

*Part II*  
Stunde Null

BLANK Page

10. Seventh Army Interrogation Center, "Notes on the Red Army—  
Intelligence and Security," 24 June 1945

*1. Duplicate*  
 Ref No SAIC/R/2  
 24 Jun 45  
 Copy No *7*  
*Cyler, Lt. Col. [unclear]*  
*450*

SEVENTH ARMY INTERROGATION CENTER  
 APO 758  
 US ARMY

289/9  
 AUTH: CG, 7th Army  
 INIT: [unclear]  
 DATE: 24 Jun 45

SECRET

NOTES ON THE RED ARMY - INTELLIGENCE AND SECURITY

(This report should be read in conjunction with SAIC Report  
"NOTES ON THE RED ARMY - LEADERSHIP AND TACTICS", dated 21 Jun 45)

SOURCES

- a. GEHLEN, Reinhard, GENMAJ (Brig Gen), formerly Chief of Foreign Armies East Dept, OKH. Source talked freely during interrogation.
- b. SCHÜLLER, Albert, MAJ, Foreign Armies East Dept, OKH. Source, a 29-year-old professional soldier, worked under the supervision of Gen GEHLEN. His specialty was questions of leadership in the Red Army; he was very cooperative and talked willingly during interrogation.

Rating (both sources): B-2    Date of Inf: Apr 45    Interrogator: R.W.

I. INTELLIGENCE

1. INTELLIGENCE SOURCES

Unlike the German Intelligence Service, which was distinctly divided into two main branches, viz, procurement of intelligence (SPIONAGE; espionage and evaluation of intelligence (Ic DIENST; G-2 Service), these functions are very closely related in the various Russian intelligence organizations. Intelligence was obtained in peace time through the following three agencies

- a. The Fourth Dept of the Red Army General Staff (U 4) was mainly concerned with military intelligence. The Dept maintained its own net of agents and supervised the activities of the military attachés who, on their part, also established nets of agents for work in their assigned countries.
- b. The Foreign Dept of the People's Commissariat of the Interior (INO-NKVD) concerned itself with obtaining political intelligence. This same Dept also supervised, to a certain extent, the activities of the military attachés and of the Soviet diplomatic posts abroad in general. The INO maintained a separate net of agents for its own purposes.
- c. The Communist International (KOMINTERN) collected both military and political intelligence through the Communist Parties in every country. It was in close contact with both the Fourth Dept of the Red Gen Staff and with the INO-NKVD. Again, a separate net of agents was established by this agency

With the beginning of the war this procedure was maintained and made more complete through the inclusion of corresponding posts in the G-2 offices of all commands down to army. Agents of these posts were the main source of intelligence concerning the enemy's rear areas, in addition to intelligence obtained through Partisan channels, as directed by the Main Hq for the Partisan Movement in MOSCOW.

Economic intelligence was collected by all three agencies described above, and an attempt to coordinate their efforts was made.

2. EVALUATION OF INTELLIGENCE

Military intelligence was evaluated by the G-2 sections of army and front hq, or by the G-2 dept of the Red Army Gen Staff, according to its scope of information. Agents' reports were compared with other intelligence sources, with information obtained through reconnaissance and through front-line contacts. The main task of the G-2 sections was to keep situation maps

*A 1389-B*

~~SECRET~~

RECORDED  
INDEXED  
760041

10. (Continued)

~~SECRET~~  
Ref No SAIG/R/2  
24 Jun 45

up to date and to evaluate enemy capabilities. The Germans repeatedly succeeded in capturing Russian documents of this type, originating from div or corps. These documents proved conclusively that the Russians were able to construct a generally correct picture of the forces opposing them. The last document of great importance thus captured was a situation map that fell into German hands at the start of the Russian winter offensive in the BARANOV bridgehead area. According to this map, the Russians knew the front-line units opposing them, but overestimated the number of armored divisions kept in the rear of the German lines by confusing their numbering.

As in other armies, G-2 employed various means to obtain intelligence, such as tactical reconnaissance, troop observation, PW information, capture documents, air, radio, and arty reconnaissance. Higher commands also had at their disposal excerpts of hostile propaganda publications; radio broadcasts, and the press of neutral and enemy countries.

### 3. FOURTH DEPT, RED ARMY GENERAL STAFF

As sources recall it, the Fourth Dept of the Red Army Gen-Staff was sub-divided into the following sections:

- a. Section for registration, collection, and control of all incoming news; files
- b. Military Attachés Section
- c. Far Eastern Sec, with sub-sections for China, Japan, and Manchuria
- d. Near Eastern Section, with sub-sections for Turkey, Iran, and Iraq
- e. The Balkans and Poland
- f. Italy, Spain, and Portugal
- g. Germany
- h. France, Belgium, and Holland
- i. Scandinavia and the Baltic States
- j. Great Britain
- k. United States of America
- l. Information Office, Press, and Censorship
- m. Personnel Section and Education
- n. Technical and Materiel Office, Finance

The Foreign Dept of the NKVD was divided in a similar manner, but its sub-divisions were much more detailed.

It is noteworthy that the Far Eastern Section of the U-4 Dept, the Hq of which are probably in HARBIN, enjoyed almost complete independence from the main office and great authority.

### 4. NAVAL INTELLIGENCE SERVICES

The G-2 Service of the Red Navy was arranged according to battle areas as follows:

- a. Western Battle Area, Baltic Sea
- b. Southern Battle Area, Black and Caspian Seas
- c. Northern Battle Area, North Atlantic and the Bering Sea
- d. Far Eastern Battle Area, including AMUR River area

The Navy maintained nets of agents in all countries with which naval conflicts were thought possible. At the same time the Navy exercised control over the Naval Attachés. Close coordination with the work of the Fourth Dept and with the Foreign Dept of the NKVD was attempted concerning all common problems.

10. (Continued)

Ref No SAIG/R/2  
24 Jun 45

~~SECRET~~

## II. SECURITY

### 1. GENERAL

The Russians, more than any other nation, are particularly concerned with preventing any possible opponent from obtaining advanced information on any important measures pertaining to their military or national life. This tendency led to such a development of camouflage and security measures that the Russians have become masters of this art which, in Russia, penetrates into every field of national activities. Naturally, in the field of military operations these characteristics found particularly fertile ground for adoption. All important military activities, such as approach-marches for major operations and troop movements, are, as a rule, exceedingly well camouflaged.

The Russian is a master of camouflage against enemy air reconnaissance, particularly when he has enough time to prepare and execute his camouflage activities. But even in the cases when much time is not available, such as during emergency shifting of larger forces to points of main efforts, the Russians always attempted to cloak their movements as much as possible, in some cases by dealing out severe punishment to violators of camouflage and security regulations.

### 2. SECURITY OF MOVEMENTS

All approach marches are executed mainly at night. Infantry units move in small groups on secondary roads, motorized units are moved on moonlit nights and without lights showing whenever possible. When it is absolutely necessary to use lights, only every third or fifth vehicle uses them in order to deceive possible reconnaissance as to the volume of traffic. The general rule of executing movements from the front area in daytime and movements towards the front at night is applied in most cases. Night movements start after dusk and end before dawn. During daytime troops are as a rule dispersed in woods, even in extremely cold weather. This is only possible because of the inborn tenacity of the Russian soldier and because of his ability to make good use of nature. In woodless areas, where towns have to be used for the billeting of troops, absolutely no movements are allowed during daytime.

#### a. Rail Movements

The bulk of movements by rail is executed under the cover of darkness. Superstructures are built over objects that can easily be recognized by air reconnaissance, especially over tanks. These superstructures are sometimes executed with surprisingly simple means.

Occasionally trains have been observed to stop when reconnaissance planes appeared. Loading and unloading activities were also well camouflaged and were executed at night whenever possible. Emphasis was placed on camouflaging the distribution of materiel from unloading points.

#### b. Armored Units

Movements of armored units are camouflaged with special care. Camouflage of individual tanks dispersed in woods and, if feasible, in villages was so effective that very careful photo interpretation would as a rule disclose not more than three or four poorly camouflaged tanks, and that would already be taken by the Germans as a sign of an imminent offensive. The use of dummy tanks, sometimes placed in really used tank approach-march areas for purposes of deception, the attachment of special rollers for the purpose of sweeping of tracks left by tanks, and the making of deceptive artificial tank tracks, are widespread.

In order to prevent the premature disclosure of the tank approach march armored units are brought into the final jumping off area immediately before the attack - sometimes only 4 hours before its start.

~~SECRET~~

10. (Continued)

~~SECRET~~  
Ref No SAIG/R/2  
24 Jun 45

c. Artillery Units

Security of artillery preparations is attempted by the continuous construction of additional arty positions, evenly distributed throughout the front area. Thus each front-line btry has to construct additional gun emplacements and numerous dummy installations, even when it is not intended to bring up arty reinforcements in its particular sector.

Dummy arty pieces are widely used. Newly built-up arty concentrations can best be recognized by the presence of large btrys (GROSSBATTEREEN, SALVENGESCHÜTZSTELLUNGEN) of 10-12 guns, which are difficult to camouflage, and also by the direction of fire of the newly built positions.

The "attack arty" is brought into position only a few days before the start of the offensive, and an intensified fighter cover protects it from that time on. In order to prevent enemy interception through sound ranging, the "attack arty" does not register its guns. Firing data are carefully obtained by the front line arty units over a long period, and are then relayed to the reinforcing "attack arty".

The use of alternate arty positions and of roving guns is very common with Russian front-line arty units, especially in secondary sectors.

3. SOME SECURITY DEVICES

a. In order not to give away the number of troops to be used in an attack made from a bridgehead, the Russians construct bridges the surface of which is immediately below water level. These bridges can only be detected by the observation of the bridge approaches or of actual traffic on the bridge.

b. The Russians carry on the construction of infantry positions in depth at all times. Therefore especially intensive entrenching activities cannot be taken as proof of defensive intentions in a particular sector; on the contrary, it might lead to the conclusion that an attack is being prepared in the area.

c. Measures against enemy tactical reconnaissance are strongly intensified before a Russian offensive. Unit boundaries and the general picture of the front is maintained to the very end, in order not to give the enemy any hints concerning the coming attack. The necessary regrouping is executed in the last few days, and units completely unknown to the enemy are not brought up to the front until the last night before the attack. In order to prevent the enemy from obtaining information about the attack preparations immediately before the start of the offensive from PW sources, the outpost line is often vacated several days before, and then re-occupied during the night preceding the offensive, when the assault infantry units are brought into line.

4. COUNTER-INTELLIGENCE MEASURES

In addition to attempts, often very successful, to infiltrate into the enemy's intelligence agencies, the Russians exercise an exceedingly strict control over the area behind the front lines. This is made easier by the very complicated system of passes, certificates, etc. used by the Russians. It is practically impossible for individual Russian soldiers as well as for unit detachments to cover the shortest distance without the prescribed rignarole of documents. The control of the rear areas is exercised by the NKVD (People's Commissariat of the Interior), by means of several impenetrable "blockade lines" (SPERRLINIEN). These lines, established one behind another, often make use of natural terrain features. Forging of documents is made difficult by the use of all possible, always changing, tricks. A strengthening of NKVD troops in a particular sector should always be viewed with suspicion.

In times of peace or armistice the Russian borders are hermetically sealed off, even when friendly relations exist. Other counter-intelligence measures are the restrictions and strict control of both the domestic and foreign correspondents, who are suspended under the slightest pretext.

~~SECRET~~

10. (Continued)

~~SECRET~~  
Ref No SAIC/R/2  
24 Jun 45

The most important measure against enemy radio reconnaissance is the suspension of all radio traffic before major Russian operations. The areas of radio silence are chosen in such a way, that they can give no indication, as to the intended place of attack. Radio silence orders were rigorously obeyed, especially during the last year. In the case of the shifting of major armored forces, single radio stations of important hq were usually left operating in the old area; these stations, in addition to their deceptive role, were also used for radio traffic concerning supply matters.

### III. DECEPTION AND PROPAGANDA

#### 1. DECEPTION THROUGH THE FOREIGN PRESS

The Russians repeatedly attempted to deceive their enemies by planting specially prepared reports in the international press. During the past two years ANKARA and STOCKHOLM played an important role in this respect. Despite numerous warnings of German news monitoring agencies, these attempts met with partial success. Sometimes the Russians even succeeded in giving their "news items" the appearance of coming from different sources and of corroborating one another. Especially numerous were reports planted by the Russians concerning exhaustion within the ranks of Russian troops, low morale, food troubles in the interior, and counter-revolutionary trends within the Soviet Union. Sometimes items of a primarily propaganda value were also launched, such as the intended stopping at the CURZON Line, then at the ODER River, etc.

Beside these general methods of deception, certain deceptive "news" might also be spread by agents. This was the case in the rumors concerning the intended employment of the Black Sea Fleet, later the Baltic Fleet, in support of the operations in progress at that time.

Neutral and friendly foreign correspondents were also used by the Russians to deceive the enemy. Since the press is a most important source for evaluating the enemy situation, partly also by noticing the things which are obviously NOT covered by it, this field of deception is, in source opinion, more important than is usually recognized.

#### 2. DECEPTION THROUGH PW

Political indoctrination plays a very important role in the Red Army. The slogan of the times is incessantly hammered into the minds of the Russian soldiers. Since it was found that PW and deserters talk willingly about these political lectures, the Russians use them for deception purposes. Before major operations the Russians attempt, through the lectures given their own soldiers, to create false impressions either as to the main aims of the offensive, or as to the timing, strength, etc, of the intended operation. Especially stressed are supposed visits by prominent Russian military leaders in certain sectors of the front, alleged reinforcements by forces from the Far East, commitment of new tank models, etc.

#### 3. RADIO DECEPTION

No major radio deception scheme has ever been attempted by the Russian who realized that such a scheme is easily detected if it is not accompanied by thoroughly planned deceptive measures in all other fields. Tactical radio deception has been employed, but was of only limited importance.

#### 4. FRONT-LINE PROPAGANDA

The Russians cleverly select topics for their front-line propaganda activities. These include the dropping of leaflets and propaganda disseminated through loudspeakers. The most unusual procedure is sometimes followed such as trying to bluff and confuse the enemy by the announcement, over loudspeakers, of the correct time and place of the intended attack.

~~SECRET~~

~~TOP SECRET~~  
Ref No SAIC/R/2  
24 Jun 45

~~TOP SECRET~~  
IV. TAILPIECES

1. Gen GEHLEN states that PW taken on the Eastern Front at the end of 1944 said they were told, during political indoctrination lectures, that an eventual conflict between the Soviet Union on one side and England and the United States on the other was inevitable. Similar statements were made by Russian PW for a short time only; and afterwards nothing was heard of these particular indoctrination lectures.

2. Twice the German intelligence agencies received reports about differences of opinion between the Russian military leaders and the political forces of the Soviet Union. The military, whose representative was supposedly ZHUKOV, maintained that the quick and complete defeat of Germany and the occupation of as much German territory as possible would automatically solve all European problems with which Soviet Russia was concerned. The political faction, whose ideological leader was STALIN, wanted to solve the Balkan questions first, before the British and Americans had time to intervene. This latter faction seemed to have prevailed, at least to a major extent.

24 June 1945

SEVENTH ARMY INTERROGATION CENTER

*Paul Kubala*  
PAUL KUBALA, Maj, MI,  
Commanding.

1389

~~TOP SECRET~~