

## APPENDIX XIV

**MINUTES OF PALESTINE MEETING OF THE SUPREME COUNCIL OF THE  
ALLIED POWERS HELD IN SAN REMO AT THE VILLA DEVACHAN -  
APRIL 24, 1920**

(Minutes prepared by the British Secretary)

**Present:** *United States of America:* Mr. Robert Underwood Johnson, American Ambassador in Rome; Mr. Leland Harrison, Mr. T. Hart Anderson, Jr. (The United States representatives joined the Supreme Council shortly after the commencement of Minute 2.)

*British Empire:* The Right Hon. D. Lloyd George, Prime Minister; The Right Hon. the Earl Curzon of Kedleston, Secretary of State for Foreign Affairs; Mr. R. Vansittart, Colonel Gribbon; SECRETARIES, Sir M. Hankey, Lieutenant-Colonel L. Storr.

*France:* M. Millerand, President of the French Council; M. Bertielot, M. Kammerer.

*Italy:* Signor Nitti, Prime Minister (*in the Chair*); Signor Scialoja; SECRETARIES, Signor Garbasso, Signor Galli, Signor Trombetti, Lieutenant Zanchi.

*Japan:* Mr. Matsui; SECRETARIES, Mr. Saito, Mr. Sawada.

INTERPRETER: M. Camerlynck.

I. *The Frontiers of Turkey, Armenia* SIGNOR NITTI said that the first question before the Supreme Council that afternoon was the resumption of the discussion in regard to Erzerum and the boundaries of Armenia. The previous day Armenia Mr. Lloyd George had suggested that a telegram should be sent to President Wilson. He understood, however, that since then there had been some modification in the situation. He himself was personally quite inclined to agree in substance with the proposal put forward by Mr. Lloyd George.

MR. LLOYD GEORGE said that he had had an opportunity that morning of discussing the question with M. Millerand, who had a suggestion to put before the Supreme Council.

M. MILLERAND said that in the course of the conversation which he had had with Mr. Lloyd George that morning, the British Prime Minister had indicated a solution which he would now put before the council, and to which the president of the council had just alluded. He himself doubted whether the United States would consent to act in the matter. The last thing they wanted, however, was to revert to the position in which they were left the previous day. He had suggested to Mr. Lloyd George that morning that they should appeal to the United States to take charge of Armenia. If she refused to do this, to ask her to act as arbitrator and to decide in that capacity whether Erzerum was to be left to the Turks or whether it was to be regarded as neutral or whether it should be handed over to the new Armenian State.

SIGNOR NITTI said that he himself had no objection to raise against this proposal. The Turks, however, had been invited to Paris on the 10th of the following month, and it was therefore necessary that the treaty should, before that date, be in a form in which it could be presented to the Turkish representatives.

MR. LLOYD GEORGE said that his proposal was that the United States should be asked to accept the mandate for Armenia. If they consented, as he thought the council hoped they would, all that was necessary was to make the necessary provision in the treaty. If they refused, then the Washington Government should be asked to arbitrate. It might be stated in the text of the treaty

that the fate of Erzerum was to be left for the decision of the President of the United States, who would act as arbitrator, and that all the parties would agree to abide by his decision. This, he understood, was the proposal of M. Millerand...

2. Mandates. SIGNOR NITTI said that the next matter before the Supreme Council was the question of mandates for those territories which had been Mandates formerly under Turkish domination and which it was proposed should, in the future, be administered by the various Principal Allied Powers (A.J. 170).

LORD CURZON said that the question of mandates over territories which, under the terms of the treaty, were to be severed from Turkish dominion had been under discussion between the French and the British delegations. Both delegations were in agreement that at this stage it was impossible to introduce into the treaty any clauses defining the exact form of the said mandates, if the treaty was to be presented to the Turks by the 10th May. Further, in the course of the past months the situation in each of the said territories had changed; that is to say, in Mesopotamia, Palestine and Syria. It was desirable that the forms of mandate for Syria and Mesopotamia should be drawn up by the French and British Governments in mutual consultation and co-operation, and they would then be submitted to the Council of the League of Nations.

Palestine. As regards Palestine, His Britannic Majesty's Government had, two years previously, promulgated a formal declaration which had been accepted by the Allied Powers, that Palestine was in future to be the National Home of the Jews throughout the world. His information was to the effect that the Jews themselves attached a passionate importance to the terms of this declaration, and that they would not only be disappointed, but deeply incensed if the pledge given in Mr. Balfour's declaration were not renewed in the terms of the treaty. The Supreme Council had now to consider what should be the exact form that the repetition of this pledge should take. He thought that the only safe plan was to repeat the pledge in the precise form in which it had been originally given. The British Foreign Office had been pressed very closely by the Zionists in order to have the terms of that pledge expanded and improved. He himself as head of the British Foreign Office, had absolutely refused to go beyond the original declaration, and had said that the fairest thing was to adhere strictly to the original terms. Beyond this the British Government were not prepared to go. He sincerely hoped that the French delegation would not refuse to adhere to the terms as originally drafted. He understood the French déléga-tion had an alternative draft of the article relating to mandates which they proposed to submit to the council, but he sincerely trusted they would not press its acceptance.

M. BERTHELOT said that he confessed that he was not in entire agreement with all that Lord Curzon had said. It seemed to him the safest plan to adopt was to accept the proposal to submit the question to the League of Nations. In regard to the Zionists he was not again in entire agreement with Lord Curzon, but he thought it [it] was especially important that the council should not go beyond the present proposals. Were they to grant to the Jews all facilities to settle in Palestine and to organise there a theoretical Jewish home? He thought that the whole world was sympathetic to the aspiration of the Jews to establish a national home in Palestine, and they would be prepared to do their utmost to satisfy their legitimate desires. Nor did the French Government desire at all to stand in the way of Great Britain's wish to give the Jews due opportunity to achieve those passionate aspirations. So far as these were concerned, the French delegation had no objection to offer, and they were prepared to recognise the responsibilities of the country accepting the mandate. It was essential, however, that there should be no misunderstanding on this question. Was this new projected State, however, to have an entirely

different administration from other States? If so, a great difficulty would be created, both with the Mussulman and the Christian world. He could not think that this was intended by His Majesty's Government. As regards Mr. Balfour's declaration on behalf of the Zionists, had it been generally accepted by the Allied Powers? He had not the text in front of him, but, so far as his recollection went, it was framed in general terms. But he could not recall that general acceptance had even [ever] been given to Mr. Balfour's declaration by the Allied Powers. He had no desire at all to embarrass the British Government, but he must state that, so far as his recollection went, there had never been any official acceptance of Mr. Balfour's declaration by the Allies of the British Government.

LORD CURZON thought that M. Berthelot was possibly not fully acquainted with the history of the question. In November 1917 Mr. Balfour had made a declaration on behalf of the Zionists. The terms of this declaration had been communicated by M. Sokolov, in February 1918 to M. Pichon, who, at that time, was head of the French Foreign Office. He had before him a copy of a letter from M. Pichon, which had been published in the French press, which he would ask the interpreter presently to read out to the Supreme Council. Further, the Italian Government had also expressed its approval of the terms of the declaration, which had, further, been accepted by the President of the United States, and also by Greece, China, Serbia and Siam. He thought, therefore, he was quite justified in saying that Mr. Balfour's declaration had been accepted by a large number of the Allied Powers. Secondly, M. Berthelot had laid stress upon the fact that it was desirable that there should be no misunderstanding at all upon the subject. He quite agreed, but he did not see how any such misunderstanding could arise. He thought it was impossible for the Supreme Council to determine, that day, exactly what form the future administration of Palestine would take. All they could do was to repeat the declaration which had been made in November 1917. That declaration contemplated, first, the creation of national home for the Jews, whose privileges and rights were to be safeguarded under a military Power. Secondly, it was of the highest importance to safeguard the rights of minorities; first, the rights of the Arabs, and then of the Christian communities. Provision was made for this in the second part of the declaration. He submitted, therefore, that, in the interests of those communities to which M. Berthelot had alluded, it was unwise to suppress the second part of the declaration. The position of the British Government was this, that they simply could not exclude it, and they sincerely hoped that in view of the explanation which he had submitted to the Supreme Council, the French Government would not press their objections.

M. BERTHELOT said that he would like to hear Mr. Balfour's declaration read out. As he understood the matter, it appeared that hitherto all M. Pichon had agreed to was to establish the traditional home of the Jews, and it was not in any way evident that M. Pichon had accepted the whole declaration in its entirety.

(The official interpreter then read out the text of Mr. Balfour's declaration.)

SIGNOR NITTI expressed the view that it was useless to go into past history. It appeared to him that in principle the Powers were generally in agreement as to the desirability of instituting a national home for the Jews. The discussion had disclosed the fact that there was a divergence of opinion between the British and French delegations as to exactly what rights were to be reserved for the non-Jewish communities in Palestine. The subject, moreover, raised the whole question of the position of Roman Catholics in the East, which he did not think required a very elaborate solution. It was agreed that Palestine was to be under British control, and on

behalf of the Italian delegation he begged leave to submit the following addition to the British text of the mandates:—

*‘Tout privilège, et toute prérogative vis-à-vis des communautés religieuses prendra fin. La Puissance mandataire s’engage à nommer dans le plus bref délai une commission spéciale pour étudier toute question et toute réclamation concernant les différentes communautés religieuses et en établir le règlement. Il sera tenu compte dans la composition de cette commission des intérêts religieux en jeu. Le président de la commission sera nommé par le Conseil de la Société des Nations.’*

He was quite sure that all the members of the Supreme Council present shared the full confidence that he himself felt in the British Government in regard to the safeguarding of the rights and privileges of non-Jewish communities. He himself would like to see the president of the commission, which was proposed by the Italian delegation, to be appointed by the League of Nations, in order to ensure complete impartiality.

M. MILLERAND said that, as regards Palestine, there were really three questions. The first was that there should be a national home for the Jews. Upon that they were all agreed. The second point was the safeguarding of the rights of non-Jewish communities. That again, he thought, offered no insuperable difficulties. The third was the question of existing traditional rights of non-Jewish bodies, and on that he would like to offer certain observations. He was not precisely informed as to what had transpired during the discussions which Mr. Lloyd George had held with M. Clemenceau on this subject, and no doubt Mr. Lloyd George would give precise information to the Supreme Council. He himself had no objection to the mandate which he understood Great Britain desired to exercise in Palestine. He was quite sure that England would faithfully discharge that duty, and he was equally sure that M. Clemenceau had not contemplated that this mandate should carry with it the renunciation of the traditional rights of the inhabitants of Palestine. What was the question before the Supreme Council that afternoon? He understood that in undertaking a mandate for Palestine Great Britain undertook, first, to establish a national home for the Jews in that country, and also not to neglect the traditional rights of the inhabitants generally.

SIGNOR NITTI said that they were all agreed on the question of establishing a Jewish home there.

SIGNOR NITTI said he wished to interpose for a moment in the discussion in order to inform the council that he had information to the effect that the United States Ambassador at Rome was in the ante-chamber, and had asked to be admitted to the meeting. Hitherto, the representative of the Washington Government in Rome had not received any instructions from his Government to attend meetings of the Supreme Council. He understood that if he attended it would be as an observer only, and not as a representative participant in their deliberations.

MR. LLOYD GEORGE suggested that the United States Ambassador should be admitted to the Council Chamber and that the president of the Supreme Council should ask him exactly what his instructions were.

(At this point the United States Ambassador to Rome and his secretaries entered the Council Chamber.)

SIGNOR NITTI said that he desired, on behalf of the Supreme Council, of which he was

president, to offer a cordial welcome to the representative of the United States. He was particularly glad that the United States should be represented at a moment when the Supreme Council was about to take many decisions of very great importance. The Supreme Council were now engaged in discussing the terms of the Treaty of Peace with Turkey, which they hoped shortly would be presented to the Turkish representatives for signature. The trend of their discussions would be gathered by Mr. Johnson from the minutes of the meetings which would be furnished to him. The Supreme Council had just concluded their discussion upon Armenia, and they had agreed that the matter should be referred to President Wilson as arbitrator. The question now occupying the attention of the Supreme Council was the subject of mandates, and their present pre-occupation in the future of Palestine and the Zionists.

M. BERTHELOT, referring to Mr. Balfour's original declaration, quoted the words: 'The mandatory Power will assume the responsibility of establishing a home for the Jews on the understanding that the rights of other communities will be safeguarded.' This, he said, guaranteed the two points referred to by Lord Curzon. He suggested that it might be as well to have Mr. Balfour's statement in its original form translated for the benefit of the Supreme Council. As he had already pointed out, the French Government had never taken official cognisance of Mr. Balfour's declaration, and M. Pichon's connection with that declaration was, he submitted, somewhat vague.

LORD CURZON said that M. Berthelot could hardly say that M. Pichon was unaware of the significance of the declaration. M. Pichon, in his reply to M. Sokolov, had not only endorsed, on behalf of his own Government, Mr. Balfour's declaration, but had added in his letter: 'Besides, I am happy to affirm that the understanding between the French and British Governments on this question is complete.' With regard to M. Berthelot's second point, where he had suggested words beginning 'Sous réserve des droits politiques . . .', the question of political and existing traditional rights raised an infinite field of discussion. He quite agreed that it was desirable to raise this point, but he thought it was most unwise, and, indeed, quite unnecessary, to raise the question now. It has been agreed by the Supreme Council that the mandate should be submitted to the League of Nations, and he thought that the council should be content at present with merely repeating the terms of Mr. Balfour's original declaration, which had been accepted by the French Government at the time of its promulgation.

M. BERTHELOT said he accepted this, but he disputed the necessity of referring to Mr. Balfour's declaration, which had long been a dead letter.

LORD CURZON indicated his dissent.

SIGNOR NITTI said that there was another important question, to which he had already referred, and that was the protection of the rights of Roman Catholics in Palestine. M. Berthelot was perfectly well aware that Turkish control over Palestine was now entirely at an end. Great Britain had taken over the administration of the country, and she would certainly respect the traditional rights of the inhabitants. The Catholic Church generally, however, was not satisfied with this solution of the question, and a letter from Cardinal Gaspar [r]i had been published in the press some time before to the effect that, should Turkish domination in that region end, the French were its natural successors. The idea of the Church was that France, and not Great Britain, should be the protector of Roman Catholic interests in Palestine. From the international

point of view he urged that it was better that the formula which had been suggested by the Italian delegation should be accepted. As M. Millerand was well aware, the Roman Catholic Church was not a signatory to the treaty. (...) insert the word 'political' was that they were anxious that non-Jewish communities should not be deprived of existing political rights, that is to say, the right to vote and take part in elections.

SIGNOR NITTI thought that the apparent difference of opinion between the French and British delegations was one of form and not of substance. He quite understood M. Millerand's points as regards political rights to be reserved to non-Jewish communities. He thought that the Supreme Council, as at present constituted, were quite agreed as to what was intended and designed. At the same time it was possible that, in the course of the next three years, neither he nor M. Millerand might be in power, and then difficulties might arise. He hoped that the Supreme Council would now be able to come to a decision on this point.

M. MILLERAND said that he was prepared to accept the Italian addition to the article, provided that the opening sentence with regard to the abandonment of the French religious privileges was not formally included in the treaty, but was regarded as a binding pledge. As regards the political rights of the inhabitants of Palestine for which the French delegation had pressed, he would be satisfied to record the French claim in the *procès-verbal*.

The following draft resolution was formulated by the British delegation for consideration:-

To accept the terms of the mandates article as given below with reference to Palestine on the understanding that there was inserted in the *procès-verbal* an undertaking by the mandatory Power that this would not involve the surrender of the rights hitherto enjoyed by the non-Jewish communities in Palestine; this undertaking not to refer to the question of the religious protectorate of France which had been settled earlier in the afternoon by the undertaking given by the French Government that they recognised this protectorate as being at an end. That the terms of the mandates article should be as follows:-

The high contracting parties agree that Syria and Mesopotamia shall, in accordance with the fourth paragraph of article 22, Part I (Covenant of the League of Nations), be provisionally recognised as independent States subject to the rendering of administrative advice and assistance by a mandatory until such time as they are able to stand alone. The boundaries of the said States will be determined, and the selection of the mandatories made, by the Principal Allied Powers.

The high contracting parties agree to entrust, by application of the provisions of article 22, the administration of Palestine, within such boundaries as may be determined by the Principal Allied Powers, to a mandatory, to be selected by the said Powers. The mandatory will be responsible for putting into effect the declaration originally made on the 8th November, 1917, by the British Government, and adopted by the other Allied Powers, in favour of the establishment in Palestine of a national home for the Jewish people, it being clearly understood that nothing shall be done which may prejudice the civil and religious rights of existing non-Jewish communities in Palestine, or the rights and political status enjoyed by Jews in any other country :-

'La Puissance mandataire s'engage à nommer dans le plus bref délai une commission spéciale pour étudier toute question et toute réclamation concernant les différentes communautés religieuses et en établir le règlement. Il sera tenu compte dans la composition de cette

commission des intérêts religieux en jeu. Le président de la commission sera nommé par le Conseil de la Société des Nations.'

The terms of the mandates in respect of the above territories will be formulated by the Principal Allied Powers and submitted to the Council of the League of Nations for approval.

Turkey hereby undertakes, in accordance with the provisions of article," to accept any decisions which may be taken in this connection.

3. *Further Business* SIGNOR NITTI enquired as to the future business which was to come before the Supreme Council.

M. BERTHELOT said that there were a certain number of essential questions which still remained for discussion and decision. They had yet to fix the limits of certain States—for instance, Mesopotamia, Syria, and so on; and also to name the Powers which would have the mandates for those States. These were important questions, the solution of which was more desirable than decisions on minor points, such as Zionism.

SIGNOR NITTI said that it would be necessary for the Supreme Council to hold two sittings on the following day if they were to conclude their business, and he proposed that the subjects to be brought on the agenda should be:-

- (1) Mandates.
- (2) Hedjaz.
- (3) Points raised by the Drafting Committee.
- (4) Russia.
- (5) Adriatic.

San Remo, April 24, 1920.

## APPENDIX XV

**MINUTES OF MEETING OF THE SUPREME COUNCIL OF THE ALLIED POWERS  
IN SAN REMO AT THE VILLA DEVACHAN - APRIL 25, 1920**

## PRESENT:

*United States of America:* Mr. Robert Underwood Johnson, American Ambassador in Rome; Secretaries, Mr. Leland Harrison, Mr. T. Hart Anderson, Jr.

*British Empire:* The Right Hon. D. Lloyd George, Prime Minister; The Right Hon. the Earl Curzon of Kedleston, Secretary of State for Foreign Affairs; Mr. R. Vansittart, Colonel Gribbon, Mr. E. F. Wise (for Minute 7); Secretaries, Sir M. Hankey, Lieutenant-Colonel L. Storr.

*France:* M. Millerand, President of the French Council; M. Berthelot, M. Kammerer.

*Italy:* Signor Nitti, Prime Minister (*in the Chair*); Signor Scialoja; Secretaries, Signor Garbasso, Signor Galli, Signor Trombetti, Lieutenant Zanchi.

*Japan:* Mr. Matsui; Secretaries, Mr. Saito, Mr. Sawada.

Interpreter: M. Camerlynck.

I. **MANDATES** SIGNOR NITTI said that it was very important that the Supreme Council should settle as soon as possible the question of Asia Minor. The first item on the agenda was the resumption of the discussion held the previous day in regard to mandates. He enquired whether his colleagues had thought that the third item should be taken first in sequence, which was the hearing of the Drafting Committee on certain points which the committee desired to raise in order to clear up this matter at once.

M. BERTHELOT said that he hoped that the Supreme Council did not think that the discussion on the question of mandates had been concluded. The British delegation had submitted to the council the text of a mandates article which did not correspond to the view held by the French, who proposed to submit their views in a separate document. Moreover, so far, the council had only had under consideration the question of the mandate of Palestine. There were two very important things which had to be settled. The first was the appointment of the mandatory Powers, and the second was the fixation of the boundaries of the mandate countries. Taking the question of boundaries, so far as Syria was concerned her northern frontiers were already indicated in the terms of the Treaty of Peace with Turkey. In respect of the eastern frontier and the Mosul region it was proposed to draw a line from the Tigris (Jezireh-bin-Omar and the mouth of the eastern Kabour River) up to the junction of the Sykes-Picot line with the Euphrates. The southern frontier would follow the Sykes-Picot line, with the exception of a slight modification of the frontier of Palestine, which would conform to the definition advocated by Mr. Lloyd George, who had been in favour of the ancient boundaries of Dan and Beersheba; that is to say, that Palestine should include the *casa* of Safed as far as north of Dan, and that the frontier should be demarcated to the east by a perpendicular line drawn from the south of Mount Hermon to where it crossed the frontier as described in the Sykes-Picot Agreement of 1916. These frontiers had been included in the draft which he had submitted to the British delegation in London. They raised no difficulties at all, as complete agreement had been reached between the British and French delegations. As regards the northern frontier, Lord Curzon proposed certain boundaries for the Mosul Vilayet.

LORD CURZON said that M. Berthelot had referred to the question of the nomination of mandatory Powers for the countries to be severed from Turkey. M. Berthelot desired that the names of those Powers should be inserted in the treaty, but he himself wished to point out that this course had not been adopted in the case of the treaty with Germany, when it had been agreed that the names of the mandatories should be included in a separate Act. He suggested that the Supreme Council should follow the same course which they had adopted in the case of the treaty with Germany. The nomination of the Powers was a matter which could be taken up at any time—that afternoon, if necessary. M. Berthelot had then referred to Syria, which he had hoped would be, with Palestine, included in the treaty. Lord Curzon said that he thought it was both undesirable and impossible, as well as unnecessary. First, this part of the treaty was concerned with the severing of certain portions of the old Turkish dominion from the new Turkish State, e.g., Syria and Mesopotamia. The council, therefore, had to deal only with the Syrian frontier which was to be left, and the northern frontier of Syrian Palestine which would be taken away. The British delegation were quite prepared to deal with these matters that morning. M. Berthelot had further referred to the boundaries of Palestine and Syria, and the eastern boundary of Syria. He thought himself that it was impossible to settle the northern boundary of Syria without regard to her eastern frontier, and, moreover, he was not aware of the actual nature of the French proposals. There was a further reason for not accepting M. Berthelot's point of view. The Powers were most desirous that peace should reign in those regions, and that a *modus vivendi* should be reached with Feisal. It was true that the Emir Feisal had recently taken illicit action. He was, however, on the spot, he had a strong backing, and it seemed certain that he would emerge shortly as the head of a new State. If the Allied Powers now fixed the boundaries without him they would be creating great difficulties for themselves in the future. When Feisal and his Arabs heard that the Allied Powers had come to a decision in regard to the boundaries of Syria and Palestine, there would be a great ebullition of Arab feeling, of which Feisal would take full advantage, and an unpleasant situation would arise. The council, he thought, were in agreement as to the boundary of Palestine to the north, but they had not yet settled what the eastern frontier was to be. The Emir Feisal would almost certainly be coming to Europe very shortly, and Lord Curzon urged that it would be better to await his arrival before the council definitely committed itself. To fix boundaries now was unnecessary, in the first instance, and unwise in the second.

M. BERTHELOT said that from the point of view of the mandatories he quite agreed that it was logical to follow the precedent of the German treaty, and that the Supreme Council should take a separate decision in regard to the nomination of the mandatory Powers, provided that the decision was taken as soon as possible and without any unnecessary delay. As regards frontiers, the northern frontier, as he had already said, would raise no difficulty. It had been fully discussed in London, and an agreement had been reached. Lord Curzon's argument that it was difficult to fix the frontier to the north of Palestine without simultaneously fixing the frontier to the east and south, and that to determine these without consulting the Emir Feisal would place the latter in a very embarrassing position, did not somehow how quite convince him. He thought that this argument would be easy to meet. Lord Curzon had been apprehensive that if the Supreme Council should come to a decision about the boundaries, an explosion was bound to occur among the Arabs as soon as they were made aware of that decision. He himself doubted this. *Vis-à-vis* Feisal, he thought it was most important that, before the Emir were admitted to their counsels, Great Britain and France should be in complete agreement. Such an agreement had, he thought, already been reached between the two countries in London. The last thing they wanted was to prolong indefinitely the discussion regarding these frontiers. Mr. Lloyd George had indicated a

formula, and had stated that if the French accepted this the British delegation would not press their points in other directions. There was no difficulty in regard to the eastern frontiers of Palestine. Here the 'B' zone of the Sykes-Picot Agreement fixed the limit of British influence. He suggested that the simplest thing to do was to have it stated that the two Powers adhered to the line which was fixed in the Sykes-Picot Agreement, and he trusted that the British delegation would agree to this; otherwise, the French Government would be bound to seek something further later on. Their present request represented quite a legitimate demand. He was not in favour of Lord Curzon's argument that the best thing to do would be to settle the question of the mandatory Powers in an Act separate from the treaty. What the French earnestly desired was complete agreement: first, in regard to the Mosul area; secondly, in respecting [respect of] Palestine; and thirdly, so far as the extension of the northern frontier was concerned. The French had made considerable concessions, and he thought that in the circumstances the British delegation should be prepared to give way.

MR. LLOYD GEORGE said that he fully agreed with M. Berthelot that a complete and comprehensive understanding between the British and the French was most desirable. Serious difficulties had arisen between the two Governments at a previous date, but fortunately these had now vanished. To take the northern limit of Palestine, the Zionists had claimed the whole of the country up to the river, including Tyre and Sidon. These, however, had never been included in history in the boundaries of Palestine. When in London he had informed M. Berthelot that M. Clemenceau had agreed to his suggestion that the limits should be fixed by the old historic towns of Dan and Beersheba. The French had not favoured this suggestion, but they had agreed to it, and now they were loyally standing by it. The British Government also perceived many objections to it but they were equally prepared to stand by it. It was not a good arrangement, for this reason, that the head waters of the Jordan would be outside the control of the men who had been inhabiting Palestine. However, these waters had never been under their control at any time in history. He wished once more to refer to a book by the Reverend George Adam Smith, which was regarded as the ablest book on Palestine which had ever been written. He himself had given copies to British military experts, who had taken it practically as a textbook. He himself was prepared, as soon as negotiations began between the Zionists and the Arabs, to back the former. This particular question presented no difficulty, as the limits were already fixed on the map. To the east difficulties might arise, but those difficulties would not be with the Arabs but with the Druses. He thought that the British and the French were practically agreed about the question of Mosul. In this connection he would take the opportunity of asking the French to concede a small corner here which was the head of a navigable river, and it was desirable that the British should possess it, as the navigation of the river was affected. It was a quite small matter. He reminded the Supreme Council that when they were discussing the Treaty of Peace with Germany in Paris, and had come to the clauses dealing with the disposal of the German colonies, the then Supreme Council—which had consisted of M. Clemenceau, Signor Orlando, President Wilson and himself—who [*sic*] had agreed that the actual *boundaries* of Togoland, the Cameroons and German East Africa should be settled later; and he agreed with Lord Curzon that the council surely could not dispose of the countries now under discussion without giving the Emir Feisal a chance of stating his case.

M. BERTHELOT begged to thank Mr. Lloyd George very much for what he had said, and he would rejoice with him that no real difficulties remained as between the French and the British. The small point to which Mr. Lloyd George had referred in the Mosul area could, he thought, easily be settled. As regards the question of mandates, M. Millerand was anxious that

the decision should be reached that day, if possible, and he enquired whether they could not decide now that the British be given a mandate over Mesopotamia and Palestine, and the French over Syria.

SIGNOR NITTI said that he thought that a formal decision could be taken that morning.

M. MILLERAND added that it should be understood that the agreement should be recorded in the minutes of the meeting only, and not inserted in the treaty.

SIGNOR NITTI said that he wished to make a reservation on this point, which would be submitted shortly to the council as soon as copies had been typed and circulated. His point was that part of Asia Minor was being ascribed to Armenia and part to Greece. He reminded the Supreme Council that Italy was wholly a Mediterranean Power, and as such was deeply concerned in the disposal of the countries in Asia Minor.

M. MILLERAND thought it might be as well to add, after the resolution, something to the effect that the terms of the mandates constituting the mandatory Powers should be settled by the Principal Allied and Associated Powers to be agreed upon by the League of Nations.

LORD CURZON pointed out that this point had been included in the draft which had been submitted at their meeting the previous day by the British delegation.

SIGNOR NITTI said that if the Supreme Council ac[c]epted the Italian reservation, he thought the question of mandates was now closed.

It was agreed-

(a) To accept the terms of the mandates article as given below with reference to Palestine, on the understanding that there was inserted in the *procès-verbal* an undertaking by the mandatory Power that this would not involve the surrender of the rights hitherto enjoyed by the non-Jewish communities in Palestine; this undertaking not to refer to the question of the religious protectorate of France, which had been settled earlier in the previous afternoon by the undertaking given by the French Government that they recognised this protectorate as being at an end.

(b) That the terms of the mandates article should be as follows:-

The high contracting parties agree that Syria and Mesopotamia shall, in accordance with the fourth paragraph of article 22, Part I (Covenant of the League of Nations), be provisionally recognised as independent States, subject to the rendering of administrative advice and assistance by a mandatory until such time as they are able to stand alone. The boundaries of the said States will be determined, and the selection of the mandatories made, by the Principal Allied Powers.

The high contracting parties agree to entrust, by application of the provisions of article 22, the administration of Palestine, within such boundaries as may be determined by the Principal Allied Powers, to a mandatory, to be selected by the said Powers. The mandatory will be responsible for putting into effect the declaration originally made on the 8<sup>th</sup> [2<sup>nd</sup>] November, 1917, by the British Government, and adopted by the other Allied Powers, in favour of the establishment in Palestine of a national home for the Jewish people, it being clearly understood that nothing shall be done which may prejudice the civil and religious rights of existing non-Jewish communities in Palestine, or the rights and political status enjoyed by Jews in any other country:-

'La Puissance mandataire s'engage à nommer dans le plus bref délai une commission spéciale pour étudier toute question et toute réclamation concernant les différentes communautés religieuses et en établir le règlement. Il sera tenu compte dans la composition de cette commission des intérêts religieux en jeu. Le président de la commission sera nommé par le Conseil de la Société des Nations.'

The terms of the mandates in respect of the above territories will be formulated by the Principal Allied Powers and submitted to the Council of the League of Nations for approval.

Turkey hereby undertakes, in accordance with the provisions of article to accept any decisions which may be taken in this connection.

(c) Les mandataires choisis par les principales Puissances alliées sont : la France pour la Syrie, et la Grande-Bretagne pour la Mésopotamie et la Palestine.

In reference to the above decision the Supreme Council took note of the following reservation of the Italian delegation:-

'La délégation italienne, en considération des grands intérêts économiques que l'Italie en tant que Puissance exclusivement méditerranéenne possède en Asie Mineure, réserve son approbation à la présente résolution, jusqu'au règlement des intérêts italiens en Turquie d'Asie.'