International Financial Aid to the Palestinian
Redirected to Terrorist Elements
International Aid for the
The Administration of the
Palestinian Authority - PLO
The Salary Budget and Its
Exchange Rate Differences
Deductions from the Salaries
of PA Employees for Fatah Activists
Salaries Paid to Fatah Activists
Budget Reserves for Financing
is the Money Transferred?
Money Transfers to Fatah
PA External Budgetary Sources
How Much Money is Directed
to Terrorist Elements?
Table: Sources from the
PA Salary Budget that could be diverted to other activities
1. The international community has so far
invested $4.5 billion in the PA in order to establish infrastructures
and an organized civil society. However, the European and
international hopes were met with a reality of corruption
in the PA and the allocation of funds for completely different
2. Since April 2001, the Arab states transferred
directly to the PA $45 million of aid per month, and the
European Union transfers directly to the PA 10 million Euro
(approx. $9 million) of aid per month. Thus, the EU finances
10% of the PA budget.
3. Two thirds of the PA's monthly budget,
which is $90 million, are devoted according to PA declarations
to the payment of salaries. This section of the PA budget
can also be used for accumulation of surplus funds and their
diversion to other purposes, as proven from the wealth of
information uncovered during IDF Operation Defensive Shield.
4. For paying the salaries of its employees,
the PA is managing a double reporting system. The PA claims
to the aid entities that it requires about $60 million dollar
a month. However, from the captured documents (most of which
are from the end of 2001) it can be learned that the PA needs
only 55%-65% of this sum. This, as a result of a number of
a. From a document that summarizes the
salary payments to PA security forces in the West Bank
and from additional data, it can be learned that the PA
registers salary expenses of approx. $40 million, about
half for security forces personnel. A low exchange rate
during payment of salaries in shekels (3.7 shekels to the
dollar, compared to the representative rate of 4.4 shekels
to the dollar at the end of 2001), creates a surplus of
b. The PA deducts 1.5-2% from the salaries
of security forces personnel as Fatah membership fees.
In addition, many hundreds of Fatah activists were placed
on the PA salary payroll, and in this manner, hundreds
of thousands of dollars were transferred to the Fatah each
month. In practice, these activists, have been in operation
for several years, and especially during the confrontation
with Israel, in Fatah local branches in the West Bank and
c. The implication is that the PA paid
salaries to hundreds of Fatah personnel who engaged in
terrorism. Amongst the salary earners in this status was
the commander of the Al Aqsa Martyrs Brigades in Samaria
(responsible for attacks in which 17 Israelis were killed),
and the two murderers of the Israeli youth who was lured
via the Internet to the Ramallah area where he was murdered.
d. The moves to integrate activists in
the PA salary list are directed and managed by Arafat,
wearing his triple-hat as Chairman of the PA, the PLO and
the Fatah. His handwriting is on many documents regarding
this subject, and the employment of Fatah activists is
authorized by his signature.
e. A captured document file shows that
there were check books of the PA's salary account in the
office of Marwan Barghouti, the head of Fatah's "Supreme
Movement Committee" in the West Bank, and he and his
aide-de-camp withdrew money in an authorized and systematic
manner in order to finance Fatah branches in the West Bank.
5. Therefore, the PA financed dozens of
Fatah branches in order to establish a broad infrastructure
of field activists who in time became armed local militias.
This was a calculated move, which took place many years before
the confrontation with Israel. Marwan Barghouti, who provided
the checks, was head of the Fatah/Tanzim in the West Bank
and directed the murderous attacks of the Al Aqsa Martyrs
Brigades. He was arrested by Israel in April 2002.
6. Money allocations in dollars were later
added to the budgetary aid to Fatah branches which were given
by Arafat to Fatah activists involved in terror. The money
was transferred through Fatah district branches. The 16 payment
orders found add up to approx. $100,000. We estimate that
Fatah elements are allocated $5-$10 million per month for
its expenses in the confrontation against Israel. Some of
this sum is in money and some in goods - fuel and arms.
7. The surpluses from the PA budgets and
the external budget sources (for example, taxes on fuel and
tobacco) enable the PA to maintain additional PLO and Fatah
apparatuses that were not disbanded after the PA was established.
PLO veterans employed in PLO representations and some of
whom enjoy diplomatic immunity, intensively aid in arms procurement
operations and smuggling to the West Bank and Gaza Strip.
8. Within the PA budget, activities take
place that are typical of a "money laundry". The
main source for paying PA salaries in 2001- 2002 is the international
aid money. The methods described above "create"
surpluses of $9 million per month from this account. It can
be stated that 14% of the international aid is channeled
to other objectives than those originally intended. It is
reasonable to assume that a significant part of the revenue
accumulated from the exchange rate differences is not directed
to humanitarian goals, and some of the money is transferred
directly to the Fatah.
9. The documents described in this report
clearly show the connection between the PA financing of the
Fatah/Tanzim and the terrorist attacks against Israeli civilians
and the suicide attacks carried out by these local militias
Aid for the Palestinian Authority
1. When the Palestinian Authority (PA)
was established in 1994, European andArab states mobilized
to aid it. The international community has so far invested
$4.5 billion in the PA in order to establish infrastructures
and a civil society in the West Bank and Gaza. However, Arafat's
organization, which was on the brink of bankruptcy following
the Gulf War, failed to take advantage of the political and
economic opportunity it was given. The European and international
hopes were met with a reality of corruption in the PA and
the allocation of funds for completely different objectives.
2. Since the end of 2000, the PA receives
large scale international aid in order to finance its current
budget. In this framework, since April 2001, the Arab states
transferred directly to the PA $45 million of aid per month
(which was raised in April 2002 to $55 million a month).
The European Union transfers directly to the PA 10 million
Euro (approx. $9 million) of aid per month, financing 10%
of the PA budget.
3. Two thirds of the PA's monthly budget,
which is $90 million, are devoted according to PA declarations
to the payment of salaries. Thus, the salaries of PA personnel
are financed mostly by international elements, including
the European community. This section of the PA budget can
also be used for accumulation of surplus funds and their
diversion to other purposes, as proven from the wealth of
information uncovered during IDF Operation Defensive Shield.
4. This report analyzes documents unveiled
during IDF Operation Defensive Shield and the diversion of
money for purposes different to those which they were originally
designated. The analysis is based on conservative assessments
regarding the diversion of funds, according to captured documents.
Naturally, they reflect only part of the overall picture.
The analysis is based on an exchange rate of 4.4 shekels
per dollar which was the representative rate in Israel in
December 2001 (in April 2002, the representative rate was
4.8 shekels per dollar).
of the PA Finances
5. For years, the PA has conducted its
financial affairs in a twisted manner that has aroused the
anger of the international contributing elements, as well
as criticism from within the PA areas. For instance, Abed
al Juad Salah, a Fatah veteran in the West Bank, in a leaflet
published in November 2001, criticizes the PA's 2001 budget,
claiming that "the PA's most serious offence is the
multitude of monetary centers, so that the legislative council
does not know how much money enters these centers and how
it is used
at this moment, there is still no internal
financial supervision apparatus for the government units
and offices, and there is no unified internal supervision
apparatus in the governmental accounting office".
6. The European demands are in line with
Abed al Juad Salah's criticism. The Europeans demand that
all PA funds should be managed in the Palestinian Finance
Ministry, under the supervision of the International Monetary
Fund (IMF). In light of this demand, Arafat issued in January
2000 a Presidential decree ordering the unification of the
PA Finance Ministry's accounts and transfer of the "Employees
Directorate", responsible for the employment and salaries
of PA personnel, to the Finance Ministry. In practice, some
of the accounts were unified, others were managed separately
and the "Employees Directorate" was not transferred
to the Finance Ministry.
Authority - PLO - Fatah
7. One of the main problems is that institutionalized
Palestinian organizations were not disbanded when the PA
was established, especially the PLO, the roof organization
of the terrorist organizations, and Fatah, the "Palestinian
Liberation Movement", Arafat's organization, the central
movement within the PLO. Their personnel keep wearing 'two
hats': they have become functionaries in the PA but at the
same time they continue to run Fatah affairs in their new
offices, while transferring PA funds to Fatah apparatuses.
Arafat, needless to state, holds all three functions: Chairman
of the PA, Chairman of the PLO and the Chairman of the Fatah.
When monetary transfers from Arafat to Fatah terrorist apparatuses
are uncovered, the Palestinians claim that these are internal
Fatah transfers and deny the affiliation to the PA. In practice,
under Arafat's 'triple-hat', PA funds, including money originating
from the international aid are provided to the Fatah and
other organizations engaging in terror within the PLO.
Budget and Its Management
8. At Europe's request, the IMF supervises
the PA budget. According to its report correct for the beginning
of 2002, the PA pays the salaries of 118,000 employees. In
practice, it seems that the manpower scope is 130,000 (as
appears also from the statements of a Palestinian element
involved in the subject). For paying the salaries of its
employees, the PA is managing a double reporting system.
The PA claims to the aid entities that it requires about
$60 million dollar a month. However, from the captured documents
it can be learned that the PA needs only 55%-65% of this
sum. This, in light of a combination of a number of operating
9. The PA receives money from international
aid elements in US dollars or in European currency. In practice,
the PA pays the salaries in Israeli Shekels (NIS) at a very
low exchange rate. The PA's exchange rate has not been amended
in recent years, and as a result of an accumulative devaluation
in the Israeli currency, the PA keeps the ever growing difference
for other expenses. For instance, the difference between
the exchange rates was 10% in 1998 (3.5 shekels per dollar
- the representative rate in Israel, vs. 3.2 shekels per
dollar for the salary exchange rate). At the end of 2001,
the difference was 19% (4.4 shekels per dollar - representative
rate, vs. 3.7 shekels per dollar for the salary exchange
10. The salaries paid to General Security
personnel in December 2001 prove this (see Document 1 - link
at bottom). The remainder of the exchange can be deduced
from the document regarding the payments to all General Security
personnel. According to other documents, in December 2001,
"Scientific Committee Personnel" in West Bank branches
were paid 183,601 NIS ($49,622), an exchange rate of 3.7
shekels per dollar (see Documents 1-3).
11. While the PA registers in its books,
in our assessment, $40.5 million for the payment of salaries,
in practice it pays the salaries of its employees in shekels
which is equal to $34 million. Therefore, there is a surplus
of $7.7 million in the PA salary account (following the rise
in the exchange rate in Israel from 4.4 shekels per dollar
to 4.8 shekels per dollar, the surplus in the PA salary budget
from the Salaries of PA Employees for Fatah Activists
12. The PA exploits its budgets in other
ways for providing money to the Fatah. According to documents
captured by the IDF in Ramallah, the PA deducts a sum called
"Fatah Membership Fee" from the salary of PA security
personnel. This deduction is taken directly from the salaries
of all security apparatus personnel and is not voluntary.
13. According to "Scientific Committee"
salary documents, it can be seen that the deductions are
proportional to the salary; starting from 50 NIS deducted
from salaries of Brig. Generals down to 5 NIS from privates.
From another document it can be learned that the scope of
deductions from General Intelligence officers in the Ramallah
and Jerusalem districts during March-April 2002 was 45,440
NIS (see Documents 5-6).
14. In our assessment, the Palestinian
security forces employ approx. 50,000 people. As the average
salary is approx. 1,500 NIS a month and the deduction is
1.5-2%, Fatah receives approx. 1.1-1.4 million NIS per month,
which is equivalent to $260,000-345,000).
Paid to Fatah Activists
15. According to files belonging to the
Organization and Administration Department in the General
Security Apparatus, over 100 activists from the Fatah and
other organizations operating in the framework of the PLO
were included in the salary payment lists of the National
Security Apparatus (the PA police forces), but were actually
operating in Fatah/Tanzim local branches in the West Bank.
This process, which took place in the second half of the
90s, was given additional legitimacy by the PA leadership
in early 2001 and has remained in effect during the conflict
with Israel. Scores of activists from other organizations,
operating in the PLO framework, received salaries in a similar
16. Fatah activists were also integrated
in other security apparatuses such as the General Intelligence,
with Arafat personally approving their employment with his
signature. A file captured in the office of the Commander
of the Special Forces (a PA security apparatus reestablished
in 2001) shows that during Spring-Summer 2001, hundreds of
additional activists from Fatah branches in the West Bank
were integrated into the PA employee list. Similar transfers
to this apparatus also took place in March 2002.
17. The implication is that the PA paid
salaries to hundreds of Fatah personnel who engaged in terrorism.
Amongst the salary earners in this status was the commander
of the Al Aqsa Martyrs Brigades in Samaria (responsible for
attacks in which 17 Israelis were killed), and the two murderers
of the Israeli youth who was lured via the Internet to the
Ramallah area where he was murdered.
18. The moves to integrate activists in
the PA salary list are directed and managed by Arafat, wearing
his triple-hat as Chairman of the PA, Chairman of the PLO
and Chairman of the Fatah. His handwriting is on many documents
regarding this subject, and the employment of Fatah activists
in local branches is authorized by his signature.
19. It is estimated that 500-800 Fatah activists
from the West Bank joined the PA apparatuses in recent years.
Assuming that a similar number joined the apparatuses in
the Gaza Strip, this would mean the integration of 1000-1600
Fatah members. If this number is multiplied by the average
salary in the security forces (1,500 NIS a month), this means
an injection of an additional $345,000-552,000 (1.5-2.4 million
NIS) each month from the security forces salary budget only
to the Fatah.
20. Many more Fatah activists were integrated
into PA civilian apparatuses with improved pay conditions.
On the assumption that between approx. 1,000- 1,600 activists
joined the civilian apparatuses with an average salary of
$300, the salaries paid to Fatah activists are between $640,000
and $1 million, which assist to finance the Fatah infrastructure.
Reserves for Financing Other Activities
21. The PA budget in 2000 was significantly
larger than the 1999 budget. The 2001 budget was 16% larger
than the 2000 budget. The budget of the Employees Directorate,
responsible for paying the salaries, grew by 250% since 1999,
and its budget was increased considerably during the confrontation
with Israel. As mentioned above, the international aid elements
finance a major part of the PA's current budget. Displaying
an inflated budget to the international aid bodies enables
the PA to have a large reserve budget for other activities.
The inflated budget of Arafat's bureau is a classic example:
it was doubled in 2001 compared to 2000 and is now $40 million
a year (4% of the total PA budget). And indeed, money for
Fatah elements and other organizations is transferred directly
from Arafat's bureau after being personally authorized by
is the Money Transferred?
22. Money transfer from the PA to the Fatah
is carried out through several channels: from the Palestinian
Finance Ministry and funds external to the budget. It is
noted that the Palestinian Finance Ministry is supposed to
handle the PA budget. Other PLO financial sources, such as
the "Palestinian National Fund" are managed in
a separate fund by different officials. Hence, money transfers
from the Palestinian Finance Ministry to Fatah activists
and other PLO organizations originate from the PA budget
and the international aid.
23. Beyond the flow of money from the official
PA salary budget, large sums of money are transferred to
the various Fatah branches.
Transfers to Fatah Branches
24. One of the document files captured
in Ramallah details a systematic process of transferring
money from the PA salary account to Fatah branches. There
were 70 such money transfers in 1998-99. The characteristics
of this process are as follows:
a. Fatah district branches received payments
of between 15,000-18,000 NIS and district sub-branches
received between 3,000-10,000 NIS. About 40 such branches
received funding from the PA budget.
b. Fatah Branches in refugee camps received
payments of between 12,000-19,500 NIS.
c. "Shabiba" (Fatah youth movement)
branches as well as Fatah student committees in the various
West Bank colleges were financed by the salary account.
d. The financing is periodical - 7 Fatah
branches received by this method, 2-4 checks, some of which
were cleared on the same day.
e. In total, in 70 money transfers, approx.
440,000 NIS ($107,000) was transferred (the exchange rate
in 1999 was 4.1 NIS to the dollar).
25. The documentation shows that there were
check books of the PA's monthlysalary account in the office
of Marwan Barghouti, the head of Fatah's "Supreme Movement
Committee" in the West Bank, and Barghouti or his aide-de-camp
withdrew money in an authorized and systematic manner in
order to finance Fatah branches in the West Bank (see Documents
26. The PA salary account is designed to
pay the salaries of the security forces personnel and civilian
employees in the PA. It is meant to be transparent to the
international aid elements and the IMF. In 1998-99, the international
aid elements did not finance the PA's current budget, but
this cannot reduce the severity of this activity, in which
the PA financed dozens of Fatah branches in order to establish
a broad infrastructure of field activists who in time became
armed local militias. This was a calculated move, which took
place many years before the confrontation with Israel.
27. Some Palestinians with the power of
attorney to draw checks became terror perpetrators in the
conflict with Israel. For example, Jihad Mahmud Tumali, a
senior Fatah/Tanzim activist in the Al Amari refugee camp
in the Ramallah area and Lawrence Suleiman Makhal from another
Fatah local branch in the Ramallah area, carried out shooting
attacks while receiving financial aid both from the Fatah
and from the General Intelligence. Abed Al Bassat Rabhi Shu'abka,
Fatah/Tanzim secretary in El Bireh, is on the list of activists
from mid-2001, which Arafat approves the payment of $500
to each one due to their activities in the confrontation
with Israel. Marwan Barghouti, who provided the checks, was
head of the Fatah/Tanzim in the West Bank and directed the
murderous attacks of the Al Aqsa Martyrs Brigades. He was
arrested by Israel in April 2002 (see Document 11,13).
28. It is reasonable to assume that during
the confrontation with Israel, changes were made in the characteristics
of the allocation of money from the PA to the Fatah. We estimate
that the aid to Fatah field branches was institutionalized
during 2001. From the protocols of the Fatah branch in Nablus,
it can be learned that the official (apparently monthly)
budget in 2001 was 49,000 NIS ($12,000). Arafat had authorised
in November 2001 the branch in Jenin to cover debts of $6,000
(see Document 12).
29. Later on, money allocations were added
to the budgetary aid to Fatah branches which were given by
Arafat in dollars to Fatah activists involved in terror and
were transferred through Fatah district branches.
30. From analysis of 15 payment orders
carried out during 10 months (April 2001 - February 2002),
the characteristics of the process can be learned:
a. This was a series of money transfers
carried out from the PA Finance Ministry, most of them
to Fatah district branch activists in the West Bank, and
only a small number to activists from other bodies such
as Fatah student committees in a district sub-branch.
b. Most transfers were to Fatah/Tanzim
activists involved in the confrontation with Israel and
a small number were to families of activists under arrest
c. It is standard for requests to be made
for payment of $2,000-3,000 per activist. Arafat authorizes
a sum of between $300-800.
d. In each branch, 14 activists on average
receive aid of approx. $440. Terrorist squad leaders receive
a higher sum - $600. Occasionally, Arafat approves a sum
of $800 per activist.
e. These are periodical payments to activists.
From a number of branches, requests for payment are made
in intervals of weeks to a few months, and they are authorized
f. Activists in district branches in Samaria
(Jenin, Tubas, Tulkarm) received between $2,000-6,000 in
each allocation. The Ramallah and El Bireh branch, the
main power center of the Fatah/Tanzim in Judea received
between $5,000-10,000 in each allocation.
g. District branch activists received
an accumulating sum of between $12,000-22,000 over the
ten month period.
31. In the period between the end of November
2001 and beginning of February 2002, when there was an escalation
in the conflict with Israel, Arafat approved between $50,000-70,000
to activists in Fatah branches in the West Bank. The 16 payment
orders found add up to approx. $100,000. They reflect only
part of the overall picture, since there are 20 Fatah district
branches: 13 in the West Bank and 7 in the Gaza Strip (see
Documents 13 and 14).
32. From the orders uncovered, it can be
deduced that the allocations to branch activists in this
format is between $290,000-530,000. These are direct payments
to Fatah/Tanzim activists involved in terrorism. This in
addition to the periodical financing of Fatah branches and
the provision of means such as arms and fuel to local militias.
The PA officials involved in the process
33. The transfer of money from the PA to
the Fatah is directed by Yasser Arafat who is involved in
most of the smallest details daily. In addition, a number
of PA officials are also responsible for this activity. One
is Hikham Balawi, apersonal associate of Arafat. He is the
secretary of the PA Supreme National Security Council, and
one of the senior officials in charge of the Fatah/Tanzim
in the West Bank - hence also of its budget in this area.
Another associate of Arafat engaged in money transfer to
the Fatah is the PA's main financier, Fuad Shubaki. Documents
captured by the IDF demonstrate his connection to the Al
Aqsa Martyrs Brigades - Fatah's military wing. Shubaki was
asked to allocate money to these elements for perpetration
of terrorist attacks such as preparing explosive charges
and arms production. Shubaki was also asked to finance the
construction of a workshop for producing heavy weapons, apparently
rockets and mortars (see Documents 15 and 16).
34. The allocation of funds to Fatah field
activists are personally authorized by Arafat, after he is
approached by Fatah senior activists in the West Bank such
as Hussein al Sheikh and Marwan Barghouti, head of the Fatah/Tanzim.
Through them, the aid is provided to the terrorist squads
operating in the West Bank. These squads operate under the
title of the "Al Aqsa Martyrs Brigades", and their
organizational affiliation to the Fatah is a proven fact.
35. Financial sources external to the budget
are created from money accumulated from various PA activities
such as fuel and tobacco imports to the PA. The import of
these products is handled as economic monopolies, which are
in the hands of senior PA officials. The Deputy Chairman
of the PA Legislative Council (Nahaj Munir Alris), who listed
the PA's weaknesses in an interview to an Arab newspaper
(Al Hayat Al Jadidah, 26 November 2001), placed the economic
monopolies and the corruption phenomena at the head of the
list. The revenue from the heavy taxation of the fuel and
tobacco imports is diverted to funds not included in the
PA budget, from which activities not listed in the official
budget can be financed. It is not surprising that Arafat
personally controls this money. The European elements rightfully
demanded that the monopoly revenues should be part of the
accounts managed by the Palestinian Finance Ministry.
36. The surpluses from the PA budgets and
the external budget funds enable the PA to maintain additional
PLO apparatuses that were not disbanded after the PA was
established. One of these is the array of PLO/Fatah representations
around the world. PLO veterans employed in these representations
and enjoying diplomatic immunity, intensively aid in arms
procurement operations and smuggling to the West Bank and
Much Money is Directed to Terrorist Elements?
37. It is hard to give a clear quantitative
answer to the question of how much money is diverted from
the PA budgets to terrorist groups. However, the activities
described above generates millions of dollars a month in
surpluses outside the official PA budget, as described in
the table on the following page. We estimate that Fatah elements
are allocated $5-$10 million per month from the PA for its
expenses in the confrontation against Israel. Some of this
sum is in money and some in goods - fuel and arms. It can
be estimated that PLO apparatuses in the Middle East and
worldwide are allocated millions of dollars more each month.
38. Obviously there is no way of proving
that all the money saved from the official salary budget
is transferred directly to Fatah elements and additional
terrorist organizations. The claim is that within the PA
budget, activities take place that are typical of a "money
Sources from the PA Salary Budget that could be diverted
to other activities
Monthly Sum ($)
Differences in exchange rate in salary
|$40.5 million, 19% difference
in exchange rate
|Deductions from salaries of security personnel
for Fatah's budget
|50,000 security personnel, average monthly
salary $345, 1.5-2% deduction
Payment of salaries to Fatah personnel
on the PA payroll
|2,000-3,200 Fatah personnel
|Financing of Fatah branches
|$3,400-4,100 per district branch, 20 branches.
$680- 1,360 per sub- branch, 100 branches
|Total sources from the salary budget
that can be diverted to the Fatah and other terrorist
|14% of the scope of the international
aid to the PA budget ($64 million per month)
Note: The official representative exchange
rate in Israel at the end of December 2001 was 4.4 shekels
39. As unveiled in the captured documents,
the main methods which enabled the creation of surpluses
in the PA salary account (differences in the exchange rate,
deductions to the Fatah, and the integration of Fatah personnel
in the PA salary payroll) continued at the end of 2001 and
in early 2002. In our assessment, the PA continued to finance
Fatah branches during these years. The direct payments to
Fatah/Tanzim activists were in addition to these methods,
and in accordance to the scope of attacks carried out by
Fatah/Tanzim in the confrontation with Israel.
40. A clear example of the financial aid
to these militias is found in the example of cooperation
between PA elements and the Al Aqsa Martyrs Brigades (Fatah/Tanzim
activists) in the Tulkarm area: financing of procurement
of M- 16 rifles, direct payments to terrorist squad activists,
with Arafat's personalinvolvement, and recommendations to
continue to assist them with funds and logistic means (through
the PA official security apparatuses such as the General
Intelligence (see Document 17).
41. The main source for paying PA salaries
in 2001-2002 is the international aid money. Assuming that
surpluses of $9 million per month are accumulated from the
salaries section of the budget, it can be stated that 14%
of the international aid is channeled to other objectives
than those originally intended. It is reasonable to assume
that a significant part of the revenue accumulated from the
exchange rate differences is not directed to humanitarian
goals, and some of the money is transferred directly to the
42. The documents described in this report,
and other documents published during April 2002, clearly
show the connection between the PA financing of the Fatah/Tanzim
and the terrorist attacks against Israeli civilians and the
suicide attacks carried out by these local militias inside
Copies and Translations of Captured Documents