Letter to Jordanian King Hussein Criticizing
Israel for its Raid
(November 23, 1966)
This telegram reviews a draft of a letter to King
Hussein of Jordan that
assures him Israel will not attack
Jordan again, and condems Israel for its action against Jordan in the Hebron region.
CAP 661033. Memorandum for the President.
Subject: Message to King Hussein.
Our next step in defusing the Jordan-Israel crisis is to bolster King
Hussein. He is under great pressure both from the Palestinian elements
in his population and from the junior army officers who charge that
he has not provided adequately for Jordan's defense. Demonstrations
have spread to all the major centers in West Jordan. He has asked us
for substantial amounts of military equipment to help him demonstrate
that he has moved to prevent a repeat of the mauling Israel gave Jordan's
forces on November 13. Some of his advisors tell him that only attacking
Israel will win the popular support necessary to save his regime.
From our point of view either of the extreme approaches Jordan officials
are talking about amounts to suicide. An attack on Israel could result
in nothing but a severe Jordanian defeat. Expanding the army to the
extent the King is talking about would be economic suicide because the
Jordanian budget--already heavily subsidized by us--could not stand
the additional $20 million a year in normal support maintenance costs
we estimate would be required.
The King may still choose to commit suicide. He has told Ambassador
Burns that a point may come when he would rather go down fighting his
enemies rather than his own people. However, our job is to (a) do what
we can to help him through this tense period and (b) to restore balance
to his thinking. We are convinced--and we now have Eshkol's own assurances--that
Israel has not changed its policy toward Jordan as the King seems to
believe. With the gradual restoration of calm, we hope to turn his thinking
to modest efforts to better control his borders.
The following message, approved by Under Secretary Katzenbach, from
you to the King is designed to help him over the current crisis.
It expresses our sympathy to Hussein, makes clear our sharp disapproval
of Israel's action and reaffirms our interest in the peace, security,
and economic progress of Jordan. It seeks to allay his fears that this
major raid represents a change in Israel's policy toward the West Bank
by indicating you have good reason to believe it highly unlikely that
the events he fears will in fact occur. (We have the firmest assurances
from Israel to this effect.) It makes clear that the Israelis are fully
aware that a repeat performance will have the gravest consequences for
U.S.-Israeli relations.
I believe we now have the Israelis focussing on better control of the
borders--the most necessary immediate step in launching a period of
quiet in Israel-Jordan relations. It will be more difficult to get Hussein
concentrating on this problem rather than making unrealistic calls on
us to make Jordan and Israel militarily equal. We will also have to
help him parry thrusts again from the USSR and UAR, who are standing
in the wings waiting to jump in with offers of new equipment as they
were when you approved our plane sale. However, this message is the
first step in that direction.
"Your Majesty:
Words of sympathy are small comfort when lives have been needlessly
destroyed. I do, however, want to convey to Your Majesty a sense of
the sorrow and concern the military action by Israel in the Hebron area
has raised in me and in this country generally. My disapproval of this
action has been made known to the Government of Israel in the strongest
terms. Our support of condemnation of this action by the Security Council
and Ambassador Goldberg's statement during the Security Council hearings
demonstrate the depth of my feelings and those of our country.
This action has placed Your Majesty in a difficult position. I am certain
that with your demonstrated courage, wisdom and moderation, your difficulties
will be overcome. For our part, I assure you that this government maintains
its interest in the peace and security of Jordan and in the economic
progress and well-being of its people. I have ordered an urgent review
of measures which the United States Government could take to assist
you during this difficult period./2/ We will continue to be in touch
with your government on this question.
/2/On another copy of CAP 661033, this sentence is revised in an unknown
handwriting to read as follows: "I have ordered an urgent review
of measures which the United States Government could take to assist
in settling these difficulties." (Ibid., Special Head of State
Correspondence File, Jordan)
Finally Ambassador Burns has informed me of Your Majesty's concern
that Israel's policies have changed and that Israel now intends to occupy
territory on the West Bank of the Jordan River. While I can understand
the reasons for this concern, I have good reason to believe it highly
unlikely that the events you fear will in fact occur. In this connection
my government's opposition to the use of force to alter armistice lines
or borders in the Near East has been made unmistakably clear to all
parties concerned.
The strong private representations we have made in Israel as well as
our forthright public statements make clear that should Israel adopt
the policies you fear it would have the gravest consequences for United
States-Israel relations./3/ There is no doubt in my mind that our position
is fully understood and appreciated by the Israelis.
/3/On the copy of CAP 661033 cited in footnote 2 above, the sentence
ends after the word "consequences" and the words "for
United States-Israel relations" are crossed out.
Sincerely,"
Approve
Disapprove/4/
/4/Neither option is checked. A handwritten note states, "Been
cleared with revisions." The message, with the revisions indicated
in footnotes 2 and 3 above, was sent in telegram 90603 to Amman, November
23. (National Archives and Records Administration, RG 59, Central Files
1964-66, POL 32-1 ISR-JORDAN) Burns reported in telegram 1237 from Amman,
November 24, that he delivered the message that morning to the King,
who was "clearly pleased." (Ibid.)
Source: Johnson Library, National Security File, Memos to the President,
Walt W. Rostow, Vol. 15. Secret. A handwritten note reads, "Sent
4:40 p.m."
Sources: Foreign
Relations of the United States, 1964-1968, V. 18, Arab-Israeli
Dispute 1964-1967. DC: GPO,
2000. |