CIA Report on Rogue Nations’ Efforts to Acquire
This is the CIA's semiannual briefing to Congress on proliferation
Unclassified Report to Congress
on the Acquisition of Technology
Relating to Weapons of Mass Destruction
and Advanced Conventional Munitions,
1 July Through 31 December 2003
The Director of Central Intelligence (DCI) hereby submits this
report in response to a congressionally directed action in Section 721
of the FY 1997 Intelligence Authorization Act, which states:
The Director of Central Intelligence shall submit to
Congress an annual report on -
(1) The acquisition by foreign countries during the
preceding 6 months of dual-use and other technology useful for the
development or production of weapons of mass destruction (including
nuclear weapons, chemical weapons, and biological weapons) and advanced
conventional munitions; and
(2) Trends in the acquisition of such technology by such countries."
(b) Submittal dates
(1) The report required by subsection (a) of this
section shall be submitted each year to the congressional intelligence
committees and the congressional leadership on an annual basis on
the dates provided in section 415b of this title.
(2) In this subsection:
(A) The term "congressional intelligence committees
has the meaning given that term in section 401a of this title.
(B) The term "congressional leadership" means the Speaker
and the minority leader of the House of Representative and the majority
leader and the minority leader of the Senate.
(c) Form of reports
Each report submitted under subsection (a) of this
section shall be submitted in unclassified form, but may include a classified
At the DCI's request, the DCI Weapons Intelligence,
Nonproliferation, and Arms Control Center (WINPAC) drafted this report
and coordinated it throughout the Intelligence Community (IC). As directed
by Section 721, subsection (c) of the Act, it is unclassified. As such,
the report does not present the details of the IC's assessments of weapons
of mass destruction and advanced conventional munitions programs that
are available in other classified reports and briefings for the Congress.
As required by Section 721 of the FY 1997 Intelligence
Authorization Act, the following are country summaries of acquisition
activities (solicitations, negotiations, contracts, and deliveries)
related to weapons of mass destruction (WMD) and advanced conventional
weapons (ACW) that occurred from 1 July through 31 December 2003. We
have excluded countries that already have established WMD and ACW programs,
as well as countries that demonstrated little WMD acquisition activity
Iran continued to vigorously pursue indigenous programs
to produce nuclear, chemical, and biological weapons. Iran is also working
to improve delivery systems as well as ACW. To this end, Iran continued
to seek foreign materials, training, equipment, and know-how. During
the reporting period, Iran still focused particularly on entities in
Russia, China, North Korea, and Europe. Iran's nuclear program received
significant assistance in the past from the proliferation network headed
by Pakistani scientist A.Q. Khan.
Nuclear. The United States remains convinced
that Tehran has been pursuing a clandestine nuclear weapons program,
in contradiction to its obligations as a party to the Nuclear Non-proliferation
Treaty (NPT). During 2003, Iran continued to pursue an indigenous nuclear
fuel cycle ostensibly for civilian purposes but with clear weapons potential.
International scrutiny and International Atomic Energy Agency (IAEA)
inspections and safeguards will most likely prevent Tehran from using
facilities declared to the IAEA directly for its weapons program as
long as Tehran remains a party to the NPT. However, Iran could use the
same technology at other, covert locations for military applications.
Iran continues to use its civilian nuclear energy
program to justify its efforts to establish domestically or otherwise
acquire the entire nuclear fuel cycle. Iran claims that this fuel cycle
would be used to produce fuel for nuclear power reactors, such as the
1,000-megawatt light-water reactor that Russia is continuing to build
at the southern port city of Bushehr. However, Iran does not need to
produce its own fuel for this reactor because Russia has pledged to
provide the fuel throughout the operating lifetime of the reactor and
is negotiating with Iran to take back the irradiated spent fuel. An
Iranian opposition group, beginning in August of 2002, revealed several
previously undisclosed Iranian nuclear facilities, sparking numerous
IAEA inspections since February 2003. Subsequent reports by the IAEA
Director General revealed numerous failures by Iran to disclose facilities
and activities, which run contrary to its IAEA safeguards obligations.
Before the reporting period, the A. Q. Khan network provided Iran with
designs for Pakistan's older centrifuges, as well as designs for more
advanced and efficient models, and components.
The November 2003 report of the IAEA Director General
(DG) to the Board of Governors describes a pattern of Iranian safeguards
breaches, including the failure to: report the import and chemical conversion
of uranium compounds, report the separation of plutonium from irradiated
uranium targets, report the enrichment of uranium using both centrifuges
and lasers, and provide design information for numerous fuel cycle facilities.
In October 2003, Iran sent a report to the DG providing additional detail
on its nuclear program and signed an agreement with the United Kingdom,
France, and Germany that included an Iranian promise to suspend all
enrichment and reprocessing efforts. On 18 December 2003, Iran signed
the Additional Protocol (AP) to its IAEA Safeguards Agreement but took
no steps to ratify the Protocol during this reporting period.
Ballistic Missile. Ballistic missile-related
cooperation from entities in the former Soviet Union, North Korea, and
China over the years has helped Iran move toward its goal of becoming
self-sufficient in the production of ballistic missiles. Such assistance
during 2003 continued to include equipment, technology, and expertise.
Iran's ballistic missile inventory is among the largest in the Middle
East and includes some 1,300-km-range Shahab-3 medium-range ballistic
missiles (MRBMs) and a few hundred short-range ballistic missiles (SRBMs)-including
the Shahab-1 (Scud-B), Shahab-2 (Scud C), and Tondar-69 (CSS-8)-as well
as a variety of large unguided rockets. Already producing Scud SRBMs,
Iran announced that it had begun production of the Shahab-3 MRBM and
a new solid-propellant SRBM, the Fateh-110. In addition, Iran publicly
acknowledged the development of follow-on versions of the Shahab-3.
It originally said that another version, the Shahab-4, was a more capable
ballistic missile than its predecessor but later characterized it as
solely a space launch vehicle with no military applications. Iran is
also pursuing longer-range ballistic missiles.
Chemical. Iran is a party to the Chemical
Weapons Convention (CWC). Nevertheless, during the reporting period
it continued to seek production technology, training, and expertise
from foreign entities that could further Tehran's efforts to achieve
an indigenous capability to produce nerve agents. Iran may have already
stockpiled blister, blood, choking, and possibly nerve agents-and the
bombs and artillery shells to deliver them-which it previously had manufactured.
Biological. Even though Iran is part
of the Biological Weapons Convention (BWC), Tehran probably maintained
an offensive BW program. Iran continued to seek dual-use biotechnical
materials, equipment, and expertise that could be used in Tehran's BW
program. Iran probably has the capability to produce at least small
quantities of BW agents.
Advanced Conventional Weapons. Iran
continued to seek and acquire conventional weapons and production technologies,
primarily from Russia, China, and North Korea. Tehran also sought high-quality
products, particularly weapons components and dual-use items, or products
that proved difficult to acquire through normal governmental channels.
In March of 2003, coalition forces took action under
Operation Iraqi Freedom to remove the Saddam Hussein regime from power
in Iraq. A large-scale effort has been under way to find the answers
to the many outstanding questions about Iraq's WMD and delivery systems.
We are not yet at the point where we can draw comprehensive or final
conclusions about the extent of Iraq's prewar WMD program.
In March 2003, Libya approached the United Kingdom
and United States expressing interest in coming clean about its WMD
programs. In the course of discussions and visits, the Libyans made
significant disclosures about their nuclear, chemical, and missile-related
activities and minor disclosures about biological-related activities.
A team of US and UK experts traveled to Libya in October and early December
to receive detailed presentations and to visit a number of Libyan facilities.
After extensive discussion during the three weeks of meetings, our experts
were shown covert facilities and equipment and were told of years of
Libyan efforts to develop weapons capabilities. In late December, the
Libyan Government announced its intention to eliminate its nuclear and
chemical weapons programs and MTCR class missiles as part of an effort
to rejoin the community of nations.
Progress with the Libyans was made in four strategic
Nuclear. Libya admitted to nuclear fuel
cycle projects that were ultimately intended to support a nuclear weapons
program, including uranium processing and enrichment. The team was given
access to more than 10 sites connected to Libya's nuclear activities
and examined a large amount of specialized nuclear equipment. Libya
pledged to voluntarily eliminate its nuclear weapons program, abide
by its IAEA safeguards agreement, as required by the Nuclear Non-Proliferation
Treaty (NPT), and to act as though the Additional Protocol was in force,
which requires adherents to provide information about, and the right
of access to, all aspects of a Member State's nuclear fuel cycle activities
and facilities. Libya's disclosures revealed that the A. Q. Khan network
had provided Libya with designs for Pakistan's older centrifuges, as
well as designs for more advanced and efficient models, and components.
Chemical. The Libyans showed us a significant
quantity of sulfur mustard that was produced at the Pharma 150 plant
near Rabta more than a decade ago, as well as aerial bombs designed
to be filled with sulfur mustard agent. Libya also showed us equipment
in storage that could be used to outfit a second CW production facility
and dual-use chemical precursors that could be used to produce mustard
and nerve agent. Libya reiterated its commitment to complete its accession
to the Chemical Weapons Convention and requested assistance in destroying
chemical warfare stockpiles.
Biological. Libya disclosed past intentions
to acquire equipment and develop capabilities related to biological
warfare, but it remains unclear if these activities were offensive or
defensive in nature. At the team's request, Libya took us to a number
of civilian medical-, biotechnical- and agricultural- related research
centers that have a "dual-use" potential to support BW-related
work. The team was given access to scientists at these facilities.
Ballistic Missile. Libya provided extensive
information on its Scud missile inventory, its efforts to develop longer-range
missiles, and the assistance it obtained from North Korea and other
Nuclear. After announcing in early 2003
its withdrawal from the Treaty on Non-Proliferation of Nuclear Weapons
(the NPT Treaty) and its intention to resume operation of nuclear facilities
at Yongbyon, which had been frozen under the terms of the 1994 US-North
Korea Agreed Framework, North Korea announced in early October 2003
that at the end of June it had completed reprocessing all of the 8,000
spent fuel rods previously under IAEA safeguards. They also said that
all the plutonium derived from that reprocessing (an estimated 25 to
30 kilograms) was being used for increasing the size of its nuclear
deterrent force. After announcing in early 2003 that the 5 Mwe reactor
at Yongbyon had resumed operation, in October 2003 the North said that
future spent fuel from the reactor will be reprocessed.
In late April 2003 during the Six Party Talks in Beijing,
North Korea privately threatened to "transfer" or "demonstrate"
its nuclear weapons. North Korea repeated these threats at the Six Party
Talks in August 2003. In December 2003, North Korea proposed freezing
its nuclear activities, including not exporting nuclear weapons, in
exchange for rewards. We continued to monitor and assess North Korea's
nuclear weapons efforts amidst diplomatic efforts to arrange a second
round of Six Party Talks.
Ballistic Missile. North Korea is nearly
self-sufficient in developing and producing ballistic missiles and continues
to procure needed raw materials and components from various foreign
sources. In the second half of 2003, North Korea continued to abide
by its voluntary moratorium on flight tests adopted in 1998 but announced
it may reconsider its September 2002 offer to continue the moratorium
beyond 2003. The multiple-stage Taepo Dong-2- potentially capable of
reaching parts of the United States with a nuclear-weapon-sized payload-may
be ready for flight-testing. North Korea has demonstrated a willingness
to sell complete ballistic missile systems and components that have
enabled other states to acquire longer-range capabilities earlier than
would otherwise have been possible and to acquire the basis for domestic
Chemical. North Korea is not a party
to the Chemical Weapons Convention (CWC). During the reporting period,
Pyongyang continued to acquire dual-use chemicals that could potentially
be used to support Pyongyang's long-standing CW program. North Korea's
CW capabilities included the ability to produce bulk quantities of nerve,
blister, choking, and blood agent, using its sizable, although aging,
chemical industry. North Korea may possess a stockpile of unknown size
of these agents and weapons, which it could employ in a variety of delivery
Biological. North Korea has acceded
to the Biological and Toxin Weapons Convention but nonetheless has pursued
BW capabilities since the 1960s. Pyongyang acquired dual-use biotechnical
equipment, supplies, and reagents that could be used to support North
Korea's BW program. North Korea is believed to possess a munitions production
infrastructure that would have allowed it to weaponize BW agents and
may have some such weapons available for use.
Nuclear. Syria-an NPT signatory with
full-scope IAEA safeguards-has a nuclear research center at Dayr Al
Hajar. Russia and Syria have continued their long-standing agreements
on cooperation regarding nuclear energy, although specific assistance
has not yet materialized. Broader access to foreign expertise provides
opportunities to expand its indigenous capabilities, and we are monitoring
Syrian nuclear intentions with concern.
Ballistic Missile. During 2003, Damascus
continued to seek help from abroad to establish a solid-propellant rocket
motor development and production capability. Syria's liquid-propellant
missile program continued to depend on essential foreign equipment and
assistance-primarily from North Korean entities. Damascus also continued
to manufacture liquid-propellant Scud missiles. In addition, Syria was
developing longer-range missile programs, such as a Scud D, and possibly
other variants with assistance from North Korea and Iran.
Chemical and Biological. Syria continued
to seek CW-related technology from foreign sources during the reporting
period. Damascus already held a stockpile of the nerve agent sarin,
but apparently has tried to develop more toxic and persistent nerve
agents. Syria remained dependent on foreign sources for key elements
of its CW program, including precursor chemicals and key production
equipment. Syria probably also continued to develop a BW capability.
Advanced Conventional Weapons. Damascus's
Soviet-era debt to Moscow and inability to fund large purchases continued
to hamper efforts to purchase the large quantity of equipment Syria
requires to replace its aging weapons inventory.
The threat of terrorists using chemical, biological,
radiological, and nuclear (CBRN) materials remained high. Many of the
33 designated foreign terrorist organizations and other nonstate actors
worldwide have expressed interest in using CBRN; however, most attacks
probably will be small-scale, incorporating improvised delivery means
and easily produced or obtained chemicals, toxins, or radiological substances.
Although terrorist groups probably will continue to favor long-proven
conventional tactics, such as bombings and shootings, the arrest of
ricin plotters in London in January 2003 indicated that international
mujahidin terrorists were actively plotting to conduct chemical and
Increased publicity surrounding the anthrax incidents
since the September 11 attacks has highlighted the vulnerability of
civilian and government targets to CBRN attacks.
One of our highest concerns is al-Qa'ida's stated readiness
to attempt unconventional attacks against us. As early as 1998, Usama
Bin Ladin publicly declared that acquiring unconventional weapons was
"a religious duty." In 2003, an extremist cleric who supports
al-Qa'ida issued a fatwa that purports to provide a religious justification
for the use of WMD against the United States.
Al-Qa'ida and associated extremist groups have a wide
variety of potential agents and delivery means to choose from for CBRN
attacks. The success of any al-Qa'ida attacks and the number of ensuing
casualties would depend on many factors, including the technical expertise
of those involved, but most scenarios could cause panic and disruption.
- Several groups of mujahidin associated with al-Qa'ida have planned
"poison plot" attacks in Europe with easily produced chemicals
and toxins best suited to assassination and small-scale scenarios.
These agents could cause hundreds of casualties and widespread panic
if used in multiple simultaneous attacks.
- Analysis of an al-Qa'ida document recovered in Afghanistan in
the summer of 2002 indicates the group has crude procedures for
making mustard agent, sarin, and VX.
- Both 11 September attack leader Mohammad Atta and Zacharias Moussaoui-arrested
by the FBI before the 11 September attacks-expressed interest in
crop dusters, raising our concern that al-Qa'ida has considered
using aircraft to disseminate BW agents.
- Al-Qa'ida is interested in radiological dispersal devices (RDDs)
or "dirty bombs." Construction of an RDD is well within
its capabilities as radiological materials are relatively easy to
acquire from industrial or medical sources.
Documents and equipment recovered from al-Qa'ida facilities
in Afghanistan show that al-Qa'ida had conducted research on biological
agents. We believe al-Qa'ida's BW program is primarily focused on anthrax
for mass casualty attacks, although the group most likely will pursue
opportunities to produce and use other biological agents in smaller-scale
Information from 2003 details the construction of a
terrorist cyanide-based chemical weapon that can be made with easily
available items, requiring little or no training to assemble and deploy.
The plans are widely available to any terrorist. Such a device could
produce a lethal concentration of poisonous gases in an enclosed area.
Usama Bin Ladin and other al-Qa'ida leaders have stated
that al-Qa'ida has a religious duty to acquire nuclear weapons. Documents
recovered in Afghanistan during Operation Enduring Freedom show that
al-Qa'ida was engaged in rudimentary nuclear research, although the
extent of its indigenous program is unclear. Outside experts, such as
Pakistani nuclear engineer Bashir al-Din Mahmood may have provided some
assistance to al-Qa'ida's program. Bashir, who reportedly met with Bin
Ladin, discussed information concerning nuclear weapons. Al-Qa'ida has
been seeking nuclear material since the early 1990s, according to the
testimony of a government witness-Jamal Ahmad Fadl-during the 2001 trail
on the al-Qa'ida bombings of the American Embassies in Tanzania and
Kenya. Fadl claimed that al-Qa'ida pursued the sale of what they believed
was enriched uranium in Sudan in the early 1990s. This effort may have
been a "scam" operation, and there is no credible evidence
al-Qa'ida actually acquired the uranium. Al-Qa'ida has been the victim
of other nuclear "scams" in the past, but it probably has
become sensitized to such operations in recent years, in part due to
media coverage of nuclear smuggling and scam operations.
In addition, we are alert to the very real possibility
that al-Qa'ida or other terrorist groups might also try to launch conventional
attacks against the chemical or nuclear industrial infrastructure of
the United States to cause panic and economic disruption. In a video
aired by Al-Jazirah in September 2002, senior al-Qa'ida members said
they had contemplated striking nuclear power plants early in their decision
making on targets but dropped the idea for fear it would "get out
During 2003, Russia's struggling defense, biotechnology,
chemical, aerospace, and nuclear industries continued to be eager to
raise funds via exports and transfers. Some Russian universities and
scientific institutes also showed a willingness to earn funds by providing
WMD or missile-related teaching and training for foreign students. The
Russian Government's efforts to stem proliferation remained an important
element of US bilateral dialogue with Russia.
Nuclear. Russia continues to play a key
role in constructing light-water nuclear power reactors in Iran, China,
and India. Moscow has pledged to supply fuel to the Bushehr reactor
in Iran for the life of the reactor and is negotiating with Iran to
sign an agreement on the return of the irradiated spent fuel to Russia.
Ballistic Missile. Russian entities during
the reporting period continued to supply a variety of ballistic missile-related
goods and technical know-how to countries such as Iran, India, and China.
Iran's earlier success in gaining technology and materials from Russian
entities helped accelerate Iranian development of the Shahab-3 MRBM,
and continuing Russian entity assistance has supported Iranian efforts
to develop new missiles and increase Tehran's self-sufficiency in missile
Chemical and Biological. During the second
half of 2003, Russian entities remained a key source of dual-use biotechnology
equipment, chemicals, and related expertise for countries of concern
with active CBW programs. Russia's well-known biological and chemical
expertise made it an attractive target for countries seeking assistance
in areas with CBW applications.
Advanced Conventional Weapons. Russia
continued to be a major supplier of conventional arms. In 2003, Russia
was an important source of ACW for China, Iran, Libya, Sudan, Syria
and India. Russia continued to be the main supplier of technology and
equipment to India's and China's naval nuclear propulsion programs.
Moscow continued negotiations with New Delhi for a package deal, which
includes a refurbished aircraft carrier with a MiG-29K air wing, as
well as a lease of Tu-22M Backfire bombers and at least one Akula-class
nuclear attack submarine. During 2003, Russia continued work with India
on the PJ-10 antiship/land-attack cruise missile.
Export Controls. Despite progress in
creating a legal and bureaucratic framework for Russia's export controls,
lax enforcement remains a serious concern. To reduce the outward flow
of WMD and missile-related materials, technology, and expertise, top
Russian officials must make a sustained effort to convince exporting
entities-as well as the bureaucracy whose job it is to oversee them-that
nonproliferation is a top priority and that those who violate the law
will be prosecuted.
Nuclear. In late April 2003 during trilateral
talks in Beijing, North Korea privately threatened to "transfer"
or "demonstrate" its nuclear weapons. It repeated these threats
in August 2003 at the Six Party Talks. In December 2003, North Korea
proposed to "freeze" its nuclear activities, including not
transferring nuclear weapons, in exchange for rewards.
Ballistic Missile. Throughout the second
half of 2003, North Korea continued to export significant ballistic
missile-related equipment, components, materials, and technical expertise
to the Middle East, South Asia, and North Africa. Pyongyang attached
high priority to the development and sale of ballistic missiles, equipment,
and related technology. Exports of ballistic missiles and related technology
were one of the North's major sources of hard currency, which supported
ongoing missile development and production.
Over the past several years, Beijing improved its nonproliferation
posture through commitments to multilateral nonproliferation regimes,
promulgation of expanded export controls, and strengthened oversight
mechanisms, but the proliferation behavior of Chinese companies remains
of great concern.
Nuclear. China has taken some positive
steps during the reporting period. In September 2003, China stopped
at the China-North Korea border a shipment of chemicals that could have
been used in North Korea's nuclear program. China also decided in late
2003 that it would apply for membership in the Nuclear Suppliers Group
(NSG), indicating that it intends to embrace the policy of full scope
safeguards (FSS)-which is required for NSG membership-as a condition
of nuclear supply to non-nuclear weapons states (NNWS).
Ballistic Missile. China is not
a member of the MTCR, but in October 1994 it pledged not to sell MTCR
Category I ground-to-ground missiles.
Although Beijing continues to take some steps to educate
firms and individuals on the new missile-related export regulations
- offering an export control seminar in September 2003 for officials
and companies from China and other countries - Chinese entities continued
to work with Pakistan and Iran on ballistic missile-related projects
during the second half of 2003. Chinese entity assistance has helped
Pakistan move toward domestic serial production of solid-propellant
SRBMs and has supported Pakistan's development of solid-propellant MRBMs.
Chinese-entity ballistic missile-related assistance helped Iran move
toward its goal of becoming self-sufficient in the production of ballistic
missiles. In addition, firms in China provided dual-use missile-related
items, raw materials, and/or assistance to several other countries of
proliferation concern-such as Iran, Libya, and North Korea.
The United States imposed sanctions on a number of
Chinese entities during the reporting period, including the China North
Industries Corporation (NORINCO) and the China Precision Machinery Import/Export
Chemical. Evidence during the current
reporting period showed that Chinese firms still provided dual-use CW-related
production equipment and technology to Iran.
Advanced Conventional Weapons. During
2003, China remained a primary supplier of advanced conventional weapons
to Pakistan, Sudan, and Iran. Islamabad also continued to negotiate
with Beijing for China to build frigates for Pakistan's Navy and to
cooperate in developing the FC-1 fighter aircraft.
Countries of proliferation concern continued to approach
entities in Western Europe, South Asia, and the United States to provide
needed acquisitions for their WMD and missile programs. Proliferators
and associated networks continued to seek machine tools, spare parts
for dual-use equipment, and widely available materials, scientific equipment,
and specialty metals. Although West European countries strove to tighten
export control regulations, Iran continued to successfully procure dual-use
goods and materials from Europe. In addition, several West European
countries remained willing to negotiate ACW sales to India, Pakistan,
and other countries in order to preserve their domestic defense industries.
North Korea approached Western European entities to obtain acquisitions
for its uranium enrichment program. A shipment of aluminum tubing-enough
for 4,000 centrifuge tubes-was halted by German authorities.
West European entities remained an important source for the proliferation
of WMD- and missile-related information and training. The relatively
advanced research of European institutes, the availability of relevant
dual-use studies and information, the enthusiasm of scientists for sharing
their research, and the availability of dual-use training and education
may have shortened development time for some WMD and missile programs.
As nuclear, biological, chemical, and ballistic missile-applicable
technologies continued to be more available around the world, new sources
of supply have emerged that made the challenge of stemming WMD and missile
proliferation even more complex and difficult. Nuclear fuel-cycle and
weapons-related technologies have spread to the point that, from a technical
view, additional states may be able to produce sufficient fissile material
and to develop the capability to weaponize it. As developing countries
expanded their chemical industries into pesticide production, they also
advanced toward at least latent chemical warfare capability. Likewise,
additional nonstate actors became more interested in the potential of
using biological warfare as a relatively inexpensive way to inflict
serious damage. The proliferation of increasingly capable ballistic
missile designs and technology posed the threat of more countries of
concern developing longer-range missiles and imposing greater risks
to regional stability.
In this context, there was a growing concern that additional
states, that have traditionally been recipients of WMD and missile-related
technology, might have followed North Korea's practice of supplying
specific WMD-related technology and expertise to other countries or
by going one step further to supply such expertise to nonstate actors.
Even in cases where states took action to stem such transfers, knowledgeable
individuals or non-state purveyors of WMD- and missile-related materials
and technology could act outside government constraints. The exposure
of the A. Q. Khan network and its role in supplying nuclear technology
to Libya, Iran, and North Korea illustrate one form of this threat,
but commercial purveyors of dual-use technologies who routinely seek
to circumvent international export control regimes to deliver WMD-related
equipment and material to WMD-aspirant countries are of grave concern