Executive Sessions Of The Senate Foreign Relations Committee

Together With Joint Sessions With The Senate Armed Services Committee:

(February 7, 1967)

STATEMENT OF JOHN T. McNAUGHTON, ASSISTANT SECRETARY OF DEFENSE FOR INTERNATIONAL SECURITY AFFAIRS [P. 66]

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3. Military sales to developing countries have amounted to about 10 percent of the total. I should underline the fact that the Department of Defense does not respond independently to requests from countries of the Middle East, Latin America, Africa or other underdeveloped areas for the purchase of arms. These requests are subject to the most intensive review and debate within the U.S. Government; usually, serious efforts are made to reduce the requests in either quantitative or qualitative terms; non-U.S. alternative sources of supply are often sought for foreign policy reasons, Mr. Chairman; that is when the U.S. does not want to be involved in the case.

Senator McCarthy. Is that when you have the Germans ship the tanks for you to Israel?

Mr. McNaughton. Senator McCarthy, we did not do that. I beg your pardon. I thought you were talking about Iran--the Iran case.

Senator McCarthy. No.

Mr. McNaughton. The German case to Israel about two years ago, this was involved in that case, yes. This attempt, this desire not to have the United States as a source of supply, and later on, Mr. Chairman, I am sure you will want to have questions about this delicate situation in the Middle East, and the extent to which the United States is involved.

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Tank And Aircraft Sales to Israel [P. 67]

1. The first is our recent tank or aircraft sales to Israel (1964 and 1966) were concluded primarily to prevent the development of an arms imbalance in the area which would have had a seriously destabilizing effect. The imbalance was being created by a heavy infusion of modern Soviet equipment (principally tanks and MIG 21's) to the U.A.R., Syria and Iraq. Our negotiations with Israel were protracted, and a serious American effort was made to have them meet their requirements from European markets. In the end, however, and especially with respect to aircraft, available European equipment proved either too sophisticated or too expensive; we at length acceded to Israel's request [Deleted.] assurances from the Israelis.

[Deleted.]

Sale of Small Aircraft to Jordan

Our recent, 1966, sale of a small number of aircraft to Jordan was the result of a similarly protracted and reluctant process. The United States Command had levied on Jordan a requirement to acquire three squadrons of supersonic aircraft as Jordan's contribution to the all-Arab military posture. The U.A.C. would provide a limited sum of money (contributions from member states); Jordan could buy western aircraft if it chose, but the U.A.C. showed a clear preference for MIG 21s, which were available at a cut-rate price. The pressures in the Arab world were such that Jordan was compelled to comply. The pressures were such that Jordan asked the U.S. to sell suitable aircraft on generous credit terms. Over a period of 18 months, we repeatedly insisted that Jordan explore all possibilities in the U.K., France, Sweden and other markets; but European prices and the credit terms proved far too severe--far beyond purchasing power of the limited funds available from the U.A.C. In the end, when it appeared that Jordan would be forced to accept MIG 21s, and thus to open its country to a large Soviet training mission and also to U.A.R. military influence--a move which we regarded as inimical to the integrity of Jordan and a grave danger to stability in the Middle East--we agreed to sell Jordan a small number of F-104's from our MAP inventory. In concluding the arrangement, we successfully reduced the Jordanian request from 60 to 36, and consummated ultimately an initial sale of only 12 of the 36.

POWER IMBALANCE IN THE MIDDLE EAST [P. 73]

Senator Symington. Right. There was a question of balance.

I want to make this point to you. I have just come back from the Middle East. The situation in Jordan is extremely serious. I personally hope we do everything and anything we can to help this fellow in his problem in Jordan, but in my opinion there is a tremendous imbalance out there as a result of what has been going on, and I think it is operated on too classified a basis from the Congress. I am not talking about from the people.

For example, there is no question about it, you check it when Mr. Battle comes back, because he briefed me at length on it, and he is a very brilliant fellow and is coming back here as assistant secretary. Now, today the quality of the U.A.R. air force is fantastic as against the number and quality of the Israeli air force.

They bought their airplanes from France because we were too high toned to sell them, for various reasons that I have never been able to figure out, and get the business over here. So they buy the Mystere from France, and the new plane, whatever it is, the Mirage, and the Russians, who are, our embassy tells us in the highest classification, moving very rapidly into the U.A.R., they now ship there just as an illustration. The U.A.R. today has over four times more MIG's than the Chinese and the North Vietnamese combined, and sixty of those MIG's are considered the most modern that they have. This is the information I got only last month.

Now, it is all very well to say that the Israelis can handle the U.A.R. because of pilot security, et cetera, but any day that the Soviets really get annoyed or there were any other mercenaries who really knew how to fly came in to run those U.A.R. airplanes, in my opinion, Israel is dead.