Telegram Concerning Israeli Raids
On Jordan
(November 22, 1966)
This telegram summarizes Dean Rusk's meeting with Jordan's
ambassador Harman following Israeli raids on Jordan. Rusk emphasizes
Israel's need for restraint despite terror attacks, and Jordan's need
to help curb terrorism in its own country.
For the Ambassador only. Secretary saw Ambassador
Harman morning 21st/2/ to convey through him President's concern over
Israeli raid into Jordan and its impact on King Hussein's position in
Jordan. Secretary said we aware dilemma faced by Israel in coping with
terror incidents but that the raid was disproportionate to problem.
It was launched without consultation with us although just two weeks
earlier we had stood firmly with Israel in the Security Council on this
very problem. Israel's action has put Jordan Government under heavy
pressure and both our interests and Israel's have been adversely affected.
Secretary made clear that a recurrence of action across armistice lines
could bring re-examination of our decision to sell certain military
equipment to Israel./3/
/2/A memorandum of the conversation is filed with a memorandum of November
21 from Read to Rusk telling him that the President had sent word through
Rostow that he would prefer Rusk to call in Harman and deliver the warning
against further Israeli reprisals. It also states, "Apparently
the President looks with favor on the idea of a border sealing and hopes
we can encourage the Israelis and the Arabs to promote this action."
(Ibid., POL ISR-US)
/3/In telegram 88827 to Tel Aviv and Amman, November 21, Rusk informed
Barbour and Burns that Komer had made this point to Harman and warned
them that no indication of this should be given to the Jordanians. (Ibid.,
POL 27 ARAB-ISR)
Secretary said he welcomed statement by Prime Minister Eshkol as carried
Monday's newspapers that Israel would seek to strengthen border security
measures to prevent infiltration. Israel faces basically police problem,
and police measures rather than disproportionate military attacks were
the answer.
Harman said President's thoughts would be conveyed immediately to Jerusalem.
He had however just received message from Prime Minister/4/ concerning
USG distress over November 13 incident which he then read. Message opened
with statement relief at news President's swift and resilient recovery
and expression appreciation for meaning President's leadership for cause
world peace and advancement human welfare. Noted Prime Minister's distress
at course which events have taken since disturbances of November 12
and 13 and stated USG views being studied with utmost respect. Following
lengthy recapitulation events in Israel and Security Council which led
to Israel's decision to take action in response to November 12 incident,
Prime Minister stated he felt refusal to act would not only demoralize
his people but also open way for new attacks by terrorist groups. What
was planned as limited local action turned out differently owing to
arrival of Arab Legion infantry who unexpectedly engaged Israeli unit
at close range. Repeated details attack as given by General Rabin to
Barbour (Tel Aviv's 1742)./5/ In regard to future Prime Minister wished
President to know he has ordered study be made and action be taken in
regard methods of improving Israel's static defense. Prime Minister
stated central point is that Israel's basic policy has not changed.
It stands by armistice agreement, supports status quo, and sovereignty
and integrity of existing states. Prime Minister invited understanding
of President for dilemma in which Israel found itself. Message closes
with strong appeal for US support to prevent SC resolution which utterly
ignores Israel's losses, anxieties and difficulties.
/4/The message, stated in the third person, dated November 21, is filed
with a covering memorandum of November 22 from Rostow to the President,
which notes that Evron called on Rostow that day, underlined the shock
felt in Israel at the consequences of the raid, and reaffirmed that
the Israeli Government was "beginning to think seriously about
more effective passive defense." (Johnson Library, National Security
File, Special Head of State Correspondence File, Israel)
/5/Dated November 21. (National Archives and Records Administration,
RG 59, Central Files 1964-66, POL 32-1 ISR-JORDAN)
Following Harman's presentation Secretary stated he still could not
understand how Israel so misread situation as not to realize even limited
action would seriously endanger Jordan Government and moderate policies
it pursued. That Israel's action got out of control and escalated brought
to his mind three incidents where escalation had or could have occurred.
First occurred last year when infiltrators crossed from Pakistan-held
territory into Indian-held Kashmir to harass area. Action taken by GOP
without consultation with us brought move into Pakistan-held territory
by Indian forces, again without consultation with us. Rate of escalation
such we had no means to use our influence with either party. When cease-fire
agreement finally came we were "fifteen minutes" from Congressional
resolution which would have barred all further aid to India and Pakistan.
In matters involving U.S. we have practiced restraint in order to avoid
escalation to extent possible. Despite heavy infiltration of North Viet
Nam forces into south we waited five years before ordering bombing of
supply points and routes in north. In effect, there was a five-year
pause during which we sought other solutions. At present, almost every
week, there are armed forays from Cambodia against us in Viet Nam. We
know Prince Sihanouk does not condone actions and that he lacks military
force to prevent them. Yet, because of position in which he would be
put, we do not strike at our enemy in Cambodian territory.
Secretary noted that recently when six U.S. soldiers killed south of
demilitarized zone in Korea we did not launch retaliatory action against
north. Restraint is essential to avoid escalation and to build up prospects
of peace. And yet, restraint and moderation are the most difficult of
postures for any government to assume.
Ambassador Harman said Israel faces most difficult problem. Terror
incidents occur on doorstep rather than miles away as in Kashmir. Its
800-mile frontier across extremely difficult terrain is guarded by only
small conscript army. Government had increased length military service
to make more men available for security patrols. Frontier villages employing
night guards at their own expense. All this created "siege atmosphere"
and made for most difficult way of life for Israeli citizens. Arab actions
seem indication of policy of total aggression.
Secretary did not agree this the case and again noted measures taken
by Jordan to control terror groups. He said "what you have done
in the name of your security seems in fact to have undermined Israel's
security."
Rusk
Source: National Archives and Records Administration, RG 59, Central
Files 1964-66, POL 32-1 ISR-JORDAN. Secret; Exdis. Drafted by Davies
on November 21 and approved and initialed by Rusk. Repeated to Amman
and USUN.
Sources: Foreign
Relations of the United States, 1964-1968, V. 18, Arab-Israeli
Dispute 1964-1967. DC: GPO,
2000. |