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March 1, 2007

Framework for Action on Palestinian side

- Following a number of discussions with Arab and Western leaders, it has become clear that there is a need for the Palestinian leadership to articulate its course of action over the next few months with regard to its own internal government issues, as well as to its relationship with Israel and, in broader terms, with the international community.
- In the absence of such a clear action plan (that needs to be developed, adopted and articulated by the Palestinian leadership, both publicly and privately) serious questions will remain over the sincerity of the intentions of the Palestinian leadership for peace, as well as their ability to deliver. This will adversely affect Israel's willingness to pursue serious peace negotiations with the Palestinian leadership, and also reduce the level of interest of the U.S. in particular, and the international community to engage seriously in a new peace process. It might also lead the international community to seek relations with other Palestinian groups, in particular, Hamas, in order to break the deadlock, especially if they are perceived to hold the cards (release of Shalit, negotiations..etc)
- We need to draft an Action Plan that can be then provided to the Palestinians as a suggestion for them to adopt and to obtain the approval and support of the Arab Quartet and the U.S. on it as a first step. This will also be shared with Israel and the Europeans in order to prove that Abbas does have a plan of action and is seriously committed to it.
- The Plan will include concrete steps in the security, political and economic domains that are designed to ensure the strengthening of the Palestinian leader's authority, and to provide him with the political, administrative and financial tools necessary to govern, and to be able to comfortably call early elections at the earliest possible time.
- The Plan will build upon the security, political and financial commitments already agreed upon between the Palestinians and the Israelis (Dayton – Dahlan), and understandings already reached with the Arab Quartet and the US. It must be time-lined and benchmarked to assure the serious commitment of the Palestinian leadership, and to ensure its acceptance by Israel and the other parties.
- Once adopted and articulated, the Plan will enable the Palestinian leadership to be more credible in the eyes of Israel and the others, and will also provide the Palestinians with a framework through which they can seek financial assistance and political support.
- We can prepare a draft Action Plan within the next few days and discuss it with the U.S. Administration. The U.S. and / or Jordan, Saudi Arabia and Egypt can then present the concept to the Palestinian leadership, and set up a joint task force (with a representative from each party) to produce the final draft, that can then be shared with Israel. This needs to be completed well before the next visit of Secretary Rice to the region, in order for the Israelis to be more positive with regard to the Public Statement (that is proposed to be made after the Secretary's visit), and which will in turn trigger a positive statement from the Arab Summit in Riyadh supporting the Palestinian – Israeli effort, and confirming the Arab Peace initiative.

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An action plan for the Palestinian Presidency - 2007

I. Issue:

The credibility of President Abbas outside the Palestinian territories has suffered in the aftermath of the Mecca Accord and the failure of the new Palestinian Unity Government Agreement to fulfill the Quartet conditions or Abbas' original demands.

In the absence of a concrete effort by Abbas to keep the Presidency as the center of gravity of Palestinian leadership it is expected that the international community's support for Abbas will erode and it will no longer deal exclusively with the Presidency (seen as increasingly ineffective). Many countries in the EU and the G8 will start looking for more credible interlocutors on the Palestinian side who can deliver on key issues of security and governance. This will strengthen Hamas' position within Palestinian society, further undermining Fateh and the Presidency, as well as prospects for early elections.

President Abbas, therefore, needs to present a concrete, meaningful, performance-based action plan that would render him more credible ahead of his discussions with the Israelis and the US during the U.S. Secretary of State's expected visit in March 2007. Moreover, such a plan would maintain the attention and focus of the international community and the US on channeling support where it can be most effective in moving the political process forward.

The elements of such a plan should be considered as necessary components in the process of building a Palestinian State (governance, sound economic management, institution building and rule of law).

II. Objectives

1. Maintain the Presidency and Fateh as the center of gravity in the Palestinian political scene to the international community.
2. Underscore the basis of the peace process and the requirements on all parties to abide by established international parameters. This means avoiding wasting valuable time on accommodating Hamas' ideological conditions and turning the clock to the pre-Madrid context. Spending valuable time and political capital on getting Hamas on board would undermine the entire basis for a peace framework.
3. Provide sufficient support (financial and political) for Abbas and Fateh to enable the President to move forward with the political negotiations towards the establishment of a Palestinian State and build the political capital to move on with plan 'B' (early Parliamentary elections in the Palestinian territories).
4. Undermine the political strength of Hamas by providing for the Palestinian people's immediate economic needs through the Presidency and Fateh as well as improving and strengthening the governance structures, and rule of law institutions within the PA.
5. Provide the necessary tools for the Presidency to control the security institutions and impose necessary order on the Palestinian street. This would also deter attempts for escalation by Hamas or other groups as long as the superiority of the PA forces and Fateh is well established.
6. Tie the plan to a timeline that focuses efforts of all parties on performance-based targets within a short period of time 3-9 months.
7. Ensure US and Israeli buy – in and cooperation in achieving the objectives outlined above.

III. Components:

1. Political: *Timeline 9 months*

Moving ahead with political negotiations on the establishment of a Palestinian State that would include discussions on final status issues, in addition to steps that change the current situation on the ground in the short term, is necessary in building Abbas' and Fateh's political capital.

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Launching political negotiations publicly, while conducting them secretly would produce the needed optimism while protect the parties from political pressures. Moreover, phased-out withdrawals and confidence building measures tied to progress on the security plan would also help the political process (phased out withdrawals, removal of road blocs, prisoner release, settlement freeze and cessation of excavation activities in Jerusalem).

It is also important that the Palestinian leadership ensure the adherence to the elements below in its political plan:

- In order to ensure adherence to and compliance with national decisions, and maintain the internal security of the Palestinian territories, the Palestinian government will cooperate with the President of the Palestinian Authority to agree to suspend acts of violence (acknowledging that this is in the best national interest to end violent activities and limit Israeli aggression against the Palestinians). Such action must end the chaos of uncontrolled weapons and the deteriorating internal security situation by reinforcing national law and order;
- The government program will focus on the internal agenda, specifically maintaining internal security and putting an end to the deteriorating crisis and renewing the pursuit of the reconciliation and economic programs, and limiting poverty and unemployment rates, and supporting those groups that have endured the hardships of resistance;

2. Governance: *Timeline 9 months*

The Plan should include concrete steps to ensure the strengthening of the Palestinian leader's authority, and to provide him with the legal and administrative tools necessary to govern, strengthen his credibility and legitimacy, and to be able to comfortably call and conduct early elections by the Autumn of 2007.

Fateh reform would fall under this component of the plan (plan to be presented with objectives and key benchmarks for Fateh overhaul in addition to the required budget for such a program to be concluded over the next 3-9 months).

- Get members of the young guard into higher positions of power within Fateh
- Election to a new Central Committee that empowers the new guard,
- Consolidate Fatah to be capable of presenting unified lists in upcoming elections.
- Close ranks within Fatah and control over Al-Aqsa Martyrs' Brigade.

The Institution of the Presidency would also be subject to strengthening a priori under the plan in order to build capacity to deliver on its financial, political and security responsibilities.

3. Security: *Timeline: 6 months*

Ensure "one authority one with one force" policy called for by Abbas and start taking necessary action against groups undermining the ceasefire with the goal of ensuring full control and responsibility over armed organizations and ultimately consolidating all armed groups within Palestinian security institutions in stages (between 2007 and 2008) and in line with benchmarks established by the international community.

The Security component of the plan will build upon the security commitments already agreed upon between the Palestinians and the Israelis (Dayton – Dahlan), and understandings already reached with the Arab Quartet and the US. It must be time-lined and benchmarked to assure the serious commitment of the Palestinian leadership, and to ensure its acceptance and support by Israel and the other parties (see attached annex).

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5. Economic: Timeline: 3-9 months

Salaries: Formalize mechanism for distribution of salaries in the Office of the President (focal depository and monitoring point) to be coordinated with the Minister of Finance (disbursement) in the absence of full acceptance by the Palestinian Government of the Quartet conditions that can channel salary payments to agreed upon sectors and employees while ensuring that such payments are not diverted by any faction. Such a system should credit the President as the guarantor of salary funding for the PA as Hamas remains unwilling to accept international obligations.

Development Projects: President Abbas has to provide in coordination with the World Bank and the EU a development plan that determines key sectors, areas and projects that need funding and can have beneficial effects on the ground over a period of 6-9 months focusing on poverty alleviation and unemployment. Funding for these projects would go to a fund under the Presidency and will be used by NGOs and the international community in implementing accelerated developmental programs. While the timeline for many such projects would exceed 9 months, it is important to ensure that sufficient progress is achievable within the 9 month timeline for projects initiated in order to guarantee maximum value from such initiatives before the next elections. (The average timeline for completion of vocational training centers, schools, health centers etc. is around 15 months).

Movement of goods and labor: Special export enhancement initiatives that would avoid Israeli movement restrictions (Peace Corridor) as well as necessary Israeli cooperation in lifting road blocks and restrictions to labor movement based on coordination between the President's Office and Israeli authorities.

IV. Implementation Steps: Prior to March 15th

The action plan can be provided to the Palestinians as a suggestion for them to adopt and to obtain the approval and support of the Arab Quartet and the U.S. on it as a first step. This will also be shared with Israel and the Europeans in order to prove that Abbas does have a plan of action and is seriously committed to it. The U.S. and / or Jordan, Saudi Arabia and Egypt can then present the concept to the Palestinian leadership, and set up a joint task force (with a representative from each party) to produce the final draft, that can then be shared with Israel.

It is necessary, however, to make sure that the plan is clear, not subject to various interpretations/reservations and is implementable in order not to fall in the Road Map predicament and face further bottlenecks or excuses for Israeli recalcitrance

What Israel needs to do:

Israel would have to make parallel commitments in return for the presentation and agreement on this plan during the next summit as indicated in the suggested joint declaration draft for the Rice-Abbas-Olmert Summit in March - and which will in turn trigger a positive statement from the Arab Summit in Riyadh supporting the political efforts, and confirming the Arab Peace initiative.

Just as the Palestinians are required to come up with a plan, the Israelis have to show commitment and seriousness to move forward. This is particularly true if Israel is expecting to see the Arab engagement that it hopes for. Israel can establish a Committee on the Arab Peace Initiative. The Committee would be charged with assessing the Initiative and ways Israel can work towards finding common ground in advancing political negotiations taking advantage of the initiative. This would send an important message on Israel's willingness to establish a common platform with Arab countries in the pursuit of a final settlement.

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ANNEX

Brief Description of the Transformation of the Palestinian Security Forces

Introduction

The Palestinian National Authority has indulged in a process of transforming the Palestinian Security Forces to ensure enforcement of law and order. Accordingly, President Mahmoud Abbas, the President of the Palestinian National Authority has instructed to design a programme for Security Reform.

General Objective

Building Security Capability and Capacity to enforce law and order in the West Bank and Gaza Strip enabling the two-state solution and capable of safeguarding the signed agreements on behalf of the Palestinian National Authority. The desired outcome of this effort will be transformed Palestinian Security Forces enabler of the two-state solution and provide the President of the Palestinian National Authority with the capability to take the required strategic political decisions in addition to be capable of safeguarding such decisions (such as dismissing the cabinet, establishing an emergency cabinet)

Specific Objectives (6-12 Months)

- Upgrade the existing capacity and capability of the Security Forces to deliver efficiently and effectively.
- Rationalize the size and structure of the Palestinian Security Forces according to coasted options that ensure affordability and sustainability.
- Restructure and reorganize the security forces agencies in accordance with vision of the Palestinian National Security Strategy.
- Design the necessary legal framework to realize the above-mentioned objectives.

Outputs (6-12 Months)

- Increase the level and capacity of 7 highly trained battalions on strong policing. The battalions consist of 4,700 security personnel in the West Bank and Gaza Strip governorates in order to limit and control the chaotic internal security situation,
- Increase the level and capacity of 15,000 security personnel in the West Bank and Gaza Strip including training, equipping, and basic capacity building to enforce law and order.
- Set up new organizational structure for the security institution with all of its formations. The structure would start with selected agencies such as the Presidential Guards and the National Security Forces.
- Complete development plans for every security agencies in accordance with the new vision starting with selected agencies such as the Presidential Guards and the National Security Forces.
- Develop a set of proposals for a legal framework regulating the function of the security agencies and issue a number of them in the form of Presidential Decrees with respect to specialty, leadership, command and control.
- Establish an effective national security office and appoint a national security advisor who will be in charge of following up on the reform programs of the security institutions as well as other tasks related to security strategies and policies.
- Form specialized security groups to work on realizing the reform program of each

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security agency.

Achievements as of December 7, 2006 to February 28, 2007

- Developed Palestinian strategic vision, which was approved by President Mahmoud Abbas after being discussed and agreed by General Dayton's team.
- Developed initial programs about the shape of the security institution, its distribution, and structures and agree with General Dayton's team on it.
- Formed the core of the national security office through forming the Palestinian technical team for reform.
- Developed the tasks of the national security advisor.
- Developed the tasks and duties of the national security office.
- Developed and start implementing of the General restructuring of the National security Forces.
- Assign a large number of inefficient officers, below of the retirement age to early retirement.
- Assign a large number of officers who reach the age of retirement to retirement.
- The appointment of young qualified officers to serve in leading positions.
- Abolish, merge and unify several security departments in order to reach the Road Map plan of organizing Palestinian Security Agencies into three branches; National Security, Internal Security and General Intelligence
- Formed security groups that include the various security agencies as support groups of operations, tasks, and work mechanisms within the framework of detailed development plans.
- Initiated the selection of the appropriate human resources with respect to security clearance, health, and academic qualifications to form the core of the restructured security units. In this context, 15,000 national security personnel had been selected in Gaza and 5,000 in the West Bank to form the core of the transformed security agencies with enhanced policing capabilities on (gendarmerie type).
- Basic training of 3,700 security personnel had been initiated in Gaza Strip.
- Basic training of 1,400 security personnel had been initiated in the West Bank.
- Rehabilitation is now underway for three training centers in the West Bank and three training centers in Gaza Strip.

Next steps

1. Set up integral and specialized training plan for the security agency personnel -the Presidential Guards, National Security- including law and order, internal security, anti rioting, and anti terrorism.
2. Prepare security camps for the personnel who finish training and deployment in the governorates in accordance with internal security priorities.
3. Complete rehabilitation of the training camps and increase their capacities and equipment.
4. Specialized training abroad.
5. Prepare Palestinian trainers for leading the training operations.
6. Provide the security personnel with the necessary equipment and arms to carry out their missions.

Requirements

The accomplishment of the abovementioned objectives and arriving to better security situation in the coming phase -6 to 12 months- require immediate political, technical, financial, material, and logistic support as follows-

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| No. | Item | Cost |
|-----|--|--|
| 1. | Technical support through providing international expertise and consultants to support the work of the technical team for reform in accordance with the best practices in this area. | |
| 2. | Efforts to be made in order to create conducive regional environment enabling the success of the security service reform program (positive cooperation on behalf of the government of Israel.) | |
| 3. | Serious financial support for training including training of Palestinian security personnel in Jordan and Egypt, this includes training the Presidential Guards, the national security personnel, and the border crossing guards in accordance with detailed training program. | 96 million dollars -for the first year only- |
| 4. | Serious effort to ensure the payment of salaries and dues of the Palestinian security personnel | 53 million dollars a month 640 million dollars a year |
| 5. | Cover the operational expenditure of the Palestinian national security personnel. | 95 million dollars a year |
| 6. | Cover the capital expenditure | 49 million dollars a year |
| 7. | Provide the needed security equipment –lethal and non-lethal | |
| 8. | Provide the necessary financial means for institutional and capacity building | 46 million dollars a year |
| 9. | Develop training centers in the West Bank and Gaza Strip | 53 million dollars |
| | Total | 1.27 billion dollars |

Note-

The costs and overall budget were developed jointly with General Dayton's team and the Palestinian technical team for reform.

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**Executive Summary:
An Action Plan for the Palestinian Presidency in 2007**

Outlined below are 10 measures that Abbas could take in the next 6-12 months in the areas of security, politics, governance and economic activity. These should all be considered as necessary components in the process of building a Palestinian State (governance, sound economic management, institution building and rule of law).

The action plan can be suggested to the Palestinians to adopt and to obtain the support of the Arab Quartet and the U.S. as a first step. This will also be shared with Israel and the Europeans in order to prove that Abbas does have a plan of action and is seriously committed to it. The U.S. and Arab Quartet can then set up a joint task force with Palestinians to produce the final draft. It is necessary, however, to make sure that the plan is clear, not subject to various interpretations/reservations and can be implemented, in order not to fall in the same predicament faced by the Road Map.

10 Steps Towards a Palestinian State

1. Moving forward with political negotiations towards the establishment of a Palestinian State
2. Control of areas in the context of phased-out withdrawals and confidence building measures tied to progress on the security plan.
3. Establish and sustain a ceasefire that and actively prevent acts of violence.
4. The strengthening of the Palestinian President's authority, and to provide him with the legal and administrative tools necessary to govern, strengthen his credibility and legitimacy, and to be able to comfortably call and conduct early elections by the Autumn of 2007. It is also vital to maintain the Presidency and Fateh as the center of gravity in the Palestinian political scene to the international community
5. Fateh reform (plan to be presented with objectives and key benchmarks for Fateh overhaul in addition to the required budget for such a program to be concluded over the next 3-9 months).
 - Get members of the young guard into higher positions of power within Fateh
 - Election to a new Central Committee that empowers the new guard,
 - Consolidate Fateh to be capable of presenting unified lists in upcoming elections.
 - Close ranks within Fateh and control over Al-Aqsa Martyrs' Brigade.
6. The Office of the President would also be subject to strengthening a priori under the plan in order to build capacity to deliver on its enhanced financial, political and security responsibilities.
7. Salaries: Formalize mechanism for distribution of salaries in the Office of the President (focal depository and monitoring point) to be coordinated with the Minister of Finance (disbursement). Such a system should credit the President as the guarantor of salary funding for the PA as Hamas remains unwilling to accept international obligations.
8. Development Projects: President Abbas has to provide in coordination with the World Bank and the EU a development plan that determines key sectors, areas and projects that need funding and can have beneficial effects on the ground over a period of 6-9 months focused on unemployment and poverty alleviation. Funding for these projects would go to a fund under the Presidency and will be used by NGOs and the international community in implementing accelerated developmental programs. While the timeline for many such projects would exceed 9 months, it is important to ensure

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that sufficient progress is achievable within the 9 month timeline for projects initiated in order to guarantee maximum value from such initiatives before the next elections. (The average timeline for completion of vocational training centers, schools, health centers etc. is around 15 months).

9. Movement of goods and labor: Special export enhancement initiatives that would avoid Israeli movement restrictions (Peace Corridor) as well as necessary Israeli cooperation in lifting road blocks and restrictions to labor movement coordinated between the President's Office and Israeli authorities.

10. Conduct necessary measures on security reforms as outlined below:

- Upgrade the existing capacity and capability of the Security Forces to deliver efficiently and effectively.
- Rationalize the size and structure of the Palestinian Security Forces according to costed options that ensure affordability and sustainability.
- Restructure and reorganize the security forces agencies in accordance with vision of the Palestinian National Security Strategy.
- Design the necessary legal framework to realize the above-mentioned objectives.
- Increase the level and capacity of 7 highly trained battalions on strong policing. The battalions consist of 4,700 security personnel in the West Bank and Gaza Strip governorates in order to limit and control the chaotic internal security situation.
- Increase the level and capacity of 15,000 security personnel in the West Bank and Gaza Strip including training, equipping, and basic capacity building to enforce law and order.
- Set up new organizational structure for the security institution with all of its formations. The structure would start with selected agencies such as the Presidential Guards and the National Security Forces.
- Complete development plans for every security agencies in accordance with the new vision starting with selected agencies such as the Presidential Guards and the National Security Forces.
- Develop a set of proposals for a legal framework regulating the function of the security agencies and issue a number of them in the form of Presidential Decrees with respect to specialty, leadership, command and control.
- Establish an effective national security office and appoint a national security advisor who will be in charge of following up on the reform programs of the security institutions as well as other tasks related to security strategies and policies.
- Specialized security groups to work on the reform program of each security agency.
- Set up integral and specialized training plan for the security agency personnel -the Presidential Guards, National Security- including law and order, internal security, anti rioting, and anti terrorism.
- Prepare security camps for the personnel who finish training and deployment in the governorates in accordance with internal security priorities.
- Complete rehabilitation of the training camps with enhanced capacities and equipment.
- Specialized training abroad.
- Prepare Palestinian trainers for leading the training operations.
- Provide the security personnel with the necessary equipment and arms to carry out their missions.

EXPECTATIONS

(US-Jordanian paper, Mawla: 2007)

| EXPECTATIONS FROM ISRAEL | EXPECTATIONS FROM PALESTINIAN LEADERSHIP | EXPECTATIONS FROM SAUDI ARABIA |
|---|---|--|
| I. Deliverables for March Palestinian-Israeli-American Summits (pre-Arab Summit) | I. Deliverables for March Palestinian-Israeli-American Summits (pre-Arab Summit) | I. Deliverables for March Palestinian-Israeli-American Summits (pre-Arab Summit) |
| 1. Welcome the Arab Initiative and Arab call for peace with Israel, and work towards negotiated agreements that would resolve the Palestinian-Israeli and Arab-Israeli conflict. | 1. Underline the President Abbas's responsibility and mandate to lead political negotiations and maintain the Presidency and Fateh as the center of gravity in the Palestinian political scene to the international community | 1. Reiterate strong Saudi commitment to the Arab Peace Initiative and call upon Israel to work together with Arab states to reach the objectives and goals stated in the Initiative |
| 2. Express desire to work with Palestinians and Arab States in order to reach permanent peace settlement as offered by the Arab Initiative and other key peace parameters on the basis of agreed upon and negotiated outcomes. | 2. Formalize and sustain a ceasefire that and actively prevent acts of violence | 2. Express desire to work with Palestinians, Arab and Muslim states in order to reach permanent peace settlement as offered by the Arab Initiative and on the basis of agreed upon and negotiated outcomes |
| 3. Agree to meet again to discuss ways to advance the objectives of the Arab Initiative and consider the agenda for political negotiations with the support of the International Quartet and Arab and Muslim countries willing to assist movement on the peace process. | 3. Institutionalize mechanism for distribution of salaries in the Office of the President (focal depository and monitoring point) to be coordinated with the Minister of Finance (disbursement | 3. Call on Hamas and other Palestinian factions to accept Arab Initiative as the path to a Palestinian state |
| 4. Express Israeli willingness to start political negotiations towards the establishment of a Palestinian state. Negotiations to be conducted with Abbas | | |
| 5. Israeli readiness to begin removing road-blocs in the West Bank and take actions to ease the movement of goods and labor to support the peace efforts | | |

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| II. Elements needed as an outcome of a meeting (April) that would include Arab and International Quartets as well as Palestinians and Israelis. | II. Elements needed as an outcome of a meeting (April) that would include Arab and International Quartets as well as Palestinians and Israelis. | II. Elements needed as an outcome of a meeting (April) that would include Arab and International Quartets as well as Palestinians and Israelis. |
| 1. Discuss ways to advance the objectives of the Arab Initiative and agree on the agenda for political negotiations with the support of the International Quartet and Arab and Muslim countries willing to assist movement on the peace process | 1. President Abbas to present a developmental plan in coordination with the World Bank and the EU that determines key sectors, areas and projects that need funding and can have beneficial effects on the ground over a period of 6-9 months focused on unemployment and poverty | 1. Accept attending a meeting between two Quartets, Israeli and Palestinian officials to discuss a working agenda that would translate Arab Initiative into a political negotiation process |
| 2. Israel declares a moratorium on settlement expansion and the construction of the West Bank Wall during political negotiations. | 2. Advances in Security Reforms and control over WB cities to allow for Israeli timely withdrawal | 2. Agree to sponsor and support peace talks between Palestinians and Israelis |
| 3. Adopt a timeline for a gradual process of withdrawal from the West Bank to September 28 th 2000 lines in coordination with Palestinian leadership and security institution. | | 3. Lead in coordination with Arab Quartet an effort to market the Arab Initiative to the Israeli and US public. |
| 4. Affirm moratorium on settlement expansion, excavations in old city of Jerusalem and construction of the West Bank Wall. | | |
| III. Supporting Elements | III. Supporting Elements | III. Supporting Elements |
| 1. Uphold ceasefire and refrain from retaliatory activities that undermine it. | 1. Fatah reform plan with objectives and key benchmarks to be concluded within the next 3-9 months | 1. Provide needed financial and political support to Palestinian Presidency. |
| 2. Prisoner exchange. | 2. Act against violations of ceasefire | |

**INTERNATIONAL POLICY DEPARTMENT
FEBRUARY 26TH 2007**

Suggested statement for an Israeli Palestinian Summit Meeting in March

The parties agreed that pursuing a Two State solution is key to achieving peace and security for Palestinians and Israelis, as well as the stability of the region. The leaders are committed and determined to actively start working in the coming weeks towards a comprehensive agreement between Israelis and Palestinians.

Such an agreement will need to satisfactorily address and resolve all the issues of importance relating to security, Jerusalem, right of return, settlements and final borders for both parties. Progress on such an agreement would be a prelude towards a comprehensive settlement to the Arab Israeli conflict in accordance with UNSC resolutions, the Road Map and the Arab Peace Initiative of 2002.

We are determined to begin an immediate and sustained push forward to accelerate movement on the Road Map and start political negotiations to advance discussions on establishing an independent and viable Palestinian state living side by side with Israel in peace and security and achieving a settlement to the Arab Israeli conflict.

The settlement will resolve the Israel-Palestinian conflict, and end the occupation that began in 1967, based on the foundations of the Madrid Conference, the principle of land for peace, UNSCRs 242, 338 and 1397, agreements previously reached by the parties, and the initiative of Saudi Crown Prince Abdullah – endorsed by the Beirut Arab League Summit – calling for acceptance of Israel as a neighbor living in peace and security, in the context of a comprehensive settlement. This initiative is a vital element of international efforts to promote a comprehensive peace on all tracks, including the Syrian-Israeli and Lebanese-Israeli tracks.(RM language)

The parties call on the international community, the Quartet, Arab and Muslim states to support their progress in the political negotiations and provide all necessary assistance in advancing the peace process and reaching a comprehensive settlement.