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то :	NEA - Mr. Talbot	DATE	December 15, 1964
FROM :	NE - Rodger P. Davies	prD	
SUBJECT:	Israel's Cabinet Cris	is and the Dimona Inspectio	on

#### Discussion:

VECUNSSIFIED

We are concerned that the resignation of Prime Minister Eshkol appears to have no sound political reasons. The pretext, the revival of the Lavon affair by Ben-Gurion, is a dead horse that has received repeated posthumous beatings. Eshkol remains the only likely candidate for the Prime Ministership, so that he could return to office much stronger for having resigned and more immune to domestic political attack. If President Shazar should ask Eshkol to head a caretaker government, however, he could still continue as Prime Minister until the parliamentary elections originally expected November 1965. Such an arrangement would enable Eshkol to plead more effectively that he was in no position to entertain distasteful foreign proposals.

We feel sure Israeli leaders are aware of our concern about Israel's activities in the nuclear and missile fields. If, <u>as seems</u> <u>likely</u>, Israel has decided to develop a nuclear weapon, it will make every effort to conceal the fact from us until we can be faced with a <u>fait accompli</u>. Eshkol, however, found it necessary to bow to White House pressure to set a date for the next Dimona inspection despite pleas for a delay because of domestic difficulties. Selection of January 30 as a suitable time made further delays difficult, barring a serious internal political upheaval. The Prime Minister's resignation meets this description and allows ample time to request postponement of the inspection.

Despite their apparent differences today, we must bear in mind the long and close association of Eshkol and Ben-Gurion. Both played major roles in the establishment of Israel as a state. Both regard defense measures as the keystone to Israel's survival. Deputy Defense Minister Peres and former Agriculture Minister Dayan, both Ben-Gurion men, share this view. Therefore, cooperation by these men to create circumstances that would permit Israel to develop unhindered the ultimate deterrent against Arab attack is neither illogical nor unlikely. The present cabinet crisis need affect neither the ultimate position of Eshkol or the Mapai party.

Recommendation ....

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#### Recommendation:

1. That we press for the Dimona inspection as scheduled on January 30 on the terms set forth in our telegram now awaiting clearance at the White House.

2. That, if necessary, we request the President's permission to exert the graduated pressures set forth in our memorandum on extension of IAEA safeguards to nuclear facilities in the Near East (attached).

Attachment:

Graduated Scale of Pressures.

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## ENCLOSURE III

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## SECRET

### TRESSURES THAT COULD BE APPLIED TO PERSUADE ISRAEL TO ADOPT LAFA SAFEGUARDS FOR ALL NUCLEAR FACILITIES

If, after receiving the President's request, Prime Minister Eshkol demotred or refused to accede, the following graduated scale of pressures could be applied:

1. Formal, reasoned reiteration through diplomatic channels.

2. Warning that non-compliance would force reappraisal of forms of U.S. support to Israel.

3. Public restatement by President of U.S. non-proliferation policy with emphasis on the Near East arms race.

4. Reduction or elimination of development loan support.

5. Elimination of PL-480 sales.

6. Curtailment of all military sales and training.

7. Termination of special military support assistance.

S. Reinterpretation of U.S. tax policy to make financial contributions channeled to Israel taxable.

#### SECRET

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2020-11-03