

January 15, 1944  
9:30 a.m.

## JEWISH EVACUATION

Present: Mr. Gaston  
Mr. Paul  
Mr. White  
Mr. Pehle  
Mr. Luxford  
Mr. DuBois  
Mr. Cohen ✓  
Mr. Cox ✓  
Mrs. Klotz

H.M.JR: Your record is good on this.

MR. COX: Yes, it isn't bad.

H.M.JR: Is Paul in town?

MR. PEHLE: Yes, sir, he will be in in a very few minutes.

May I mention one new development that came up last night that will throw some light on this thing? Riegelman called and talked to Miss Hodel in my office and said he wanted to read a memorandum he had prepared on the refugee problem which is to be sent to Mr. Stettinius.

Now, this memorandum, he says, outlines all the various problems and aspects of this question and specifies the many divisions of State as well as the other Government agencies which are concerned with these problems. In order to expedite the matter, and in order that all interested parties be consulted and heard, the memorandum could be included with the recommendation that a committee be set up composed of high-level representatives of State, FEA, and Treasury under Mr. Travers, Chief of the Visa Division of State, to handle all refugee problems. Riegelman says that the foregoing is the unanimous

recommendation of the interested divisions of State who met yesterday, January 14, to discuss the problem, and that they didn't want this taken up with you, and that if Mr. Stettinius approves, it is planned he will write Crowley and the Secretary, meaning you, asking you to appoint representatives on this committee, to be pointed up under Travers.

MR. COX: Who is Riegelman?

MR. PEHLE: That is Mr. Riegelman who is distantly related to the Secretary. He is in the State Department in a division called EH.

H.M.JR: He is Charley Riegelman's son.

MR. COX: Oh, Bill Riegelman. I know him.

MR. PEHLE: In other words, they want to set up a committee under Travers to settle it.

(Mr. Paul entered the conference.)

H.M.JR: This man who wanted to set it up is the man-- Crowley didn't know who he was.

MR. COX: It looks like some of the heat is beginning to work a little bit.

H.M.JR: Well, there is plenty of heat.

MR. GASTON: Have different grades of highness, high, higher, and highest.

H.M.JR: Paul, would you like to start this discussion, or who would you like to have start it?

MR. PAUL: I don't know.

H.M.JR: The only thing I have been given is the memorandum, which I have read, from you to me.

MR. LUXFORD: I think we ought to start with the report to the President.

MR. PAUL: That is sort of a summary of the thing.

H.M.JR: Why don't you read it? You have a nice voice.

MR. LUXFORD: I don't know what I have this morning.

H.M.JR: I don't think the movie was too much for you and your wife.

MR. LUXFORD: (Reading from memorandum entitled "Personal Report to the President," copy attached.) "One of the greatest crimes in history, the slaughter of the Jewish people in Europe, is continuing unabated."

(Mr. Cohen entered the conference.)

H.M.JR: Just take a minute to bring him up to date. I can tell it to him. There was a suggestion made yesterday within the State Department, that just came to us this morning, that a committee should be set up in the State Department, with representatives from Treasury and Crowley's organization, with a Mr. Travers of the Visa Department to head it up, that is, not getting as high up as Stettinius. But that is an answer for the heat which has been on them for the past month.

MR. PEHLE: The significant point that I get out of it in addition to the fact that these little things that they want to do is supposed to be the cure, that is, unless we get action there may be some letters coming around to you and Mr. Crowley setting up such a committee and State will say, "Well, we have taken this action on the many phases to meet the need of getting to the point fast."

H.M.JR: If he (Luxford) has a sore throat, why don't you take it (Pehle).

MR. LUXFORD: We might hand each person a copy and let them read it right along with us.

H.M.JR: All right.

MR. LUXFORD: There will be changes from page five on.

MR. WHITE: Why don't you give the Secretary the original and read from the carbon?

H.M.JR: This is good enough.

(Copies of "Personal Report to the President" distributed.)

MR. PEHLE: (Reading) "One of the greatest crimes in history, the slaughter of the Jewish people in Europe, is continuing unabated.

"This Government has for a long time maintained that its policy is to work out programs to save those Jews of Europe who could be saved.

"You are probably not as familiar as I with the utter failure of certain officials in our State Department, who are charged with actually carrying out this policy, to take any effective action to prevent the extermination of the Jews in German-controlled Europe.

"The public record, let alone the facts which have not yet been made public, reveals the gross procrastination of these officials. It is well known that since the time when it became clear that Hitler was determined to carry out a policy of exterminating the Jews in Europe, the State Department officials have failed to take any positive steps reasonably calculated to save any of these people. Although they have used devices such as setting up inter-governmental organizations to survey the whole refugee problem, and calling conferences such as the Bermuda Conference to explore the whole refugee problem, making it appear that positive action could be expected, in fact, nothing has been accomplished.

"The best summary of the whole situation is contained in one sentence of a report submitted on December 20, 1943, by the Committee on Foreign Relations of the Senate, recommending the passage of a Resolution (S.R. 203), favoring the appointment of a commission to formulate plans to save the Jews of Europe from extinction by Nazi Germany. The Resolution had been introduced by Senator Guy M. Gillette in behalf of himself and eleven colleagues, Senators Taft, Thomas, Radcliffe, Murray, Johnson, Guffey, Ferguson, Clark, Van Nuys, Downey and Ellender. The Committee stated:

'We have talked; we have sympathized; we have expressed our horror; the time to act is long past due.'

"Whether one views this failure as being deliberate on the part of those officials handling the matter, or merely due to their incompetence, is not too important from my point of view. However, there is a growing number of responsible people and organizations today who have ceased to view our failure as the product of simple incompetence on the part of those officials in the State Department charged with handling this problem. They see plain Anti-Semitism motivating the actions of these State Department officials and, rightly or wrongly, it will require little more in the way of proof for this suspicion to explode into a nasty scandal.

"In this perspective, I ask you to weigh the implication of the following two cases which have recently come to my attention and which have not as yet become known to the public.

"On March 13, 1943, a cable was received from the World Jewish Congress representative in London stating that information reaching London indicated the possibility of rescuing Jews provided funds were put at the disposal of the World Jewish Congress representation in Switzerland.

"On April 10, 1943, Sumner Welles cabled our Legation in Bern and requested them to get in touch with the World Jewish Congress representative in Switzerland, who Welles had been informed was in possession of important information regarding the situation of the Jews.

"On April 20, 1943, a cable was received from Bern relating to the proposed financial arrangements in connection with the evacuation of the Jews from Rumania and France.

"On May 25, 1943, State Department cabled for a clarification of these proposed financial arrangements. This matter was not called to the attention of the Treasury Department at this time although the Treasury has the responsibility for licensing all such financial transactions.

"This whole question of financing the evacuation of the Jews from Rumania and France was first called to the attention of the Treasury Department on June 25, 1943.

"A conference was held with the State Department relating to this matter on July 15, 1943.

"One day after this conference, on July 16, 1943, the Treasury Department advised the State Department that it was prepared to issue a license in this matter.

"It was not until December 18, 1943, after having interposed objections for five months, that the State Department, precipitously and under circumstances revealing the fictitious character of their objections, instructed Harrison to issue the necessary license."

H.M.JR: Let's say "...instructed Harrison in Switzerland."

MR. PEHLE: "During this five months period between the time that the Treasury stated that it was prepared to issue a license and the time when the license was actually issued delays and objections of all sorts were forthcoming from officials in the State Department, our Legation in Bern, and finally the British. The real significance of these delays and objections was brought home to the State Department in letters which I sent to Secretary Hull on November 23, 1943, and December 17, 1943, which completely devastated the excuses which State Department officials had been advancing.

"On December 18 I made an appointment to discuss the matter with Secretary Hull on December 20. And then an amazing but understandable thing happened. On the very day I made my appointment the State Department issued a license notwithstanding the fact that the objections of our Legation in Bern were still outstanding and that the British had indicated their disapproval for political reasons.

"State Department officials were in such a hurry to issue this license that they not only did not ask the Treasury to draft the license (which would have been the normal procedure) but they drafted the license themselves and issued it without even consulting the Treasury as to its terms. Informal discussions with certain State Department officials have confirmed what is obvious from the above-mentioned facts.

"This wasn't all that my letter and appointment precipitated. I had told Secretary Hull that I wished to discuss the British objections--in simple terms, the British were apparently prepared to accept the probable death of thousands of Jews in enemy territory because of 'the difficulties of disposing of any considerable number of Jews should they be rescued.' Accordingly, on that day of 'action' for our State Department, December 18, they sent a telegram to the British Foreign Office expressing astonishment at the British point of view and stating that the Department was unable to agree with that point of view.

"Breckinridge Long knew that his position was so indefensible that he was unwilling even to try to defend it at my pending conference with Secretary Hull on December 20. Accordingly, he took such action as he felt was necessary to cover up his previous position in this matter. It is, of course, clear that if we had not made the record against the State Department followed by my request to see Secretary Hull, the action which the State Department officials took on December 18 would either never have been taken at all or would have been delayed so long that any benefits which it might have had would have been lost."

H.M.JR: Do these gentlemen who are here want to ask any questions before we go into the next one?

MR. PAUL: I think we ought to go through the whole thing.

H.M.JR: All right.

MR. COHEN: What sort of objections were made?

MR. PEHLE: One of the objections they made is that it would aid the enemy by giving him foreign exchange, an objection which was apparently false on its face. It was advanced by political officers of the State Department who are concerned with the question of whether a foreign exchange operation would or would not aid the enemy. It is the type of objection that they would override if it were something they would want to do.

MR. LUXFORD: In all of our dealings with State on trading with the enemy and economics, it has always been these political boys who said, "Forget about the economic side; forget about the foreign exchange."

Now, along comes the problem where we are willing to say, "Well, if there is any such consideration, let's forget about it," and they are the ones who immediately flag that one and say, "No, no, we are going to let some exchange be made available to the enemy."

MR. PEHLE: In other words, the safeguards, as set up, were so good that no foreign exchange would be available.

MR. LUXFORD: Notwithstanding that, they wrote a memorandum to Hull.

MR. PAUL: Those objections were devastated just before all this happened, when the Secretary sent letters to Mr. Hull. It was evident then that they couldn't get away with it on that line of attack.

MR. LUXFORD: Another tactic they employed was, they proposed for months to discuss this problem with us for



working out a program of exchanging cables with Harrison. During that whole period, there was only one early reference that had to be taken up with the British at that time, but they waited until they had exhausted every other excuse, and then Harrison came back four or five months later and said, "Now, I have to take this up with the British."

Notwithstanding the fact that we forced State into a position to say, "No, go ahead," he took it up with the British anyway, and began to use the British as a device for delay.

MR. COHEN: But in your dealings with the State Department--is there anyone over there whose job it is to see what can be done for refugees? Naturally, the different departments, if something comes through, pass upon whether it can be done or can't be done, but is there anyone actively charged to see that what can be done is done?

MR. PEHLE: Breckinridge Long is charged with that.

MR. COHEN: No, as I understand it, Mr. Long is one of the principal Assistant Secretaries whose job it is to consider the policy problems brought to him. Certainly I don't think that it is Mr. Long's job to follow through and develop actively what can be done.

MR. PEHLE: Well, it is his job as much as it is anybody's.

MR. COHEN: You might say it is the job of the Department, but is there any individual--

MR. COX: Long has his own staff of three people who are presumably charged with doing the kind of job that you indicate.

MR. COHEN: But nobody has the job to see what merit there is in the various matters that come from different sections when things are proposed, or is it their job to see what can be done?

MR. COX: It is their job to see that it can be done.

MR. COHEN: Have they been designated to assignments as Assistants?

MR. PEHLE: They have Mr. Reams; they have this Mr. Travers in the Visa Division; and Mr. Brandt is probably the closest to it. He is a very sympathetic person who is not anxious to see anything done. I don't know of anybody who is specifically tagged with getting the work done outside of Mr. Long. And Mr. Long is the person who went before the House Committee. He takes the position that they are doing a lot.

MR. COHEN: I would like to have a copy of his testimony.

MR. COX: His whole testimony, which was in terms of verbal presentation, was that he has jurisdiction within the State Department to see that things are done and that they have done everything that is humanly possible. I guess that there probably are internal orders in the State Department that charge Breckinridge Long and his staff with this work. Purportedly in doing the thing--you say now in discussing it you get something quite different.

MR. LUXFORD: Applying the hierarchy of State to this particular case, Ben, it was probably just by certain accident that Sumner Welles referred one of these cables to Herbert rather than through the routine State Department channels on refugees that we ever got word about the Rumanian situation.

MR. DuBOIS: Feis and Meltzer, we know, are the only two men in the State Department who have been doing anything on this, and they were opposed by Breckinridge Long and that whole crowd.

MR. LUXFORD: That is true. They got the cable out, that inquiry which was the proposal in terms of this, and there was a bitter fight in State because they even got an inquiry out.

H.M.JR: There is one thing which I think should be stronger, and that is the exchange of cables between the British Foreign Office and State to show that the British Foreign Office's position--maybe that is in the next paragraph.

MR. PAUL: It is quoted there.

H.M.JR: I think it should be expanded.

MR. PAUL: There are reasons for not doing it.

H.M.JR: I would like the President to get the impression that it is not only his whole State Department we had to deal with, but the British Foreign Office as well.

MR. WHITE: I think that is true, because it is an indication that the State Department was easily convinced by the British objections, and they made no attempt to--

MR. PAUL: They didn't have to be convinced by them.

H.M.JR: May I give my reason for that? You people may vary. In talking with Governor Lehman the other night, I asked him what he was doing--you people may know it, but we are trying to get all the pieces together--and that is, the information which he had, which I hadn't had before, was that at some recent time the President and Churchill had talked over this refugee problem, as a result of which he agreed to put up a million dollars to set up a camp at Casablanca, and out of the President's fund five hundred thousand dollars was set up. Lehman didn't know whether the English had put up any or not.

And when you asked the State Department the other day, we couldn't get it. But when this thing finally gets down to the President, he has to do this thing vis-a-vis Churchill, and, therefore, I think the President ought to know it up to the minute what action the Foreign Office has taken.

MR. LUXFORD: There is only one question on that, Mr. Secretary. We have a big enough battle in taking on State at the moment without taking on the British Government, too.

H.M.JR: I am just raising the point. If this is done advisedly, all the--

MR. PEHLE: The points are in here to show that something must be done within this Government, and it doesn't develop the other objection, which is the British.

H.M.JR: You don't think I should? Wait until you hear Mr. Stettinius' broadcast tonight on the reorganization of the State Department.

MR. PEHLE: He is also going to modernize.

MRS. KLOTZ: What?

MR. PEHLE: Haven't you seen the entrance? When you come in everything is sort of plush. They have removed the counters.

MR. LUXFORD: They are changing the paint over there.

H.M.JR: All right, go ahead. We will make Oscar squirm out of former loyalty.

MR. PEHLE: "Suppression of Facts Regarding Hitler's Extermination of Jews In Europe."

"Sumner Welles as Acting Secretary of State requests confirmation of Hitler's plan to exterminate the Jews. Having already received various reports on the plight of the Jews, on October 5, 1942 Sumner Welles as Acting Secretary of State sent a cable (2314) for the personal attention of Minister Harrison in Bern stating that leaders of the Jewish Congress had received reports from their representatives in Geneva and London to the effect that many thousands of Jews in Eastern Europe were being slaughtered pursuant to a policy embarked upon by the German Government for the complete extermination of the Jews in Europe. Welles added that he was trying to obtain further information from the Vatican but that other than this he was unable to secure confirmation of these stories. He stated that Rabbi Wise believed that information was available to his representatives in Switzerland but that

they were in all likelihood fearful of dispatching any such reports through open cables or mail. He then stated that World Jewish Congress officials in Switzerland, Riegner and Lichtheim, were being requested by Wise to call upon Minister Harrison; and Welles requested Minister Harrison to advise him by telegram of all the evidence and facts which he might secure as a result of conferences with Riegner and Lichtheim.

"State Department receives confirmation that the extermination was rapidly carried out. Pursuant to Welles' cable of October 5 Minister Harrison forwarded documents from Riegner confirming the fact of extermination of the Jews (in November 1942), and in a cable of January 21, 1943 (482) relayed a message from Riegner and Lichtheim which Harrison stated was for the information of the Under Secretary of State (and was to be transmitted to Rabbi Stephen Wise if the Under Secretary should so determine). This message described a horrible situation concerning the plight of Jews in Europe. It reported mass executions of Jews in Poland; the Jews were required before execution to strip themselves of all their clothing which was then sent to Germany; the remaining Jews in Poland were confined to ghettos, etc., in Germany; deportations were continuing; many Jews were being deprived of rationed foodstuffs; no Jews would be left in Prague or Berlin by the end of March, etc.; and in Rumania 130,000 Jews were deported to Transnistria; about 60,000 had already died and the remaining 70,000 were starving; living conditions were indescribable; Jews were deprived of all their money, foodstuffs and possessions; they were housed in deserted cellars, and occasionally twenty to thirty people slept on the floor of one unheated room; disease was prevalent, particularly fever; urgent assistance was needed."

You can't follow it from here on, because there has been a rewrite, but I can read it.

"Sumner Welles furnishes this information to the Jewish organizations. Sumner Welles furnished the documents received in November to the Jewish organizations in the United States and authorized them to make the facts public.

On February 9, 1943 Welles forwarded the message contained in cable 482 of January 21 to Rabbi Stephen Wise. In his letter of February 9 Welles stated that he was pleased to be of assistance in this matter.

"Immediately upon the receipt of this message, the Jewish organizations arranged for a public mass meeting in Madison Square Garden in a further effort to obtain effective action.

"On February 10, the day after Welles forwarded the message contained in cable 482 of January 21 to Rabbi Wise, and in direct response to this cable, a most highly significant cable was dispatched. This cable, 354 of February 10, read as follows:

"Your 482, January 21--"

MR. COX: This was to Mr. Harrison.

MR. PEHLE: "In the future we would suggest that you do not accept reports submitted to you to be transmitted to private persons in the United States unless such action is advisable because of extraordinary circumstances. Such private messages circumvent neutral countries' censorship and it is felt that by sending them we risk the possibility that steps would necessarily be taken by the neutral countries to curtail or forbid our means of communication for confidential official matter.

"The cable was signed for Hull by 'SW' (Sumner Welles). But it is significant that there is not a word in it that would even suggest to the person signing that it was designed to countermand the Department's specific requests for information on Hitler's plans to exterminate the Jews. The cable has the appearance of being a normal routine message which a busy official would sign without question.

"On its face it is most innocent and innocuous, yet when read together with the previous cables it can be interpreted as nothing less than an attempted suppression of information requested by this Government concerning the murder of Jews by Hitler.

"Thereafter on April 10, 1943, Sumner Welles again requested our Legation for information (cable 877). Apparently he did not realize that in cable 354 (to which he did not refer) Harrison had been instructed to cease forwarding reports of this character. Harrison replied on April 20 (cable 2460) and indicated that he was in a most confused state of mind as a result of the conflicting instructions he had received. Among other things he stated? 'May I suggest that messages of this character should not (repeat not) be subjected to the restriction imposed by your 354, February 10, and that I be permitted to transmit messages from R more particularly in view of the helpful information which they may frequently contain.'

"The fact that cable 354 is not the innocent and routine cable that it appears to be on its face is further highlighted by the efforts of State Department officials to prevent this Department from obtaining the cable and learning its true significance.

"The facts relating to this attempted concealment are as follows:

"Several men in our Department had requested State Department officials for a copy of the cable of February 10 (354). We had been advised that it was a Department communication; a strictly political communication, which had nothing to do with economic matters; that it had only had a very limited distribution within the Department, the only ones having anything to do with it being the European Division, the Political Adviser and Sumner Welles; and that a copy could not be furnished to the Treasury.

"At the conference in Secretary Hull's office on December 20 in the presence of Breckinridge Long I asked Secretary Hull for a copy of cable 354, which I was told would be furnished to me.

"By note to me of December 20, Breckinridge Long enclosed a paraphrase of cable 354. This paraphrase of cable 354 specifically omitted any reference to cable 482 of January 21--thus destroying the only tangible clue to the true meaning of the message.

"I would never have learned the true meaning of cable 354 had it not been for chance. I had asked one of the men in my Department to obtain all the facts on this matter. He had previously called one of the men in another Division of the State Department and requested permission to see the relevant cables. In view of the Treasury interest in this matter, this State Department representative obtained cable 354 and the cable of January 21 to which it referred and showed these cables to my representative.

"The facts I have detailed in this report, Mr. President, came to the Treasury's attention as a part of our routine investigation of the licensing of the financial phases of the proposal of the World Jewish Congress for the evacuation of Jews from France and Rumania. The facts may thus be said to have come to light through accident. How many others of the same character are buried in State Department files is a matter I would have no way of knowing. Judging from the almost complete failure of the State Department to achieve any results, the strong suspicion must be that they are not few.

"This much is certain, however. The matter of rescuing the Jews from extermination is a trust too great to remain in the hands of men who are indifferent, callous, and perhaps even hostile. The task is filled with difficulties. Only a fervent will to accomplish, backed by persistent and untiring effort can succeed where time is so precious."

MR. COX: May I raise one minor question? Why did they change the number order of the cables by using 354 when applied to 482?

MR. PEHLE: It may have been a different series.

MR. COX: I think the fact that they put it in a different series may be significant.

MR. PEHLE: There is a different series.

MR. DuBOIS: 482 is from Harrison.



MR. LUXFORD: There is a three-months lag between those cables.

H.M.JR: The only thing they are doing over there is throwing their weight in favor of Sumner Welles. He did all this in innocence. We are giving him the benefit of the doubt.

MR. LUXFORD: It isn't in the record here, but the parties who initialed that 354 were Atherton, Dunn, Hickerson, and DuBrow.

H.M.JR: Is this new to you?

MR. COX: No, your fellows told me about it.

H.M.JR: Did you know about it?

MR. COHEN: No.

MR. COX: Did Long initial 354?

MR. PEHLE: We have every reason to believe he paraphrased it himself.

H.M.JR: What made me think about this was, in front of Mr. Hull I asked for this thing and Hull said, "Just give it to him." But Long did his own paraphrasing. We know this to be a fact. We have an eye witness to that. We can name the person who knows that he personally paraphrased and left that reference out.

MR. COHEN: Which particular one?

MR. COX: In answer to 482.

MR. COHEN: Is it right, as indicated here, that 482 was sent to the State Department and expressly said that this message was to be transmitted to these private parties only if the Under Secretary so desired?

MR. PEHLE: Exactly, and Under Secretary--

MR. COHEN: So the cable to which this referred was not the cable that had the warning, but the cable itself had a warning.

MR. GASTON: Right.

MR. COHEN: And I also wonder, assuming that there is something in the reasons they give for the general rule, why that shouldn't be a rule for the government of the Department after the information reached Washington. That is, I can see that there would be problems if things had gone through without the usual censorship as to whether the Department here should release or not release, but why the Department should want to debar itself from getting--

MR. GASTON: Why, specifically, it seems to say there are people in this Department we don't trust so don't let this stuff come in here.

MR. PEHLE: They were trying to stop us from giving it to Sumner Welles, because he was giving it to the Jewish organization, who was building up some pressure for action.

H.M.JR: Ben makes an excellent point.

MR. COHEN: Did we ask the undercover agents to get things surreptitiously and not to give them out, that they shouldn't send them over here?

H.M.JR: That is the same as Military Intelligence saying, "Don't send us anything from the Argentine thing because maybe they don't want things to come out."

MR. PEHLE: That is a little different, because Riegner was sending things through addressed to Wise."

MR. WHITE: This Department here has the final decision as to whether the final leg of this journey should or should not take place, so there is their point.

MR. PEHLE: Which Department?

MR. WHITE: The State Department.

H.M.JR: When you review this thing and live with it, there is every evidence that people in State did everything possible to suppress information and assistance.

As I told Breckinridge Long when he took me aside the other day and asked me to come to his defense--I said, "What was this country founded for if it wasn't founded for political refugees and religious refugees?" But instead of the State Department taking the initiative and saying, "What can we do to help these people?" everything is done to block them. There is a concerted effort there to block them.

MR. WHITE: We don't know what discussions went on between Long and Halifax in these matters. It is impossible, even if you saw reports of the conference, even if there was a stenotype copy of it.

MR. GASTON: We don't know how far we created the British objections.

MR. PEHLE: Remember what happened in the last war with the men we had in Britain helping to draft the British reply to the notes of protest. That is an old diplomatic fashion.

MR. LUXFORD: They are again using the legitimate measure. That is, we have been after State consistently to stop communicating or passing commercial messages from banks, Standard Oil, and I. T. & T., and others from occupied territories. They turn around though, and instead of stopping those messages, they apply it in these cases.

MR. PEHLE: To indicate how right these things are--

H.M.JR: You may have a hard time to convince Ben on this. (Laughter)

MR. PEHLE: Before we asked State for an official copy of that cable, which had already been sent, and which we knew contained a reference to the previous cable, Joe, here, particularly said, "When we get the cable there won't be any reference to it."

MR. COHEN: How do you know the reference was in?

MR. PEHLE: We had seen the cable.

MR. WHITE: We have information termites over there.

MR. PAUL: He sent over a copy, Ben, without that reference, and we knew it was wrong. I called up Long and said, "This cable isn't clear to us the way it is paraphrased. I would like to send a man over to see the document." He couldn't refuse that. That is the way we actually got to see it.

MR. PEHLE: That is the way we officially got to see it.

MR. PAUL: We knew it was there through our termites over there.

MR. WHITE: The fact that an Assistant Secretary paraphrased a cable, which is ordinarily done way down the line, is in itself suggestive.

MR. PEHLE: Well, the fact that they wouldn't give it to us--

MR. COHEN: There may be a very good reason.

MR. WHITE: There is no code in the State Department that is known only by the Secretary and the Assistant Secretaries.

MR. PEHLE: It had already been decoded. This was just a paraphrase job.

MR. COHEN: That was just an objection.

H.M.JR: I just want to explain that Judge Rosenman was quite late in getting to the President.

MR. COX: One point about it is, I think these fellows have put in the proper emphasis, because a lot of this stuff, I would guess, is playing on the British by reason of the kind of presentation Harry has indicated was made to them. Now, if you say to them in a tone and in context that you don't want them to do much, then, that is one thing. But, if you take the strong affirmative position that you want it done, you get another action.

MR. PEHLE: Well, the British have a lot of tricky people like those in our State Department.

H.M.JR: Let me get this thing. Maybe Mr. Cohen and Mr. Cox want to ask some questions. Let's say for argument's sake that I am not yet convinced that I should take this to the President. I want to explore it a little further. Maybe I should take it to Mr. Hull. But, let's just follow this to an end.

I will take this to the President--something of this nature--and then he will say, "What do you suggest?"

MR. PEHLE: We have the document.

H.M.JR: Let's have that. Then I would like to have somebody, if he would, take the position and argue that this should first be taken to Mr. Hull.

MR. LUXFORD: We usually have a case, too.

H.M.JR: What?

MR. LUXFORD: We usually have a case.

MR. WHITE: Since when does a lawyer have to have a case?

MR. COHEN: You don't need a lawyer if you have a case.  
(Laughter)

MR. WHITE: Before you read this, I would like to say that this represents some very intensive work and

settling of difference and coming to an agreement on the part of the boys here, and Ben and Oscar and Handler. There was a lot of hard intensive work done over the last few days which is not represented by mere feeling.

H.M.JR: Sometime bring Handler in and introduce him. I don't want to be like Mr. Hull; I want to know who my people are.

MR. COX: All right.

H.M.JR: Will somebody give Mrs. Klotz a true copy of what we are reading here? (Page 8 handed to Mrs. Klotz)

Now, will somebody proceed who is familiar with the Executive Order?

MR. LUXFORD: Would you like to have it read out loud? I think it might be worth while.

H.M.JR: Yes.

MR. LUXFORD: (Reading from "Executive Order," copy attached.) "Executive Order Establishing a War Refugee Board. Whereas it is the policy of this Government to take all measures within its power to rescue the victims of enemy oppression who are in imminent danger of death and otherwise to afford such victims all possible relief and assistance consistent with the successful prosecution of the war.

"Now, therefore, by virtue of the authority vested in me by the Constitution and the statutes of the United States, as President of the United States and as Commander in Chief of the Army and Navy, and in order to effectuate with all possible speed the rescue and relief of such victims of enemy oppression, it is hereby ordered as follows:"

H.M.JR: Just a minute. All right, go ahead.

MR. LUXFORD: "1. There is established in the Executive Office of the President a War Refugee Board (hereinafter referred to as the Board). The Board shall consist of the

Secretary of State, the Secretary of the Treasury, and the Foreign Economic Administrator. The Board may request the heads of other agencies or departments to participate in its deliberations whenever matters specially affecting such agencies or departments are under consideration. It shall be the duty of the heads of the agencies and departments to supply or obtain for the Board such information and to extend to the Board such assistance and facilities as the Board may require in carrying out the provisions of this Order."

H.M.JR: Just a moment, please. All right.

MR. LUXFORD: "2. The Board shall be charged with the responsibility for seeing that the policy of the Government, as stated in the Preamble, is carried out. The functions of the Board shall include without limitation the development of plans and programs and the inauguration of effective measures for (a) the rescue, transportation, maintenance and relief of the victims of enemy oppression, and (b) the establishment of havens of refuge, and the resettlement of such victims. To this end the Board, through appropriate channels, shall take the necessary steps to enlist the cooperation of foreign governments and obtain their participation in the execution of such plans and programs. It shall be the duty of the State and Treasury Departments and the Foreign Economic Administration, within their respective spheres, to execute at the request of the Board, the plans and programs so developed and the measures so inaugurated. The State Department shall appoint special attaches with diplomatic status, selected by the Board, to be stationed abroad in places where it is likely that assistance can be rendered to war refugees, the duties and responsibilities of such attaches to be defined by the Board in consultation with the State Department.

"3. The Board and the State and Treasury Departments and the Foreign Economic Administration are authorized to accept the services or contributions of any private persons, private organizations, State agencies, Federal agencies or departments, or agencies of foreign governments in carrying out the purpose of this Order. The Board shall cooperate

with all existing and future international organizations concerned with the problems of refugee rescue, maintenance, transportation, relief, rehabilitation, and resettlement.

"4. To the extent possible the Board shall utilize the personnel, supplies, facilities and services of the State Department, Treasury Department and Foreign Economic Administration, as well as such other personnel, supplies, facilities, and services as may be made available by other departments and agencies of the Government. In addition, the Board, within the limits of funds which may be made available, may employ necessary personnel and make provisions for supplies, facilities and services necessary to discharge its responsibilities. The Board shall appoint an Executive Director who shall serve as its principal executive officer. It shall be the duty of the Executive Director to arrange for the prompt execution of the plans and programs developed and the measures inaugurated by the Board, to supervise the activities of the special attaches and to submit frequent reports to the Board on the steps taken for the rescue and relief of war refugees.

"5. The Board shall be directly responsible to the President in carrying out the policy of this Government, as stated in the Preamble, and the Board shall report to him at frequent intervals concerning the steps taken for the rescue and relief of war refugees and shall make such recommendations as they deem appropriate for further action to overcome any difficulties encountered in the rescue and relief of war refugees."

H.M.JR: That is a wonderful article.

MR. PAUL: Now we have another memorandum to the Director of the Budget, summarizing--

H.M.JR: All right, do you want to read it?

(Mr. Paul read "Memorandum for the Director of the Budget," copy attached.)



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H.M.JR: That is a wonderful article.

MR. PAUL: Now we have another memorandum to the Director of the Budget, summarizing--

H.M.JR: All right, do you want to read it?

(Mr. Paul read "Memorandum for the Director of the Budget," copy attached.)

H.M.JR: Ben, this is the first time I have heard it and the first time you have heard it.

MR. COX: No, Ben is one of the authors. We can speak to him and say he has done a good job.

MR. PAUL: We thought we had better clear all the techniques.

MR. WHITE: There was substantial difference of opinion on the approach, but this has all been cleared and agreed upon. Ben took on the job of reconciliation.

H.M.JR: This is a beautiful job. Everybody has seen it but Judge Rosenman?

MR. COX: He saw the earlier draft.

H.M.JR: He did?

MR. COX: Yes.

MR. PEHLE: How long ago?

MR. COX: I sent it to him about ten days ago for his information.

H.M.JR: But you haven't talked to him?

MR. COX: No, I just sent it to him.

H.M.JR: But he is not familiar with this information we have here?

MR. COX: No.

MR. LUXFORD: Now, Mr. Secretary, there is a transmittal letter from the President to Hull, rather a letter advising him of what is happening, which Mr. Cohen and Oscar drafted, that I think we should read to you.

(Reading from "Proposed Draft of Letter from the President to Hull," copy attached.) "Dear Cordell: We have all been concerned for a long time with the cowardly

persecution of minorities by the Nazis. I fear that as the war approaches the end, Hitler will take further vengeance on the helpless minorities and Allied sympathizers in the lands which he controls. It is imperative, therefore, that vigorous action be taken by us to forestall the Nazi plot to exterminate these helpless peoples. I think it also important that we let our own people know that we are redoubling our efforts to save the victims of enemy oppression."

H.M.JR: I want to interrupt you. Where you said "forestall," I think something should be said there that we can still do something. The point is, I would like to say, "A lot of water has gone over the dam, but let's make the best of what is left."

MR. LUXFORD: Yes.

H.M.JR: See what I mean? The way it is now, it might have been written three years ago.

MR. LUXFORD: There was considerable discussion as to whether you would want to send a letter from the President to Hull.

H.M.JR: The point is, in writing it he is saying to Hull, "Everything is lovely."

MR. LUXFORD: That is what we--

MR. WHITE: There is a difference of opinion as to whether or not the letter should be sent.

H.M.JR: I would definitely lay down the thing that some of these people have died because of inaction. Now let's do what we can with the little time left.

MR. LUXFORD: All right, we can put that in.

"I have asked the Director of the Budget to prepare for my signature an Executive Order carrying out the proposed course of action outlined in a memorandum which

I am enclosing. In order to save time, I would appreciate it if you would take up with me directly any questions which you may have concerning this program. Harold Smith can take care of the details of the Order and can move forward in the meantime with the task of clearing it with the other interested departments and agencies. Sincerely yours."

MR. PEHLE: I think we feel we would rather not tell the President how he can sell this thing to Cordell.

H.M.JR: It won't do any harm to have it.

MR. COHEN: The only thing is, if it isn't arranged just by detail he may do nothing, and then the Secretary of State will say, "This important matter has been carried through without even consulting me, and it is not the correct information." I think there should be some way of indicating that the President has informed Cordell and has asked him not to have these fights with Harold Smith's boys, but to take up the major matters with him.

H.M.JR: On the assumption that we are going to do this, I think it would be definitely worth while to have that letter available.

MR. PAUL: Some words can be slipped in there.

MR. COHEN: And I think the less provocative that letter is to Hull, the better.

H.M.JR: Granted. In other words, you don't want the President to write a letter to Hull saying, "Everything you have done in the last three years is lovely."

MR. WHITE: I think we could write a letter such as you suggested that would remove many of the objections the Treasury had to sending a letter.

H.M.JR: Furthermore, if the President writes it, it puts him in the same boat with Hull.

MR. WHITE: That is right.

H.M.JR: I think when the facts are known--and I know that Mrs. Roosevelt brought it to the President's attention very, very forcibly, this question of bringing in children--everything the President tried to do was turned down. I know that the man did everything possible that he could up to the point of, maybe--I don't know what, but I suggest--

MR. PAUL: That sounds kind of funny. The President was turned down?

MR. LUXFORD: Mr. Secretary, that is exactly what happened in the Tunisian program.

H.M.JR: That isn't an isolated case.

MR. COX: Do you want me to be the devil's advocate on the hard case?

H.M.JR: Yes, but just give me one moment please.

MR. WHITE: I am a little troubled about sending the Executive Order. It seems to run right across UNRRA when you take care of assistance and relief.

MR. COHEN: This relates only to what this Government does. I mean UNRRA is an agency that this Government might work through. There is too much belief that UNRRA is an agency of the American Government. It is not; it is an international institution.

MR. COX: Not only that, but under the resolutions all that they expect to do is handle the migration and the incidental relief of displaced persons, but there is a specific division in here--

MR. COHEN: Not only as far as UNRRA is going to do anything, that is, to have people over here that are eager to cooperate with what they want to do--

MR. COX: The committee should confer with all future and existing international organizations, so if it is in that field, they ought to do it.

H.M.JR: Just one second. All right, Mr. Devil!

MR. COX: O.K. Personally let me state--

MR. WHITE: That sounded like Mr. Biddle.

MR. COX: Personally let me state a few assumptions. One is that I don't think that Hull knows in detail most of the things that have been happening in this situation, and particularly in the two cases that you give.

Second, in terms of political significance, generally, and in terms of specific relationship to the President, I think you can go to him and say, "I am not going to do anything behind your back."

H.M.JR: To whom?

MR. COX: To Hull. "I feel strongly that this ought to be done, and I am just telling you what ought to be done in going to the President. I am going to go to him with a draft of an Executive Order and with a recommendation that action be taken on it as quickly as possible. Now, either you can come with me if you want, or you can join in the memorandum with me so we can expedite it, or you can object. That is your problem."

Now, my hunch is that you have a better chance with Hull himself under the present circumstances and with that kind of an approach to get him to agree and go along with the Executive Order. If he does that, that makes the task for the President particularly easy in terms of saying to Smith, "I want this. It already has the approval of the Secretary of State and the Secretary of the Treasury and our Foreign Economic Administrator."

If he opposes it, the only chance I can see that you take is that he may go over alone and argue the case before you get a chance to present it, and then what I would do would be to add a note to the memorandum saying that the substance of this idea has been called to the attention of the Secretary of State and he has objected,

which is stating that under the circumstances there is every need and every reason to get the job done, and we, therefore, want to send the following letter to Mr. Hull as well as the memorandum that goes to the Director of the Budget.

Otherwise, the President may feel in any event he has to talk to Hull about it. That is the decision he will have to make.

H.M.JR: Oscar, for me, as well as for everybody here, give us the status of this resolution on the Hill. Where would that fit into the picture?

MR. COX: It would fit in this way: The Senate Foreign Relations Committee, with ten members present, voted unanimously to report the resolution out, so the only problem now is the debate on the Floor. Most of the people who know about the resolution feel that when it gets to the Floor two things will probably happen. One element thinks the resolution will be passed; the other that in the course of debate State Department's position will be ripped open in that Breckinridge Long's testimony will be attacked in the specific content that his figures were wrong, in that his facts were wrong, and it was an attempt to sugar-coat an action when action should have been taken.

On the House side the Committee has had a terrific internal fight between--lead in the main on one side by Will Rogers, who is one of the introducers of the resolution, and Gillette, and on the other side by Sol Bloom, who feels that a large part of this is direct personal criticism of him and what he did as the American delegate to the Bermuda Conference.

Now, Bloom, himself, although he takes a personal emotional interest in the thing, feels it would be a problem to have the full debate both on the Floors of the Senate and the House, because he doesn't think he could hold the resolution in the House Committee, and it would also be a direct attack on the Administration, including the President, for having failed to act in this kind of an

important situation, so Bloom, himself, is championing to go to Hull and say, for practical reasons--and we might also call them political reasons involving the State Department, the President, and the House Foreign Affairs Committee--"I think you ought to take some bold, imaginative action such as appointing a high-level Government committee to take hold of this thing and do something about it."

H.M.JR: Well, I would like to sit in the capacity of a judge. Does anybody want to answer Cox?

MR. WHITE: I would like to say something that is probably more on his side.

What bothers me about the sending of that document to the President--and I am speaking now of the memorandum, not the Executive Order, which I think is excellent--is that the President may want to send it to the State Department, or you, yourself, may send a copy to Secretary Hull. In either case, they will at once sit down and explain away every single item that is there; and with ample time they can do a job which might not satisfy you, but which would so confuse the President after he saw it so as to do away with some of the effectiveness of the presentation. In the light of that it may be possible to go over that memorandum to modify some of the statements so as to give you a little more defense of that.

In other words, that means going back again, and they may show conferences they had over a period of months. They may say they had a conference at such a time, and such a time, and such a time, and that action didn't take place only on the 18th, that they might have had a whole series of conferences. One doesn't know what they have. We only know that if they have time to build up a case, they certainly will build one, and they will confuse the issue enough so as to put you a little on the defensive on some of these matters, where you shouldn't be.

I wonder if it might not be better to have a little less detail and depend a little more on your general



evaluation of the case, and depend on the fact that there are no results that have been obtained. I am not sure how far one can go in that direction.

MR. PAUL: If you leave out the details you are just dealing in general allegations.

MR. COHEN: I don't think you have to have the details, but I think it may not satisfy our feelings quite so much. But I think it may be much more effective if on the basis of the thing--on the ground that here is the most difficult and tragic problem that confronts--it undoubtedly is part of our basic policy to do what we can, but although that is our policy today, no one regards himself--no group in the State Department regards itself as charged with the responsibility of actually doing what can be done to save these people, though the regular officials of the State Department consider these matters when they come up along with other things.

The difficulty of viewing things without changing these established rules that have been devised for other purposes always looms large when any proposed action is circulated among the various officials who are concerned with many things. Because they are not things which occur often brings us to the charge that they have neglected them. Then cite these things that occur, because when something comes up in the State Department it may in many cases be innocent. I mean, we get so furious we can't believe it, and even if it isn't innocent, you won't be able to convince Hull that his most-trusted Assistant Secretary simply doesn't care what happens. But I think you can make progress in convincing him that the Department is in an exposed position and the Administration is in an exposed position.

MR. LUXFORD: Mr. Secretary, if that discussion that has just been made had been made a year ago, we would all have agreed one hundred percent with it, but the time is rapidly running out. A year has gone by.

MR. COHEN: That depends on whether the more effective thing you can do now is to change the minds of Long and

Hull or whether the most effective thing you can do now is to get someone of outstanding rank put under this committee in the State Department who can't be pushed aside.

MR. PEHLE: I just don't think there is a chance there.

H.M.JR: One at a time.

MR. LUXFORD: I will give you an example of one of these outstanding men, and I don't think any of us will challenge it. I will name Governor Lehman. When he was in the State Department, he was pushed around, that man, strong as he is. I have seen him fight meeting after meeting, and he couldn't even get men on his staff. They kicked his personnel around month after month.

MR. COHEN: Part of that is due to an impossible situation. He was to be the head of an international organization. He was put in the State Department, and he started to organize a section in the State Department.

MR. LUXFORD: The impossible situation was putting him in the State Department.

MR. COHEN: I mean, that is a problem that is very confusing, and I don't think it provides a helpful analogy, because if we get started debating that--

MR. WHITE: Let's bet on your basis when we have a weak offense.

MR. DuBOIS: What troubles me is, you don't attempt to face the issue on its merits.

MR. COHEN: I am, but I am not willing to write a memorandum that is more for the sake of making a record than for getting what you want.

MR. GASTON: Let's declare what we are debating in the field of action. Are we debating whether we can

modify a memorandum to go to the President, or are we debating a question of whether the Secretary should go first to Hull before going to the President? Should the Secretary have a personal solitary talk with Hull, just Secretary Morgenthau and Secretary Hull, to ask him to join him in recommending this Executive Order to the President? Should he do that before going to the President?

MR. WHITE: One of the difficulties about doing that is, by so doing you are practically condoning much of what the State Department has done, in the sense that you are not indicting them.

One of the things Hull will say is, "Yes, I think you are right, Henry, and the man who is going to represent me is Long." Then where are you? In other words, Ben, I think, doesn't place sufficient stress on State Department by virtue of being in a key position in the situation where they can sabotage surreptitiously and through a hundred different ways any effort which has taken place. And if you don't sock them now and scare them to death, they will sabotage it in so many ways that you will get very little. The Secretary can't keep pounding away at this level. The Secretary expects to do a job on this, and from then let it carry on its own momentum, being in on it every once in a while. But when you are up against an organization whose technique has been perfected over years, with whom everyone cooperates, and their job is to see that little is done, I don't think you will get very much done unless you scare them in the first place.

H.M.JR: Wait a minute; Cox is next. May I have a little more rebuttal from the devil's advocate?

MR. COX: I would like to state one additional fact, and then go on. As I understand it, Stettinius talked to the President about this same central idea. During the time that Secretary Hull was at the Moscow Conference, Stettinius talked to the President about it. The President thought it was fine, and suggested that he talk to Hull.

H.M.JR: Which order?

MR. COX: It was not an order, just the idea of setting up a three-man committee.

Stettinius did talk to Hull, and Long was brought in, and the argument that was given to him was that it would cut across the other international committee and upset the report of the Bermuda Conference, and so forth, and Stettinius didn't know enough about the technical stuff to say that it wasn't true at all.

The second point I want to raise is really one of psychology with the President. If you put yourself in the President's position, particularly with Stettinius, in the light of whatever Long's relationship may be to the President, my hunch is, he may say to you, "Henry, why don't you talk to Hull about it and see if you two fellows can't come to an agreement." Because, otherwise he has to give a direct order to Hull no matter what his position is, clearing whether he will do it merely by a written document.

The power, it seems to me, you have over Hull, quite aside from letting it get entrenched in the same groups that it is in the State Department, is that you are going to them on a pretty tough basis.

H.M.JR: Who is going to whom on a tough basis?

MR. COX: The alternate is, you ought to go to Hull first. I think if you do go to Hull, the only basis on which to go is to say clearly and forthrightly, "I am going to the President. I am going to take the position that this ought to be done, that it ought to be taken out of the State Department, and that Long and his fellows have not done this job, either on the merits or public acceptance of what they have done, and you need a new deal on this thing."

MR. GASTON: "And I want to invite you to join me in recommending this new setup."

MR. COX: "And if you don't, I am going anyway."

MR. LUXFORD: What do you achieve by that?

MR. GASTON: It will take a great load off the President.

MR. LUXFORD: You are assuming that he will sign it.

MR. GASTON: Don't you go to the President to exhaust the opportunity for agreement?

MR. COX: The President has two Cabinet Officers he has to decide between. If they are in agreement, it relieves the problem for the President. If Hull doesn't agree, then the President has the other alternative, which is, "Despite Hull's disagreement," he says, "I will do it anyway."

MR. PEHLE: He calls Hull in and says, "Cordell, this is--"

H.M.JR: You don't know the President.

MR. PEHLE: That may very well be.

H.M.JR: I think this is a very weak and compromising way to do it. If I go to Hull in the first instance--which I admit is a difficult thing to do--let's say I decide that is what we are going to do. Then he has a chance to get his case to the President before I do.

MR. PEHLE: That is the point.

H.M.JR: Wait a minute; I have an answer. Therefore, my thought is to ask to see the President tomorrow and say, "Look, Mr. President, here is the situation: I would like to discuss this and get your advice." Then I have given him all the dirt.

Chances are nine out of ten he will say, "Make this easy for me. See Cordell."

"I will be glad to, Mr. President."

He will say, "Will you see Cordell?"

Then I will say, "Of course, Mr. President." I will go see Cordell, and then I go back, but I have gotten there first. I will give the President all the dirt, and with me I will take Paul, and most likely Gaston.

MR. WHITE: You will give him the substance of this order?

H.M.JR: No, I will let him read it.

MR. COHEN: It might be that the President will be willing to ask Hull to come over to talk it over with him and with you.

H.M.JR: I don't know, but I know the President well enough to go to him and say, "I want to see you on a matter that is very, very close to my heart. I want your advice. How would you handle this situation?"

MRS. KLOTZ: That is wonderful.

MR. WHITE: That is all right.

MRS. KLOTZ: That would be an off-the-record meeting.

H.M.JR: I think he will read it; he likes to read things.

MR. LUXFORD: I wouldn't spare any punches though.

H.M.JR: I am not asking for the documents to be modified.

MR. PEHLE: It isn't the documents; it is the way you present it. And it has to be done then, and not later. Once Hull has talked to him, you confuse the issue. That is the one opportunity to put the thing over.

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H.M.JR: I mean, I have got to see him first.

It is just like the Argentine thing where, in the room here, I used General Strong. The President called General Strong and Hull there, and General Strong presented the case of why we should do something about the Argentine. But I got to the President first, and, of course, Hull suspected it.

MR. COX: I think everybody agrees with your decision, but John wants to make sure that in arguing the case there are no holds barred.

H.M.JR: What do you think about doing it that way? I have every right to do it with him first.

MR. LUXFORD: That sounds good, but there is one thing that worries me, and that is, if this comes down to a question of negotiating an order with Hull you are going to end up with something so weak--

H.M.JR: Look, let me tell you a little story. It is a German story, and I can't tell it in German, but it is about a woman who is sitting there knitting and she is worried.

They say, "What are you worrying about, grandma?"

She says, "I am worrying because my grand-daughter who is going to get married. She will have a child, and some day she will walk out in the woods and fall down the well and get drowned."

They say, "Grandmother, you should wait until the grand-daughter gets married."

That is your job. You can worry, but first I have to see how the President feels. I mean, after all, we can go back in history. I had an order drawn which would have stopped the sale of high-test gasoline and scrap iron to Japan and he signed it. And three days after it was signed, he rescinded. Now, you just don't know.



MR. PEHLE: That is right.

H.M.JR: You just don't know what the rule is. I personally hate to say this thing, but our strongest out is the imminence of Congress doing something. That is our strongest out. Really, when you get down to the point, this is a boiling pot on the Hill. You can't hold it; it is going to pop, and you have either got to move very fast, or the Congress of the United States will do it for you.

MR. WHITE: I would hate to see that argument used by you, because you are putting it on, it seems to me, the extremity of your position of getting something done. Let the President think of that himself.

MRS. KLOTZ: No, Harry, Mr. Morgenthau is right.

MR. COHEN: It is the best argument the President can use to get things started with Hull. I think he can be convinced, and I don't think there will be much difficulty in convincing him that there has been some skulduggery in this thing, and that he can't take on himself the problem of convincing Hull that it is true. But Hull can't admit that it has been true, I mean, even to himself, if he wants to. But I mean, after laying the basis on which we don't disagree, there is not only the danger that the thing will get out of hand in Congress, but there has been the fact that, I think, Long admits it, that he made a very unfortunate statement before the Congressional Committee. The story I hear is that it was prepared for him and he didn't realize that it wasn't accurate. But all that indicates that something has to be done to give the thing a fresh start, and there is also a factor which you don't want to put in the memorandum which will influence the President and influence Hull. We all know that during this political year minorities are being exploited. It is not that the minorities are trying to exploit politics. There may be some of that, but all the politicians are trying to exploit the value of minority groups, and the situation has gotten to the point where something has to be done.

MR. PEHLE: Mr. Secretary, there is one danger in using too much of that political thing, and that is that what is done here must be more than a symbol to satisfy and stop Congressional action. It would be so easy for Hull to say, "Well, we will take this away from Long; we will set up a new committee."

H.M.JR: Look, if you don't mind, I think I know him well enough to present a case to the President, and I can't get into all this legal thing, but I do think I know what will have weight with him. And to preface those remarks, I hate to say that I have to use this at all. The arguments ought to be settled on the merits of the case we are talking about here in the Treasury family, and we are calling a spade a spade.

MR. COHEN: I am not adverse to using arguments that are persuasive, even though we are using them.

MR. WHITE: That isn't the--

H.M.JR: What I want to do is accomplish results.

MR. WHITE: There is no difference there. We don't want to jeopardize the result by the use of arguments which are easy.

MR. COX: It can be argued on its merits. Look how much easier it is for the President to say to Hull--here is a particular phase of factual importance that supports Ben's point--"Look at the guys who introduced this resolution in the Senate." Gillette, Taft, Ferguson, and those fellows aren't on the President's team.

MR. WHITE: You know, I think it would take very little changing in some of the paragraphs here.

MR. LUXFORD: Harry--

MR. WHITE: Let me tell you--you will appreciate it even better than I. In some of these paragraphs, some of these sentences as they are written now, there is a

definite direct charge which, if it gets into the hands of Hull, he would want you to change, I would say.

MR. COHEN: These charges will be made, and it is difficult to disprove them to the satisfaction of people who don't--

MR. WHITE: It seems to me you can make the charge to the President.

MR. LUXFORD: No, sir, you cannot, without putting yourself in the position where Hull will come back and say, "You prove this." If this thing ever gets into the question of arguing proof or no proof, you are through. You are either going to swing this--

MR. COHEN: The only thing is, the President puts it to Hull on the ground that he takes this action because Mr. X and Mr. Y in Hull's Department, who are the closest friends of Hull, are indifferent and callous.

MR. PEHLE: Nobody would recommend that the President put Hull in that position.

MR. WHITE: You don't know what he will do with this document. You can always bet nine out of ten that he will take this document and send it to Hull. Then Hull will take it and they will put their lies together and begin to sizzle. Now, it wouldn't take many changes here, but I think we can take up the two or three places in which there are direct charges which in rewording it you can--

MR. PAUL: Harry, I can't get over it.

MR. WHITE: I say I don't want to jeopardize the result.

MR. PEHLE: I agree that the argument should be made.

MR. WHITE: But if you put it all on that basis, you are left high and dry if the outcome doesn't achieve your result.

(The conference was adjourned for a short recess, during which time the Secretary made an appointment to see the President on the 16th.)

H.M.JR: Would you people listen please? I would like some names for the director of the executive committee.

MR. COHEN: I thought that Clarence Pickett--he is represented as being interested in refugee work. He is one of the leaders of the Friends. There isn't any question as to his sympathy. I know also that he is fairly persistent as a lobbyist, which is not a bad quality.

MR. LUXFORD: Does he have Government experience?

MR. COHEN: I don't think directly, but he has had long relationships with the Government in the Friends relief work, and I think he has also shown great realism, as contrasted with many of the other Friends people in understanding the Nazi problem as different from the ordinary, more conflicting problem.

MR. WHITE: I know little about him, but I think he might be a little overwhelmed with the prestige and the status and importance of the State Department.

MR. LUXFORD: That is the point.

MR. PEHLE: Mr. Secretary, he has led me to believe that he would not be willing to fight.

MR. GASTON: You say he would not?

MR. PEHLE: No.

MR. COX: I think the fellow who would turn the Secretary's hair whiter is Milo Perkins.

H.M.JR: I have another suggestion, and don't all jump on me at once. Why not let's be out in the open? Who is this man who is working for JDC?

MR. PEHLE: Leavitt.

MR. COX: There is a fellow who is even more competent in this, Abramson, who is the director of all the Jewish organizations. He was Professor of Economics at Bowdoin, which is a rare thing. He was put in by the Administration to run WPA when it was on the rocks, and he lifted it out with the support of the rock-bound Republicans up there.

MR. WHITE: I haven't seen him for over seven or eight years.

MR. PEMLE: Is he above the controversies between the Jewish organizations? That is one thing about Leavitt, he is on one side of the fight.

MR. COX: He was picked by all the different conflicting groups to be the director, and he did good work. He has a nose for Government, and he has as good a mind as I have seen.

H.M.JR: I have a suggestion here from Judge Lehman, Doctor Frank Aydelotte.

MR. WHITE: I know him. He is a very able fellow, and he is a very nice fellow, but he is a fellow who wouldn't question a State Department decision.

MR. LUXFORD: This isn't a kid glove job.

MR. WHITE: He is a very nice chap.

H.M.JR: But he is not tough?

MR. WHITE: No. He is the kind that if Long, say, would tell him such and such a thing he would say it was so. Moreover, when he deals with the British, he would be like Dean Acheson.

H.M.JR: I think that is an awful thing to say, Harry.

Paul, would you write down Abramson's name?

MR. LUXFORD: Let's get some names.

MR. COHEN: I just wonder, John, if a Jew wouldn't be more effective. I definitely think so.

H.M.JR: I said you would all jump on me.

I have Frank Graham.

MR. PEHLE: He is too old.

MR. WHITE: You mean of North Carolina?

MR. COHEN: He hasn't been so good.

MR. WHITE: But he would have the qualities of many of the others. Frank Graham would be the best to take the job.

H.M.JR: My first choice is a Jew.

MR. LUXFORD: That is my choice, too.

H.M.JR: I said you would all jump on me, but if the President is going to meet this thing--

MR. PEHLE: Of course, it should be a Jew.

MR. COHEN: There is no reason why it shouldn't be. The only question is, will he be most effective, and will-- I know there will be things that won't be said to him, but others will talk together. I mean, it is just one of those situations where we can understand--

MR. WHITE: So what? He is training to--

MR. COHEN: But I am saying, will he be most effective? Will he have the feeling that someone in the State Department is talking a little more freely than someone else and is sugar-coating or camouflaging it?

MR. WHITE: I am sure all that will be true; and yet if he is competent enough he has to push right through all that and he gains in the drive. I think you would find that in Graham and in Edwin Smith, or I could name a few others, but Edwin Smith would be the best man if his record is good.

MR. COX: Ninety-five percent of this problem is a Jewish problem. The people who have been the most articulate in these things in terms of public controversies have suggested in the resolution that the resolution deal only with the Jewish people, because that is the main problem.

The second thing is, that it is really after you get over the first crux it is going to come down to the merits as to what kind of drive the guy has. Has he got the brains and drive, and will he do the thing? Take a man like Abramson. He is the only Jew who was made a full professor in Bowdoin.

MR. WHITE: Where is Bowdoin?

MR. GASTON: Maine.

MR. WHITE: Maybe that isn't the reason.

MR. COHEN: It may be. Maine isn't part of the Union.

MR. WHITE: Is Bowdoin your alma mater? ~~isn't it?~~

MR. COX: No, no.

MR. LUXFORD: I want to make a different kind of suggestion. I am not sure that getting a big name or something like that is what we need here. I suggest Pehle. He knows what we are doing; he knows what we are going to be up against in day-to-day operations; and he knows what this game is.

H.M.JR: Well, I am going to pull a Roosevelt on you; I dreamed of that, too. I have been thinking of nothing else, but the question is whether I want to give him up.

MR. LUXFORD: You won't have to give him up.

MR. COX: This is a full-time job.

H.M.JR: I think it is a good suggestion.

MR. LUXFORD: I would like to see somebody in here who isn't going to be the least bit awe-stricken by State and knows their tricks. He can deal with the important people, and he can get some of these other fellows on his staff. That is the point I mean.

MR. WHITE: I think Foreign Funds, Mr. Secretary, has reached the state where--

MR. GASTON: Don't tell John to fire all his men.

MR. WHITE: ...they can carry on efficiently when John is out of town.

MR. LUXFORD: I would like to have you tell John to do this job.

H.M.JR: Well, I don't have to do that.

MR. LUXFORD: I know, he would understand that.

H.M.JR: I mean, it is a very good suggestion, but I won't have to. I thought of it, like Roosevelt.

MRS. KLOTZ: No, like Morgenthau.

MR. WHITE: It would be necessary for him to be supplemented by fellows like Abramson and others who know how to talk with many of the organizations left to do the work, and who have been immersed in this field and who know all the circumstances.

MR. LUXFORD: Look--

H.M.JR: He does.

MR. COX: As a team, Pehle and Abramson--

MR. LUXFORD: Pehle has the Foreign Funds Control. These people are in there, the Swiss, and the Swedes; they are all in there all the time asking for privileges and favors. He knows how to deal with them.



MR. WHITE: He knows how to turn them down.

MR. LUXFORD: He has turned them down. It won't be a new phase to him.

H.M.JR: I like it.

MR. WHITE: You will have a little budget so you can get such people as you need.

MR. LUXFORD: I think it should be twenty-five million.

MR. COX: I wouldn't worry about the financial part of it.

H.M.JR: I think I ought to take Paul and Pehle when I go to see the President.

MR. GASTON: Yes, indeed.

MR. LUXFORD: Oscar, is there any question about tapping the President's fund for this?

MR. DuBOIS: There is some provision in that.

MR. COX: They just tapped the President's fund for a camp location.

MR. DuBOIS: For how much?

MR. COX: For five hundred thousand. I wouldn't worry about the funds, because you can get the funds out of voluntary contributions. I checked with both organizations and individuals, and you won't have any question.

MR. LUXFORD: You can get an appropriation like that. If you need it, you can get some funds to start with.

MR. COX: There isn't any question about financing it; that is an easy one.

(The Secretary held a telephone conversation with General Arnold.)