms
to other Arabs, somebody in the Pentagon defensively leaked that the
Israelis were secretly buying fancy missiles from France. We haven't
made them feel any better by pointing out that, while we deplore the
leak, it serves them right.
Although Israel will complain about a crisis of confidence, this is
par for the course. So is sending Feldman and Feinberg in to harry you.
Thus, I'd see merit in telling Feldman to pass back word that we naturally
bridle when Israel tells us how to run our business and that, if Israel
expects help from us, it must be a two-way street. We could well afford
to hold the line for another few weeks before easing up.
If you feel that we are trying to play too cozy a game, however, we
can ease up. We can short-circuit most Zionist criticism by leaking
the tank deal to Israel (even though this risks flak from Arabs, especially
Nasser). We could also go ahead with the economic aid package, and then
with the planes. In sum, we have more than enough goodies in hand to
stem any tide of criticism. The only real issue is whether to play hard
to get a bit longer as a lesson, or to begin caving now.
R. W. Komer
Keep holding back till February
Start easing up now/3/
/1/Source: Johnson Library, National
Security File, Memos to the President, McGeorge Bundy, Vol. 18. Secret.
Filed with a January 12 covering memorandum from Bundy to the President
noting that it replaced a memorandum that he and Komer had sent earlier
and expressing disappointment that the Israelis were "still trying
to use the Feldman/Feinberg channel for serious business."
/2/A January 5 memorandum from Komer
to the President noted several items that Komer attributed to an Israeli
effort to put public pressure on the United States for more aid. He
recommended telling the Israelis that "we simply refuse to do business
this way." A note from Bundy on the memorandum endorsed Komer's
recommendation. Johnson wrote "See me" on the memorandum.
(Ibid., Country File, Israel, Vol. 5) Bundy stated in the January 12
memorandum cited in footnote 1 above that he had not done so because
of the press of other business.
/3/Neither option is checked.
Sources: Foreign
Relations of the United States, 1964-1968, V. 20, Arab-Israeli Dispute
1967-1968. DC: GPO,
2001. |