CIA National Intelligence Estimate for Israel
(April 11, 1968)
This National Intelligence Estimate is a "state
of affairs" with regard to Israel.
The report's main point is that although Israel was victorious
over its Arab neigbors in the 1967
War, the Arabs do not want to make peace with the
Jewish state. Instead, the report says, Arab terrorist attacks are likely to increase in the near future.
ISRAEL
Note
This estimate assesses Israel's situation
with particular reference to its central problem of
security In the radically altered situation arising
from the June war, Israel's security problems have two
major aspects: (a) its military capabilities compared
to those of the Arabs; and (b) the political, psychological,
diplomatic, and administrative questions involved in
dealing with the occupied territories and with its Arab
neighbors in circumstances short of war.
Conclusions
A. Despite its smashing victory in the June 1967 war,
Israel finds that acceptance by its Arab neighbors continues to elude
it. A formal peace settlement is out of the question, and the present
stalemate, with Israel occupying large tracts of territory and controlling
a million Arabs, will probably continue for a long time.
B. Arab terrorist activity is likely
to increase, though Israel will be able to keep it under
control. Incidents along the cease-fire lines will also
continue. Israel will retaliate on occasion, and this
could develop into heavy fighting. In the longer run,
continued Israeli occupation will almost certainly lead
to a new round of major hostilities.
C. In this condition of uneasy truce, Israel will maintain
a military superiority over the Arabs, with a view to deterring them
or, if war comes, defeating them quickly enough to prevent serious damage
to itself. This means modem weapons. Israel probably sees France as
a not very reliable source of such arms, at least as long as de Gaulle
is in power, and will look increasingly to the US. But it will also
try to produce as much as possible of its own military equipment.
D. Six years ago, Israel contracted
with a French supplier for a surface-to-surface missile
with a range of 280 nautical miles. It could be deployed
in Israel in 1969, if de Gaulle permits it. If he refuses
to allow the French firm to deliver the missiles or
to assist Israel in manufacturing them, the latter could
go ahead on its own, but it would probably take at least
five years to deploy a missile system.
[1 paragraph (8 lines of source
text) not declassified]
[Here follows the 9-page Discussion
section of the estimate.]
Sources: Foreign
Relations of the United States, 1964-1968, V. 20, Arab-Israeli Dispute
1967-1968. DC: GPO,
2001. |