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HEADQUARTERS
AIR P/W INTERROGATION DETACHMENT
Military Intelligence Service

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APC 696, US Army
1 June 1945

A.P.W.I.D. (Ninth Air Force Adv) 65/1945
373.2

SUBJECT: Enemy Intelligence Summaries

TO : See Distribution

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HERMANN GOERING

PREAMBLE.

The following report is the result of a lengthy interrogation of HERMANN GOERING by officers of the Air P/W Interrogation Detachment. Questionnaires prepared by USSTAF and Air Ministry were covered by this interrogation.

The interrogation dealt also with information of a general and historical nature which often led to liberal discussions on basic issues. It will readily be seen that by this means considerable light was shed on the events which took place behind the scenes of the play enacted by the leading characters of the Nazi hierarchy. It was apparent that the totalitarian regime had not run as smoothly as its leaders would have made it seem, and, surprisingly enough, one of the chief causes was HITLER'S constant trespassing on GOERING'S private operational premises.

How much constant interference affected the overall policy of the Luftwaffe and accelerated its doom is shown in the reflections of the P/W who, by his very nature, pretended to be unaware of the disastrous part that he himself had played in this regard. The report shows how HITLER concerned himself continuously with the smallest technical decisions. During the last two years when GOERING'S star - to use his own words - was descending, this interference assumed proportions which caused GOERING to exclaim: "You had a great ally in your aerial warfare -- the Führer."

OUTLINE.

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- PART I. ALLIED AIR POWER AND THE WAR.
 - PART II. THE G.A.F.
 - PART III. JET AIRCRAFT.
 - PART IV. ALLIED STRATEGIC BOMBING.
 - PART V. THE BATTLE OF BRITAIN.
 - PART VI. THE RUSSIAN CAMPAIGN AND THE RUSSIAN AIR FORCE.
 - PART VII. THE JAPANESE.
 - PART VIII. OTHER CAMPAIGNS AND OPERATIONS.
- CONCLUSION.

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25 JUN 1945

No. P. O. Reg. #

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INTRODUCTION

1. Reichsmarschall HERMANN GOERING, Reichsminister for Air, Supreme Commander of the GAF, Prime Minister of PRUSSIA, President of the State Council, President of the Reichstag, Reichsmaster of Forestry and Game, President of the Scientific Research Council - a series of titles and offices, which he - half mockingly, half proudly - enumerated himself - was a willing talker.

2. P/W stated his readiness to tell everything he knew, pointing out, however, that his knowledge of GAF matters was confined to those of a more organizational nature, in accordance with the office he held. Technical details were dealt with by his various staff experts. He made particular mention of his aide, Oberst VON BRAUCHITSCH, who was later separately interrogated and his information, when cross-checked against GOERING'S statements, was incorporated into this report.

3. GOERING tried hard to make a case for himself, and, despite rumors to the contrary, is far from being mentally deranged. In fact he must be considered a very "shrewd customer", a great actor and professional liar who most likely made some mental reservations, trying to keep what he might consider a few aces up his sleeve in order to have some bargaining power if and when the need arises. It may be added that GOERING still considers himself the legal successor to ADOLF HITLER, stating however: "This is no longer of importance but it may be quite interesting for you".


4. GOERING spoke with pathos and drama about the events leading to his arrest by the SS, his liberation by a Luftwaffe unit, and then his final capture by US troops on 6 May 1945. He stated that at 0300 on 21 April he left BERLIN for Southern GERMANY.

5. During the night of 22 April, Generaloberst KOLLER followed GOERING to BERCHTESGADEN and reported to him that HITLER had decided to stay and die in BERLIN. Thereupon, GOERING sent a telegram to HITLER informing him that, in view of HITLER'S former appointment of GOERING as his successor, he would assume full control of the German Reich unless he received orders to the contrary by 2200 hours. He was encouraged in his actions by a remark which HITLER is supposed to have made when reminded that it was high time to start negotiations with the Allies. "I shall never do that", HITLER is supposed to have said, "GOERING can do it much better".

6. The telegram was sent at 1500 hours on 23 April, and at 2200 hours, GOERING was arrested by SS troops. A telegram signed by HITLER then arrived asking him to resign all his offices. According to GOERING'S interpretation this referred only to the offices he was holding at that time and did not include his appointment as HITLER'S successor. A second telegram signed "Führer" which GOERING said was a fake since it was sent after HITLER'S death by BORMANN, the secretary of the NSDAP, sentenced him and his family to death.

7. While he was standing there surrounded by SS men, members of the 12 LN Regt (Air Signal Regt) passed by. Upon seeing him, they ran forward to greet and cheer their beloved commander. GOERING, swiftly weighing up the situation and finding that the Luftwaffe men outnumbered the SS, ordered them to charge the SS, whereupon the SS-Commander - rather willingly as GOERING claimed - let him go.

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8. GOERING'S comment on his liberation is characteristic of his pompous vanity up to the end. "It was one of the most beautiful moments of my life to stand there again in front of my troops and see them present arms for their Commander-in-Chief." This liberation, GOERING continued, gave him back his freedom of action. It was shortlived, however, as the Americans were even then closing in on him.

9. Further reference will be made in the course of this report to the differences which existed among the leaders of GERMANY particularly between GOERING and HITLER. Some light will be thrown on the entire complex of events preceding the final collapse of the Third Reich. GOERING'S statements will be quoted verbatim, whenever practicable, in order to preserve the genuine character of his reaction to certain questions and problems under discussion.

10. It must be borne in mind that throughout the entire interrogation GOERING made partly subtle, partly obvious efforts to clear himself. Not only did he render HITLER responsible for almost all mistakes made by the German High Command in general and by the Luftwaffe in particular, but he also took great pains to show that he himself was not such a bad fellow after all. "Next to being a German, I favor the West; I am a European like you". "If you know my speeches, you will admit that in none of them - whether delivered in peace or wartime - have I attacked a foreign statesman personally". "I never held an office in the Nazi party". "I was the most outspoken exponent of the State authority versus the authority of the party". These quotations may serve to underline the above statement.

PART I.

ALLIED AIR POWER AND THE WAR


THE ROLE OF THE AIR FORCE IN GENERAL.

11. Although the Air Forces may render a decisive contribution towards the winning of a war, they alone, in the opinion of GOERING, will never bring a great nation to its knees. "The Air Forces can not occupy." They can only disrupt, interfere and destroy and thus prepare for the eventual last fight leading to final occupation and victory.

12. This softening-up process should follow certain set rules which he called his "Evangelium". The first objective at the beginning of a war must always be to destroy the enemy's Air Force, completely disregarding all other targets. The Air Force is the heart of military power and resistance, and only when this is destroyed, should other targets be attacked; the priority to be given to these other targets would obviously depend on the economics of the country under attack. GOERING'S views on the assigning of target priorities in GERMANY are outlined in Part IV.

THE ROLE OF THE ALLIED AIR FORCES IN THIS WAR.

13. GOERING attributed our victory over GERMANY to two main factors, the successful invasion and, above all, the irresistible numerical superiority of the Allied Air Forces. Aside from all other aspects, he emphasised the devastating effect of such superiority on the morale of the ground forces. "The Allies owe the success of the invasion to their Air Forces. They prepared the invasion; they made it possible, and they carried it through".



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Without the Allied Air Force, GOERING claimed, it would have been possible to bring up German ground reinforcements and make full use of armored units.

14. He particularly stressed the part which the US Air Force has played. "Without the American Air Force, the war would still be going on elsewhere but certainly not on German soil".

15. The first heavy blow rendered by our Air Force came in the African campaign and then in ITALY, when we attacked Italian airfields. He claimed that the GAF was helpless against these attacks because of the refusal of the Italians to allow the Germans to adjust the airfields to their own needs. When these objections were finally overcome, GOERING tried to render Allied attacks ineffective by building what he called air-force fortresses - a system of runways built on either side of a major road and connected with each other by taxi-strips, protected by heavy flak-concentrations. The purpose of such fortresses was to maintain a sufficient number of runways even under the heaviest carpet-bombing attacks. Three such fortresses were completed in ITALY and others were started in FRANCE, HOLLAND, and BELGIUM. He claimed that his theory had proved sound since the fortresses stood up under heavy attacks. In practice, however, they were not of much help since sufficient aircraft were never available to make full use of the scheme.

16. Another heavy blow, and he considered this to be one of the most decisive factors in the ultimate outcome of the war, was the range of our fighters. The man who once boasted that no enemy bomber would ever fly over German soil, admitted that he was stunned. "I would have thought it impossible that so many enemy four-engined bombers could fly around for hours over German territory." GOERING is convinced that this was only made possible through our fighter escort which, indeed, came as a complete surprise to him. He said that he almost refused to believe it when our fighters penetrated as far as LIEGE, and then HANNOVER. But when two weeks later, fighters, escorting bombers, even appeared over BERLIN, he knew that the result of these long range fighters would be tragic. "Der weitreichende Begleitjäger war eine Tragik".

17. GOERING believed that night raids were effective and had good results inasmuch as they caused great damage to industrial installations. Beyond this, he called them terror raids as they, not so much by intention but rather in effect, were not confined to definite targets, and actually in most cases hit residential sections.

18. Ground strafing attacks at night were unimportant in their contribution to the defeat of GERMANY. He said that they could be very effective if they were carried out on a large scale.

19. The effect of our strategic bombing is dealt with in detail in Part IV.

PART II.

THE G.A.F.

ORGANIZATION AND POLICIES.

HITLER and GAF Policies.

20. The relationship between HITLER and the GAF was summed up by GOERING with the words: "What does Jack know about the Air Force?" (Wie sich der kleine Hans die Luftwaffe vorstellt."). HITLER, GOERING said, knew a lot concerning military matters and

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was an expert in weapons of the Army and Navy, but he knew absolutely nothing about the Air Force. Initially, therefore, he left all matters of GAF policy to GOERING. At the beginning of 1942, however, when Allied air attacks increased, he became nervous; lost confidence in GOERING and began to interfere. With the exception of an Adjutant of the Luftwaffe, Oberst v. BELOW, who is now believed to be dead, there was no GAF man on HITLER'S General Staff to advise him.

OKL, OKW and Navy

21. OKL had two liaison officers with the OKW: Major BÜCHS and Oberstlt. BÖHM - TETTELBACH.

22. There was no liaison officer of the OKW with the OKL. The Führer took care of that himself;

23. Naval-Aviation to all intents and purposes did not exist in GERMANY.

Disposition of Units.

24. Unless interfered with by HITLER, GOERING decided the displacing of units from one front to another. Employment of units in the West was the problem of Luftwaffenkommando West (incl 2 Jagdkorps) while Jagdkorps 1 and later Jagdkorps 9 handled the question in GERMANY.

A/C Procurement.

25. In June/July 1944 procurement was transferred from MILCH to SPEER. This resulted in an increase in a/c production although the average quality of the a/c suffered somewhat. The number of good a/c, however, still surpassed the former production figures.

26. In line with his growing distrust of GOERING, HITLER ordered the production of jet a/c be turned over to SS Gruppenführer KAMMLER.

Personnel.

27. GOERING'S private secretary was a Fräulein LIMBERGER of BERCHTESGADEN to whom, he said, he very seldom dictated any orders and who could, therefore, not be considered as a valuable source of information. In line with his normal procedure, GOERING would give oral orders to his Duty Adjutant, who, in turn, passed them on to the Chief Adjutant.

28. Responsibility for the drafting of orders was delegated by GOERING to the appropriate department. GOERING himself dictated only proclamations.

29. Oberst WODARG was in charge of Intelligence (Ic) matters concerning foreign countries. His aides included:

- Oberstlt. KIENITZ (WEST)
- Major OWE (EAST)

The office of the Ic was last located at a castle - formerly belonging to the DAF - near WASSERBURG/INN.

Personal Files.

30. GOERING claimed that all his personal files had been destroyed. None of these were in the RLM, since he very seldom went there; instead, he used an office in the building of the Prussian State Ministry. All the Adjutants' files were supposedly burned at KARINHALL.

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INTELLIGENCE.

Organization

31. Intelligence (Ic) information was accorded strict attention and was frequently the basis for defensive and offensive operations unless overridden by the Führer. Intelligence information of general value and interest was published in Ic publications.

Sources of Intelligence.

32. Important sources of information included foreign newspapers, magazines and broadcasts, and pertinent excerpts taken therefrom were wired to BERLIN. Allied newspapers, for instance, announced our intention to employ Russian bases long before the plan materialized and this information was the basis for the subsequent attack on POLTAVA. Radio interceptions were used extensively to obtain information on missions of our Air Forces. By intercepting our radio tune-up traffic it was possible to form an idea of our impending operations.

33. As President of the Research Council, GOERING had access to intelligence information collected by a department of this organization. It was the job of this department to monitor all telephone traffic within the Reich - including embassies, hotels, foreign personalities and other sources.

34. GOERING considered as most important the information derived from P/W interrogation, which - he stated - enabled them often to take effective counter-measures. P/W interrogation was carried out by GAF interrogators at the Dulags which were opened, on demand, to SS personnel who questioned P/W on morale and other general issues. The proper Dulag interrogation was concerned only with Air Force matters and was - so GOERING said - conducted on a comradeship basis. HITLER suspected that some interrogators at the Dulags were Anglophiles and, therefore, ordered their transfer.

35. The information gained from P/W interrogation was so voluminous that only excerpts from the most important items were referred to GOERING. Occasionally he saw an important P/W himself.

Air Technical Intelligence.

36. RECHLIN was the center of Air Technical Intelligence.

37. When asked whether foreign patent applications were screened by the GAF before issuance he exclaimed: "They could have gone to hell three times if they had not done so, patents never bothered me - German or foreign."

38. GROSS-ING. SCHWENKE, formerly of the German Embassy in WASHINGTON and technical Ic under WODARG, was concerned with Air Technical Intelligence collection.

39. Enemy a/c were taken to RECHLIN and there examined by Oberst PETERSON.

Photographic Intelligence.

40. The GAF relied to a great extent on photographic intelligence, each Gruppe having a "Bildstelle" (Photo Evaluation Center). The main Bildstelle was with the OKL. It was last transferred to the WASSERBURG AM INN area in Southern GERMANY.

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FIGHTER PRODUCTION, STRENGTH AND LOSSES.

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41. GAF fighter strength was greatly reduced by our bombing attacks on Fw and other a/c plants. The attack on the Fw plant at BREMEN in April 1943 interfered with the final assembly, but it seems that the Fw management was not too depressed about it as it gave them the excuse for not living up to a production figure which they would not have reached anyhow. Actually, difficulties in the BMW-801 production reduced the output of a/c even before our attack.

42. After the attack substantial dispersals into the interior took place. However, no single Fw final assembly installation produced more than 200 a/c per month.

43. The attacks on the fighter plants at REGENSBURG and WIENER NEUSTADT in August 1943 and on MARIENBURG in October 1943 were most successful. However, the plant at REGENSBURG was amazingly soon reestablished so that it was working again at full capacity in the month following the attack. This was largely due to having an adaptable and versatile manager.

44. According to GOERING, Allied bombing succeeded in reducing the German fighter production decisively from February-March 1944 on, fighter production dropping from 1200 in January to 400-500 in February.

45. After the formation of the Jägerstab in March 1944, by emphasis on younger officers like GALLAND and others, by further dispersal of installations and by going underground, production began to increase again to such an extent that by the end of 1944 an average monthly production of 2000 Me 109's and Fw 190's was claimed. This figure was understood to include all a/c repaired in factories but not those handled on airfields. (See par 53).

46. The Jägerstab caused a pool of about 1000 a/c to be kept in readiness for the expected invasion. After the invasion, only 400-500 serviceable a/c were left out of these 1000.

47. The Jägerstab had extreme powers. Construction of bombers was practically discontinued and main emphasis was placed on the Me 109 and Fw 190.

48. GOERING claimed that they did not pre-calculate fighter losses at a fixed rate; losses depended too much on the circumstances and on the quality of the pilots. The greater the number of inexperienced pilots, the greater were the losses.

49. Generally speaking, losses increased 4 and 5 times after introduction of our fighter escort. The ratio of pilots to a/c lost was approximately 1:5, some pilots bailing out 2 or 3 times a day. An important reason for loss of a/c was their short range. "A fighter pilot wants to sleep in his own bed". Instead, therefore, of landing at the nearest airfield after completion of their mission, fighter pilots were attempting to reach their home base and had to bail out enroute due to lack of fuel. Where 4 a/c were lost in combat, 40 a/c might crash on the way home.

50. Our claims with regard to German a/c lost were said by GOERING to have usually been much exaggerated; as a rule we claimed about three times the actual losses.

51. The day of the greatest losses in fighter pilots was 1 January 1945; when GOERING said approximately 100 pilots were lost. On other days, the highest losses in the defence of the Reich were approximately 80-90 a/c, mostly destroyed on the ground.

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with the number of pilots lost accordingly small. BRAUCHITSCH added that their losses in the air during 1945 were about 3 to our 1.

52. The shift from production of offensive a/c to defensive a/c was, according to GOERING, not caused by losses in the Battle of Britain, but was rather due to the beginning of the Russian campaign in June 1941. This may be explained by the fact that the Russian campaign called for a large number of fighters. The small bomber requirements were stated by GOERING to be due to the lack of concentrated targets in RUSSIA. In this connection reference is made to Par 184.

53. Repairs to damaged a/c were carried out when the damage was under 60%; where damage was more extensive, the a/c were scrapped (parts being salvaged), or otherwise disposed of. Approximately 500-900 a/c per month came back from the repair-shops but this figure showed a marked decline following on the disruption of the railway system.

TACTICS.

Night Fighters.

54. Night fighting had already been practiced before the war with a small force of He 51's and Me 109's. The results were not very satisfactory. Then, in the summer of 1941 Korps 12, consisting of 4 night fighter groups, was formed. It was under the command of General KAMMHUBER, was equipped with Me 110's and was entrusted with the defence against British 4 engine bombers. Korps 12 was gradually enlarged to consist of many more groups and was finally formed into Jagdkorps 1. In addition to the Me 110 it was equipped with Ju 88's and He 219's.

55. Lately 5 Me 262's were available for night fighting over BERLIN of which only 1-2 were operational at any one time. The average claims were 1-2 a/c shot down per night by these a/c.

56. Single engined night fighting, as it was practiced at the beginning of the summer of 1943 by 9 Gruppen was considered effective only if there were sufficient a/c to allow them to stay close to a definite target as these single engined a/c were not equipped with W/T instruments. Twin engined a/c for night fighting were considered to be more effective.

57. In the fall of 1943 night fighting was improved by using experienced bomber pilots on Me 109's and Fw 190's. Newly trained pilots were as a rule less successful because of their all too short and insufficient training due to lack of fuel.

Tail attacks.

58. Tail attacks on our day bombers were preferred to head-on attacks, because the closing-in speed in head-on attacks allowed only too short a firing time; tail attacks, therefore, had accomplished better results. In this connection it may be mentioned that the fear of fire power from the tail had to such extent lowered the morale of the Jagdgeschwaders which were employed in the Defence of the Reich against our four engined bombers that GOERING found it necessary to visit all squadrons personally and give them pep-talks.

Specific point for attack.

59. There was no specific point where the GAF fighters were to concentrate their attack on our bomber stream. Only when particularly large operations were taking place, were Planspiele prepared to demonstrate the best points of attack, trying to antici-

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pate the various possibilities of approach of our bombers.

Attacks on Assembling Bombers.

60. The possibility of attacking Allied bombers while assembling over ENGLAND was at one time considered, but the plan was dropped as being too expensive considering the losses German fighters would have suffered on their way home, if, as was to be expected, they were intercepted by Allied fighters.

Fighter-bombers.

61. Fighter-bombers were introduced by GOERING in the fall of 1940, the purpose being to provoke British fighters into battle. The British - so GOERING said - had given orders to disregard German fighters and concentrate on bombers. It was too expensive, however, for the Germans to send bombers as bait; for this reason, fighter a/c were provided with 250 kg and 500 kg bombs. This forced the hand of the British fighters. From this original idea was developed today's fighter-bomber.

RESEARCH AND DEVELOPMENT.

Organization and Personalities.

62. Research was in the main carried out by the Research Institutes. Industry was supposed to come forward with suggestions, but lacked initiative in this respect.

63. GOERING regretted that GERMANY had no financially independent private a/c industry on a competitive basis and said that there was nothing that he envied us more than this.

64. When the GAF wanted a new a/c, orders were given to the industry specifying the general requirements. From the submitted plans the Generalluftzeugmeister submitted three to GOERING who made the final decision as to which one was to be accepted. The order was then placed with the firm which had designed the a/c. When the first three a/c were completed, they were shipped to RECHLIN for testing.

65. General research orders were constantly given to the Research Institutes. Personalities connected with this development and research were:

Ministerialrat GÖRNERT - in charge of research
Oberst KNEMMEYER - Chief of technical development
LÖRTEIER - Chief of Personnel and Personnel Equipment
Oberst. Ing. MIX - Responsible for development of a/c
armament

Institutes concerned with research and development:

PEENEMÜNDE: HORTEN BROTHERS, Dr Ing. BLUME (Arado designer)
PEENEMÜNDE Institute was partly transferred to NORDHAUSEN
BERLIN: Kaiser Wilhelm Institut, Technische Hochschule.

For names of personalities in this connection, GOERING referred to General von AXTHELM.

66. GOERING thought it likely that some of the people concerned with research in new weapons are now in Russian occupied territory.

Atomic Energy.

67. Urgent requests had been given to all Research Institutes to work in this field with the greatest energy and in collaboration

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with all available personnel. The Kaiser Wilhelm Institut was charged with the general research and special tasks were distributed among the Research-Ringe.

68. Professor ESAU was in charge of all atomic energy research. GOERING however, professed to know nothing about the present status of this work.

Things to Come.

69. GOERING mentioned several new projects which had been in the development stage:-

70. "Natter" - a rocket a/c that was supposed to go through a bomber stream at a very high speed. The pilot pushed a button causing the "Natter" to split into three parts which then parachuted down to earth. "Natter" had already been flown in test flights.

71. "Wasserfall", "Enzian", "Rheintöchter" - are the code names for radio controlled Flak rockets. These were handed over to a special staff under DORNBERGER. More information on them can be obtained from General von AXTHELM.

V-Weapons.

72. "You were extremely lucky that the war did not last another year or that we were unable to start to use our weapons one year earlier." With these words GOERING began his comments on V-weapons.

73. The development of V-1 started during the war. It was originally in the hands of the Luftwaffe, but later was handed over to the Flak organization.

74. The V-1 was very primitive and did not require much material which might otherwise be used in a/c production. The production of V-2 was more complicated and absorbed more material, although not enough to handicap a/c production. In this connection, GOERING mentioned that the production of a/c was held back by the "ridiculous" Navy program, particularly by the building of heavy battle-ships.

75. The research work on V-2 began already before the war. It was based on the original idea of developing an express mail service to the U.S. The German Army then sponsored the further research and developed it.

76. Because of the impossibility of exact aiming, only larger cities could be attacked with V-weapons. Too much success, however, was not expected as only an insufficient number of missiles was available.

77. "V-2 was impressive (V-2 war imponierend)". GOERING said with enthusiasm and pride when he related how he had seen a V-2 being fired. When he imitated - as the actor that he is - the process of the V-2 firing, from the sofa which he filled, the effect was almost as unattractive as the actual firing.

FLAK.

Personnel.

78. Flak personnel on "D" Day numbered about 500,000 in GERMANY proper and more than 1,000,000 in GERMANY and occupied countries. The personnel was originally very good but, with the war taking a great toll in the ranks, men had to be transferred

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to other units. 300,000 men were transferred into the infantry, 30,000 to the SS. The forming of parachute regiments caused another cut into Flak personnel. Finally, of the original men only those were left who were absolutely needed. The men who were withdrawn were replaced by foreigners, women and GAF-helpers down to 15 years of age.

79. As a rule, women were only employed on search-light batteries.

Flak Batteries.

80. Flak was constantly augmented, batteries of four pieces being increased to 6, 8 and 12 pieces. After the beginning of our day-bombing attacks, Flak batteries were augmented as fast as the guns could be produced, AA guns having a first priority in production. At the end there were approximately 12,000 heavy guns.

"Victories"

81. The ratio between fighter and Flak "victories" was approximately 2:1. Flak personnel were usually so cautious in their claims, that whatever they claimed was recognized.

Flak-Gaps.

82. There was no particular purpose in the fact that certain routes were left free of Flak. The reason was simply that GERMANY had not sufficient AA guns to protect everything; and this despite the fact that, as GOERING claimed, GERMANY had the greatest Flak force in the world. However, certain important targets had first priority.

83. There was a heavy Flak Barrage behind the West Wall and behind this barrage were numerous Flak Forts.

Cooperation.

84. Cooperation between fighters and Flak was very good. The Flak Führer was in the CP of the Jagddivision.

MISCELLANEOUS.

D-Day Preparations.

85. The GAF had anticipated an invasion through NORMANDY and had made its calculations accordingly, whereas the OKW had based its preparations on the assumption that the invasion would come in the PAS DE CALAIS area. In order to avoid a premature crippling of the Luftwaffe, GOERING had left only a limited force in NORMANDY being ready to throw in from GERMANY necessary reinforcements when and where needed. However, in view of the immense numerical superiority of the Allied Air Forces, he simply did not have enough a/c at his disposal. BRAUCHITSCH said, that on D-Day they had only 2 Geschwaders viz. JG 2 and JG 26 with a combined strength of 80 a/c in Northern FRANCE. The next day they transferred 700 to 800 a/c from the Reich to A/D's in the PARIS area. Of this combined total of about 800/850 only 200/250 a/c returned to their home bases.

The Luftwaffe's New Year's greetings, 1 January 1945.

86. Although the 1 January 1945 attack was ordered by GOERING, the cause for it was - so GOERING said - HITLER'S interference once again. Prior to this GOERING had deployed his entire fighter strength in a long line from the West of GERMANY to the East. His intention was to engage the Allied fighter escorts along the entire line. In the middle of November 1944, however, HITLER ordered that the line be turned and the fighter force deployed in a North-South

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line from HOLLAND to BASEL. Only NJG 300 and 301 remained near BERLIN. His purpose was to lift the morale of the ground forces, who, until then, had only seen Allied planes overhead.

87. In order to make the best of HITLER'S command GOERING ordered the 1 January 1945 attack on Allied airfields, hoping to inflict heavy damage upon the Allied fighter force. The attack was planned to start one hour earlier than it did, roughly 0815 over targets instead of 0915, but was delayed for various reasons, one of them being ground fog over some of the GAF bases. GOERING thought 600 Allied a/c were destroyed as against 100 German pilots lost. (These figures do not check with information previously obtained from other sources).

Radar and Counter-measures.

88. GOERING believed Radar-warfare (Funkmesskrieg) to have been almost as important as aerial warfare itself and stated that the purpose of the Air Forces was two-fold, namely: 1) aerial combat, 2) Radar-warfare.

89. He said that they refrained from using window for about 9 months, anticipating that once they started, the RAF would soon do likewise. They were rather afraid of this as their counter-measures had not been fully developed. When, however, the RAF introduced it, they used it too. Window had been very effective in the beginning, but was largely overcome later on.

90. Our spoofing was not very successful. Somehow, the Germans knew, when our assemblies were faked. They took weather conditions into consideration and thereby obtained certain experience in anticipating whether and which part of GERMANY was to be attacked. Allied penetration tactics did not cause great confusion to GAF fighter controllers.

Weapons.

91. The 21 cm rocket was used for the first time in Summer 1943. Its use was discontinued because it was difficult to close in on the bomber in the exact distance for which the detonator was set.

92. The 8-gun fighter had no effect on bomber design or bomber doctrine. GOERING said that he was in favor of a centrally placed heavy armament.

KG 26.

93. Activities of KG 26 were the result of a plan which GOERING had at the outbreak of the war. He intended to cripple the British fleet with one terrific air attack on SCAPA FLOW. HITLER, however, discarded this plan, believing that he could still come to terms with ENGLAND as soon as POLAND was defeated. This hope was destroyed when CHURCHILL became Prime Minister, and KG 26 then carried out on a small scale, what originally had been intended to be an all-out effort.

Desertion in the GAF.

94. GOERING claimed that desertion was a rare incident with flying units. Desertions from ground units began soon after the ARDENNES offensive. He figured that less than 15 pilots had deserted with their a/c.

95. If a pilot deserted, his family was deprived of all allowances. In serious cases, when e.g. secrets had been taken along, members of the pilot's family were imprisoned.

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The Geneva Convention.

96. In the beginning of 1945, HITLER, supported by GOEBBELS, intended to renounce the Geneva Convention for a dual purpose. First, he wanted a free hand in the treatment of Allied P/W, and second, he hoped that desertion would cease if the Germans knew they were no longer protected by the convention.

97. GOERING claimed that the 50 odd Allied flying personnel who were caught in civilian clothes after their escape, and were shot, "for offering resistance" were killed by the SS upon direct orders from HITLER. "With what were they to offer resistance?" GOERING asked.

Use of Italian and Allied a/c.

98. The Germans flew Italian a/c in the fall of 1943 because there was a temporary shortage of German planes. Some of the Italian fighter a/c were not bad, "and the Italians did not fly anyway." Allied fighter planes which had fallen into German hands were used for training and experimental purposes only.

99. Allied bomber a/c captured by the Germans were, according to GOERING, not used for operational purposes either, although he knew that they were used to drop agents over the BALKANS. This, however, was - so he claimed - entirely an affair of the Gestapo. The a/c employed belonged to KG 200.

Aircraft.

100. The manufacture of Me 410, a modified Me 210, was discontinued as it did not prove effective.

101. The Ju 188 was abandoned in favor of the Ju 88 - S3, because its engine, the 801 D, was needed for the Fw 190.

102. Two a/c which were in the development stage, the Ar 240 and the Me 264, were stopped from going into production by MILCH, out of antipathy against MESSERSCHMITT. GOERING called them two missed opportunities.

103. The Ar 240 was in the class of the Me 410, and could have come out in approximately 6 months. The Me 264 was supposed to be a four-engined bomber with a range as far as NEW YORK.

104. Another new bomber, which was expected for the summer of 1946, was a combination of jet and engine propulsion. There were three types under consideration, a Me-type, a Ju-type and a Horten-type.

PART III.

JET AIRCRAFT

HE 162.

105. He 162 (Volksjäger) was a small fighter plane, intended for employment against enemy fighter escort. Its main task was to engage enemy fighters as soon as they crossed into German territory and cause them to jettison their drop-tanks. They expected, thereby, to force our fighter escort to break off their deep penetration mission and thus expose our unescorted bombers to the attack of the conventional German fighters.

106. First plans for the production of the He 162 were made in September of 1944 and the first plane was delivered in December 1944. They were the result of the closest and most intensive collaboration of all the important exper

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107. The original production schedule provided for an initial month of 500 a/c, gradually increasing to 1000 a/c per month. At the end of the war, the a/c was already in series production, but in all only 140 had been delivered. Oberst GOLLOP after testing the He 162 told BRAUCHITSCH that its endurance on the deck was 20 minutes with full throttle, that it was a good a/c but of no military importance.

Me 163.

108. The Me 163, the fastest of all the jet a/c so far produced, had almost the speed of a rocket but because of its extremely short range, it was to be based in the vicinity of important oil targets for protective purposes.

109. It could have been produced much faster than it actually was, but on account of personal differences between its designer, Prof. LIPPISCH, and Prof. MESSERSCHMITT, its production was neglected in favor of the Me 262.

110. The manufacture of the Me 163 finally had to be discontinued altogether because of lack of the necessary fuel (C-Stoff) which could no longer be produced.

ME 262.

Production.

111. Of all the jet a/c, the Me 262 had been planned to be the first one to go into mass-production in August 1944. However, for the reasons outlined in the next section dealing with its operational use, production was delayed. The planned production figures could, therefore, not be attained.

112. The original plan called for 500 a/c for December 1944, 500/600 per month for January and February, and 800 for March 1945. The highest output reported by the industry was 280 a/c in March 1945, but actual deliveries to operational units totalled only 190 a/c for that month. Altogether, 1400 Me 262's had been built by the end of the war. Over half of these 1400 a/c were lost through our bomb attacks on their A/Ds, crashes, conversion training and other causes. Of the 700 a/c which became operational, the greater part was lost in combat, through crashes or defects in the propulsion units. A number were destroyed by the Germans at the end of the war.

113. Bombing attacks on the Messerschmitt plant caused, according to GOERING, merely slight delay but no decisive set-back. He stated that the same holds true - to a somewhat lesser extent of the effect of bombing of the Junkers plants making the jet propulsion units for the Me 262.

114. A more serious delay was caused when it became necessary to abandon underground factories, not on account of bombing, but rather because of the advance of our ground forces. With the railway system thoroughly disorganized, as it was following our constant bombing attacks, removal from one underground factory to another was complicated and took considerable time. Without this difficulty, underground production, according to GOERING, would have increased over the previous surface output, as underground production was concentrated and therefore eliminated the delay caused by wide dispersal of component factories.

115. In the last stage of the war, the production of Me 262s was handicapped by a shortage of main components caused by our bombing as well as by the advance of our ground forces to the RUHR district.

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Operational Use.

116. GOERING was asked: "What was the reason for the delay in the use of the Me 262 as a fighter?" Promptly and excitedly came the answer: "ADOLF HITLER's madness" ("Der Wahnsinn Adolf Hitler's"). He elaborated this statement with the following explanation: When the first Me 262 left the assembly line in May 1944, GOERING confidently, and full of hope for a revival of the GAF's fighter strength, presented it to ADOLF HITLER as the fighter which was to sweep Allied air power from the skies.

117. To GOERING's and everybody else's surprise and consternation. HITLER said: "I am not at all interested in this plane as a fighter." He insisted that it be converted into a bomber. He ordered that the armament be removed and that 1 x 500 kg or 2 x 250 kg bombs be carried instead. When GOERING called his attention to the fact that a removal of the guns would cause an unbalance, HITLER suggested that extra fuel should be carried in the front thereby also increasing the range of the a/c. HITLER in his ignorance, stated GOERING, did not realize that since this extra fuel would be consumed in flight, the original unbalance would return.

118! HITLER even went so far as to have GOERING issue a written order strictly forbidding that the a/c be referred to as a fighter. He wanted it to be called a "Blitzbomber".

119. Generalleutnant GALLAND, young and famous German fighter ace, General der Jagdflieger (Commanding General Fighters Command), embittered by this decision and backed by other fighter pilots of long standing and fame, tried to fight HITLER and had a heated argument with him. On HITLER's insistence, GOERING had then to dismiss GALLAND.

120. Because of all these arguments, the Me 262 was, fortunately for us, but to GOERING's regret, kept from its effective use for several months. Only one concession was made by HITLER. Our intrusions over German territory were becoming so troublesome that - as GOERING put it - "Mustangs were practically doing training flights over BAVARIA". GALLAND was therefore recalled to stop "this nonsense" and given a small unit of about 16 Me 262s (JV 44), for which he picked the most experienced pilots he could find.

121. At long last, at the end of 1944, HITLER gave permission to use this a/c as a fighter on a larger scale. According to GOERING, HITLER was finally convinced of the effectiveness of the Me 262 as a fighter when in January/February 1945, 10 jets attacking a bomber stream, shot down 10 bombers.

122. Once HITLER had decided that the Me 262 become a fighter a/c, he wanted it to become operational immediately. GOERING would have preferred to wait until he was able to equip a complete Geschwader with it. This, however, was not approved by HITLER and death was threatened to anyone who tried to keep a jet a/c from the front line.

Armament.

123. Two 5.5 cm cannon were supposed to be the armament for the Me 262. As this cannon had not yet been produced, HITLER - always favoring heavy armament - demanded that the long-barrel 5 cm cannon used by tanks should be built in. It took a long time to convince him that this was inadvisable as the barrel of this cannon would stick out of the a/c by about 2 m, "a damnable asparagus" as GOERING called it.

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124. Arrangement when finally installed, varied; in most a/c it was four 2 cm cannon, in a few a/c six 3 cm cannon. Some other a/c had two 2 cm plus two 3 cm cannon. GOERING intended to leave this to the preference of each operational unit.

R4M - Rocket.

125. The R4M rocket was employed in racks holding 12 each, under both wings. The rockets had such a terrific explosive effect that no matter where they hit - according to experiments - the bomber crashed. The loaded racks reduce the speed of the a/c by 35 km p.h., or by 20 km p.h. when empty.

126. HITLER conceived the idea that jets, equipped with rockets, should approach our bombers not closer than 1200 m. Considering the additional distance which the a/c would travel after the last rocket had been launched, the rocket would have had to be fired from a distance of approximately 2000 m. HITLER's thought was to keep the Me 262 always out of machine gun range of our bombers.

Use as Reconnaissance a/c.

127. The Me 262 was used on a small scale as a reconnaissance a/c and on rare occasions flew reconnaissance flights over South-East ENGLAND.

ARADO 234.

Production.

128. The Ar 234 was at first produced as B-series with 2 jets. Altogether only 225 a/c of this series were turned out. Mass production of the C series, 4 jets (BMW 003) with a bomb load of 1500 kg, was supposed to start in March 1945 with a planned initial output of 500 a/c per month, the beginning of production of this series overlapping with the ceasing of production of the B series. However, the production schedule gradually went down to 200, 100, and then 50 a/c per month and was finally abandoned altogether in favor of Me 262 production.

Operational Use.

129. The Ar 234B was first used for reconnaissance over ENGLAND shortly before the invasion, and later also as a light bomber.

EFFECT OF BOMBING ON JET OPERATIONAL PROGRAM.

130. The general effect of our strategic bombing on the production schedule for jet a/c resulted in the decision to give absolute priority to the production of the Me 262 and to speed up its manufacture to the utmost.

POWER UNITS.

131. The Junkers jet propulsion power unit was used because it was ready. It was planned, however, to replace it with the Heinkel-Hirth power unit which was considered to be better and by the BMW 003 which was to be ready by the fall of 1945.

FUEL.

132. J-2, used by jets, is a simplified, very cheap fuel. Its production presented no difficulties. It is an ordinary synthetic fuel with a low octane content.

CONTROL.

133. The problems of control of the Me 262 lay in the adjusting of speed in combat. GOERING said he expressly forbade an adjustment of speed as this would have offset the advantage which the jet a/c had over others. "Once you give full gas, you have to leave it there."

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RUNWAYS.

134. The length of a runway necessary for landing and take-off for a Me 262 is between 1000 and 1400 m. Approximately the same applies to the Ar 234.

PILOT TRAINING.

135. No special training was necessary for pilots for the Me 262 and Ar 234, and the conversion from a conventional type fighter was easy.

136. Bomber as well as fighter pilots were used for jet a/c. While the latter had the advantage of practical experience as fighter pilots and were more experienced in gunnery, most of them lacked sufficient training in instrument flying. Since our bombers were not grounded by bad weather, the GAF felt that they could not continue to keep their fighter force on the ground during our instrument bombing attacks. Therefore, GOERING decided, upon the advice of PRELTZ, to employ his, at that time, inactive bomber force, Former bomber pilots, though they lacked the above mentioned advantages of the fighter pilots, but at least had some experience with instrument flying - were to be trained as Me 262 pilots for the interception of our bomber formations on bad weather days.

137. Pilots for the Me 163 had to go through a glider pilot's training.

JET TACTICS.

138. The development of the best tactics for jet a/c were still in the experimental stage and depended on the number of Me 262s available for an attack. So far only general directives had been issued and apparently no more than 40 Me 262s were employed on any one mission.

139. When attacking a bomber stream, a formation of two flights of four a/c each were to be used in the attack. A third flight of four a/c was to fly high cover in loose formation. The attacking flights were to take position below or above the bomber group and leap frog one group of bombers after the other along the entire bomber stream. They were not to turn back and re-attack. The third flight of four was to continue its top cover.

140. The main principle for the attack on fighters was to avoid a "dog-fight".

COOPERATION BETWEEN ME 262 AND OTHER FIGHTERS.

141. The idea was similar to the He 162 viz. to have the jet a/c engage our fighters thereby forcing them to jettison their drop tanks. Then the ordinary fighters could cope with them having no longer the disadvantage of a shorter range. In addition, conventional fighters were to protect the jets while landing.

PART IV.

ALLIED STRATEGIC BOMBING

TARGETS.

Selection.

142. GOERING claimed that the Germans realized at an early stage of our air attacks, that the Allied Air Force intended to bomb by systematic selection of related targets. Immediately after our first attack on the oil industry, they were sure that synthetic

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oil works would then become our first priority target. Generally speaking, our attacks selected the right targets and did not overlook any installations, the bombing of which would have ended the war sooner. Explosives factories should have received more attention. The priority which we put on the targets was not always right either. He also felt, that I.G. Farben plants had been comparatively spared for some particular reason.

Airfields, Airframe, engine and ball-bearing factories.

143. Attacks on airfields were generally effective. It was, however, very easy to make necessary repairs within a short time. They called this "the race between the shovel and the bomb" ("Wettlauf zwischen Spaten und Bombe").

144. As between airframe and engine factories, priority should definitely have been given to the latter. Attacks on airframe factories were effective, but concentrated attacks on engine factories would have crippled the GAF much sooner. (This, incidentally, is contrary to the opinion of Prof. MESSERSCHMITT, who was questioned on this and other points and claimed, that there is no difference in the importance of these two types of targets.)

145. Attacks on ball-bearing manufacture were, according to GOERING, none too effective. He offered three reasons for this: Dispersal, Underground factories, and above all, substitution of roller-bearings for ball-bearings.

Synthetic Oil Works and Communication Lines.

146. "Then came attacks on two elements, which hurt us considerably." With these words GOERING expressed the damage done to the GAF by our attacks on Synthetic Oil Works and Communication Lines.

147. The attacks on Synthetic Oil Works were the most effective of all strategic bombing and the most decisive in GERMANY's defeat. "Without fuel, nobody can conduct a war."

148. The GAF schedule for aviation fuel originally provided for a production of 300,000 tons per month, and this amount would have been ample for all their needs. They attained a maximum production of 160,000 tons in the summer of 1944, but their average availability of aviation fuel was only about 110,000 - 120,000 tons per month. Constant bombing reduced the output to 15,000 - 20,000 tons and as an example of the effect of this reduction he related that in the Russian Campaign 3,000 sorties per day had been reduced to 600 - 800 (on exceptional days to 1200) per day towards March/April 1945.

149. Even if 90% of the bombs dropped on a factory like Leuna Works missed, the 10% which registered, were sufficient to interrupt production.

150. A concentration on oil targets in preference to our policy of bombing aircraft and ball bearing factories from January 1944 on would not have permitted the a/c industry to recover sufficiently to produce enough fighters to protect oil targets in subsequent attacks. In order to minimize the effect of our attacks on oil targets, 60 heavy bombers would have, had to be shot down per day. The aircraft industry could not have recovered sufficiently to produce such an excess number of fighters as to accomplish this.

151. "The disruption of our communication lines has done more harm to us than the destruction of our factories." Our attacks on

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the German transportation system became particularly severe and most noticeable at a time when it was finally decided to build underground factories. The destruction of the transportation system prevented a contraction of industry which had previously been dispersed all over the country in underground factories.

Conclusion.

152. The following conclusion can be drawn from GOERING's statements. In order to hamper the German Air Force most, the following order of targets should have been observed:

- a) Synthetic Oil Works.
- b) Communications.
- c) Aero-engine factories.
- d) Airframe factories.
- e) Ball-bearing factories.
- f) Airfields.

Repeat Raids.

153. GOERING emphasized that they were very relieved whenever we failed to bomb the same target in close succession and allowed them the breathing spell that they were praying for in order to carry out operationally vital repairs. It also gave them sufficient time to salvage and remove vital machine tools. An outstanding example in BRAUCHITSCH's opinion was the USAAF raid on SCHWEINFURT which, if it had been promptly repeated, would have had an even more crippling effect than the 60% damage resulting from the one attack. Both GOERING and BRAUCHITSCH considered the Allied raids on DRESDEN this February, when one blow followed the other in quick succession, the most deadly, most demoralizing and therefore the most effective series of raids of the war.

154. "Nothing is more terrible than an attack which is made on the same target three times in a row. That really undermines the resistance of the people."

CARPET BOMBING ON TROOPS.

155. Carpet bombing on troop concentrations was as in the case of ST. LO, very effective. On one occasion tanks assembling for a planned attack on a grand scale were severely hit. It took them six hours to reassemble, thus rendering the intended attack impossible.

COUNTERMEASURES.

Dispersal of Industry and Underground Factories

156. The first step in counteracting the damaging effect of our strategic bombing was the dispersal of industry - a step which later on, as outlined above, proved fatal because of the destruction of the German railway system.

157. GOERING claimed that he favored the building of underground factories at an early stage, but was frustrated at first by the opposition put up against this plan by the industry as well as by experts. Industry, he claimed, did not realize in the beginning the danger of our coming air attacks. Moreover, dispersal was much simpler than going underground. The opposition of the oil experts was based on the claim that much too great a risk was involved on account of the danger of explosions.

158. Discussion on this subject gave GOERING another opportunity to show how "humane" he really was. When asked how it was possible that, in a totalitarian regime, the opposition of individuals could frustrate a plan decided upon by the F"uhrung, he answered: "I did not want to send them to a concentration camp." But,

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he was ~~giving~~ to give himself away by saying: "After all, I needed them."

159. GOERING believed that if the building of underground factories had been carried out in 1942 and 1943 instead of 1944, the GAF would have been less vulnerable. But even so, without our attacks on the railway system, the GAF would have been completely underground by the fall of 1945. Production, particularly of jet aircraft, would have been on a substantial scale. The production schedule for Kahla alone provided for the manufacture of 500 Me 262's per month.

160. As things turned out, when it finally was decided to follow GOERING's plan, i.e. when in his words "it got too hot on the ground", it was too late, as by then the Allied ground forces started to overrun important industrial areas.

Camouflage.

161. He claimed that camouflage was often an effective means of protection against air attacks. "You have been fooled quite nicely by our camouflage and by our dummy installations." In many cases, instead of trying to repair damaged factories, essential production continued underneath the debris, at the same time giving the illusion that operations had come to a standstill and that the plant had been abandoned. In these cases very great care was taken not to remove any more debris than was absolutely necessary for restarting operations, usually on a much reduced scale.

162. Another ruse was to start fires far away from the real target thereby deceiving a/c returning in follow-up attacks.

PART V.

THE BATTLE OF BRITAIN

INVASION PLAN.

163. The part which the GAF was to play in the preparation for the eventual invasion of Great Britain was to gain absolute air supremacy over the British Isles, and to destroy the British Fleet.

164. Fighter planes constituted the only British asset at that time. It was therefore the aim of the GAF to destroy the British Fighter Force.

165. The reason for the failure to invade ENGLAND, according to GOERING, lay in the lack of sufficient shipping space - in particular a completely insufficient number of landing craft. If the German Navy would have had the latter, the German Fighter Force, so GOERING believed, would have been able to protect a landing, as ENGLAND had no bombers at that time. Once a bridge-head had been established, GOERING was sure that the invasion would have been successful. There was nothing to offer effective resistance - no army, no Flak, no bombers; "Only Volkssturm", he exclaimed in self mockery.

GAF STRENGTH AND LOSSES DURING THE BATTLE OF BRITAIN.

166. During the Battle of Britain the GAF strength in aircraft, bombers, fighters, and fighter-bombers increased slightly. At any rate, GOERING stated that, at the end of the Battle of Britain the GAF had slightly more a/c than at the beginning.

167. The GAF losses during that battle were according to GOERING not too painful. He did not know even approximate figures of losses sustained by his Air Force and said that he would have liked to get together the official documents on this subject which, of course,

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were not available. In any case, he considered the RAF claims for that period fantastically high. On the other hand, when pressed for an answer about his own losses, his guess sounded so much like GOEBBELS that it is not to be repeated. BRAUCHITSCH, when asked separately about the losses for that period, did not remember accurate figures either, but said that they were such that the effort could not be maintained. To the best of his recollection, production of bombers in 1940 was about 280 a/c and that of fighters about 400 a/c per month.

REASON FOR "BABY BLITZ" ON GREAT BRITAIN IN EARLY 1944.

168. The plan for the renewal of raids on ENGLAND originated with HITLER himself. However, the switch from bomber to fighter production, the GAF requirements for nightfighters, the withdrawal of an entire Geschwader from the West and finally the OKL's policy of building up and maintaining a reserve for the coming Allied invasion, made it impossible to carry out bombing on any sizeable scale. Consequently, the attacks soon petered out.

PLAN - GISELA.

169. During the last months of 1944, GOERING planned another attack against ENGLAND. This time his idea was that German nightfighters should intercept British bombers while landing upon their return to ENGLAND from night bombing missions. This plan was disapproved by HITLER who believed that it was not worth the effort. The idea was, therefore, carried out only on a very small scale after the failure of the ARDENNES offensive.

RECONNAISSANCE OVER ENGLAND.

170. There were extensive reconnaissance flights over ENGLAND in the spring of 1944 and limited reconnaissance of British ports was carried out shortly before the Allied invasion. In the fall of 1944, reconnaissance was resumed with Me 262's and Ar 234's, with good results, but there was no full reconnaissance of the West-coast ports and LONDON after the spring of 1944.

PART VI

THE RUSSIAN CAMPAIGN AND THE RUSSIAN AIR FORCE

THE DECISION TO ATTACK RUSSIA.

171. GOERING, besides being busy with his Luftwaffe, had ideas of his own regarding German Foreign Policy, and had a plan which included anything but an attack on RUSSIA.

172. He said that it had become known that RUSSIA intended a second campaign against FINLAND and at the same time an expansion to the South in the direction of the DARDANELLES.

173. With this in mind, GOERING suggested that, after the defeat of FRANCE, some arrangement should be made whereby the French would allow the Germans to move through FRANCE into SPAIN. There the Germans were to take GIBRALTAR from the rear. The Spaniards who, as GOERING put it, were inclined to friendliness towards the Germans and grateful for the assistance the Germans had given them in their "liberation from Communism", were weak and would have had no objections. For the same reason, FRANCO would have granted the Nazis the use of Spanish ports for their U-boats.

174. With GIBRALTAR lost and with the DARDANELLES threatened by the Russians, GOERING furthermore counted on using British anti-Russian sentiment aroused by the latter's renewed attack on

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helpless FINLAND, to come to terms with ENGLAND, thereby ending the war, with GERMANY holding all the trump cards in her hand.

175. But, instead, ADOLF HITLER decided to attack RUSSIA. "The decision to attack the East made me despair." He tried to change HITLER's mind referring to HITLER's book "Mein Kampf" where HITLER himself had warned against a two-front war. "I knew", GOERING continued, "that we could defeat the Russian Army; but how were we ever to make peace with them? After all, we could not march to VLADIVOSTOCK!"

176. His efforts, however, proved futile. HITLER, probably advised and supported by RIBBENTROP, was persistent, and so the attack on RUSSIA began. GOERING had a strong dislike for RIBBENTROP, but HITLER, impressed with RIBBENTROP's success in concluding the Japanese alliance, said he was the best Foreign Secretary since BISMARCK.

GERMAN A/C TYPES USED AGAINST RUSSIA.

177. The Germans used literally all types of a/c in RUSSIA. The reason for the comparatively late use of Fw 190's in RUSSIA as fighter-bombers was that the Ju 87's were to be used up first and further, they were considered good enough.

RUSSIAN AIR FORCE STRENGTH.

178. There was a difference of opinion between GOERING and BRAUCHITSCH with regard to the strength of the Russian Air Force. BRAUCHITSCH quoted Ic reports which had given the total strength of bombers, fighters, transport, training and liaison a/c as 19,000, a figure which GOERING thought much too high. Nevertheless, GOERING considered the Russian Air Force to be very strong in numbers and said that they had always wondered why the Russians did not make more and better use of this great force.

179. To give an idea of what the Russians could do, BRAUCHITSCH quoted from memory some figures which, he said, were also taken from Ic reports. Against East PRUSSIA, RUSSIA employed 1000 to 1500 a/c. In certain army sectors, they had 1500 - 2000 a/c at any one time. In the BUG (VISTULA) bridgehead they flew up to 5800 sorties per day.

180. GOERING considered the Russian Air Force to be poor technically as well as in the training of their pilots. He granted that they were great masters in the art of improvisation, a fact which, incidentally, was lauded by other high ranking German air- and ground officers as well. He stated his belief that if it had not been for the lack of oil the Germans could have dealt with the Russian Air Force easily.

RUSSIAN AND GERMAN LOSSES.

181. Due to GOERING's policy and determination to deal with the enemy's Air Force first, the Russians lost 2700 a/c, the vast majority on the ground, during the first three days of the campaign.

182. German losses were initially very light. They became extremely high, however, when HITLER ordered the German bomber force to be used for the transport of supplies to STALINGRAD and other pockets. "There died the core of the German bomber fleet." Losses were due, above all, to the extreme cold and bad weather, but Russian light Flak was also considered very good.

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THE BOMBING OF MOSCOW.

183. The bombing of MOSCOW was ineffective because it was never seriously applied. It was just a token bombing prompted by HITLER's sarcastic question: "Do you think that there is a Geschwader left in the GAF that would have the courage to fly to MOSCOW?"

OTHER OPERATIONS.

184. Since RUSSIA offers very few strategical targets for an operational Air Force on account of her dispersed industries and cities, and since she lacks communication centers and marshalling yards in the European and American sense, GOERING intended to undermine her military potentialities with a concentrated blow, towards the end of March 1945, against all Russian electrical power stations. The code name for this operation was "Eisenhammer."

185. HITLER, however, discarded this plan in favor of attacks on the ODER bridges which, in GOERING's opinion, were futile as these bridges were rebuilt within 3 days.

RUSSIAN INTELLIGENCE AND AIR P/W INTERROGATION METHODS.

186. The Russians were very poorly informed about the GAF. They eagerly sought any information on the subject, and interrogated captured German airmen on all phases of the GAF, but their evaluation was poor. In addition to this, their captives were not particularly knowledgeable members of the Luftwaffe.

187. GOERING defined Russian methods of interrogation with the words "Whip and candy, but more whip than candy."

RUSSIA AND JAPAN.

188. In discussing the Russian campaign, GOERING ventured an opinion regarding the possibility of RUSSIA's entry into the war against JAPAN. He reasoned that RUSSIA cannot afford to do so without impairing her economical position. He claimed that RUSSIA had always tried to get the best German engineers. With their help and with her own wealth in raw materials, RUSSIA, ambitious to become the strongest economical power of the world, had built an enormous industry behind the URALS. In order to stay on a competitive basis with the US, RUSSIA will, according to GOERING, not participate in the war against JAPAN.

189. It must be emphasized that this reasoning, like almost everything else GOERING said in connection with RUSSIA, springs from the only sincere feeling GOERING seemed to be capable of, his hatred for RUSSIA and his hope that the war, which GERMANY has just lost has not been the last one.

190. The old Nazi methods and tricks, particularly the effort to create dissention among the Allied powers, appear to have survived the collapse of the regime and seem to continue to assert themselves even in a lost cause.

191. It might be interesting in this connection that Oberst v. BRAUCHITSCH, in discussing our victory, injected the remark: "This time you won it." There was so much emphasis on the first two words that one could not help but feel that he was thinking merely of one round in a match which would not be the last.

PART VII.

THE JAPANESE

GENERAL.

192. GOERING professed to know very little about the Japanese

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Air Force and GERMANY's relationship to it. He emphasized that he had no particular liking for the Japanese, and that GERMANY's alliance with JAPAN should not be looked upon as an alliance based on love and friendship but rather on expediency and necessity. According to him, traditionally the Germans and their commerce had always inclined more towards the Chinese people than towards the Japanese.

193. Japanese affairs were primarily dealt with by the Ic (Intelligence), Oberst WODARG, who maintained contact with them.

LIAISON WITH JAPANESE AIR STAFF.

194. There may have been contact with the Japanese Air Staff, but not through GOERING. There was, probably, some connection between the Attachés. They had one for the Army and another for the Navy. Under the Army Military Attaché was the Army Air Force and under the Naval Attaché the Naval Air Force Attaché. The Japanese and German Navies were working closer together than their Armies and Air Forces.

NO SUGGESTIONS FOR U.S. AIR STRATEGY AGAINST JAPAN.

195. GOERING stated that, in order to make any recommendations as to the type of air strategy to be applied by the US Air Force, he would have to make a thorough study of the situation first. He added that he followed the Japanese war only very superficially and, therefore, was not up to date in his knowledge of the conditions prevailing there. Whenever he needed any information, he called upon the experts on Japanese affairs in Ic.

SECRET JAPANESE WEAPONS, PLANS, AND AIR TACTICS.

196. GOERING likewise professed not to know anything about the development of Japanese secret weapons or about any plans to withdraw to the Chinese mainland for a final defence. He does not know of any secret air bases there or of any secret air tactics which the Japanese contemplate using against us,

197. His apparent ignorance also applies to Japanese weaknesses and deficiencies in aircraft, production, and methods.

GERMAN V-WEAPONS, A/C AND OTHER DEVELOPMENTS.

198. GOERING claimed that he was not quite sure but he thought it possible that the Japanese had the blueprints for V-1 and V-2. But he said: "There is still a difference between having blueprints and being able to use them."

ME-262.

199. HITLER ordered that the blue-prints for the Me 262 be handed over to the Japanese despite GOERING's objections. GOERING was of the opinion that "the last thing is not given even to an Ally".

200. The plans for the Me 262 were handed over in GERMANY and were sent to JAPAN in a U-boat in the first months of 1945. None of the German construction experts went to JAPAN and no Japanese ever flew a Me 262 in GERMANY.

New Developments.

201. GOERING emphatically stated that neither the plans for the jet-bomber nor any projects for new weapons in the development stage, were handed over to the Japanese.

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A/C BETWEEN GERMANY AND JAPAN.

202. At the beginning of the war with AMERICA, the Japanese declared that they would send a/c to GERMANY. However, these planes never arrived.

203. On the other hand, JAPAN wanted from GERMANY the He 177 and the Ju 290 and negotiations to this effect were carried on in 1942/1943. The Japanese wished these a/c be flown via PERSIA and INDIA. The Germans, however, insisted that they be flown by the shorter route via SIBERIA to which plan the Japanese did not agree basing their refusal on their neutrality pact with RUSSIA. The same argument prevented the new German Air Attache for JAPAN, General KESSEL, from flying in a Ju 290 to JAPAN, even after RUSSIA had renounced the non-aggression pact. KESSEL finally left by U-boat.

JAPANESE INTEREST IN GERMAN UNDERGROUND FACTORIES.

204. Rather sarcastically referring to the Japanese thirst for knowledge, GOERING related that they did a lot of travelling around showing a particular interest in German underground installations.

PART VIII

OTHER CAMPAIGNS AND OPERATIONS

MALTA.

205. When GOERING was asked why there was no invasion of MALTA, his answer was: "You try to carry out an invasion with the Italians." He said that he was ready for this invasion. The Italians insisted that they be permitted to participate in it, and, more important still, such an operation was impossible without the effective cooperation of the Italian Navy. The Germans, knowing that they could not rely on the Italian fleet, preferred to call off the whole thing.

206. He claimed that the energy spent by the GAF in the assault on MALTA was not futile as it had served the purpose of eliminating the striking power of the British Air Force based there.

207. He admitted, however, that, as a Naval Base, MALTA had not been destroyed. For this, it would have been necessary to invade and occupy the island.

CRETE.

208. The invasion of CRETE was very costly. Here again the Italians wanted to participate, but GOERING prevented this.

BARI, POLTAVA AND CORSICA.

209. The successes obtained against the harbor of BARI and the airfields in CORSICA were attributed by GOERING to a very minute and careful preparation of these operations. He admitted that at BARI luck came to their assistance, when they succeeded in scoring hits on 4 Allied ammunition ships.

210. As to the success on the airfield at POLTAVA P/W stated that the impending landing of U.S. bombers had been discovered by a He 177 which had joined an American bomber formation, had flown with them to the airfield and had then turned back to report its findings.

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ICELAND, GREENLAND.

211. The plan contemplated occupying ICELAND. However, ICELAND had no airfields, and GERMANY could not attempt to invade anywhere, where she could not employ her Air Force. The German Navy was so inferior to the British Fleet that it could not be depended upon for protection. Moreover, GERMANY was trying hard to keep AMERICA out of the war and an occupation of ICELAND would strategically have called for an occupation of GREENLAND too. This, it was felt, would find little understanding in the United States.

NORWAY.

212. The invasion of NORWAY was successful because there were some landing-fields, even though these were rather poor. In addition, the GAF could and did make use of frozen lakes.

AZORES.

213. A plan had also been under consideration, whereby the AZORES were to be invaded if and when the GIBRALTAR project had been carried out.

CONCLUSION

214. The "Reichsmarschall", as will be apparent from the length of this report, was willing enough to talk and to answer questions. On certain subjects and details, however, he was not well informed. This may partly be due to what his Adjutant referred to as his "easy going nature", but partly also to his unwillingness to face unpleasant facts, which often led his assistants to conceal the truth from him.

215. The above leads to another observation; not only did his waning star, and HITLER's constant interference, dampen his desire for hard work, but the once daring fighter ace and post-war politician had, surrounded by outward comfort, wealth and luxury, become soft and afraid for his life.

216. GOEBING, still playing with the idea of stepping into HITLER's shoes and, for this reason, attempting to appease HIMMLER, finally said away from the final consequences which such a step might entail. And it was more like the playing with the idea when he exclaimed: "If I ever had to use an armored car, then this would have been the moment. Everybody knew that my first move would have been to do away with BORMANN."

217. His self-deceit remained right up to the very end and his ruthlessness towards those under him, can best be illustrated by citing one of his own statements, namely:- "I have never signed a man's death warrant, or sent anybody to a concentration camp, never, never, never.... unless, of course, it was a question of military necessity and expediency."

Eric M. Warburg

ERIC M. WARBURG
Lt Col., AC.,
Commanding.

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